Research classified by Journal of Economic Literature (JEL) codes

1. Transaction Cost Economics

2024

• Burguet, Roberto & Tseng, Michael C., 2024, "Implementing deterministic outcomes in stochastic dynamic environments," Economics Letters, Elsevier, volume 243, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2024.111937.
• Doval, Laura & Skreta, Vasiliki, 2024, "Mechanism design with limited commitment: Markov environments," European Economic Review, Elsevier, volume 167, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.euroecorev.2024.104777.
• Shachat, Jason & Walker, Matthew J. & Wei, Lijia, 2024, "Contingent payments in procurement interactions: Experimental evidence," European Economic Review, Elsevier, volume 170, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.euroecorev.2024.104886.
• Biggar, Darryl R. & Hesamzadeh, Mohammad Reza, 2024, "Optimal retail contracts with contractible uncertainty," Energy Economics, Elsevier, volume 136, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.eneco.2024.107769.
• Zhao, Zhiying & Lan, Yanfei & Xu, Shuxian & Zou, Hongyang & Du, Huibin, 2024, "Addressing the reliability challenge: Subsidy policies for promoting renewable electricity consumption," Energy Economics, Elsevier, volume 139, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.eneco.2024.107926.
• Li, Jing & Nie, Huihua & Ruan, Rui & Shen, Xinyi, 2024, "Subjective perception of economic policy uncertainty and corporate social responsibility: Evidence from China," International Review of Financial Analysis, Elsevier, volume 91, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.irfa.2023.103022.
• Van Tassel, Eric, 2024, "Bank monitoring and debt dilution," Finance Research Letters, Elsevier, volume 62, issue PA, DOI: 10.1016/j.frl.2024.105072.
• Du, Ninghua & Shahriar, Quazi, 2024, "Information disclosure in mitigating moral hazard: An experimental investigation," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 144, issue C, pages 284-299, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2024.02.001.
• Niu, Yingjie & Zou, Zhentao, 2024, "Robust dynamic contracts with multiple agents," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 148, issue C, pages 196-217, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2024.09.012.
• Abrardi, Laura & Cambini, Carlo & Hoernig, Steffen, 2024, "“I don't care about cookies!” data disclosure and time-inconsistent users," Information Economics and Policy, Elsevier, volume 69, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.infoecopol.2024.101112.
• Ghossoub, Mario & Zhu, Michael B., 2024, "Stackelberg equilibria with multiple policyholders," Insurance: Mathematics and Economics, Elsevier, volume 116, issue C, pages 189-201, DOI: 10.1016/j.insmatheco.2024.02.008.
• Boonen, Tim J. & Han, Xia, 2024, "Optimal insurance with mean-deviation measures," Insurance: Mathematics and Economics, Elsevier, volume 118, issue C, pages 1-24, DOI: 10.1016/j.insmatheco.2024.05.005.
• Feng, Felix Zhiyu & Luo, Robin Yifan & Michaeli, Beatrice, 2024, "In search of a unicorn: Dynamic agency with endogenous investment opportunities," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, volume 78, issue 2, DOI: 10.1016/j.jacceco.2024.101738.
• Michels, Anne & Platteau, Jean-Philippe, 2024, "How can migration unequalize inheritance: Theory and insights from Bolivia," Journal of Comparative Economics, Elsevier, volume 52, issue 1, pages 28-53, DOI: 10.1016/j.jce.2023.07.001.
• Afridi, Farzana & Dhillon, Amrita & Sharma, Swati, 2024, "The ties that bind us: Social networks and productivity in the factory," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, volume 218, issue C, pages 470-485, DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2023.12.026.
• González-Jiménez, Víctor, 2024, "Incentive design for reference-dependent preferences," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, volume 221, issue C, pages 493-518, DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2024.03.005.
• Weinschenk, Philipp, 2024, "Incentives and performance under two-dimensional moral hazard," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, volume 225, issue C, pages 107-115, DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2024.06.037.
• Downs, Justin, 2024, "Screening, overconfidence, and competition’s effect on market efficiency," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, volume 226, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2024.106690.
• Name Correa, Alvaro J. & Yildirim, Huseyin, 2024, "Multiple prizes in tournaments with career concerns," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, volume 215, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2023.105778.
• Gottardi, Piero & Mezzetti, Claudio, 2024, "Shuttle diplomacy," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, volume 216, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2023.105794.
• Han, Seungjin & Sam, Alex & Shin, Youngki, 2024, "Monotone equilibrium in matching markets with signaling," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, volume 216, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2024.105801.
• Starmans, Jan, 2024, "Contracting and search with heterogeneous principals and agents," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, volume 217, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2023.105761.
• Okat, Deniz & Nash, John G.F., 2024, "Delegating trial and error," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, volume 217, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2024.105802.
• Ball, Ian & Gao, Xin, 2024, "Benefiting from bias: Delegating to encourage information acquisition," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, volume 217, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2024.105816.
• Mitkov, Yuliyan, 2024, "A theory of debt maturity and innovation," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, volume 218, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2024.105828.
• Ábrahám, Árpád & Laczó, Sarolta, 2024, "Efficient risk sharing and separation," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, volume 219, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2024.105849.
• Burkett, Justin & Rosenthal, Maxwell, 2024, "Statistical uncertainty and coarse contracts," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, volume 220, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2024.105876.
• Banerjee, Snehal & Szydlowski, Martin, 2024, "Harnessing the overconfidence of the crowd: A theory of SPACs," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, volume 153, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.jfineco.2024.103787.
