Research classified by Journal of Economic Literature (JEL) codes

1. Transaction Cost Economics

2020

• Farukh, Razi & Kerkhof, Anna & Loebbing, Jonas, 2020, "Inefficiency and Regulation in Credence Goods Markets with Altruistic Experts," VfS Annual Conference 2020 (Virtual Conference): Gender Economics, Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association, number 224590.
• Göller, Daniel, 2021, "How Long-Term Contracts can Mitigate Inefficient Renegotiation Arising Due to Loss Aversion," VfS Annual Conference 2020 (Virtual Conference): Gender Economics, Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association, number 224598, revised 2021.

2019

• Drew Fudenberg & Luis Rayo, 2019, "Training and Effort Dynamics in Apprenticeship," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, volume 109, issue 11, pages 3780-3812, November.
• Andrey Malenko & Anton Tsoy, 2019, "Selling to Advised Buyers," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, volume 109, issue 4, pages 1323-1348, April.
• Zhijun Chen & Greg Shaffer, 2019, "Market Share Contracts, Exclusive Dealing, and the Integer Problem," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, volume 11, issue 1, pages 208-242, February.
• Daniel Barron & Michael Powell, 2019, "Policies in Relational Contracts," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, volume 11, issue 2, pages 228-249, May.
• Andrea Attar & Catherine Casamatta & Arnold Chassagnon & Jean-Paul Décamps, 2019, "Multiple Lenders, Strategic Default, and Covenants," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, volume 11, issue 2, pages 98-130, May.
• Ravi Jagadeesan, 2019, "Cadet-Branch Matching in a Kelso-Crawford Economy," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, volume 11, issue 3, pages 191-224, August.
• Matthias Fahn & Hendrik Hakenes, 2019, "Teamwork as a Self-Disciplining Device," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, volume 11, issue 4, pages 1-32, November.
• Matthias Fahn & Nicolas Klein, 2019, "Relational Contracts with Private Information on the Future Value of the Relationship: The Upside of Implicit Downsizing Costs," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, volume 11, issue 4, pages 33-58, November.
• Buso, Marco & Dosi, Cesare & Moretto, Michele, , "Termination Fees and Contract Design in Public-Private Partnerships," ETA: Economic Theory and Applications, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM), number 281284, DOI: 10.22004/ag.econ.281284.
• D'avid Csercsik & Franz Hubert & Bal'azs R. Sziklai & L'aszl'o 'A. K'oczy, 2019, "Modelling transfer profits as externalities in a cooperative game-theoretic model of natural gas networks," Papers, arXiv.org, number 1901.11435, Jan, revised Feb 2019.
• Zsolt Bihary & P'eter Cs'oka & P'eter Ker'enyi & Alexander Szimayer, 2019, "Self-respecting worker in the precarious gig economy: A dynamic principal-agent model," Papers, arXiv.org, number 1902.10021, Feb, revised Aug 2025.
• Laura Doval & Vasiliki Skreta, 2019, "Optimal mechanism for the sale of a durable good," Papers, arXiv.org, number 1904.07456, Apr, revised May 2021.
• Giuseppe Lopomo & Luca Rigotti & Chris Shannon, 2019, "Detectability, Duality, and Surplus Extraction," Papers, arXiv.org, number 1905.12788, May, revised Oct 2021.
• Stephan Leitner & Friederike Wall, 2019, "Decision-facilitating information in hidden-action setups: An agent-based approach," Papers, arXiv.org, number 1908.07998, Aug, revised Apr 2020.
• Swagata Bhattacharjee, 2019, "Dynamic Contracting for Innovation Under Ambiguity," Working Papers, Ashoka University, Department of Economics, number 15, Jul, revised 02 Aug 2019.
• Dmytro Fedchyshyn & Iryna Ignatenko & Oleksandr Bondar, 2019, "Legal issues of development of organic farming in Ukraine Abstract: The theoretical principles of organic farming development in Ukraine are substantiated. The concept and features of the land for organic farming, especially the legal regime of such ," Juridical Tribune - Review of Comparative and International Law, Bucharest Academy of Economic Studies, volume 9, issue Special, pages 15-28, October.
• López-Martín Bernabé & Pérez-Reyna David, 2019, "Contracts, Firm Dynamics and Aggregate Productivity," Working Papers, Banco de México, number 2019-07, Apr.
• Daniel Bird & Alexander Frug, 2019, "Monotone Contracts," Working Papers, Barcelona School of Economics, number 1085, Apr.
• Gerard Llobet & Juan-José Ganuza, 2019, "The Simple Economics of White Elephants," Working Papers, Barcelona School of Economics, number 1134, Dec.
• Victoria Vanasco & Vladimir Asriyan, 2020, "Security Design in Non-Exclusive Markets with Asymmetric Information," Working Papers, Barcelona School of Economics, number 1164, Mar.
• Dean Showalter & Richard Jensen, 2019, "University Startup Intensity And Faculty Quality," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, volume 57, issue 2, pages 855-875, April, DOI: 10.1111/ecin.12752.
• Giacomo Calzolari & Leonardo Felli & Johannes Koenen & Giancarlo Spagnolo & Konrad O. Stahl, 2019, "Trust, Investment and Competition: Theory and Evidence From German Car Manufacturers," CRC TR 224 Discussion Paper Series, University of Bonn and University of Mannheim, Germany, number crctr224_2019_081, Apr.
