Research classified by Journal of Economic Literature (JEL) codes
Top JEL
/ D: Microeconomics
/ / D8: Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty
/ / / D86: Economics of Contract Law
This JEL code is mentioned in the following RePEc Biblio entries:
2022
- Deb, Rahul & Said, Maher & Pai, Mallesh, 2022, "Dynamic Incentives for Buy-Side Analysts," CEPR Discussion Papers, Centre for Economic Policy Research, number 17772, Dec.
- Светослав Борисов, 2022, "Регулаторни И Данъчни Предизвикателства Пред Пазара На Криптоактиви," Electronic magazine "Dialogue", D. A. Tsenov Academy of Economics, Svishtov, Bulgaria, issue 1 Year 20, pages 31-57.
- Hebert, Benjamin & Zhong, Weijie, 2022, "Engagement Maximization," Research Papers, Stanford University, Graduate School of Business, number 4035, Jul.
- Zhao, Siqi, 2022, "Robust contracting and corporate-termism," Economics Letters, Elsevier, volume 213, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2022.110344.
- Maslov, Alexander & Noiset, Luc & Schwartz, Jesse A., 2022, "A closer look at two conjectures about irregular marginal revenue," Economics Letters, Elsevier, volume 218, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2022.110728.
- Wu, Xi & Gan, Li, 2022, "One-sided commitment in life insurance contracts: Evidence from Health and Retirement Study," Economics Letters, Elsevier, volume 219, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2022.110825.
- Krause, Andreas, 2022, "The optimal exclusion length of borrowers after default," Economics Letters, Elsevier, volume 220, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2022.110881.
- Alasseur, Clémence & Chaton, Corinne & Hubert, Emma, 2022, "Optimal contracts under adverse selection for staple goods such as energy: Effectiveness of in-kind insurance," Energy Economics, Elsevier, volume 106, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.eneco.2021.105785.
- Fedorov, Semyon & Lavrutich, Maria & Hagspiel, Verena & Lerdahl, Thomas, 2022, "Risk and benefit sharing schemes in oil exploration and production," Energy Economics, Elsevier, volume 116, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.eneco.2022.106401.
- Azrieli, Yaron, 2022, "Delegated expertise: Implementability with peer-monitoring," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 132, issue C, pages 240-254, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2021.12.008.
- Bhattacharjee, Swagata, 2022, "Dynamic contracting for innovation under ambiguity," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 132, issue C, pages 534-552, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2022.01.015.
- Rao, Neel, 2022, "Search equilibrium with unobservable investment," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 133, issue C, pages 300-330, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2022.03.011.
- Rodivilov, Alexander, 2022, "Monitoring innovation," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 135, issue C, pages 297-326, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2022.06.011.
- Awaya, Yu & Do, Jihwan, 2022, "Incentives under equal-pay constraint and subjective peer evaluation," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 135, issue C, pages 41-59, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2022.05.007.
- Abrardi, Laura & Cambini, Carlo, 2022, "Carpe Data: Protecting online privacy with naive users," Information Economics and Policy, Elsevier, volume 60, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.infoecopol.2022.100988.
- Wolfstetter, Elmar G., 2022, "Universal high-speed broadband provision: A simple auction approach," Information Economics and Policy, Elsevier, volume 60, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.infoecopol.2022.100994.
- Choi, Kyoung Jin & Jeon, Junkee & Lee, Ho-Seok & Lin, Hsuan-Chih, 2022, "Optimal long-term contracts with disability insurance under limited commitment," Insurance: Mathematics and Economics, Elsevier, volume 104, issue C, pages 99-132, DOI: 10.1016/j.insmatheco.2022.02.007.
- Bourguignon, François & Platteau, Jean-Philippe, 2022, "Aid allocation: The role of external discipline," International Economics, Elsevier, volume 172, issue C, pages 278-296, DOI: 10.1016/j.inteco.2021.06.008.
- Nakanishi, Yoshinobu, 2022, "Determinants of the number of bidders and win-reserve ratio in open competitive tendering: Relationship-specific investments and incomplete contracts," Japan and the World Economy, Elsevier, volume 63, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.japwor.2022.101147.
- Cici, Gjergji & Kempf, Alexander & Peitzmeier, Claudia, 2022, "Knowledge spillovers in the mutual fund industry through labor mobility," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, volume 134, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.jbankfin.2021.106310.
- Byun, Seong, 2022, "The role of intrinsic incentives and corporate culture in motivating innovation," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, volume 134, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.jbankfin.2021.106325.
- Stark, Oded & Budzinski, Wiktor & Jakubek, Marcin & Kosiorowski, Grzegorz, 2022, "On the optimal size of a joint savings association," Journal of Comparative Economics, Elsevier, volume 50, issue 3, pages 804-814, DOI: 10.1016/j.jce.2022.04.002.
- Canidio, Andrea & Karle, Heiko, 2022, "The focusing effect in negotiations," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, volume 197, issue C, pages 1-20, DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2022.01.029.
- Gerlach, Heiko & Li, Junqian, 2022, "Experts, trust and competition," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, volume 198, issue C, pages 552-578, DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2022.04.020.
- Feng, Jun & Ho, Chun-Yu & Qin, Xiangdong, 2022, "Internal and external reference dependence of incomplete contracts: Experimental evidences," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, volume 203, issue C, pages 189-209, DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2022.09.009.
- Harstad, Bård & Lancia, Francesco & Russo, Alessia, 2022, "Prices vs. quantities for self-enforcing agreements," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, volume 111, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.jeem.2021.102595.
- Hansen, Peter G., 2022, "New formulations of ambiguous volatility with an application to optimal dynamic contracting," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, volume 199, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2021.105205.