• Baldauf, Markus & Frei, Christoph & Mollner, Joshua, 2024, "Block trade contracting," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, volume 160, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.jfineco.2024.103901.
• Liu, Qianshuo, 2024, "Pharmaceutical innovation collaboration, evaluation, and matching," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, volume 98, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.jhealeco.2024.102922.
• Niemann, Rainer & Sailer, Mariana, 2024, "Do taxes explain why firms rarely use performance-based malus contracts?," Journal of International Accounting, Auditing and Taxation, Elsevier, volume 55, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.intaccaudtax.2024.100616.
• Kim, Jaesoo, 2024, "Incentive contracts with pay gap and pay equity," Labour Economics, Elsevier, volume 91, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.labeco.2024.102651.
• Adachi-Sato, Meg, 2024, "Socially responsible investment: Ex-ante contracting or ex-post bargaining?," International Review of Economics & Finance, Elsevier, volume 94, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.iref.2024.05.038.
• Sonia B. Di Giannatale & Itza Tlaloc Quetzalcoatl Curiel-Cabral & Genaro Basulto, 2024, "Exploring Executive Bargaining Dynamics: An Empirical Investigation," Working Papers, CIDE, División de Economía, number DTE 633, Jun.
• Alvaro Remesal, 2024, "Clawback enforcement heterogeneity and the horizon of executive pay: empirical evidence," International Journal of Accounting & Information Management, Emerald Group Publishing Limited, volume 32, issue 5, pages 773-802, August, DOI: 10.1108/IJAIM-04-2023-0099.
• Martin Gregor & Beatrice Michaeli, 2024, "Board Bias, Information, and Investment Efficiency," Working Papers IES, Charles University Prague, Faculty of Social Sciences, Institute of Economic Studies, number 2024/11, Mar, revised Mar 2024.
• Martin Gregor & Beatrice Michaeli, 2024, "Board Compensation and Investment Efficiency," Working Papers IES, Charles University Prague, Faculty of Social Sciences, Institute of Economic Studies, number 2024/12, Mar, revised Mar 2024.
• Luca Di Corato & Michele Moretto, 2024, "Supply contracting under dynamic asymmetric cost information," Working Papers, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei, number 2024.04, Feb.
• Michael Junho Lee & Antoine Martin & Robert M. Townsend, 2024, "Zero Settlement Risk Token Systems," Staff Reports, Federal Reserve Bank of New York, number 1120, Sep, DOI: 10.59576/sr.1120.
• Michael Junho Lee & Antoine Martin & Robert M. Townsend, 2024, "Optimal Design of Tokenized Markets," Staff Reports, Federal Reserve Bank of New York, number 1121, Sep, DOI: 10.59576/sr.1121.
• Selman Erol & Michael Junho Lee, 2024, "Financial System Architecture and Technological Vulnerability," Staff Reports, Federal Reserve Bank of New York, number 1122, Sep, DOI: 10.59576/sr.1122.
• Pierre Fleckinger & David Martimort & Nicolas Roux, 2024, "Should They Compete or Should They Cooperate? The View of Agency Theory," Post-Print, HAL, number halshs-04807332, Dec, DOI: 10.1257/jel.20241678.
• Pierre Fleckinger & David Martimort & Nicolas Roux, 2024, "Should They Compete or Should They Cooperate? The View of Agency Theory," PSE-Ecole d'économie de Paris (Postprint), HAL, number halshs-04807332, Dec, DOI: 10.1257/jel.20241678.
• David Bardey & Philippe de Donder & Vera Zaporozhets, 2024, "Economic Incentives to Develop and to Use Diagnostic Tests - A Literature Review," Working Papers, HAL, number hal-04472497, Feb.
• Andrea Attar & Lorenzo Bozzoli & Roland Strausz, 2024, "Mediated Renegotiation," Working Papers, HAL, number hal-04532231, Apr.
• Bruno Biais & Hans Gersbach & Jean-Charles Rochet & Ernst-Ludwig von Thadden & Stéphane Villeneuve, 2024, "Dynamic Contracting with Many Agents," Working Papers, HAL, number hal-04759186, Apr, DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.4769204.
• David Bardey & Philippe de Donder & Marie-Louise Leroux, 2024, "Incentivizing Physicians' Diagnostic Effort and Test with Moral Hazard and Adverse Selection," Working Papers, HAL, number hal-04803393, Nov.
• Schöndube, Jens Robert & Spaeth, Alexandra, 2024, "The optimal choice of after-tax and pre-tax performance measures in the presence of tax base risks," Hannover Economic Papers (HEP), Leibniz Universität Hannover, Wirtschaftswissenschaftliche Fakultät, number dp-727, Sep.
• Koustougeras, Leonidas & Santos, Manuel & Xu, Fei, 2024, "Corruption: Outbribing the Competition," Umeå Economic Studies, Umeå University, Department of Economics, number 1028, Oct, revised 12 Aug 2025.
• Fahn, Matthias & Murooka, Takeshi, 2024, "Informal Incentives and Labor Markets," IZA Discussion Papers, IZA Network @ LISER, number 17042, Jun.
• Bigoni, Maria & Bortolotti, Stefania & Parisi, Francesco & Zhang, Xin, 2024, "Do Contract Remedies Affect Efficient Renegotiation? An Experiment," IZA Discussion Papers, IZA Network @ LISER, number 17220, Aug.
• Häfner, Samuel & Haeusle, Niklas & Koeniger, Winfried & Braun, Alexander, 2024, "Optimal Compensation in Competitive Labor Markets with Heterogeneous Employers and Workers," IZA Discussion Papers, IZA Network @ LISER, number 17449, Nov.
