Research classified by Journal of Economic Literature (JEL) codes

1. Transaction Cost Economics

2022

• Scott L. Mitchell & Mark D. Packard & Brent B. Clark, 2022, "Decentralizing corporate governance? A praxeological inquiry," International Journal of Disclosure and Governance, Palgrave Macmillan, volume 19, issue 4, pages 413-429, December, DOI: 10.1057/s41310-022-00151-7.
• Schmitz, Patrick W., 2022, "How (Not) to Purchase Novel Goods and Services: Specific Performance Versus At-Will Contracts," MPRA Paper, University Library of Munich, Germany, number 112839.
• Bukvić, Rajko, 2022, "Пет сила vs Дуги реп
  [Five Forces vs Long Tail]," MPRA Paper, University Library of Munich, Germany, number 114557.
• Pitterle, Claudia, 2022, "Consumer behavior and decision making from officed- based doctors A systematic literature review," MPRA Paper, University Library of Munich, Germany, number 117730.
• Banerjee, Swapnendu & Chakraborty, Somenath, 2022, "Individual versus Team Production with Social Preferences," MPRA Paper, University Library of Munich, Germany, number 120996, Dec.
• Todorova, Tamara, 2022, "Оливър Уилямсън: Новатор На 20 Век И Основател На Новата Институционална Икономика
  [Oliver Williamson: an innovator of the 20th century and founder of the new institutional economics]," MPRA Paper, University Library of Munich, Germany, number 121077.
• Archawa Paweenawat, 2022, "Relative Performance Contracts versus Group Contracts with Hidden Savings," PIER Discussion Papers, Puey Ungphakorn Institute for Economic Research, number 176, Mar.
• Celik, Gorkem & Shin, Dongsoo & Strausz, Roland, 2022, "Aggregate Information and Organizational Structures," Rationality and Competition Discussion Paper Series, CRC TRR 190 Rationality and Competition, number 356, Dec.
• Cheng Wang & Youzhi Yang, 2022, "Code and data files for "On the Pure Theory of Wage Dispersion"," Computer Codes, Review of Economic Dynamics, number 20-92, revised .
• Marc Escrihuela-Villar & Walter Ferrarese & Alberto Iozzi, 2022, "On the Role of Bargaining Power in Nash-in-Nash Bargaining: When More is Less," CEIS Research Paper, Tor Vergata University, CEIS, number 550, Dec, revised 22 Dec 2022.
• PrzemysÅ‚aw Wechta, 2022, "Dividend policy from the perspective of social system theory," The Economic and Labour Relations Review, , volume 33, issue 3, pages 610-628, September, DOI: 10.1177/10353046221078879.
• Perrin Lefebvre & David Martimort, 2022, "Delegation, capture and endogenous information structures," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , volume 34, issue 3, pages 357-414, July, DOI: 10.1177/09516298221107552.
• Oindrila Dey & Swapnendu Banerjee, 2022, "Incentives, Status and Thereafter: A Critical Survey," South Asian Journal of Macroeconomics and Public Finance, , volume 11, issue 1, pages 95-115, June, DOI: 10.1177/2277978721990970.
• Prasun Bhattacharjee & Biswajit Mandal & Ravi Radhakrishnan, 2022, "Informal input sector and its impact on output market competitiveness," Indian Economic Review, Springer, volume 57, issue 2, pages 553-564, December, DOI: 10.1007/s41775-022-00146-9.
• Prasun Bhattacharjee & Biswajit Mandal & Ravi Radhakrishnan, 2022, "Correction to: Informal input sector and its impact on output market competitiveness," Indian Economic Review, Springer, volume 57, issue 2, pages 603-603, December, DOI: 10.1007/s41775-023-00160-5.
• Shingo Ishiguro, 2022, "Management cycles," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), volume 73, issue 1, pages 257-300, February, DOI: 10.1007/s00199-020-01337-2.
• Jaeyoung Sung, 2022, "Optimal contracting under mean-volatility joint ambiguity uncertainties," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), volume 74, issue 2, pages 593-642, September, DOI: 10.1007/s00199-021-01362-9.
• Andrei Barbos, 2022, "Optimal contracts with random monitoring," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, volume 51, issue 1, pages 119-154, March, DOI: 10.1007/s00182-021-00787-9.
• Gottlieb, Daniel & Moreira, Humberto, 2022, "Simple contracts with adverse selection and moral hazard," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, volume 17, issue 3, July.
• Martimort, David & Stole, Lars A., 2022, "Participation constraints in discontinuous adverse selection models," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, volume 17, issue 3, July.
• Moroni, Sofia, 2022, "Experimentation in Organizations," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, volume 17, issue 3, July.
• Schumacher, Heiner & Thysen, Heidi Christina, 2022, "Equilibrium contracts and boundedly rational expectations," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, volume 17, issue 1, January.
• Deb, Rahul & Mitchell, Matthew & Pai, Mallesh M., 2022, "(Bad) reputation in relational contracting," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, volume 17, issue 2, May.
• Bird, Daniel & Frug, Alexander, 2022, "Monotone contracts," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, volume 17, issue 3, July.
• Stefanie Huber & Tobias Schmidt, 2022, "Nevertheless, they persist: Cross-Country Differences in Homeownership Behavior," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers, Tinbergen Institute, number 22-009/II, Jan.
