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Two new theoretical approaches to measuring industry and firm performance

Author

Listed:
  • Julie A. Caswell

    (Assistant Professor, Department of Agricultural and Resource Economics, University of Massachusetts at Amherst and Associate Professor, Department of Agricultural Economics and Rural Sociology, University of Connecticut)

  • Ronald W. Cotterill

    (Assistant Professor, Department of Agricultural and Resource Economics, University of Massachusetts at Amherst and Associate Professor, Department of Agricultural Economics and Rural Sociology, University of Connecticut)

Abstract

This article discusses two leading theoretical approaches to understanding how firms operate in markets and the functioning of their internal organizations. Game theory is a microanalytic approach that offers a useful framework for organizing thinking about the factors that influence firm strategic conduct vis-a-vis its competitors. Agency theory is mainly concerned with market mechanisms, such as an executive labor market or market for corporate control, that may discipline firm management in the absence of ownership control. Both approaches can yield useful hypotheses for empirical testing of factors affecting industry and firm performance.

Suggested Citation

  • Julie A. Caswell & Ronald W. Cotterill, 1988. "Two new theoretical approaches to measuring industry and firm performance," Agribusiness, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 4(6), pages 511-520.
    • Handle: RePEc:wly:agribz:v:4:y:1988:i:6:p:511-520
    DOI: 10.1002/1520-6297(198811)4:6<511::AID-AGR2720040602>3.0.CO;2-2
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Fudenberg, Drew & Tirole, Jean, 1987. "Understanding Rent Dissipation: On the Use of Game Theory in Industrial Organization," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 77(2), pages 176-183, May.
    2. Jensen, Michael C, 1986. "Agency Costs of Free Cash Flow, Corporate Finance, and Takeovers," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 76(2), pages 323-329, May.
    3. Fama, Eugene F, 1980. "Agency Problems and the Theory of the Firm," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 88(2), pages 288-307, April.
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Steahr, Thomas E. & Roberts, Tanya, 1993. "Microbial Foodborne Disease: Hospitalizations, Medical Costs and Potential Demand for Safer Food," Working Papers 116110, Regional Research Project NE-165 Private Strategies, Public Policies, and Food System Performance.
    2. Connor, John M. & Peterson, Everett B., 1993. "New Estimates of Welfare and Consumer Losses in U.S. Food Manufacturing," Staff Papers 200402, Purdue University, Department of Agricultural Economics.
    3. Langan, Glenn E. & Cotterill, Ronald W., 1994. "Estimating Brand Level Demand Elasticities and Measuring Market Power for Regular Carbonated Soft Drinks," Working Papers 116168, Regional Research Project NE-165 Private Strategies, Public Policies, and Food System Performance.
    4. Cotterill, Ronald W. & Haller, Lawrence E., 1988. "Entry Barriers, The Queue Of Potential Entrants, And Entry Into Food Retailing Markets," Working Papers 115903, Regional Research Project NE-165 Private Strategies, Public Policies, and Food System Performance.
    5. Caswell, Julie A. & Kleinschmit, Jaana K., 1993. "Economic Criteria for Settling Federalism Disputes with an Application to Food Safety Regulation," Working Papers 116114, Regional Research Project NE-165 Private Strategies, Public Policies, and Food System Performance.
    6. Ding, John Y. & Caswell, Julie A. & Zhou, Furen, 1997. "Relatedness And Performance: A Reexamination Of The Diversification-Performance Link," Journal of Food Distribution Research, Food Distribution Research Society, vol. 28(1), pages 1-8, February.
    7. Tauer, Loren W., 1993. "The Skills and Training Needed by Farm Management Researchers in the Future," Staff Papers 121330, Cornell University, Department of Applied Economics and Management.
    8. Cotterill, Ronald W. & Pinkerton, Don C., 1993. "Motives for Mergers in Food Manufacturing," Working Papers 116111, Regional Research Project NE-165 Private Strategies, Public Policies, and Food System Performance.
    9. Ding, John Y. & Caswell, Julie A. & Rogers, Richard T., 1993. "Restructuring's Effect on Related and Unrelated Diversification Among Top Food Manufacturing Firms in the 1980s," Working Papers 116118, Regional Research Project NE-165 Private Strategies, Public Policies, and Food System Performance.
    10. Cotterill, Ronald W. & Salih, Hachim M., 1992. "Testing For Risk Premiums In The Wheat-Flour Subsector," Working Papers 116109, Regional Research Project NE-165 Private Strategies, Public Policies, and Food System Performance.
    11. Wen, Hong & Haller, Lawrence E., 1994. "Price Determination in the Bottled Water Industry: A Case Study of Poland Spring," Working Papers 116165, Regional Research Project NE-165 Private Strategies, Public Policies, and Food System Performance.
    12. Bhuyan, Sanjib & Cotterill, Ronald W., 1994. "Countervailing Power and Seller Performance in U.S. Food and Tobacco Manufacturing Industries," Working Papers 116163, Regional Research Project NE-165 Private Strategies, Public Policies, and Food System Performance.

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