• Li, Xinyu & Schnedler, Wendelin, 2024, "Sharing the Fame but Taking the Blame: When Declaring a Single Person Responsible Solves a Free Rider Problem," IZA Discussion Papers, IZA Network @ LISER, number 17478, Nov.
• Sage Felix & Prinz Joachim, 2024, "Is Blood Thicker than Water? The Impact of Player Agencies on Player Salaries: Empirical Evidence from Five European Football Leagues," Journal of Economics and Statistics (Jahrbuecher fuer Nationaloekonomie und Statistik), De Gruyter, volume 244, issue 5-6, pages 453-473, DOI: 10.1515/jbnst-2023-0098.
• Rosario Macera, 2024, "The roles of selection and practice in mitigating negative responses to high-powered incentives," Experimental Economics, Springer;Economic Science Association, volume 27, issue 5, pages 973-1000, November, DOI: 10.1007/s10683-024-09841-1.
• Narumi Teshima, 2024, "Delegating Decisions to Independent Committees," Discussion Paper Series, Research Institute for Economics & Business Administration, Kobe University, number DP2024-25, Jul.
• Leo Reutter, 2024, "Inefficient Incentives for Energy Saving in Tenancy Law and Policy Options to Remedy the Landlord-Tenant-Dilemma," MAGKS Papers on Economics, Philipps-Universität Marburg, Faculty of Business Administration and Economics, Department of Economics (Volkswirtschaftliche Abteilung), number 202416.
• Te Bao & Yun Dai & Yongqin Wang, 2024, "Overconfidence and Endogenous Contract Incompleteness," Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, volume 180, issue 3, pages 463-484, DOI: 10.1628/jite-2024-0025.
• Thomas Marschak & Dong Wei, 2024, "Technical Change, Moral Hazard, and the Decentralization Penalty," Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, volume 180, issue 4, pages 681-708, DOI: 10.1628/jite-2024-0029.
• Anthony M. Marino, 2024, "Reputational Damage and Reassignment Pay," Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, volume 180, issue 4, pages 557-576, DOI: 10.1628/jite-2024-0030.
• Joseph E. Stiglitz & Andrew Kosenko, 2024, "The Economics of Information in a World of Disinformation: A Survey Part 1: Indirect Communication," NBER Working Papers, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc, number 32049, Jan.
• Joseph E. Stiglitz & Andrew Kosenko, 2024, "The Economics of Information in a World of Disinformation: A Survey Part 2: Direct Communication," NBER Working Papers, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc, number 32050, Jan.
• Patrick Rey & Joseph E. Stiglitz, 2024, "Moral Hazard and Unemployment in Competitive Equilibrium," NBER Working Papers, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc, number 32700, Jul.
• Pablo D. Azar & Adrian Casillas & Maryam Farboodi, 2024, "Information and Market Power in DeFi Intermediation," NBER Working Papers, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc, number 32949, Sep.
• Yuya Wakabayashi, 2024, "An implementation of constrained efficient allocations in hidden information economies," OSIPP Discussion Paper, Osaka School of International Public Policy, Osaka University, number 24E002, May.
• Jorge Padilla & Salvatore Piccolo & Paul Reynolds, 2024, "Merging Laggards," Journal of Competition Law and Economics, Oxford University Press, volume 20, issue 1-2, pages 20-49.
• Achyuta Adhvaryu & Jean-François Gauthier & Anant Nyshadham & Jorge Tamayo, 2024, "Absenteeism, Productivity, and Relational Contracts Inside the Firm," Journal of the European Economic Association, European Economic Association, volume 22, issue 4, pages 1628-1677.
• Stéphane Verani & Pei Cheng Yu, 2024, "What’s Wrong with Annuity Markets?," Journal of the European Economic Association, European Economic Association, volume 22, issue 4, pages 1981-2024.
• Bård Harstad & Torben Mideksa, 2024, "Contracts and Induced Institutional Change," The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Oxford University Press, volume 40, issue 1, pages 1-33.
• Mario Daniele Amore & Sebastian Schwenen, 2024, "Hiring Lucky CEOs," The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Oxford University Press, volume 40, issue 3, pages 571-596.
• David Frydlinger & Oliver Hart, 2024, "Overcoming contractual incompleteness: the role of guiding principles," The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Oxford University Press, volume 40, issue 3, pages 625-647.
• Fabio Feriozzi, 2024, "Managerial Entrenchment and the Market for Talent," The Review of Corporate Finance Studies, Society for Financial Studies, volume 13, issue 1, pages 235-263.
• Rajkamal Iyer & Antoinette Schoar, 2024, "Contracting when enforcement is weak: evidence from an audit study," Review of Finance, European Finance Association, volume 28, issue 5, pages 1513-1536.
• Mark Jansen & Ludovic Phalippou & Thomas Noe, 2024, "Seller Debt in Acquisitions of Private Firms: A Security Design Approach," The Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, volume 37, issue 2, pages 507-548.
• Dae-Hyun Yoo & Caterina Giannetti, 2024, "A Principal-Agent Model for Ethical AI: Optimal Contracts and Incentives for Ethical Alignment," Discussion Papers, Dipartimento di Economia e Management (DEM), University of Pisa, Pisa, Italy, number 2024/313, Oct.
• Banerjee, Swapnendu & Saha, Soumyarup, 2024, "Absolute Power Corrupts Absolutely?: A Political Agency Theoretic Approach," MPRA Paper, University Library of Munich, Germany, number 121109, May.
• Schmitz, Patrick W., 2024, "When Should the Government Own the Physical Assets Needed to Provide Public Goods?," MPRA Paper, University Library of Munich, Germany, number 121333.