• Andrea M. Buffa & Dimitri Vayanos & Paul Woolley, 2022, "Asset Management Contracts and Equilibrium Prices," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, volume 130, issue 12, pages 3146-3201, DOI: 10.1086/720515.
• Andrey E. Shastitko, 2022, "Credible commitments in contract relations: Where are the limits of the possible?," Upravlenets, Ural State University of Economics, volume 13, issue 2, pages 20-33, May, DOI: 10.29141/2218-5003-2022-13-2-2.
• Keeler Marku & Sergio Ocampo & Jean-Baptiste Tondji, 2022, "Robust Contracts in Common Agency," University of Western Ontario, Departmental Research Report Series, University of Western Ontario, Department of Economics, number 20222.
• Tamara Todorova, 2022, "Oliver Williamson: Founder of the New Institutional Economics," Scientific Conference of the Department of General Economic Theory, University of Economics - Varna, issue 1, pages 279-286.
• Andrea Attar & Thomas Mariotti & François Salanié, 2022, "Regulating Insurance Markets: Multiple Contracting And Adverse Selection," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, volume 63, issue 3, pages 981-1020, August, DOI: 10.1111/iere.12570.
• Paulo Fagandini, 2022, "Wealth and the principal–agent matching," Managerial and Decision Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., volume 43, issue 2, pages 555-568, March, DOI: 10.1002/mde.3402.
• Swagata Bhattacharjee, 2022, "Delegation Using Forward Induction," International Game Theory Review (IGTR), World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd., volume 24, issue 03, pages 1-33, September, DOI: 10.1142/S0219198921500225.
• Chang Koo Chi & Kyoung Jin Choi, 2022, "A Dual Approach To Agency Problems: Existence," Working papers, Yonsei University, Yonsei Economics Research Institute, number 2022rwp-197, Jun.
• Peter J. Simmons & Anna Maria C. Menichini, 2022, "Efficient audits by pooling independent projects: Separation vs. conglomeration," Discussion Papers, Department of Economics, University of York, number 22/06, Oct.
• Lehr, William, 2022, "Smart Contracts: Myths and Implications for Economics and Financial Regulation," 31st European Regional ITS Conference, Gothenburg 2022: Reining in Digital Platforms? Challenging monopolies, promoting competition and developing regulatory regimes, International Telecommunications Society (ITS), number 265650.
• D'Acunto, Francesco & Xie, Jin & Yao, Jiaquan, 2022, "Trust and contracts: Empirical evidence," LawFin Working Paper Series, Goethe University, Center for Advanced Studies on the Foundations of Law and Finance (LawFin), number 32.
• Kaehny, Maximilian & Herweg, Fabian, 2022, "Do Zombies Rise When Interest Rates Fall? A Relationship-Banking Model," VfS Annual Conference 2022 (Basel): Big Data in Economics, Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association, number 264126.

2021

• Marina Halac & Elliot Lipnowski & Daniel Rappoport, 2021, "Rank Uncertainty in Organizations," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, volume 111, issue 3, pages 757-786, March, DOI: 10.1257/aer.20200555.
• Ernst Fehr & Michael Powell & Tom Wilkening, 2021, "Behavioral Constraints on the Design of Subgame-Perfect Implementation Mechanisms," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, volume 111, issue 4, pages 1055-1091, April, DOI: 10.1257/aer.20170297.
• Andrea Attar & Thomas Mariotti & François Salanié, 2021, "Entry-Proofness and Discriminatory Pricing under Adverse Selection," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, volume 111, issue 8, pages 2623-2659, August, DOI: 10.1257/aer.20190189.
• Manoj Mohanan & Katherine Donato & Grant Miller & Yulya Truskinovsky & Marcos Vera-Hernández, 2021, "Different Strokes for Different Folks? Experimental Evidence on the Effectiveness of Input and Output Incentive Contracts for Health Care Providers with Varying Skills," American Economic Journal: Applied Economics, American Economic Association, volume 13, issue 4, pages 34-69, October, DOI: 10.1257/app.20190220.
• Dana Foarta & Takuo Sugaya, 2021, "Wait-and-See or Step In? Dynamics of Interventions," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, volume 13, issue 1, pages 399-425, February, DOI: 10.1257/mic.20180321.
• Jorge Lemus & Emil Temnyalov & John L. Turner, 2021, "Liability Insurance: Equilibrium Contracts under Monopoly and Competition," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, volume 13, issue 1, pages 83-115, February, DOI: 10.1257/mic.20180245.
• Saul Lach & Zvika Neeman & Mark Schankerman, 2021, "Government Financing of R&D: A Mechanism Design Approach," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, volume 13, issue 3, pages 238-272, August, DOI: 10.1257/mic.20190053.
• Joshua A. Jacobs & Aaron M. Kolb & Curtis R. Taylor, 2021, "Communities, Co-ops, and Clubs: Social Capital and Incentives in Large Collective Organizations," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, volume 13, issue 3, pages 29-69, August, DOI: 10.1257/mic.20180359.
• Matan Tsur, 2021, "A Bargaining-Based Model of Security Design," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, volume 13, issue 3, pages 443-473, August, DOI: 10.1257/mic.20190019.
• Cyril Monnet & Erwan Quintin, 2021, "Optimal Financial Exclusion," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, volume 13, issue 4, pages 101-134, November, DOI: 10.1257/mic.20190005.