• Geoffroy de Clippel & Kfir Eliaz & Daniel Fershtman & Kareen Rozen, 2019, "On Selecting the Right Agent," CRC TR 224 Discussion Paper Series, University of Bonn and University of Mannheim, Germany, number crctr224_2019_116, Aug.
• Ian Ball & Deniz Kattwinkel, 2019, "Probabilistic Verification in Mechanism Design," CRC TR 224 Discussion Paper Series, University of Bonn and University of Mannheim, Germany, number crctr224_2019_124, Sep.
• Wang Zhen & Vukina Tomislav, 2019, "Sorting into Contests: Evidence from Production Contracts," The B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy, De Gruyter, volume 19, issue 1, pages 1-15, January, DOI: 10.1515/bejeap-2018-0049.
• Schottmüller-Einwag Ute & Dilger Alexander, 2019, "Zur Empfehlung von Abfindungsobergrenzen für Vorstandsmitglieder," ORDO. Jahrbuch für die Ordnung von Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft, De Gruyter, volume 70, issue 1, pages 256-288, December, DOI: 10.1515/ordo-2020-0013.
• Jieying Hong, 2019, "Liquidity Shocks, Security Design and Organizational Change," Revue économique, Presses de Sciences-Po, volume 70, issue 2, pages 167-180.
• Spiros Bougheas & Tianxi Wang, 2019, "A Theory of Outside Equity: Financing Multiple Projects," CESifo Working Paper Series, CESifo, number 7466.
• Matthias Fahn, 2019, "Reciprocity in dynamic employment relationships," CESifo Working Paper Series, CESifo, number 7634.
• Giacomo Calzolari & Leonardo Felli & Johannes Koenen & Giancarlo Spagnolo & Konrad O. Stahl, 2019, "Trust, investment and competition: theory and evidence from German car manufacturers," CESifo Working Paper Series, CESifo, number 7680.
• Andrea Attar & Thomas Mariotti & François Salanié, 2019, "The Social Costs of Side Trading," EconPol Working Paper, ifo Institute - Leibniz Institute for Economic Research at the University of Munich, number 34.
• Hitoshi Matsushima, 2019, "Blockchain Disables Real-World Governance," CARF F-Series, Center for Advanced Research in Finance, Faculty of Economics, The University of Tokyo, number CARF-F-459, May.
• Hitoshi Matsushima, 2019, "Information Design in Blockchain: A Role of Trusted Intermediaries," CARF F-Series, Center for Advanced Research in Finance, Faculty of Economics, The University of Tokyo, number CARF-F-462, Jul.
• Dhillon, Amrita & Iversen, Vegard & Torsvik, Gaute, 2019, "Employee referral, social proximity and worker discipline: theory and suggestive evidence from India," CAGE Online Working Paper Series, Competitive Advantage in the Global Economy (CAGE), number 418.
• Juli√°n Enrique Chitiva Bocanegra, 2019, "Implementable Mechanisms for discrete utility functions, a solution using Tropical Geometry," Documentos CEDE, Universidad de los Andes, Facultad de Economía, CEDE, number 17485, Oct.
• Babus, Ana & Hachem, Kinda, 2019, "Markets for Financial Innovation," CEPR Discussion Papers, Centre for Economic Policy Research, number 13457, Jan.
• Morjaria, Ameet & Macchiavello, Rocco, 2019, "Competition and Relational Contracts in the Rwanda Coffee Chain," CEPR Discussion Papers, Centre for Economic Policy Research, number 13607, Mar.
• Inderst, Roman & Hoffmann, Florian, 2019, "Regulating Cancellation Rights with Consumer Experimentation," CEPR Discussion Papers, Centre for Economic Policy Research, number 13641, Apr.
• Inderst, Roman & Opp, Marcus, 2019, "Only time will tell: A theory of deferred compensation," CEPR Discussion Papers, Centre for Economic Policy Research, number 13643, Apr.
• , & Calzolari, Giacomo & Koenen, Johannes & Spagnolo, Giancarlo & Stahl, Konrad, 2019, "Trust, Investment and Competition: Theory and Evidence from German Car Manufacturers," CEPR Discussion Papers, Centre for Economic Policy Research, number 13750, May.
• Schmitz, Patrick W., 2019, "Moral Hazard and the Property Rights Approach to the Theory of the Firm," CEPR Discussion Papers, Centre for Economic Policy Research, number 13841, Jul.
• Mariotti, Thomas & Attar, Andrea & Salanié, François, 2019, "The Social Costs of Side Trading," CEPR Discussion Papers, Centre for Economic Policy Research, number 13872, Jul.
• Schmitz, Patrick W., 2019, "Incomplete Contracts, Limited Liability, and the Optimality of Joint Ownership," CEPR Discussion Papers, Centre for Economic Policy Research, number 13881, Jul.
• Eliaz, Kfir & Rozen, Kareen & de Clippel, Geoffroy & Fershtman, Daniel, 2019, "On Selecting the Right Agent," CEPR Discussion Papers, Centre for Economic Policy Research, number 13891, Jul.
