Games in the Eurasian gas supply network: Multinational bargaining, Strategic investment, and Hold-up
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References listed on IDEAS
- Ilya Segal, 2003. "Collusion, Exclusion, and Inclusion in Random-Order Bargaining," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 70(2), pages 439-460.
- Lars A. Stole & Jeffrey Zwiebel, 1996. "Intra-firm Bargaining under Non-binding Contracts," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 63(3), pages 375-410.
- Yi, Sang-Seung & Shin, Hyukseung, 2000. "Endogenous formation of research coalitions with spillovers," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 18(2), pages 229-256, February.
- Rajan, Roby, 1989. "Endogenous Coalition Formation in Cooperative Oligopolies," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 30(4), pages 863-876, November.
More about this item
Keywordsstrategic investment; hold-up; coalitional bargaining; gas supply; externalities;
- L13 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
- C71 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Cooperative Games
- Q10 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Agriculture - - - General
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