Commitment Against Front-Running Attacks
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DOI: 10.1287/mnsc.2023.01239
Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://hal.science/hal-04310293
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- Andrea Canidio & Vincent Danos, 2023. "Commitment Against Front Running Attacks," Papers 2301.13785, arXiv.org, revised Jul 2023.
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Cited by:
- Andrea Canidio & Robin Fritsch, 2023. "Arbitrageurs' profits, LVR, and sandwich attacks: batch trading as an AMM design response," Papers 2307.02074, arXiv.org, revised Feb 2024.
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This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:- NEP-GTH-2024-04-29 (Game Theory)
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