• Thorburn, Karin S & Bienz, Carsten & Walz, Uwe, 2019, "Ownership, wealth, and risk taking: Evidence on private equity fund managers," CEPR Discussion Papers, Centre for Economic Policy Research, number 13944, Aug.
• Skreta, Vasiliki & Doval, Laura, 2019, "Optimal mechanism for the sale of a durable good," CEPR Discussion Papers, Centre for Economic Policy Research, number 13967, Aug.
• Gersbach, Hans & Mamageishvili, Akaki & Tejada, Oriol, 2019, "Lemons and Peaches: A (Robust) Multi-stage Buying Mechanism with Multiple Applications," CEPR Discussion Papers, Centre for Economic Policy Research, number 14063, Oct.
• Iovino, Luigi & Golosov, Mikhail, 2019, "Social Insurance, Information Revelation, and Lack of Commitment," CEPR Discussion Papers, Centre for Economic Policy Research, number 14116, Nov.
• Pradeep Dubey & John Geanakoplos, 2019, "Games with Money and Status: How Best to Incentivize Work," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University, number 2167, Feb.
• Anastasios, Dosis, 2019, "Optimal Ex Post Risk Adjustment in Markets with Adverse Selection," ESSEC Working Papers, ESSEC Research Center, ESSEC Business School, number WP1903, Feb.
• Anastasios, Dosis, 2019, "Optimal Trading for an Informed Seller," ESSEC Working Papers, ESSEC Research Center, ESSEC Business School, number WP1904, Mar.
• Anastasios, Dosis, 2019, "Optimal Redistributive Taxation in Credit Markets with Adverse Selection," ESSEC Working Papers, ESSEC Research Center, ESSEC Business School, number WP1906, Apr.
• Contensou, François & Vranceanu, Radu, 2019, "Working time and wage rate differences : a contract theory approach," ESSEC Working Papers, ESSEC Research Center, ESSEC Business School, number WP1913, Aug, revised 06 Mar 2021.
• Hartman-Glaser, Barney & Hebert, Benjamin, 2019, "The Insurance is the Lemon: Failing to Index Contracts," Research Papers, Stanford University, Graduate School of Business, number 3569, Jan.
• Fang, Dawei, 2019, "Dry powder and short fuses: Private equity funds in emerging markets," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, volume 59, issue C, pages 48-71, DOI: 10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2016.12.013.
• Suárez Serrato, Juan Carlos & Wang, Xiao Yu & Zhang, Shuang, 2019, "The limits of meritocracy: Screening bureaucrats under imperfect verifiability," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, volume 140, issue C, pages 223-241, DOI: 10.1016/j.jdeveco.2019.06.003.
• Shan, Yaping, 2019, "Incentives for research agents and performance-vested equity-based compensation," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, volume 102, issue C, pages 44-69, DOI: 10.1016/j.jedc.2019.02.007.
• Ellman, Matthew & Hurkens, Sjaak, 2019, "Fraud tolerance in optimal crowdfunding," Economics Letters, Elsevier, volume 181, issue C, pages 11-16, DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2019.04.015.
• Breig, Zachary, 2019, "Endogenous and exogenous commitment," Economics Letters, Elsevier, volume 183, issue C, pages 1-1, DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2019.108577.
• Schmitz, Patrick W., 2019, "Incomplete contracts, limited liability, and the optimality of joint ownership," Economics Letters, Elsevier, volume 183, issue C, pages 1-1, DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2019.108558.
• Takasago, Takao, 2019, "Control rights in complex partnerships revisited," Economics Letters, Elsevier, volume 183, issue C, pages 1-1, DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2019.108587.
• Altan, Baṣak, 2019, "Dynamic moral hazard with sequential tasks," Economics Letters, Elsevier, volume 183, issue C, pages 1-1, DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2019.108606.
• Dosis, Anastasios, 2019, "The effects of redistributive taxation in credit markets with adverse selection," Economics Letters, Elsevier, volume 184, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2019.108595.
• De Paola, Maria & Gioia, Francesca & Scoppa, Vincenzo, 2019, "Free-riding and knowledge spillovers in teams: The role of social ties," European Economic Review, Elsevier, volume 112, issue C, pages 74-90, DOI: 10.1016/j.euroecorev.2018.12.002.
• Corgnet, Brice & Martin, Ludivine & Ndodjang, Peguy & Sutan, Angela, 2019, "On the merit of equal pay: Performance manipulation and incentive setting," European Economic Review, Elsevier, volume 113, issue C, pages 23-45, DOI: 10.1016/j.euroecorev.2018.12.006.
• Csercsik, Dávid & Hubert, Franz & Sziklai, Balázs R. & Kóczy, László Á., 2019, "Modeling transfer profits as externalities in a cooperative game-theoretic model of natural gas networks," Energy Economics, Elsevier, volume 80, issue C, pages 355-365, DOI: 10.1016/j.eneco.2019.01.013.
• Chaigneau, Pierre & Edmans, Alex & Gottlieb, Daniel, 2019, "The informativeness principle without the first-order approach," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 113, issue C, pages 743-755, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2018.08.006.
• Barigozzi, Francesca & Burani, Nadia, 2019, "Competition for talent when firms' mission matters," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 116, issue C, pages 128-151, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2019.04.012.