• Sarah Auster & Nicola Pavoni, 2021, "Optimal Delegation and Information Transmission under Limited Awareness," ECONtribute Discussion Papers Series, University of Bonn and University of Cologne, Germany, number 059, Jan.
• Eszter Szemerédi & Tibor Tatay, 2021, "Sharing communities – Community currency in the sharing economy," Society and Economy, Akadémiai Kiadó, Hungary, volume 43, issue 1, pages 38-59, March, DOI: 10.1556/204.2020.00027.
• Joel Watson, 2021, "Theoretical Foundations of Relational Incentive Contracts," Annual Review of Economics, Annual Reviews, volume 13, issue 1, pages 631-659, August, DOI: 10.1146/annurev-economics-090820-11.
• Carlos Segura-Rodriguez & Ashwin Kambhampati, 2021, "The Optimal Assortativity of Teams Inside the Firm," Documentos de Trabajo, Banco Central de Costa Rica, number 2103, Feb.
• Laura Doval & Vasiliki Skreta, 2021, "Purchase history and product personalization," Papers, arXiv.org, number 2103.11504, Mar, revised Jul 2023.
• Seungjin Han & Alex Sam & Youngki Shin, 2021, "Monotone Equilibrium in Matching Markets with Signaling," Papers, arXiv.org, number 2109.03370, Sep, revised Jan 2024.
• Seungjin Han, 2021, "Robust Equilibria in General Competing Mechanism Games," Papers, arXiv.org, number 2109.13177, Sep, revised Aug 2023.
• Marco Buso & Cesare Dosi & Michele Moretto, 2021, "Do exit options increase the value for money of public–private partnerships?," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, volume 30, issue 4, pages 721-742, November, DOI: 10.1111/jems.12440.
• Michael Hoy & Afrasiab Mirza & Asha Sadanand, 2021, "Guaranteed renewable life insurance under demand uncertainty," Journal of Risk & Insurance, The American Risk and Insurance Association, volume 88, issue 1, pages 131-159, March, DOI: 10.1111/jori.12320.
• Gorkem Celik & Dongsoo Shin & Roland Strausz, 2021, "Public good overprovision by a manipulative provider," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, volume 52, issue 2, pages 314-333, June, DOI: 10.1111/1756-2171.12370.
• Helmut Bester & Matthias Lang & Jianpei Li, 2021, "Signaling versus Auditing," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, volume 52, issue 4, pages 859-883, December, DOI: 10.1111/1756-2171.12394.
• Eva I. Hoppe & Patrick W. Schmitz, 2021, "How (Not) to Foster Innovations in Public Infrastructure Projects," Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Wiley Blackwell, volume 123, issue 1, pages 238-266, January, DOI: 10.1111/sjoe.12393.
• Ying-Ju Chen & Zhengqing Gui & Ernst-Ludwig von Thadden & Xiaojian Zhao, 2021, "Optimal Retail Contracts With Return Policies," CRC TR 224 Discussion Paper Series, University of Bonn and University of Mannheim, Germany, number crctr224_2021_292, Apr.
• Peter Wagner & Jan Knoepfle, 2021, "Relational Enforcement," CRC TR 224 Discussion Paper Series, University of Bonn and University of Mannheim, Germany, number crctr224_2021_295, Apr.
• Giacomo Calzolari & Leonardo Felli & Johannes Koenen & Giancarlo Spagnolo & Konrad O. Stahl, 2021, "Relational Contracts and Trust in a High-Tech Industry," CRC TR 224 Discussion Paper Series, University of Bonn and University of Mannheim, Germany, number crctr224_2021_316, Aug.
• Lei Haoran & Zhao Xiaojian, 2021, "Delegation and Information Disclosure with Unforeseen Contingencies," The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, De Gruyter, volume 21, issue 2, pages 637-656, June, DOI: 10.1515/bejte-2018-0184.
• Dari-Mattiacci Giuseppe & de Oliveira Guilherme, 2021, "Slavery versus Labor," Review of Law & Economics, De Gruyter, volume 17, issue 3, pages 495-568, November, DOI: 10.1515/rle-2021-0049.
• Rishabh, Kumar, 2021, "Bank as a Venture Capitalist," Working papers, Faculty of Business and Economics - University of Basel, number 2021/09.
• Newbery, D., 2021, "Designing an incentive-compatible efficient Renewable Electricity Support Scheme," Cambridge Working Papers in Economics, Faculty of Economics, University of Cambridge, number 2128, Mar.
• Watson, Joel, 2021, "Theoretical Foundations of Relational Incentive Contracts," University of California at San Diego, Economics Working Paper Series, Department of Economics, UC San Diego, number qt19f9w2xf, Aug.
• Gjertsen, Heidi & Groves, Theodore & Miller, David A & Niesten, Eduard & Squires, Dale & Watson, Joel, 2021, "Conservation Agreements: Relational Contracts with Endogenous Monitoring," University of California at San Diego, Economics Working Paper Series, Department of Economics, UC San Diego, number qt6zq3g110, Apr.
• Ola Kvaløy & Trond E. Olsen, 2021, "Balanced Scorecards: A Relational Contract Approach," CESifo Working Paper Series, CESifo, number 8922.
• Alessandro De Chiara & Marco Alexander Schwarz, 2021, "A Dynamic Theory of Regulatory Capture," CESifo Working Paper Series, CESifo, number 8968.