• Dongsoo Shin & Roland Strausz, 2024, "Insourcing Vs Outsourcing in Vertical Structure," Rationality and Competition Discussion Paper Series, CRC TRR 190 Rationality and Competition, number 495, Feb.
• Corinne Langinier, 2024, "The Effect of Patent Continuation on the Patenting Process," Working Papers, University of Alberta, Department of Economics, number 2024-06, Oct.
• Sangita Poddar & Tanmoyee Banerjee (Chatterjee) & Swapnendu Banerjee, 2024, "Optimal Contract Under Endogenous Platform Services: Implications of Tax and Advertising," Studies in Microeconomics, , volume 12, issue 3, pages 345-370, December, DOI: 10.1177/23210222231206232.
• Alberrto Bennardo & Antonio Abatemarco, 2024, "Multiple tasks, hard information gathering, muted incentives and specialization by project," CELPE Discussion Papers, CELPE - CEnter for Labor and Political Economics, University of Salerno, Italy, number 170, Dec.
• Anna Maria C. Menichini & Peter Simmons, 2024, "Optimal Multiple Loan Contracting under Sequential Audits and Contagion Losses," CSEF Working Papers, Centre for Studies in Economics and Finance (CSEF), University of Naples, Italy, number 742, Dec.
• Gunnar Alexandersson & Staffan Hultén & Lars Henriksson, 2024, "Coping with unforeseen circumstances: the COVID-19 crisis and bus contract renegotiation in Sweden," Economia e Politica Industriale: Journal of Industrial and Business Economics, Springer;Associazione Amici di Economia e Politica Industriale, volume 51, issue 2, pages 325-353, June, DOI: 10.1007/s40812-024-00310-7.
• Silvia Martinez-Gorricho & Carlos Oyarzun, 2024, "Testing under information manipulation," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), volume 77, issue 3, pages 849-890, May, DOI: 10.1007/s00199-023-01514-z.
• William Dodds, 2024, "Solving multidimensional screening problems using a generalized single crossing property," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), volume 77, issue 4, pages 1025-1084, June, DOI: 10.1007/s00199-023-01519-8.
• Jihwan Do & Nicolás Riquelme, 2024, "Information exchange through secret vertical contracts," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), volume 78, issue 3, pages 671-707, November, DOI: 10.1007/s00199-023-01539-4.
• Jiliang Sheng & Yanyan Yang & Xiaoting Wang & Jun Yang, 2024, "How nonlinear benchmark in delegation contract can affect asset price and price informativeness," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), volume 78, issue 4, pages 1117-1168, December, DOI: 10.1007/s00199-024-01573-w.
• Alexandra Lilge & Abhishek Ramchandani, 2024, "To tell or not to tell: the incentive effects of disclosing employer assessments," Review of Accounting Studies, Springer, volume 29, issue 3, pages 2832-2870, September, DOI: 10.1007/s11142-023-09769-6.
• Natalie Kessler & Iman van Lelyveld & Ellen van der Woerd, 2024, "Exclusive Portfolio Dealing and Market Inefficiency," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers, Tinbergen Institute, number 24-019/IV, Mar.
• Saten Kumar & Dennis Wesselbaum, 2024, "Contracts and Firms' Inflation Expectations," The Review of Economics and Statistics, MIT Press, volume 106, issue 1, pages 246-255, January, DOI: 10.1162/rest_a_01115.
• De Donder, Philippe & Bardey, David & Zaporozhets, Vera, 2024, "Economic Incentives to Develop and to Use Diagnostic Tests - A Literature Review," TSE Working Papers, Toulouse School of Economics (TSE), number 24-1507, Feb, revised Sep 2025.
• Villeneuve, Stéphane & Biais, Bruno & Gersbach, Hans & Rochet, Jean-Charles & von Thadden, Ernst-Ludwig, 2024, "Dynamic Contracting with Many Agents," TSE Working Papers, Toulouse School of Economics (TSE), number 24-1511, Feb.
• Attar, Andrea & Bozzoli, Lorenzo & Strausz, Roland, 2024, "Mediated Renegotiation," TSE Working Papers, Toulouse School of Economics (TSE), number 24-1522, Mar, revised Feb 2025.
• Ahmadzadeh, Amirreza & Waizmann, Stephan, 2024, "Mechanism Design with Costly Inspection," TSE Working Papers, Toulouse School of Economics (TSE), number 24-1533, May, revised Sep 2024.
• Ahmadzadeh, Amirreza, 2024, "Costly state verification with Limited Commitment," TSE Working Papers, Toulouse School of Economics (TSE), number 24-1570, Sep.
• De Donder, Philippe & Bardey, David & Leroux, Marie-Louise, 2024, "Incentivizing Physicians' Diagnostic Effort and Test with Moral Hazard and Adverse Selection," TSE Working Papers, Toulouse School of Economics (TSE), number 24-1595, Nov, revised Feb 2026.
• Mollisi Vincenzo, 2024, "The Productivity Effect of Public-Private Partnership," Working papers, Department of Economics, Social Studies, Applied Mathematics and Statistics (Dipartimento di Scienze Economico-Sociali e Matematico-Statistiche), University of Torino, number 088, Feb.
• Haefner, Samuel & Haeusle, Niklas & Koeniger, Winfried & Braun, Alexander, 2024, "Optimal Compensation in Competitive Labor Markets with Heterogeneous Employers and Workers," Economics Working Paper Series, University of St. Gallen, School of Economics and Political Science, number 2405, Nov.