• Azevedo, Eduardo M. & Gottlieb, Daniel, 2019, "An example of non-existence of Riley equilibrium in markets with adverse selection," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 116, issue C, pages 152-157, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2019.04.007.
• Gui, Zhengqing & von Thadden, Ernst-Ludwig & Zhao, Xiaojian, 2019, "Incentive-compatibility, limited liability and costly liquidation in financial contracting," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 118, issue C, pages 412-433, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2019.09.011.
• Deneckere, Raymond & de Palma, André & Leruth, Luc, 2019, "Risk sharing in procurement," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, volume 65, issue C, pages 173-220, DOI: 10.1016/j.ijindorg.2019.01.002.
• Ghossoub, Mario, 2019, "Budget-constrained optimal insurance without the nonnegativity constraint on indemnities," Insurance: Mathematics and Economics, Elsevier, volume 84, issue C, pages 22-39, DOI: 10.1016/j.insmatheco.2018.10.004.
• Ghossoub, Mario, 2019, "Optimal insurance under rank-dependent expected utility," Insurance: Mathematics and Economics, Elsevier, volume 87, issue C, pages 51-66, DOI: 10.1016/j.insmatheco.2019.04.005.
• Boonen, Tim J. & Ghossoub, Mario, 2019, "On the existence of a representative reinsurer under heterogeneous beliefs," Insurance: Mathematics and Economics, Elsevier, volume 88, issue C, pages 209-225, DOI: 10.1016/j.insmatheco.2019.07.008.
• Ghossoub, Mario, 2019, "Budget-constrained optimal insurance with belief heterogeneity," Insurance: Mathematics and Economics, Elsevier, volume 89, issue C, pages 79-91, DOI: 10.1016/j.insmatheco.2019.09.002.
• Wei, Dong, 2019, "A model of trust building with anonymous re-matching," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, volume 158, issue C, pages 311-327, DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2018.11.025.
• Barigozzi, Francesca & Tedeschi, Piero, 2019, "On the credibility of ethical banking," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, volume 166, issue C, pages 381-402, DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2019.07.008.
• Bag, Parimal K. & Wang, Peng, 2019, "Input, output or mixed monitoring in teams?," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, volume 166, issue C, pages 471-492, DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2019.07.016.
• Livio, Luca & De Chiara, Alessandro, 2019, "Friends or foes? Optimal incentives for reciprocal agents," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, volume 167, issue C, pages 245-278, DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2018.07.012.
• Czerny, Achim I. & Fosgerau, Mogens & Jost, Peter-J. & van Ommeren, Jos N., 2019, "Why pay for jobs (and not for tasks)?," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, volume 168, issue C, pages 419-433, DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2019.10.020.
• Lang, Matthias, 2019, "Communicating subjective evaluations," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, volume 179, issue C, pages 163-199, DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2018.10.012.
• Carroll, Gabriel, 2019, "Robust incentives for information acquisition," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, volume 181, issue C, pages 382-420, DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2019.03.001.
• Carrasco, Vinicius & Fuchs, William & Fukuda, Satoshi, 2019, "From equals to despots: The dynamics of repeated decision making in partnerships with private information," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, volume 182, issue C, pages 402-432, DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2019.03.007.
• Jadbabaie, Ali & Kakhbod, Ali, 2019, "Optimal contracting in networks," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, volume 183, issue C, pages 1094-1153, DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2019.07.017.
• Bhaskar, V. & Mailath, George J., 2019, "The curse of long horizons," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, volume 82, issue C, pages 74-89, DOI: 10.1016/j.jmateco.2019.01.009.
• Barbos, Andrei, 2019, "Dynamic contracts with random monitoring," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, volume 85, issue C, pages 1-16, DOI: 10.1016/j.jmateco.2019.07.008.
• Dosis, Anastasios, 2019, "Optimal ex post risk adjustment in markets with adverse selection," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, volume 85, issue C, pages 52-59, DOI: 10.1016/j.jmateco.2019.09.003.
• Le Maux, Benoît & Necker, Sarah & Rocaboy, Yvon, 2019, "Cheat or perish? A theory of scientific customs," Research Policy, Elsevier, volume 48, issue 9, pages 1-1, DOI: 10.1016/j.respol.2019.05.001.
• Azevedo, Eduardo M. & Gottlieb, Daniel, 2019, "An example of non-existence of Riley equilibrium in markets with adverse selection," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library, number 102566, Jul.
• Anderlini, Luca & Felli, Leonardo & Immordino, Giovanni, 2019, "Costly pretrial agreements," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library, number 89255, Jan.
• Raphael Soubeyran, 2019, "Incentives, Pro-social Preferences and Discrimination," Working Papers, FAERE - French Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, number 2019.04, Feb.
• Natalia Kovrijnykh & Igor Livshits & Ariel Zetlin-Jones, 2019, "Building Credit History with Heterogeneously Informed Lenders," Working Papers, Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia, number 19-17, Mar, DOI: 10.21799/frbp.wp.2019.18.
• Richard Baron & Magali Chaudey, 2019, "Blockchain and Smart-contract: a pioneering Approach of inter-firms Relationships? The case of franchise networks," Working Papers, Groupe d'Analyse et de Théorie Economique Lyon St-Etienne (GATE Lyon St-Etienne), Université de Lyon, number 1917.