• Elmar G. Wolfstetter, 2021, "Universal High-Speed Broadband Provision: An Alternative Policy Approach," CESifo Working Paper Series, CESifo, number 9014.
• Andrea Canidio & Heiko Karle, 2021, "The Focusing Effect in Negotiations," CESifo Working Paper Series, CESifo, number 9297.
• Giacomo Calzolari & Leonardo Felli & Johannes Koenen & Giancarlo Spagnolo & Konrad O. Stahl, 2021, "Relational Contracts and Trust in a High-Tech Industry," CESifo Working Paper Series, CESifo, number 9362.
• Bernabe Lopez-Martin & David Perez-Reyna, 2021, "Contracts, Firm Dynamics, and Aggregate Productivity," Working Papers Central Bank of Chile, Central Bank of Chile, number 910, Apr.
• Theodosios Dimopoulos & Norman Schürhoff, 2021, "Self-inflicted Debt Crises," Swiss Finance Institute Research Paper Series, Swiss Finance Institute, number 21-11, Feb.
• Karle, Heiko & Canidio, Andrea, 2021, "The Focusing Effect in Negotiations," CEPR Discussion Papers, Centre for Economic Policy Research, number 15698, Jan.
• Edmans, Alex & Chaigneau, Pierre & Gottlieb, Daniel, 2021, "How Should Performance Signals Affect Contracts?," CEPR Discussion Papers, Centre for Economic Policy Research, number 15755, Feb.
• Schürhoff, Norman & Dimopoulos, Theodosios Sakis, 2021, "Self-inflicted debt crises," CEPR Discussion Papers, Centre for Economic Policy Research, number 15781, Feb.
• Dietrich, Diemo & Gehrig, Thomas, 2022, "Speculative and Precautionary Demand for Liquidity in Competitive Banking Markets," CEPR Discussion Papers, Centre for Economic Policy Research, number 15827, Apr.
• Babus, Ana & Hachem, Kinda, 2021, "Regulation and Security Design in Concentrated Markets," CEPR Discussion Papers, Centre for Economic Policy Research, number 15861, Mar.
• Skreta, Vasiliki & Doval, Laura, 2021, "Purchase history and product personalization," CEPR Discussion Papers, Centre for Economic Policy Research, number 15969, Mar.
• Schmitz, Patrick W., 2021, "On the Optimality of Outsourcing when Vertical Integration can Mitigate Information Asymmetries," CEPR Discussion Papers, Centre for Economic Policy Research, number 15970, Mar.
• Schmitz, Patrick W., 2021, "Optimal Ownership of Public Goods under Asymmetric Information," CEPR Discussion Papers, Centre for Economic Policy Research, number 16003, Apr.
• Kaniel, Ron & DeMarzo, Peter, 2021, "Contracting in Peer Networks," CEPR Discussion Papers, Centre for Economic Policy Research, number 16177, May.
• Pavlova, Anna & Kashyap, Anil & Kovrijnykh, Natalia & ,, 2021, "Is There Too Much Benchmarking in Asset Management?," CEPR Discussion Papers, Centre for Economic Policy Research, number 16296, Jun.
• Thorburn, Karin S & Eckbo, B Espen & Su, Xunhua, 2021, "Bank Compensation for Penalty-Free Loan Prepayment: Theory and Tests," CEPR Discussion Papers, Centre for Economic Policy Research, number 16300, Jun.
• Edmans, Alex, 2021, "When Is (Performance-Sensitive) Debt Optimal?," CEPR Discussion Papers, Centre for Economic Policy Research, number 16433, Aug.
• Carlin, Wendy & Bowles, Samuel, 2021, "Shrinking capitalism: Components of a new political economy paradigm," CEPR Discussion Papers, Centre for Economic Policy Research, number 16515, Sep.
• Mariotti, Thomas & Attar, Andrea & Salanié, François, 2021, "Regulating Insurance Markets: Multiple Contracting and Adverse Selection," CEPR Discussion Papers, Centre for Economic Policy Research, number 16531, Sep.
• Felli, Leonardo & Calzolari, Giacomo & Koenen, Johannes & Spagnolo, Giancarlo & Stahl, Konrad, 2021, "Relational Contracts and Trust in a High-Tech Industry," CEPR Discussion Papers, Centre for Economic Policy Research, number 16653, Oct.
• Shihui Ma, 2021, "Diverging College Premiums: A General Equilibrium Framework on China's College Expansion Policy," Annals of Economics and Finance, Society for AEF, volume 22, issue 2, pages 289-315, November.
• Yutaka Suzuki, 2021, "Collusion, Shading, and Optimal Organization Design in a Three-tier Agency Model with a Continuum of Types," Annals of Economics and Finance, Society for AEF, volume 22, issue 2, pages 317-365, November.
• Holden,Richard & Malani,Anup, 2021, "Can Blockchain Solve the Hold-up Problem in Contracts?," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9781009001397, Enero-Abr.
• Dirk Bergemann & Edmund Yeh & Jinkun Zhang, 2021, "Nonlinear Pricing with Finite Information," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University, number 2297, Aug.
• Bougheas, Spiros & Wang, Tianxi, 2021, "A theory of outside equity: Financing multiple projects," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, volume 69, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2021.102025.
• Zwart, Gijsbert, 2021, "Optimal regulation of energy network expansion when costs are stochastic," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, volume 126, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.jedc.2020.103945.