• Jonas Werth & Alessia Russo & Fabio Miessi Sanches, 2024, "Bandwagon Effects in International Environmental Agreements," Working Papers, Department of Economics, University of Venice "Ca' Foscari", number 2024: 19.
• Li, Xinyu & Schnedler, Wendelin, 2024, "Sharing the Fame but Taking the Blame: When Declaring a Single Person Responsible Sovles a Free Rider Problem," EconStor Preprints, ZBW - Leibniz Information Centre for Economics, number 306485.
• Hwang, Sunjoo, 2024, "A theoretical analysis of public procurement for innovation," KDI Journal of Economic Policy, Korea Development Institute (KDI), volume 46, issue 2, pages 21-43, DOI: 10.23895/KDIJEP.2024.46.2.21.
• Fabeienne Jedelhauser & Raphael Flepp & Pascal Flurin Meier & Egon Franck, 2024, "Does Performance Pressure Accentuate Outcome Bias? Evidence from Managerial Dismissals," Working Papers, University of Zurich, Department of Business Administration (IBW), number 402, May.

2023

• Dhruva Bhaskar & Andrew McClellan & Evan Sadler, 2023, "Regulation Design in Insurance Markets," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, volume 113, issue 10, pages 2546-2580, October, DOI: 10.1257/aer.20210710.
• Alex Gershkov & Benny Moldovanu & Philipp Strack & Mengxi Zhang, 2023, "Optimal Insurance: Dual Utility, Random Losses, and Adverse Selection," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, volume 113, issue 10, pages 2581-2614, October, DOI: 10.1257/aer.20221247.
• Anil K Kashyap & Natalia Kovrijnykh & Jian Li & Anna Pavlova, 2023, "Is There Too Much Benchmarking in Asset Management?," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, volume 113, issue 4, pages 1112-1141, April, DOI: 10.1257/aer.20210476.
• Thomas Brzustowski & Alkis Georgiadis-Harris & Balázs Szentes, 2023, "Smart Contracts and the Coase Conjecture," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, volume 113, issue 5, pages 1334-1359, May, DOI: 10.1257/aer.20220357.
• Martin Gaynor & Nirav Mehta & Seth Richards-Shubik, 2023, "Optimal Contracting with Altruistic Agents: Medicare Payments for Dialysis Drugs," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, volume 113, issue 6, pages 1530-1571, June, DOI: 10.1257/aer.20210208.
• Jeanne Lafortune & Corinne Low, 2023, "Collateralized Marriage," American Economic Journal: Applied Economics, American Economic Association, volume 15, issue 4, pages 252-291, October, DOI: 10.1257/app.20210614.
• Ilia Krasikov & Rohit Lamba & Thomas Mettral, 2023, "Implications of Unequal Discounting in Dynamic Contracting," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, volume 15, issue 1, pages 638-692, February, DOI: 10.1257/mic.20200427.
• Guillaume Roger & Benoît Julien, 2023, "Moral Hazard and Efficiency in a Frictional Market," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, volume 15, issue 1, pages 693-730, February, DOI: 10.1257/mic.20200378.
• T. Tony Ke & Christopher Li & Mikhail Safronov, 2023, "Learning by Choosing: Career Concerns with Observable Actions," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, volume 15, issue 2, pages 536-567, May, DOI: 10.1257/mic.20200192.
• Qi Liu & Bo Sun, 2023, "Relative Wealth Concerns, Executive Compensation, and Managerial Risk-Taking," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, volume 15, issue 2, pages 568-598, May, DOI: 10.1257/mic.20200325.
• Bobak Pakzad-Hurson, 2023, "Stable and Efficient Resource Allocation with Contracts," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, volume 15, issue 2, pages 627-659, May, DOI: 10.1257/mic.20210109.
• Anh Nguyen & Teck Yong Tan, 2023, "Markets with Within-Type Adverse Selection," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, volume 15, issue 2, pages 699-726, May, DOI: 10.1257/mic.20210112.
• Samuel Häfner & Curtis R. Taylor, 2023, "Working for References," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, volume 15, issue 3, pages 33-77, August, DOI: 10.1257/mic.20210299.
• Ian Appel & Jillian Grennan, 2023, "Control of Decentralized Autonomous Organizations," AEA Papers and Proceedings, American Economic Association, volume 113, pages 182-185, May, DOI: 10.1257/pandp.20231119.
• Joshua S. Gans & Richard Holden, 2023, "A Solomonic Solution to Blockchain Front-Running," AEA Papers and Proceedings, American Economic Association, volume 113, pages 248-252, May, DOI: 10.1257/pandp.20231029.
• Robert M. Townsend & Nicolas X. Zhang, 2023, "Technologies That Replace a "Central Planner"," AEA Papers and Proceedings, American Economic Association, volume 113, pages 257-262, May, DOI: 10.1257/pandp.20231031.
• J. Aislinn Bohren & Daniel N. Hauser, 2023, "Optimal Lending Contracts with Retrospective and Prospective Bias," AEA Papers and Proceedings, American Economic Association, volume 113, pages 665-672, May, DOI: 10.1257/pandp.20231115.
• Buso, Marco & Dosi, Cesare & Moretto, Michele, , "Dynamic Regulation of Public Franchises with Imperfectly Correlated Demand Shocks," FEEM Working Papers, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM), number 330499, DOI: 10.22004/ag.econ.330499.
• Denuit, Michel & Dhaene, Jan & Ghossoub, Mario & Robert, Christian Y., 2023, "Comonotonicity and Pareto Optimality, with Application to Collaborative Insurance," LIDAM Discussion Papers ISBA, Université catholique de Louvain, Institute of Statistics, Biostatistics and Actuarial Sciences (ISBA), number 2023005, Jan.
