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Workers as Creditors: Performance Bonds and Efficiency Wages

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  • Ritter, Joseph A
  • Taylor, Lowell J

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  • Ritter, Joseph A & Taylor, Lowell J, 1994. "Workers as Creditors: Performance Bonds and Efficiency Wages," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 84(3), pages 694-704, June.
  • Handle: RePEc:aea:aecrev:v:84:y:1994:i:3:p:694-704
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Avner Bar-Ilan & Bruce Sacerdote, 2001. "The Response to Fines and Probability of Detection in a Series of Experiments," NBER Working Papers 8638, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    2. Moen, Espen R. & Rosén, Åsa, 2003. "Equilibrium Incentive Contracts," Working Paper Series 3/2003, Stockholm University, Swedish Institute for Social Research.
    3. Macpherson, David A. & Prasad, Kislaya & Salmon, Timothy C., 2014. "Deferred compensation vs. efficiency wages: An experimental test of effort provision and self-selection," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 102(C), pages 90-107.
    4. Rebitzer, James B. & Taylor, Lowell J., 2011. "Extrinsic Rewards and Intrinsic Motives: Standard and Behavioral Approaches to Agency and Labor Markets," Handbook of Labor Economics, in: O. Ashenfelter & D. Card (ed.), Handbook of Labor Economics, edition 1, volume 4, chapter 8, pages 701-772, Elsevier.
    5. Andrew D. Foster & Mark R. Rosenzweig, 2001. "Imperfect Commitment, Altruism, And The Family: Evidence From Transfer Behavior In Low-Income Rural Areas," The Review of Economics and Statistics, MIT Press, vol. 83(3), pages 389-407, August.
    6. Espen R. Moen & Åsa Rosén, 2006. "Equilibrium Incentive Contracts and Efficiency Wages," Journal of the European Economic Association, MIT Press, vol. 4(6), pages 1165-1192, December.
    7. Alan Benson & Aaron Sojourner & Akhmed Umyarov, 2020. "Can Reputation Discipline the Gig Economy? Experimental Evidence from an Online Labor Market," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 66(5), pages 1802-1825, May.
    8. Lin, Chung-cheng, 2004. "Bonding, shirking and adverse selection," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 21(3), pages 545-560, May.
    9. Joseph A. Ritter & Lowell J. Taylor, 1998. "Valuable jobs and uncertainty," Working Papers 1997-005, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis.
    10. Akiomi Kitagawa, 2013. "Long-run Consequences of Ranking Job Applicants by Unemployment Duration: Theoretical and Numerical Analyses," DSSR Discussion Papers 13, Graduate School of Economics and Management, Tohoku University.
    11. Maitreesh Ghatak & Massimo Morelli & Tomas Sjöström, 2001. "Occupational Choice and Dynamic Incentives," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 68(4), pages 781-810.
    12. Joseph A. Ritter & Lowell J. Taylor, 1997. "Economic models of employee motivation," Review, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, issue Sep, pages 3-21.
    13. Fredrik Andersson, 2002. "Technological Change,Labour Contracts and Income Distribution," Finnish Economic Papers, Finnish Economic Association, vol. 15(1), pages 24-35, Spring.
    14. Bryson, Alex & Forth, John & Zhou, Minghai, 2014. "Who posts performance bonds and why? Evidence from China's CEOs," China Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 30(C), pages 520-529.
    15. Rachael E. Goodhue & Dale M. Heien & Hyunok Lee & Daniel A. Sumner, 2003. "Contracts and Quality in the California Winegrape Industry," Review of Industrial Organization, Springer;The Industrial Organization Society, vol. 23(3_4), pages 267-282, December.
    16. Clark, Andrew E., 1999. "Are wages habit-forming? evidence from micro data," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 39(2), pages 179-200, June.
    17. Shik Heo, 2003. "The Relationship Between Efficiency Wages And Price Indexation In A Nominal Wage Contracting Model," Journal of Economic Development, Chung-Ang Unviersity, Department of Economics, vol. 28(2), pages 117-128, December.

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