• Lopez-Martin, Bernabe & Perez-Reyna, David, 2021, "Contracts, firm dynamics, and aggregate productivity," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, volume 130, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.jedc.2021.104190.
• Buso, Marco & Moretto, Michele & Zormpas, Dimitrios, 2021, "Excess returns in Public-Private Partnerships: Do governments pay too much?," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, volume 102, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.econmod.2021.105586.
• Buchen, Clemens & Kragl, Jenny & Palermo, Alberto, 2021, "Specialist vs. Generalist: Efficiency in Multitasking," Economics Letters, Elsevier, volume 199, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2020.109699.
• Rodivilov, Alexander, 2021, "A note on robust procurement contracts," Economics Letters, Elsevier, volume 201, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2021.109785.
• Schmitz, Patrick W., 2021, "On the optimality of outsourcing when vertical integration can mitigate information asymmetries," Economics Letters, Elsevier, volume 202, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2021.109823.
• Roncoroni, Alan & Battiston, Stefano & Escobar-Farfán, Luis O.L. & Martinez-Jaramillo, Serafin, 2021, "Climate risk and financial stability in the network of banks and investment funds," Journal of Financial Stability, Elsevier, volume 54, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.jfs.2021.100870.
• Wang, Wenbin & Hu, Shanshan, 2021, "Moral hazard with limited liability: Random-variable formulation and optimal contract structures," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 126, issue C, pages 374-386, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2021.01.002.
• Meng, Delong, 2021, "On the value of repetition for communication games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 127, issue C, pages 227-246, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2021.03.009.
• Castro-Pires, Henrique & Moreira, Humberto, 2021, "Limited liability and non-responsiveness in agency models," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 128, issue C, pages 73-103, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2021.03.010.
• Beccuti, Juan & Möller, Marc, 2021, "Screening by mode of trade," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 129, issue C, pages 400-420, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2021.06.010.
• Che, Xiaogang & Huang, Yangguang & Zhang, Le, 2021, "Supervisory efficiency and collusion in a multiple-agent hierarchy," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 130, issue C, pages 425-442, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2021.09.003.
• Bergemann, Dirk & Yeh, Edmund & Zhang, Jinkun, 2021, "Nonlinear pricing with finite information," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 130, issue C, pages 62-84, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2021.08.004.
• Boonen, Tim J. & Ghossoub, Mario, 2021, "Optimal reinsurance with multiple reinsurers: Distortion risk measures, distortion premium principles, and heterogeneous beliefs," Insurance: Mathematics and Economics, Elsevier, volume 101, issue PA, pages 23-37, DOI: 10.1016/j.insmatheco.2020.06.008.
• Hippel, Svenja & Hoeppner, Sven, 2021, "Contracts as reference points: A replication," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, volume 65, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.irle.2020.105973.
• Dari-Mattiacci, Giuseppe & Onderstal, Sander & Parisi, Francesco, 2021, "Asymmetric solutions to asymmetric information problems," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, volume 66, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.irle.2021.105981.
• Cici, Gjergji & Hendriock, Mario & Kempf, Alexander, 2021, "The impact of labor mobility restrictions on managerial actions: Evidence from the mutual fund industry," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, volume 122, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.jbankfin.2020.105994.
• Schmitz, Patrick W., 2021, "Contracting under adverse selection: Certifiable vs. uncertifiable information," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, volume 182, issue C, pages 100-112, DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2020.11.038.
• Cameron, Alistair & Oak, Mandar & Shan, Yaping, 2021, "Peer monitoring and Islamic microfinance," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, volume 184, issue C, pages 337-358, DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2021.02.001.
• Müller, Daniel & Schmitz, Patrick W., 2021, "The right to quit work: An efficiency rationale for restricting the freedom of contract," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, volume 184, issue C, pages 653-669, DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2021.02.004.
• Tan, Teck Yong, 2021, "Assignment under task dependent private information," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, volume 186, issue C, pages 632-645, DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2020.11.015.
• Davies, Elwyn & Fafchamps, Marcel, 2021, "When no bad deed goes punished: Relational contracting in Ghana and the UK," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, volume 191, issue C, pages 714-737, DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2021.09.024.
• Kräkel, Matthias, 2021, "On the delegation of authority," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, volume 191, issue C, pages 965-981, DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2021.09.033.
• Garcia, Daniel & Tsur, Matan, 2021, "Information design in competitive insurance markets," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, volume 191, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2020.105160.
• Ozerturk, Saltuk & Yildirim, Huseyin, 2021, "Credit attribution and collaborative work," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, volume 195, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2021.105264.
• Chang, Dongkyu, 2021, "Optimal sales mechanism with outside options," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, volume 195, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2021.105279.
• Veracierto, Marcelo, 2021, "Business cycle fluctuations in Mirrlees economies: The case of i.i.d. shocks," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, volume 196, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2021.105278.
• Lu, Jingfeng & Wang, Zijia, 2021, "Optimal selling mechanisms with buyer price search," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, volume 196, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2021.105307.
• Marimon, Ramon & Werner, Jan, 2021, "The envelope theorem, Euler and Bellman equations, without differentiability," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, volume 196, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2021.105309.
• Dam, Kaniṣka & Roy Chowdhury, Prabal, 2021, "Monitoring and incentives under multiple-bank lending: The role of collusive threats," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, volume 197, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2021.105320.