• Andrea Attar & Thomas Mariotti & Francois Salanie, 2019, "On competitive nonlinear pricing," Post-Print, HAL, number hal-02097209, DOI: 10.3982/TE2708.
• Izabela Jelovac & Samuel Kembou Nzale, 2020, "Regulation and altruism," Post-Print, HAL, number halshs-01618043, Feb, DOI: 10.1111/jpet.12368.
• Andrea Attar & Catherine Casamatta & Arnold Chassagnon & Jean-Paul Décamps, 2019, "Multiple Lenders, Strategic Default, and Covenants," Post-Print, HAL, number halshs-02282023, May, DOI: 10.1257/mic.20170189.
• Brice Corgnet & Ludivine Martin & Peguy Ndodjang & Angela Sutan, 2019, "On the merit of equal pay: Performance manipulation and incentive setting," Post-Print, HAL, number halshs-02393577, Apr, DOI: 10.1016/j.euroecorev.2018.12.006.
• Andrea Attar & Catherine Casamatta & Arnold Chassagnon & Jean-Paul Décamps, 2019, "Multiple Lenders, Strategic Default, and Covenants," PSE-Ecole d'économie de Paris (Postprint), HAL, number halshs-02282023, May, DOI: 10.1257/mic.20170189.
• Marta Troya-Martinez & Liam Wren-Lewis, 2021, "Managing relational contracts," PSE Working Papers, HAL, number halshs-01370408, Apr.
• Leonidas Koutsougeras & Manuel Santos & Fei Xu, 2019, "Corruption and Adverse Selection," Sciences Po Economics Publications (main), HAL, number hal-03393076, Sep.
• Raphaël Soubeyran, 2019, "Incentives, pro-social preferences and discrimination," Working Papers, HAL, number hal-02056347.
• Anastasios Dosis, 2019, "Optimal Ex Post Risk Adjustment in Markets with Adverse Selection ," Working Papers, HAL, number hal-02130442, Feb.
• Anastasios Dosis, 2019, "Optimal Trading for an Informed Seller," Working Papers, HAL, number hal-02130450, Mar.
• Anastasios Dosis, 2019, "Optimal Redistributive Taxation in Credit Markets with Adverse Selection," Working Papers, HAL, number hal-02130458, Apr.
• Victor Hiller & Natacha Raffin, 2019, "Corporate social responsibility and workers’ motivation at the industry equilibrium," Working Papers, HAL, number hal-02328137, Oct.
• Leonidas Koutsougeras & Manuel Santos & Fei Xu, 2019, "Corruption and Adverse Selection," Working Papers, HAL, number hal-03393076, Sep.
• Marta Troya-Martinez & Liam Wren-Lewis, 2021, "Managing relational contracts," Working Papers, HAL, number halshs-01370408, Apr.
• Richard Baron & Magali Chaudey, 2019, "Blockchain and Smart-contract: a pioneering Approach of inter-firms Relationships? The case of franchise networks," Working Papers, HAL, number halshs-02111603, Apr.
• Raphaël Soubeyran, 2019, "Incentives, pro-social preferences and discrimination," CEE-M Working Papers, CEE-M, Universtiy of Montpellier, CNRS, INRA, Montpellier SupAgro, number hal-02056347.
• Leonidas Koutsougeras & Manuel Santos & Fei Xu, 2019, "Corruption and Adverse Selection," Sciences Po Economics Discussion Papers, HAL, number hal-03393076, Sep.
• David Csercsik & Franz Hubert & Balazs R. Sziklai & Laszlo A. Koczy, 2019, "Modelling transfer profits as externalities in a cooperative game-theoretic model of natural gas networks," KRTK-KTI WORKING PAPERS, Institute of Economics, Centre for Economic and Regional Studies, number 1904, Feb.
• Koo Chi, Chang & Jin Choi, Kyoung, 2019, "Performance Measurement in Agency Models," Discussion Paper Series in Economics, Norwegian School of Economics, Department of Economics, number 5/2019, Feb.
• Nyström, Johan & Wikström, Daniel, 2019, "Empirical analysis of unbalanced bidding on Swedish roads," Working Papers, Swedish National Road & Transport Research Institute (VTI), number 2019:4, Aug.
• Brice Corgnet & Roberto Hernán-González, 2019, "Revisiting the Trade-off Between Risk and Incentives: The Shocking Effect of Random Shocks?," Management Science, INFORMS, volume 65, issue 3, pages 1096-1114, March, DOI: 10.1287/mnsc.2017.2914.
• Bellemare, Charles & Sebald, Alexander, 2019, "Self-Confidence and Reactions to Subjective Performance Evaluations," IZA Discussion Papers, IZA Network @ LISER, number 12215, Mar.
• Ruo Jia & Zenan Wu, 2019, "Insurer commitment and dynamic pricing pattern," The Geneva Papers on Risk and Insurance Theory, Springer;International Association for the Study of Insurance Economics (The Geneva Association), volume 44, issue 1, pages 87-135, March, DOI: 10.1057/s10713-018-0036-9.
