Incentive Reversal
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Abstract
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Suggested Citation
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Other versions of this item:
- Eyal Winter, 2009. "Incentive Reversal," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 1(2), pages 133-147, August.
- Eyal Winter, 2007. "Incentive Reversal," Levine's Working Paper Archive 122247000000001525, David K. Levine.
References listed on IDEAS
- Eyal Winter, 2004.
"Incentives and Discrimination,"
American Economic Review,
American Economic Association, vol. 94(3), pages 764-773, June.
- Eyal Winter, 2003. "Incentives and Discrimination," Discussion Paper Series dp313, The Federmann Center for the Study of Rationality, the Hebrew University, Jerusalem.
- Itoh, Hideshi, 1991. "Incentives to Help in Multi-agent Situations," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 59(3), pages 611-636, May.
- Fischbacher, Urs & Gachter, Simon & Fehr, Ernst, 2001.
"Are people conditionally cooperative? Evidence from a public goods experiment,"
Economics Letters,
Elsevier, vol. 71(3), pages 397-404, June.
- Urs Fischbacher & Simon Gaechter & Ernst Fehr, "undated". "Are People Conditionally Cooperative? Evidence from a Public Goods Experiment," IEW - Working Papers 016, Institute for Empirical Research in Economics - University of Zurich.
- Eyal Winter, 2006. "Optimal incentives for sequential production processes," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 37(2), pages 376-390, June.
- Baliga, Sandeep & Sjostrom, Tomas, 1998.
"Decentralization and Collusion,"
Journal of Economic Theory,
Elsevier, vol. 83(2), pages 196-232, December.
- Sandeep Baliga & Tomas Sjostrom, 1996. "Decentralization and Collusion," Harvard Institute of Economic Research Working Papers 1757, Harvard - Institute of Economic Research.
- Sandeep Baliga & Tomas Sjostrom, 1998. "Decentralization and Collusion," Discussion Papers 1210, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
- Uri Gneezy & Aldo Rustichini, 2000.
"Pay Enough or Don't Pay at All,"
The Quarterly Journal of Economics,
Oxford University Press, vol. 115(3), pages 791-810.
- Gneezy, U. & Rustichini, A., 1998. "Pay Enough - Or Don't Pay at All," Discussion Paper 1998-57, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
- repec:rje:randje:v:37:y:2006:2:p:376-390 is not listed on IDEAS
Citations
Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
Cited by:
- Smirnov, Vladimir & Wait, Andrew, 2016.
"Technology, team production and incentives,"
Economics Letters,
Elsevier, vol. 141(C), pages 91-94.
- Smirnov, Vladimir & Wait, Andrew, 2015. "Technology, team production and incentives," Working Papers 2015-21, University of Sydney, School of Economics.
- Balmaceda, Felipe, 2016.
"Optimal task assignments,"
Games and Economic Behavior,
Elsevier, vol. 98(C), pages 1-18.
- Felipe Balmaceda, 2014. "Optimal Task Assignments," Working Papers 54, Facultad de Economía y Empresa, Universidad Diego Portales.
- repec:eee:deveco:v:127:y:2017:i:c:p:72-90 is not listed on IDEAS
- Esteban F. Klor & Sebastian Kube & Eyal Winter & Ro'i Zultan, 2011.
"Can Higher Bonuses Lead to Less E ort? Incentive Reversal in Teams,"
Levine's Working Paper Archive
786969000000000073, David K. Levine.
- Klor, Esteban F. & Kube, Sebastian & Winter, Eyal & Zultan, Ro'i, 2011. "Can Higher Bonuses Lead to Less Effort? Incentive Reversal in Teams," IZA Discussion Papers 5501, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
- Esteban Klor & Sebastian Kube & Eyal Winter & Ro'i Zultan, 2013. "Can Higher Rewards Lead To Less Effort? Incentive Reversal In Teams," Working Papers 1309, Ben-Gurion University of the Negev, Department of Economics.
- Uri Weiss, 2015. "The Robber Wants To Be Punished," Discussion Paper Series dp685, The Federmann Center for the Study of Rationality, the Hebrew University, Jerusalem.
- Sven Fischer & Eva-Maria Steiger, 2009. "Exploring the Effects of Unequal and Secretive Pay," Jena Economic Research Papers 2009-107, Friedrich-Schiller-University Jena.
- Bag, Parimal Kanti & Pepito, Nona, 2011. "Double-edged transparency in teams," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 95(7), pages 531-542.
- Eyal Winter, 2010. "Transparency and incentives among peers," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 41(3), pages 504-523.
- Eva-Maria Steiger & Ro'i Zultan, 2011.
"See No Evil: Information Chains and Reciprocity in Teams,"
Jena Economic Research Papers
2011-040, Friedrich-Schiller-University Jena.
- Roi Zultan & Eva-Maria Steiger, 2011. "See No Evil: Information Chains and Reciprocity in Teams," Working Papers 1108, Ben-Gurion University of the Negev, Department of Economics.
- Steiger, Eva-Maria & Zultan, Ro'i, 2014. "See no evil: Information chains and reciprocity," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 109(C), pages 1-12.
- Klor, Esteban F. & Kube, Sebastian & Winter, Eyal & Zultan, Ro’i, 2014.
"Can higher rewards lead to less effort? Incentive reversal in teams,"
Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization,
Elsevier, vol. 97(C), pages 72-83.
- Esteban Klor & Sebastian Kube & Eyal Winter & Ro'i Zultan, 2013. "Can Higher Rewards Lead To Less Effort? Incentive Reversal In Teams," Working Papers 1309, Ben-Gurion University of the Negev, Department of Economics.
- Eyal Winter & Ignacio Garcia-Jurado & Jose Mendez-Naya & Luciano Mendez-Naya, 2009. "Mental Equilibrium and Rational Emotions," Discussion Paper Series dp521, The Federmann Center for the Study of Rationality, the Hebrew University, Jerusalem.
More about this item
JEL classification:
- D23 - Microeconomics - - Production and Organizations - - - Organizational Behavior; Transaction Costs; Property Rights
- D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
- M54 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting; Personnel Economics - - Personnel Economics - - - Labor Management
NEP fields
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:- NEP-ALL-2007-08-14 (All new papers)
- NEP-CDM-2007-08-14 (Collective Decision-Making)
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