• Calcagno, Riccardo & Heider, Florian, 2021, "Stock-based pay, liquidity, and the role of market making," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, volume 197, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2021.105332.
• Feng, Felix Zhiyu & Westerfield, Mark M., 2021, "Dynamic resource allocation with hidden volatility," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, volume 140, issue 2, pages 560-581, DOI: 10.1016/j.jfineco.2020.12.006.
• Miao, Meng & Niu, Guanjie & Noe, Thomas, 2021, "Contracting without contracting institutions: The trusted assistant loan in 19th century China," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, volume 140, issue 3, pages 987-1007, DOI: 10.1016/j.jfineco.2021.02.005.
• Geczy, Christopher & Jeffers, Jessica S. & Musto, David K. & Tucker, Anne M., 2021, "Contracts with (Social) benefits: The implementation of impact investing," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, volume 142, issue 2, pages 697-718, DOI: 10.1016/j.jfineco.2021.01.006.
• Hoffmann, Florian & Pfeil, Sebastian, 2021, "Dynamic multitasking and managerial investment incentives," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, volume 142, issue 2, pages 954-974, DOI: 10.1016/j.jfineco.2021.06.027.
• Macho-Stadler, Inés & Pérez-Castrillo, David & Quérou, Nicolas, 2021, "Goal-oriented agents in a market," Journal of Economic Psychology, Elsevier, volume 84, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.joep.2021.102378.
• Babus, Ana & Hachem, Kinda, 2021, "Regulation and security design in concentrated markets," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, volume 121, issue C, pages 139-151, DOI: 10.1016/j.jmoneco.2021.05.003.
• Schmitz, Patrick W., 2021, "Optimal ownership of public goods under asymmetric information," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, volume 198, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.jpubeco.2021.104424.
• Hartwell, Christopher A. & Korovkin, Vladimir, 2021, "Contracting in a void: The role of the banking sector in developing property rights in Russia," The Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance, Elsevier, volume 82, issue C, pages 113-127, DOI: 10.1016/j.qref.2021.08.007.
• Contensou, François & Vranceanu, Radu, 2021, "Working time and wage rate differences: Revisiting the role of preferences and labor scarcity," Research in Economics, Elsevier, volume 75, issue 2, pages 164-175, DOI: 10.1016/j.rie.2021.03.002.
• Saten Kumar & Dennis Wesselbaum, 2021, "Contracts and firms' inflation expectations," CAMA Working Papers, Centre for Applied Macroeconomic Analysis, Crawford School of Public Policy, The Australian National University, number 2021-85, Oct.
• Lach, Saul & Neeman, Zvika & Schankerman, Mark, 2021, "Government financing of R&D: a mechanism design approach," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library, number 105873, Aug.
• Dietrich, Diemo & Gehrig, Thomas, 2021, "Speculative and precautionary demand for liquidity in competitive banking markets," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library, number 118869, Jun.
• Mahmoud Shahin, 2021, "The impact of long-term riskless asset on ensuring liquidity and preventing banking fragility," Journal of Economic Studies, Emerald Group Publishing Limited, volume 49, issue 4, pages 683-698, June, DOI: 10.1108/JES-11-2020-0558.
• David Newbery, 2021, "Designing Efficient Renewable Electricity Support Schemes," Working Papers, Energy Policy Research Group, Cambridge Judge Business School, University of Cambridge, number EPRG2107, Mar.
• Hans W. Friederiszick & Alexis Walckiers, 2021, "The economics of dependence: A theory of relativity," ESMT Research Working Papers, ESMT European School of Management and Technology, number ESMT-21-02, Oct.
• Alessandro De Chiara & Marco A. Schwarz, 2021, "A dynamic theory of regulatory capture," UB School of Economics Working Papers, University of Barcelona School of Economics, number 2021/410.
• Suting Hong & Robert M. Hunt & Konstantinos Serfes, 2021, "Dynamic Pricing of Credit Cards and the Effects of Regulation," Working Papers, Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia, number 21-38, Nov, DOI: 10.21799/frbp.wp.2021.38.
• Axel Anderson & Lones Smith, 2021, "The Comparative Statics of Sorting," Working Papers, Georgetown University, Department of Economics, number gueconwpa~21-21-06, Mar.
• Inés Macho-Stadler & David Pérez-Castrillo & Nicolas Quérou, 2021, "Goal-oriented agents in a market," Post-Print, HAL, number hal-03214933, Jun, DOI: 10.1016/j.joep.2021.102378.
• Andrea Attar & Thomas Mariotti & François Salanié, 2021, "Entry-proofness and discriminatory pricing under adverse selection," Post-Print, HAL, number hal-03353054, Mar, DOI: 10.1257/aer.20190189.
• François Contensou & Radu Vranceanu, 2021, "Working time and wage rate differences : a contract theory approach," Working Papers, HAL, number hal-02386781, Mar.
• Andrea Attar & Thomas Mariotti & François Salanié, 2021, "Entry-proofness and discriminatory pricing under adverse selection," Working Papers, HAL, number hal-03485384, Dec, DOI: 10.1257/aer.20190189.
• Zsolt Bihary & Péter Csóka & Péter Kerényi & Alexander Szimayer, 2021, "Self-respecting worker in the gig economy: A dynamic principal-agent model," KRTK-KTI WORKING PAPERS, Institute of Economics, Centre for Economic and Regional Studies, number 2129, Jun.