• Luigi Di Gaetano & Isidoro Mazza & Anna Mignosa, 2019, "On the allocation of talents in the contemporary art market," Journal of Cultural Economics, Springer;The Association for Cultural Economics International, volume 43, issue 1, pages 121-143, March, DOI: 10.1007/s10824-018-9331-7.
• Marco Buso, 2019, "Bundling versus unbundling: asymmetric information on information externalities," Journal of Economics, Springer, volume 128, issue 1, pages 1-25, September, DOI: 10.1007/s00712-018-0642-0.
• Sumitro Banerjee & Alex P. Thevaranjan, 2019, "Targeting and salesforce compensation: When sales spill over to unprofitable customers," Quantitative Marketing and Economics (QME), Springer, volume 17, issue 1, pages 81-104, March, DOI: 10.1007/s11129-018-9208-2.
• Hitoshi Matsushima, 2019, "Blockchain Disables Real-World Governance," KIER Working Papers, Kyoto University, Institute of Economic Research, number 1017, May.
• Hitoshi Matsushima, 2019, "Information Design in Blockchain: A Role of Trusted Intermediaries," KIER Working Papers, Kyoto University, Institute of Economic Research, number 1018, Jul.
• Lang, Matthias, 2019, "Communicating subjective evaluations," Munich Reprints in Economics, University of Munich, Department of Economics, number 78243.
• Daniel Göller, 2019, "Contract, Renegotiation, and Holdup: An Optimal Contract when Interim Renegotiation Is Possible," Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, volume 175, issue 4, pages 736-764, DOI: 10.1628/jite-2019-0033.
• Zhijun Chen & Greg Shaffer, 2019, "Market-Share Contracts, Exclusive Dealing, and the Integer Problem," Monash Economics Working Papers, Monash University, Department of Economics, number 08-18, Jun.
• Joshua S. Gans, 2019, "The Fine Print in Smart Contracts," NBER Working Papers, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc, number 25443, Jan.
• Barney Hartman-Glaser & Benjamin M. Hébert, 2019, "The Insurance is the Lemon: Failing to Index Contracts," NBER Working Papers, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc, number 25450, Jan.
• Ana Babus & Kinda Cheryl Hachem, 2019, "Markets for Financial Innovation," NBER Working Papers, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc, number 25477, Jan.
• Manoj Mohanan & Katherine Donato & Grant Miller & Yulya Truskinovsky & Marcos Vera-Hernández, 2019, "Different Strokes for Different Folks: Experimental Evidence on the Effectiveness of Input and Output Incentive Contracts for Health Care Providers with Varying Skills," NBER Working Papers, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc, number 25499, Jan.
• Richard T. Holden & Anup Malani, 2019, "Can Blockchain Solve the Hold-up Problem in Contracts?," NBER Working Papers, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc, number 25833, May.
• Sylvain Chassang & Christian Zehnder, 2019, "Secure Survey Design in Organizations: Theory and Experiments," NBER Working Papers, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc, number 25918, Jun.
• Michael Ewens & Alexander S. Gorbenko & Arthur Korteweg, 2019, "Venture Capital Contracts," NBER Working Papers, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc, number 26115, Jul.
• David Frydlinger & Oliver D. Hart, 2019, "Overcoming Contractual Incompleteness: The Role of Guiding Principles," NBER Working Papers, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc, number 26245, Sep.
• Joseph E. Stiglitz & Jungyoll Yun & Andrew Kosenko, 2019, "Characterization, Existence, and Pareto Optimality in Markets with Asymmetric Information and Endogenous and Asymmetric Disclosures: Basic Analytics of Revisiting Rothschild-Stiglitz," NBER Working Papers, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc, number 26251, Sep.
• Spiros Bougheas & Tianxi Wang, 2019, "A theory of outside equity: Financing multiple projects," Discussion Papers, University of Nottingham, Centre for Finance, Credit and Macroeconomics (CFCM), number 2019/01.
• Ewens, Michael & Gorbenko, Alexander & Korteweg, Arthur, 2019, "Venture Capital Contracts," SocArXiv, Center for Open Science, number hk38u, Jul, DOI: 10.31219/osf.io/hk38u.
• Bård Harstad & Francesco Lancia & Alessia Russo, 2019, "Compliance Technology and Self-enforcing Agreements," Journal of the European Economic Association, European Economic Association, volume 17, issue 1, pages 1-29.
• Matthias Fahn & Valeria Merlo & Georg Wamser, 2019, "The Commitment Role of Equity Financing," Journal of the European Economic Association, European Economic Association, volume 17, issue 4, pages 1232-1260.
• Orazio Attanasio & Britta Augsburg & Ralph De Haas, 2019, "Microcredit Contracts, Risk Diversification and Loan Take-Up," Journal of the European Economic Association, European Economic Association, volume 17, issue 6, pages 1797-1842.
• Alessandro De Chiara & Ester Manna, 2019, "Delegation with a Reciprocal Agent," The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Oxford University Press, volume 35, issue 3, pages 651-695.
• Andrey Malenko, 2019, "Optimal Dynamic Capital Budgeting," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, volume 86, issue 4, pages 1747-1778.
• Sylvain Chassang & Gerard Padró I Miquel, 2019, "Crime, Intimidation, and Whistleblowing: A Theory of Inference from Unverifiable Reports," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, volume 86, issue 6, pages 2530-2553.