• Roweno J. R. K. Heijmans, 2023, "Unraveling Coordination Problems," Papers, arXiv.org, number 2307.08557, Jul, revised Aug 2023.
• Ro’i Zultan & Eldar Dadon, 2023, "Missing the forest for the trees: when monitoring quantitative measures distorts task prioritization," Working Papers, Ben-Gurion University of the Negev, Department of Economics, number 2319.
• Rodney Garratt & Cyril Monnet, 2023, "An impossibility theorem on truth-telling in fully decentralised systems," BIS Working Papers, Bank for International Settlements, number 1117, Aug.
• Marco Buso & Luciano Greco, 2023, "The optimality of public–private partnerships under financial and fiscal constraints," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, volume 32, issue 4, pages 856-881, October, DOI: 10.1111/jems.12520.
• Peter M. Demarzo & Ron Kaniel, 2023, "Contracting in Peer Networks," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, volume 78, issue 5, pages 2725-2778, October, DOI: 10.1111/jofi.13260.
• Gorkem Celik & Dongsoo Shin & Roland Strausz, 2023, "Aggregate Information and Organizational Structures," Journal of Industrial Economics, Wiley Blackwell, volume 71, issue 1, pages 256-290, March, DOI: 10.1111/joie.12314.
• Ola Kvaløy & Trond E. Olsen, 2023, "Balanced Scorecards: A Relational Contract Approach," Journal of Accounting Research, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., volume 61, issue 2, pages 619-652, May, DOI: 10.1111/1475-679X.12465.
• Sarah Auster & Nicola Pavoni, 2023, "Optimal Delegation and Information Transmission under Limited Awareness," CRC TR 224 Discussion Paper Series, University of Bonn and University of Mannheim, Germany, number crctr224_2023_256v3, Apr.
• Demougin Dominique & Upton Harvey, 2023, "Relative Income Concerns, Dismissal, and the Use of Pay-for-Performance," The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, De Gruyter, volume 23, issue 1, pages 405-441, January, DOI: 10.1515/bejte-2021-0107.
• Suzuki Yutaka, 2023, "Collusion, Shading, and Optimal Organization Design," The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, De Gruyter, volume 23, issue 2, pages 537-575, June, DOI: 10.1515/bejte-2020-0130.
• Schottmüller-Einwag Ute & Dilger Alexander, 2023, "Entwicklungen der Vorstandsabfindungen von 2010 bis 2019," ORDO. Jahrbuch für die Ordnung von Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft, De Gruyter, volume 72, issue 1, pages 127-151, December, DOI: 10.1515/ordo-2023-2011.
• Parikshit Ghosh & Debraj Ray, 2023, "The Social Equilibrium of Relational Arrangements," Working papers, Centre for Development Economics, Delhi School of Economics, number 336, May.
• Giuseppe Dari-Mattiacci & Sander Onderstal & Francesco Parisi & Ram Singh, 2023, "Information-Forcing Effects of Non-Disclosure Rules," Working papers, Centre for Development Economics, Delhi School of Economics, number 338, Aug.
• Miller, David A & Watson, Joel, 2023, "An Active-Contracting Perspective on Equilibrium Selection in Relational Contracts," University of California at San Diego, Economics Working Paper Series, Department of Economics, UC San Diego, number qt2dg817mv, Jan.
• Matthias Fahn & Nicolas Klein, 2023, "Non-Common Priors, Incentives, and Promotions: The Role of Learning," CESifo Working Paper Series, CESifo, number 10481.
• Ernst Fehr & Gary Charness, 2023, "Social Preferences: Fundamental Characteristics and Economic Consequences," CESifo Working Paper Series, CESifo, number 10488.
• Francesco Celentano & Mark Rempel, 2023, "Public Listing Choice with Persistent Hidden Information," Swiss Finance Institute Research Paper Series, Swiss Finance Institute, number 23-28, Apr.
• Alexander Braun & Niklas Häusle & Paul D. Thistle, 2023, "Risk Classification with On-Demand Insurance," Swiss Finance Institute Research Paper Series, Swiss Finance Institute, number 23-49, Jun.
• Gottlieb, Daniel & Chaigneau, Pierre & Edmans, Alex, 2023, "A Theory of Fair CEO Pay," CEPR Discussion Papers, Centre for Economic Policy Research, number 17782, Jan.
• Schmitz, Patrick W., 2023, "Incentivizing Research with (Un)conditional Teaching Duties: Punishment or Rent Extraction?," CEPR Discussion Papers, Centre for Economic Policy Research, number 17885, Feb.
• Deb, Rahul & Pai, Mallesh & Said, Maher, 2023, "Indirect Persuasion," CEPR Discussion Papers, Centre for Economic Policy Research, number 17955, Mar.
• Macchiavello, Rocco & Morjaria, Ameet, 2023, "Relational Contracts: Recent Empirical Advancements and Open Questions," CEPR Discussion Papers, Centre for Economic Policy Research, number 17962, Mar.
• Schmitz, Patrick W., 2023, "Completely Relationship-Specific Investments, Transaction Costs, and the Property Rights Theory," CEPR Discussion Papers, Centre for Economic Policy Research, number 18048, Mar.
• Alasalmi, Juho & Goldlücke, Susanne & Jordan, Michelle, 2023, "Hidden Overtime: Optimal Contracts with (Self-)Deceptive Effort Reports," CEPR Discussion Papers, Centre for Economic Policy Research, number 18105, Apr.
