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A Solomonic Solution to Blockchain Front-Running

Author

Listed:
  • Joshua S. Gans
  • Richard Holden

Abstract

Blockchain front-running involves multiple agents, other than the legitimate agent, claiming a payment from performing a contract. It arises because of the public nature of blockchain transactions and potential network congestion. This paper notes that disputes over payments are similar to classic ownership disputes (such as King Solomon's dilemma). We propose a simultaneous report mechanism that eliminates blockchain front-running. In each case, the mechanism relies on threats to remove ownership from all claimants and preferences from the legitimate claimant over allocations to other agents.

Suggested Citation

  • Joshua S. Gans & Richard Holden, 2023. "A Solomonic Solution to Blockchain Front-Running," AEA Papers and Proceedings, American Economic Association, vol. 113, pages 248-252, May.
    • Handle: RePEc:aea:apandp:v:113:y:2023:p:248-52
    DOI: 10.1257/pandp.20231029
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    Cited by:

    1. Joshua S. Gans, 2023. "Cryptic Regulation of Crypto-Tokens," NBER Chapters, in: Entrepreneurship and Innovation Policy and the Economy, volume 3, pages 139-163, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
    • D86 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Economics of Contract Law

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