• Tangerås, Thomas & Gick, Wolfgang, 2021, "Contracting with Endogenously Incomplete Commitment: Escape Clauses," Working Paper Series, Research Institute of Industrial Economics, number 1390, May.
• Meng Liu & Erik Brynjolfsson & Jason Dowlatabadi, 2021, "Do Digital Platforms Reduce Moral Hazard? The Case of Uber and Taxis," Management Science, INFORMS, volume 67, issue 8, pages 4665-4685, August, DOI: 10.1287/mnsc.2020.3721.
• Matthias Fahn & Takeshi Murooka, 2021, "Informal Incentives, Labor Supply, and the Effect of Immigration on Wages," Economics working papers, Department of Economics, Johannes Kepler University Linz, Austria, number 2021-12, May.
• Te Bao & Edward Halim & Charles N. Noussair & Yohanes E. Riyanto, 2021, "Managerial incentives and stock price dynamics: an experimental approach," Experimental Economics, Springer;Economic Science Association, volume 24, issue 2, pages 617-648, June, DOI: 10.1007/s10683-020-09675-7.
• Te Bao & Edward Halim & Charles N. Noussair & Yohanes E. Riyanto, 2021, "Correction: Managerial incentives and stock price dynamics: an experimental approach," Experimental Economics, Springer;Economic Science Association, volume 24, issue 2, pages 649-649, June, DOI: 10.1007/s10683-021-09704-z.
• Stéphane Alcenat & François Maréchal & Florence Naegelen, 2021, "Implementation of personalized medicine in a context of moral hazard and uncertainty about treatment efficacy," International Journal of Health Economics and Management, Springer, volume 21, issue 1, pages 81-97, March, DOI: 10.1007/s10754-020-09290-2.
• Carsten Helm & Franz Wirl, 2021, "Multitasking: incentivizing agents differing either in their work ethic or intrinsic motivation," Journal of Economics, Springer, volume 132, issue 1, pages 41-65, January, DOI: 10.1007/s00712-020-00713-9.
• Jiajia Cong & Wen Zhou, 2021, "Optimal contract under double moral hazard and limited liability," Journal of Economics, Springer, volume 134, issue 1, pages 49-71, September, DOI: 10.1007/s00712-021-00737-9.
• Keeyoung Rhee, 2021, "Optimal Contracts under Moral Hazard and Costly Lying," Korean Economic Review, Korean Economic Association, volume 37, pages 115-140.
• Kohei Daido & Tomoya Tajika, 2021, "Hidden Cost of Sanctions in a Dynamic Principal-Agent Model: Reactance to Controls and Restoration of Freedom," Discussion Paper Series, School of Economics, Kwansei Gakuin University, number 233, Dec.
• Meg Adachi-Sato, 2021, "Contract Duration and Socially Responsible Investment," Discussion Paper Series, Research Institute for Economics & Business Administration, Kobe University, number DP2021-14, May.
• Meg Adachi-Sato, 2021, "Socially Responsible Investment: Ex-ante Contracting or Ex-post Bargaining?," Discussion Paper Series, Research Institute for Economics & Business Administration, Kobe University, number DP2021-20, Sep, revised Feb 2023.
• Seungjin Han, 2021, "Robust Equilibria in General Competing Mechanism Games," Department of Economics Working Papers, McMaster University, number 2021-07, May.
• Seungjin Han & Alex Sam & Youngki Shin, 2021, "Designing a Competitive Monotone Signaling Equilibrium," Department of Economics Working Papers, McMaster University, number 2021-08, Sep.
• Xu Jiang, 2021, "Are Interim Performance Evaluations Optimal when the Evaluations are Subject to Manipulation?," Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, volume 177, issue 3, pages 239-260, DOI: 10.1628/jite-2021-0006.
• Peter M. DeMarzo & Ron Kaniel, 2021, "Contracting in Peer Networks," NBER Working Papers, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc, number 28378, Jan.
• Ana Babus & Kinda Cheryl Hachem, 2021, "Regulation and Security Design in Concentrated Markets," NBER Working Papers, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc, number 28764, May.
• Achyuta Adhvaryu & Jean-François Gauthier & Anant Nyshadham & Jorge A. Tamayo, 2021, "Absenteeism, Productivity, and Relational Contracts Inside the Firm," NBER Working Papers, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc, number 29581, Dec.
• Danilov, V., 2021, "Stable systems of schedule contracts," Journal of the New Economic Association, New Economic Association, volume 51, issue 3, pages 12-29, DOI: 10.31737/2221-2264-2021-51-3-1.
• Jacopo Bizzotto & Adrien Vigier, 2021, "Optimal School Design," Working Papers, Oslo Metropolitan University, Oslo Business School, number 202103, Jun, DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.3877063.
• Takeshi Murooka & Takuro Yamashita, 2021, "Optimal Trade Mechanisms with Adverse Selection and Inferential Mistakes," OSIPP Discussion Paper, Osaka School of International Public Policy, Osaka University, number 21E006, Sep.
• Zhiyong (John) Liu & Ronen Avraham & Yue Qiao, 2021, "Unrequested Benefits, Damages Assessment, and Information Acquisition," American Law and Economics Review, American Law and Economics Association, volume 23, issue 1, pages 207-253.