• Schmitz, Patrick W., 2023, "The Proper Scope of Government Reconsidered: Asymmetric Information and Incentive Contracts," CEPR Discussion Papers, Centre for Economic Policy Research, number 18208, Jun.
• Auster, Sarah & pavoni, Nicola, 2023, "Optimal delegation and information transmission under limited awareness," CEPR Discussion Papers, Centre for Economic Policy Research, number 18296, Jul.
• Dumav, Martin & Khan, Urmee & Rigotti, Luca, 2023, "Optimal contracts when the players think different," UC3M Working papers. Economics, Universidad Carlos III de Madrid. Departamento de Economía, number 38519, Oct.
• Arve, Malin & Zwart, Gijsbert, 2023, "Optimal procurement and investment in new technologies under uncertainty," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, volume 147, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.jedc.2023.104605.
• Demougin, Dominique & Upton, Harvey, 2023, "Relative income concerns and the Easterlin Paradox: A theoretical framework," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, volume 127, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.econmod.2023.106448.
• Loyola, Gino & Portilla, Yolanda, 2023, "Optimal incentives for managerial innovation," The North American Journal of Economics and Finance, Elsevier, volume 68, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.najef.2023.101982.
• Schmitz, Patrick W., 2023, "Incentivizing research with (un)conditional teaching duties: Punishment or rent extraction?," Economics Letters, Elsevier, volume 224, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2023.111012.
• Schmitz, Patrick W., 2023, "Completely relationship-specific investments, transaction costs, and the property rights theory," Economics Letters, Elsevier, volume 226, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2023.111103.
• Hoffman, Ryan & Kambhampati, Ashwin & Kaplan, Scott, 2023, "Pay equality among heterogeneous agents," Economics Letters, Elsevier, volume 229, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2023.111188.
• Schmitz, Patrick W., 2023, "The proper scope of government reconsidered: Asymmetric information and incentive contracts," European Economic Review, Elsevier, volume 157, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.euroecorev.2023.104511.
• Boonen, Tim J. & Ghossoub, Mario, 2023, "Bowley vs. Pareto optima in reinsurance contracting," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, volume 307, issue 1, pages 382-391, DOI: 10.1016/j.ejor.2022.08.003.
• Zhao, Chuan & Guo, Qidong & Jia, Rongwen & Dong, Kangyin & Wang, Kun, 2023, "How does clean energy transition promote original design manufacturers? A three-party evolutionary game analysis," Energy Economics, Elsevier, volume 126, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.eneco.2023.106965.
• Xie, Yimei & Ding, Chuan & Li, Yang & Wang, Kaihong, 2023, "Optimal incentive contract in continuous time with different behavior relationships between agents," International Review of Financial Analysis, Elsevier, volume 86, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.irfa.2023.102521.
• Dasgupta, Dyotona & Mookherjee, Dilip, 2023, "A theory of progressive lending," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 137, issue C, pages 211-227, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2022.11.005.
• Mattsson, Lars-Göran & Weibull, Jörgen W., 2023, "An analytically solvable principal-agent model," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 140, issue C, pages 33-49, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2023.03.002.
• Altınok, Ahmet, 2023, "Group lending, sorting, and risk sharing," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 140, issue C, pages 456-480, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2023.05.003.
• Min, Daehong, 2023, "Screening for experiments," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 142, issue C, pages 73-100, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2023.07.009.
• Bisceglia, Michele & Piccolo, Salvatore & Tarantino, Emanuele, 2023, "M&A advisory and the merger review process," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, volume 87, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.ijindorg.2023.102919.
• Wong, Tak-Yuen & Wong, Ho-Po Crystal, 2023, "Securities auctions with pre-project information management," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, volume 88, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.ijindorg.2023.102929.
• Bernard, Christophe & Mitraille, Sébastien, 2023, "Outsourcing horizontally differentiated tasks under asymmetric information," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, volume 89, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.ijindorg.2023.102971.
• Liu, Wenyue & Cadenillas, Abel, 2023, "Optimal insurance contracts for a shot-noise Cox claim process and persistent insured's actions," Insurance: Mathematics and Economics, Elsevier, volume 109, issue C, pages 69-93, DOI: 10.1016/j.insmatheco.2023.01.002.
• Zhu, Michael B. & Ghossoub, Mario & Boonen, Tim J., 2023, "Equilibria and efficiency in a reinsurance market," Insurance: Mathematics and Economics, Elsevier, volume 113, issue C, pages 24-49, DOI: 10.1016/j.insmatheco.2023.07.004.
• Chy, Mahfuz & Kyung, Hoyoun, 2023, "The effect of bond market transparency on bank loan contracting," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, volume 75, issue 2, DOI: 10.1016/j.jacceco.2022.101536.
• Balletta, Luigi & Lavezzi, Andrea Mario, 2023, "The economics of extortion: Theory and the case of the Sicilian Mafia," Journal of Comparative Economics, Elsevier, volume 51, issue 4, pages 1109-1141, DOI: 10.1016/j.jce.2023.05.003.
• Kosenko, Andrew & Stiglitz, Joseph & Yun, Jungyoll, 2023, "Bilateral information disclosure in adverse selection markets with nonexclusive competition," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, volume 205, issue C, pages 144-168, DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2022.10.015.
• Demougin, Dominique & Helm, Carsten, 2023, "Overwhelmed by routine tasks: A multitasking principal agent perspective," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, volume 216, issue C, pages 654-669, DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2023.10.021.
• Kambhampati, Ashwin, 2023, "Randomization is optimal in the robust principal-agent problem," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, volume 207, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2022.105585.