• Jasmin Droege, 2019, "First Impression Biases in the Performing Arts: Taste-Based Discrimination and the Value of Blind Auditioning," Economics Series Working Papers, University of Oxford, Department of Economics, number 892, Dec.
• Ruo Jia & Zenan Wu, 2019, "Insurer commitment and dynamic pricing pattern," The Geneva Risk and Insurance Review, Palgrave Macmillan;International Association for the Study of Insurance Economics (The Geneva Association), volume 44, issue 1, pages 87-135, March, DOI: 10.1057/s10713-018-0036-9.
• Lisa L. Posey & Paul D. Thistle, 2019, "Large losses and equilibrium in insurance markets," The Geneva Risk and Insurance Review, Palgrave Macmillan;International Association for the Study of Insurance Economics (The Geneva Association), volume 44, issue 2, pages 222-244, September, DOI: 10.1057/s10713-019-00038-8.
• Carlos Segura-Rodriguez, 2019, "Selling Data," PIER Working Paper Archive, Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania, number 19-006, Apr.
• Luigi Balletta & Andrea Mario Lavezzi, 2019, "The Economics of Extortion: Theory and Evidence on the Sicilian Mafia," Discussion Papers, Dipartimento di Economia e Management (DEM), University of Pisa, Pisa, Italy, number 2019/242, Mar.
• Ekmekci, Mehmet & Maestri, Lucas, 2019, "Reputation and screening in a noisy environment with irreversible actions," MPRA Paper, University Library of Munich, Germany, number 100885, Aug.
• Kang, Kee-Youn, 2019, "Cryptocurrency, Delivery Lag, and Double Spending History," MPRA Paper, University Library of Munich, Germany, number 93598, May.
• Hoppe, Eva I. & Schmitz, Patrick W., 2019, "How (Not) to Foster Innovations in Public Infrastructure Projects," MPRA Paper, University Library of Munich, Germany, number 95615.
• Schmitz, Patrick W., 2019, "Incomplete Contracts, Limited Liability, and the Optimality of Joint Ownership," MPRA Paper, University Library of Munich, Germany, number 95637.
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• Doruk Cetemen & Felix Zhiyu Feng & Can Urgun, 2019, "Contracting with Non-Exponential Discounting: Moral Hazard and Dynamic Inconsistency," Working Papers, Princeton University. Economics Department., number 2019-17, Aug.
• Sylvain Chassang & Christian Zehnder, 2019, "Secure Survey Design in Organizations: Theory and Experiments," Working Papers, Princeton University. Economics Department., number 2019-22, Apr.
• Fahn, Matthias, 2019, "Reciprocity in Dynamic Employment Relationships," Rationality and Competition Discussion Paper Series, CRC TRR 190 Rationality and Competition, number 198, Nov.
• William Fuchs & Andrzej Skrzypacz, 2019, "Costs and benefits of dynamic trading in a lemons market," Review of Economic Dynamics, Elsevier for the Society for Economic Dynamics, volume 33, pages 105-127, July, DOI: 10.1016/j.red.2019.03.002.
• Andrea Attar & Thomas Mariotti & François Salanié, 2019, "The Social Costs of Side Trading," CEIS Research Paper, Tor Vergata University, CEIS, number 463, Jul, revised 10 Jul 2019.
• Anjan Mukherji, 2019, "Marxian Economics: Notes from a Neo-classical Viewpoint," Arthaniti: Journal of Economic Theory and Practice, , volume 18, issue 1, pages 1-16, June, DOI: 10.1177/0976747918814968.
• Antonio ABATEMARCO & Alberto BENNARDO, 2018, "Communication Costs and Incentives to Acquire Soft and Hard Knowledge," CELPE Discussion Papers, CELPE - CEnter for Labor and Political Economics, University of Salerno, Italy, number 157, Dec.
• Luca Picariello, 2019, "Organizational Design with Portable Skills," CSEF Working Papers, Centre for Studies in Economics and Finance (CSEF), University of Naples, Italy, number 546, Oct, revised 03 Jan 2025.
• Luca Picariello, 2019, "Promotions and Training: Do Competitive Firms Set the Bar too High?," CSEF Working Papers, Centre for Studies in Economics and Finance (CSEF), University of Naples, Italy, number 552, Dec.
• Saltuk Özerturk & Huseyin Yildirim, 2019, "Credit Attribution and Collaborative Work," Departmental Working Papers, Southern Methodist University, Department of Economics, number 1907, Nov.
• Yoshinori Wada, 2019, "Discriminatory tax and subsidy on environmental behaviors," Environmental Economics and Policy Studies, Springer;Society for Environmental Economics and Policy Studies - SEEPS, volume 21, issue 1, pages 25-36, January, DOI: 10.1007/s10018-018-0220-2.
• Marina Albanese & Cecilia Navarra & Ermanno Tortia, 2019, "Equilibrium unemployment as a worker insurance device: wage setting in worker owned enterprises," Economia Politica: Journal of Analytical and Institutional Economics, Springer;Fondazione Edison, volume 36, issue 3, pages 653-671, October, DOI: 10.1007/s40888-018-00139-z.
• Roland Eisenhuth, 2019, "Reference-dependent mechanism design," Economic Theory Bulletin, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), volume 7, issue 1, pages 77-103, May, DOI: 10.1007/s40505-018-0144-9.