• Daniel Bird & Alexander Frug, 2021, "Optimal Contracts with Randomly Arriving Tasks," The Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, volume 131, issue 637, pages 1905-1918.
• Heidi Gjertsen & Theodore Groves & David A Miller & Eduard Niesten & Dale Squires & Joel Watson, 2021, "Conservation Agreements: Relational Contracts with Endogenous Monitoring," The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Oxford University Press, volume 37, issue 1, pages 1-40.
• Ehud Guttel & Yuval Procaccia & Eyal Winter, 2021, "Shared Liability and Excessive Care," The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Oxford University Press, volume 37, issue 2, pages 358-391.
• Samuel Bowles & Wendy Carlin, 2021, "Shrinking capitalism: components of a new political economy paradigm
  [‘Environmental Preferences and Technological Choices: Is Market Competition Clean or Dirty?’]," Oxford Review of Economic Policy, Oxford University Press and Oxford Review of Economic Policy Limited, volume 37, issue 4, pages 794-810.
• Rocco Macchiavello & Ameet Morjaria, 2021, "Competition and Relational Contracts in the Rwanda Coffee Chain," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, volume 136, issue 2, pages 1089-1143.
• Richard T Thakor, 2021, "Short-termism, Managerial Talent, and Firm Value
  [Seeking alpha: Excess risk taking and competition for managerial talent]," The Review of Corporate Finance Studies, Society for Financial Studies, volume 10, issue 3, pages 473-512.
• Florian Hoffmann & Roman Inderst & Marcus Opp, 2021, "Only Time Will Tell: A Theory of Deferred Compensation
  [Motivating Innovation in Newly Public Firms]," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, volume 88, issue 3, pages 1253-1278.
• James Malcomson, 2021, "Grouping agents with persistent types," Economics Series Working Papers, University of Oxford, Department of Economics, number 941 JEL classification: C, Jul.
• Marco Buso & Luciano Greco, 2021, "The Optimality of Public-Private Partnerships under Financial and Fiscal Constraints," "Marco Fanno" Working Papers, Dipartimento di Scienze Economiche "Marco Fanno", number 0276, Nov.
• Alexis Louaas & Pierre Picard, 2021, "Optimal insurance coverage of low-probability catastrophic risks," The Geneva Risk and Insurance Review, Palgrave Macmillan;International Association for the Study of Insurance Economics (The Geneva Association), volume 46, issue 1, pages 61-88, March, DOI: 10.1057/s10713-020-00049-w.
• Miglo, Anton, 2021, "A New Capital Structure Theory: The Four-Factor Model," MPRA Paper, University Library of Munich, Germany, number 105102, Jan.
• Schmitz, Patrick W., 2021, "Contracting under Adverse Selection: Certifiable vs. Uncertifiable Information," MPRA Paper, University Library of Munich, Germany, number 105106.
• Müller, Daniel & Schmitz, Patrick W., 2021, "The Right to Quit Work: An Efficiency Rationale for Restricting the Freedom of Contract," MPRA Paper, University Library of Munich, Germany, number 106427.
• Schmitz, Patrick W., 2021, "On the Optimality of Outsourcing when Vertical Integration can Mitigate Information Asymmetries," MPRA Paper, University Library of Munich, Germany, number 106947, Mar.
• Schmitz, Patrick W., 2021, "Optimal Ownership of Public Goods under Asymmetric Information," MPRA Paper, University Library of Munich, Germany, number 107609.
• Saccal, Alessandro, 2021, "Efficiency wage (and slavery) efficiency: in theory and in time," MPRA Paper, University Library of Munich, Germany, number 108969, Jul.
• Zambrano, Juan Carlos & Astaiza-Gómez, José Gabriel & García, Juan David, 2021, "Un Modelo Principal-Agente Dinámico de Reducción de Perdidas de Energía Electrica en Tiempo Continuo
  [A Dynamic Principal-Agent Model of Electric Power Loss Reduction in Continuous Time]," MPRA Paper, University Library of Munich, Germany, number 110143.
• Kombarov, Sayan, 2021, "Action in Economics: Mathematical Derivation of Laws of Economics from the Principle of Least Action in Physics," MPRA Paper, University Library of Munich, Germany, number 112474, Aug.
• Doruk Cetemen & Felix Zhiyu Feng & Can Urgun, 2021, "Renegotiation and Dynamic Inconsistency: Contracting with Non-Exponential Discounting," Working Papers, Princeton University. Economics Department., number 2021-58, Feb.
• Can Urgun, 2021, "Restless Contracting," Working Papers, Princeton University. Economics Department., number 2021-88, Apr.
• Antoine L. Noël & Amy Hongfei Sun, 2021, "Information Transparency of Firm Financing," Working Paper, Economics Department, Queen's University, number 1459, Nov.
• Bester, Helmut & Lang, Matthias & Li, Jianpei, 2021, "Signaling versus Auditing," Rationality and Competition Discussion Paper Series, CRC TRR 190 Rationality and Competition, number 286, Oct.
• Ennio E. Piano, 2021, "Organizing high-end restaurants," Economics of Governance, Springer, volume 22, issue 2, pages 165-192, June, DOI: 10.1007/s10101-021-00253-y.
• Teddy Mekonnen, 2021, "Informed principal, moral hazard, and limited liability," Economic Theory Bulletin, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), volume 9, issue 1, pages 119-142, April, DOI: 10.1007/s40505-021-00201-3.