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Two new theoretical approaches to measuring industry and firm performance

  • Julie A. Caswell

    (Assistant Professor, Department of Agricultural and Resource Economics, University of Massachusetts at Amherst and Associate Professor, Department of Agricultural Economics and Rural Sociology, University of Connecticut)

  • Ronald W. Cotterill

    (Assistant Professor, Department of Agricultural and Resource Economics, University of Massachusetts at Amherst and Associate Professor, Department of Agricultural Economics and Rural Sociology, University of Connecticut)

This article discusses two leading theoretical approaches to understanding how firms operate in markets and the functioning of their internal organizations. Game theory is a microanalytic approach that offers a useful framework for organizing thinking about the factors that influence firm strategic conduct vis-a-vis its competitors. Agency theory is mainly concerned with market mechanisms, such as an executive labor market or market for corporate control, that may discipline firm management in the absence of ownership control. Both approaches can yield useful hypotheses for empirical testing of factors affecting industry and firm performance.

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Article provided by John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. in its journal Agribusiness.

Volume (Year): 4 (1988)
Issue (Month): 6 ()
Pages: 511-520

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Handle: RePEc:wly:agribz:v:4:y:1988:i:6:p:511-520
Contact details of provider: Web page: http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/journal/10.1002/(ISSN)1520-6297

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  1. Fudenberg, Drew & Tirole, Jean, 1987. "Understanding Rent Dissipation: On the Use of Game Theory in Industrial Organization," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 77(2), pages 176-83, May.
  2. Fama, Eugene F, 1980. "Agency Problems and the Theory of the Firm," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 88(2), pages 288-307, April.
  3. Jensen, Michael C, 1986. "Agency Costs of Free Cash Flow, Corporate Finance, and Takeovers," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 76(2), pages 323-29, May.
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