• Yu Chen, 2019, "Monotonicity in optimal mechanisms in general quasi-linear environments with a continuum of types," Economic Theory Bulletin, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), volume 7, issue 2, pages 277-290, December, DOI: 10.1007/s40505-018-00161-1.
• Andres Zambrano, 2019, "Motivating informed decisions," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), volume 67, issue 3, pages 645-664, April, DOI: 10.1007/s00199-017-1087-3.
• Eduardo Zilberman & Vinicius Carrasco & Pedro Hemsley, 2019, "Risk sharing contracts with private information and one-sided commitment," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), volume 68, issue 1, pages 53-81, July, DOI: 10.1007/s00199-018-1112-1.
• Alice Peng-Ju Su, 2019, "Team incentives with imperfect mutual inference," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, volume 48, issue 2, pages 687-712, June, DOI: 10.1007/s00182-018-00656-y.
• Emmanuelle Auriol & Josepa Miquel-Florensa, 2019, "Taxing fragmented aid to improve aid efficiency," The Review of International Organizations, Springer, volume 14, issue 3, pages 453-477, September, DOI: 10.1007/s11558-018-9329-0.
• Dragan Ilić & Sonja Pisarov & Peter S. Schmidt, 2019, "Preaching water but drinking wine? Relative performance evaluation in international banking," Swiss Journal of Economics and Statistics, Springer;Swiss Society of Economics and Statistics, volume 155, issue 1, pages 1-25, December, DOI: 10.1186/s41937-019-0032-8.
• Rahul Deb & Mallesh M. Pai & Maher Said, 2019, "Dynamic Incentives for Buy-Side Analysts," Working Papers, New York University, Leonard N. Stern School of Business, Department of Economics, number 19-01.
• Antoni Cunyat, 2019, "Crowding-out effect and sorting in competitive labour markets with motivated workers," Applied Economics Letters, Taylor & Francis Journals, volume 26, issue 4, pages 326-330, February, DOI: 10.1080/13504851.2018.1468550.
• Eduard Alonso-Paulí, 2019, "Contracting with a quiet-life manager," Economic Research-Ekonomska Istraživanja, Taylor & Francis Journals, volume 32, issue 1, pages 2231-2251, January, DOI: 10.1080/1331677X.2019.1645717.
• Hitoshi Matsushima, 2019, "Information Design in Blockchain: A Role of Trusted Intermediaries," CIRJE F-Series, CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo, number CIRJE-F-1121, Jul.
• Rahul Deb & Matthew Mitchell & Mallesh Pai, 2019, "Our distrust is very expensive," Working Papers, University of Toronto, Department of Economics, number tecipa-632, Mar.
• Romain Gauriot & Lionel Page, 2019, "Fooled by Performance Randomness: Overrewarding Luck," The Review of Economics and Statistics, MIT Press, volume 101, issue 4, pages 658-666, October.
• Attar, Andrea & Mariotti, Thomas & Salanié, François, 2019, "The Social Costs of Side Trading," TSE Working Papers, Toulouse School of Economics (TSE), number 19-1017, Jun, revised Oct 2019.
• Sand-Zantman, Wilfried & Dosis, Anastasios, 2019, "The Ownership of Data," TSE Working Papers, Toulouse School of Economics (TSE), number 19-1025, Jul, revised Sep 2020.
• Attar, Andrea & Mariotti, Thomas & Salanié, François, 2019, "Regulating Insurance Markets: Multiple Contracting and Adverse Selection," TSE Working Papers, Toulouse School of Economics (TSE), number 19-1033, Aug, revised Sep 2021.
• Juan Beccuti & Marc Moeller, 2019, "Screening by Mode of Trade," Diskussionsschriften, Universitaet Bern, Departement Volkswirtschaft, number dp1908, Nov.
• Sarah Parlane & L. (Lisa B.) Ryan, 2019, "Optimal Contracts for Renewable Electricity," Working Papers, School of Economics, University College Dublin, number 201920, Sep.
• Luca Anderlini & Leonardo Felli & Giovanni Immordino, 2019, "Costly Pretrial Agreements," The Journal of Legal Studies, University of Chicago Press, volume 48, issue 1, pages 159-188, DOI: 10.1086/699841.
• Benjamin Lester & Ali Shourideh & Venky Venkateswaran & Ariel Zetlin-Jones, 2019, "Screening and Adverse Selection in Frictional Markets," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, volume 127, issue 1, pages 338-377, DOI: 10.1086/700730.
• Emilien Prost, 2019, "Legitimacy and Incentives in a Labour Relationship," Working Papers of BETA, Bureau d'Economie Théorique et Appliquée, UDS, Strasbourg, number 2019-19.
• Emilien Prost, 2019, "Which kind of ability bolsters legitimacy?," Working Papers of BETA, Bureau d'Economie Théorique et Appliquée, UDS, Strasbourg, number 2019-20.
• Emilien Prost & Gaye del Lo, 2019, "The Hidden Effect of Meritocratic Promotion Procedure: Experimental Evidence," Working Papers of BETA, Bureau d'Economie Théorique et Appliquée, UDS, Strasbourg, number 2019-21.