• Cetemen, Doruk & Feng, Felix Zhiyu & Urgun, Can, 2023, "Renegotiation and dynamic inconsistency: Contracting with non-exponential discounting," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, volume 208, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2023.105606.
• Mookherjee, Dilip & Tsumagari, Masatoshi, 2023, "Regulatory mechanism design with extortionary collusion," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, volume 208, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2023.105614.
• Babus, Ana & Hachem, Kinda, 2023, "Markets for financial innovation," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, volume 208, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2023.105615.
• Ishiguro, Shingo & Yasuda, Yosuke, 2023, "Moral hazard and subjective evaluation," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, volume 209, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2023.105619.
• Tan, Teck Yong, 2023, "Optimal transparency of monitoring capability," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, volume 209, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2023.105620.
• Garrett, Daniel F. & Georgiadis, George & Smolin, Alex & Szentes, Balázs, 2023, "Optimal technology design," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, volume 209, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2023.105621.
• Kim, Yonggyun, 2023, "Comparing information in general monotone decision problems," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, volume 211, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2023.105679.
• Bloch, Francis & Dutta, Bhaskar & Dziubiński, Marcin, 2023, "Selecting a winner with external referees," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, volume 211, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2023.105687.
• Kirkegaard, René, 2023, "Endogenous criteria for success," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, volume 214, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2023.105760.
• Bhaskar, V & Roketskiy, Nikita, 2023, "The ratchet effect: A learning perspective," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, volume 214, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2023.105762.
• Bienz, Carsten & Thorburn, Karin S. & Walz, Uwe, 2023, "Fund ownership, wealth, and risk-taking: Evidence on private equity managers," Journal of Financial Intermediation, Elsevier, volume 54, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.jfi.2023.101025.
• Zhang, Xinhua & Hueng, C. James & Lemke, Robert J., 2023, "A self-selection pricing mechanism for residential electricity: Measures of sustainability and equity to balance market mechanisms and government controls," Journal of Policy Modeling, Elsevier, volume 45, issue 6, pages 1167-1183, DOI: 10.1016/j.jpolmod.2023.10.002.
• Bellani, Luna & Fabella, Vigile Marie & Scervini, Francesco, 2023, "Strategic compromise, policy bundling and interest group power: Theory and evidence on education policy," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, volume 77, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2022.102283.
• Denderski, Piotr & Stoltenberg, Christian A., 2023, "On the existence of private unemployment insurance with advance information on future job losses," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, volume 224, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.jpubeco.2023.104946.
• Wang, Li & Zhang, Xin-Hua & Zhang, Yue-Jun, 2023, "Designing the pricing mechanism of residents’ self-selection sales electricity based on household size," International Review of Economics & Finance, Elsevier, volume 83, issue C, pages 860-878, DOI: 10.1016/j.iref.2022.10.015.
• Brzustowski, Thomas & Georgiadis Harris, Alkis & Szentes, Balázs, 2023, "Smart contracts and the Coase conjecture," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library, number 117950, May.
• Garrett, Daniel & Georgiadis, George & Smolin, Alex & Szentes, Balázs, 2023, "Optimal technology design," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library, number 118115, Apr.
• Sonia B. Di Giannatale & Itza Tlaloc Quetzalcoatl Curiel-Cabral & Genaro Basulto, 2023, "The Dynamics of Bargaining Power in a Principal-Agent Model," Working Papers, CIDE, División de Economía, number DTE 630, Jan.
• Deahyeon Park & Doo Jin Ryu, 2023, "Small-sized asset owners’ OCIO selections and evaluations," Journal of Derivatives and Quantitative Studies: 선물연구, Emerald Group Publishing Limited, volume 31, issue 2, pages 162-171, February, DOI: 10.1108/JDQS-06-2022-0015.
• François Pannequin & Anne Corcos, 2023, "Risk Management and Public Policies: How prevention challenges monopolistic insurance markets," Documents de recherche, Centre d'Études des Politiques Économiques (EPEE), Université d'Evry Val d'Essonne, number 23-02.
• Ester Manna, 2023, "Bad NGOs? Competition in the market for donations and workers' misconduct," UB School of Economics Working Papers, University of Barcelona School of Economics, number 2023/457.
• Marco Buso & Cesare Dosi & Michele Moretto, 2023, "Dynamic Regulation of Public Franchises with Imperfectly Correlated Demand Shocks," Working Papers, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei, number 2023.03, Feb.
• Piotr Dworczak & Ellen V. Muir, 2023, "A mechanism-design approach to property rights," GRAPE Working Papers, GRAPE Group for Research in Applied Economics, number 86.
• Brice Corgnet & Roberto Hernan-Gonzalez & Yao Thibaut Kpegli & Adam Zylbersztejn, 2023, "Against the Odds! The Tradeoff Between Risk and Incentives is Alive and Well," Working Papers, Groupe d'Analyse et de Théorie Economique Lyon St-Etienne (GATE Lyon St-Etienne), Université de Lyon, number 2305.
• Brice Corgnet & Roberto Hernán González, 2023, "You Will not Regret it: On the Practice of Randomized Incentives," Working Papers, Groupe d'Analyse et de Théorie Economique Lyon St-Etienne (GATE Lyon St-Etienne), Université de Lyon, number 2314.
• Daniel F. Garrett & George Georgiadis & Alex Smolin & Balazs Szentes, 2023, "Optimal technology design," Post-Print, HAL, number hal-04224372, Apr, DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2023.105621.
• Marta Troya-Martinez & Liam Wren-Lewis, 2023, "Managing Relational Contracts," Post-Print, HAL, number halshs-03957183, Jun, DOI: 10.1093/jeea/jvac049.