Technology, team production and incentives
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More about this item
KeywordsMoral hazard in teams; Technology; Productivity; Incentive reversal;
- D21 - Microeconomics - - Production and Organizations - - - Firm Behavior: Theory
- L23 - Industrial Organization - - Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior - - - Organization of Production
NEP fieldsThis paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2015-10-25 (All new papers)
- NEP-CTA-2015-10-25 (Contract Theory & Applications)
- NEP-HRM-2015-10-25 (Human Capital & Human Resource Management)
- NEP-INO-2015-10-25 (Innovation)
- NEP-MIC-2015-10-25 (Microeconomics)
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