- Szydlowski, Martin & Yoon, Ji Hee, 2022, "Ambiguity in dynamic contracts," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, volume 199, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2021.105229.
- He, Wei & Li, Jiangtao, 2022, "Correlation-robust auction design," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, volume 200, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2021.105403.
- Lavi, Ron & Shamash, Elisheva S., 2022, "Principal-agent VCG contracts," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, volume 201, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2022.105443.
- Wang, Cheng & Yang, Youzhi, 2022, "Optimal CEO turnover," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, volume 203, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2022.105475.
- Lopomo, Giuseppe & Rigotti, Luca & Shannon, Chris, 2022, "Detectability, duality, and surplus extraction," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, volume 204, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2022.105465.
- Hua, Xiameng & Watson, Joel, 2022, "Starting small in project choice: A discrete-time setting with a continuum of types," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, volume 204, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2022.105490.
- Nishimura, Takeshi, 2022, "Informed principal problems in bilateral trading," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, volume 204, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2022.105498.
- Breig, Zachary, 2022, "Repeated contracting without commitment," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, volume 204, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2022.105514.
- Jung, Jin Yong, 2022, "Effects of changes in preferences in moral hazard problems," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, volume 205, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2022.105527.
- Ekmekci, Mehmet & Maestri, Lucas, 2022, "Wait or act now? Learning dynamics in stopping games," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, volume 205, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2022.105541.
- Orlov, Dmitry, 2022, "Frequent monitoring in dynamic contracts," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, volume 206, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2022.105550.
- Ewens, Michael & Gorbenko, Alexander & Korteweg, Arthur, 2022, "Venture capital contracts," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, volume 143, issue 1, pages 131-158, DOI: 10.1016/j.jfineco.2021.06.042.
- Donaldson, Jason Roderick & Piacentino, Giorgia, 2022, "Money runs," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, volume 126, issue C, pages 35-57, DOI: 10.1016/j.jmoneco.2021.11.007.
- Dumav, Martin & Fuchs, William & Lee, Jangwoo, 2022, "Self-enforcing contracts with persistence," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, volume 128, issue C, pages 72-87, DOI: 10.1016/j.jmoneco.2022.03.010.
- Liu, Xiaojie & Shen, Jim Huangnan & Deng, Kent, 2022, "Endowment Structure, property rights and reforms of large state-owned enterprises (SOEs) in China: Past, present and future," Structural Change and Economic Dynamics, Elsevier, volume 62, issue C, pages 675-692, DOI: 10.1016/j.strueco.2022.05.006.
- Chaigneau, Pierre & Edmans, Alex & Gottlieb, Daniel, 2022, "How should performance signals affect contracts?," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library, number 109005, Jan.
- Gottlieb, Daniel & Moreira, Humberto, 2022, "Simple contracts with adverse selection and moral hazard," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library, number 114348, Jul.
- Amine Ben Amar & AbdelKader O. El Alaoui, 2022, "Profit- and loss-sharing partnership: the case of the two-tier mudharaba in Islamic banking," International Journal of Islamic and Middle Eastern Finance and Management, Emerald Group Publishing Limited, volume 16, issue 1, pages 81-102, May, DOI: 10.1108/IMEFM-12-2020-0630.
- Slava Mikhed & Sahil Raina & Barry Scholnick & Man Zhang, 2022, "Debtor Fraud in Consumer Debt Renegotiation," Working Papers, Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia, number 22-35, Oct, DOI: 10.21799/frbp.wp.2022.35.
- Andrea Attar & Thomas Mariotti & François Salanié, 2022, "Regulating Insurance Markets: Multiple Contracting and Adverse Selection," Post-Print, HAL, number hal-03796415, Aug, DOI: 10.1111/iere.12570.
- Saib Mhamed & Mokhtari Fayçal, 2022, "
[Institutional quality and economic development in MENA region Comparative analysis]," Post-Print, HAL, number hal-03904809, Dec. - Takeshi Murooka & Takuro Yamashita, 2022, "Adverse selection and bounded rationality: an impossibility theorem," Post-Print, HAL, number hal-04047796, Sep, DOI: 10.1007/s42973-022-00119-w.
- François Bourguignon & Jean-Philippe Platteau, 2022, "Aid allocation: The role of external discipline," Post-Print, HAL, number halshs-03324977, Dec, DOI: 10.1016/j.inteco.2021.06.008.
- Perrin Lefebvre & David Martimort, 2022, "Delegation, capture and endogenous information structures," Post-Print, HAL, number halshs-03758829, DOI: 10.1177/09516298221107552.
- David Martimort & Lars A. Stole, 2022, "Participation constraints in discontinuous adverse selection models," Post-Print, HAL, number halshs-03758833, Jul, DOI: 10.3982/TE3030.
- Clémence Alasseur & Corinne Chaton & Emma Hubert, 2022, "Optimal contracts under adverse selection for staple goods such as energy: Effectiveness of in-kind insurance," Post-Print, HAL, number halshs-03983355, Feb, DOI: 10.1016/j.eneco.2021.105785.
- François Bourguignon & Jean-Philippe Platteau, 2022, "Aid allocation: The role of external discipline," PSE-Ecole d'économie de Paris (Postprint), HAL, number halshs-03324977, Dec, DOI: 10.1016/j.inteco.2021.06.008.
- Perrin Lefebvre & David Martimort, 2022, "Delegation, capture and endogenous information structures," PSE-Ecole d'économie de Paris (Postprint), HAL, number halshs-03758829, DOI: 10.1177/09516298221107552.
- David Martimort & Lars A. Stole, 2022, "Participation constraints in discontinuous adverse selection models," PSE-Ecole d'économie de Paris (Postprint), HAL, number halshs-03758833, Jul, DOI: 10.3982/TE3030.
- Andrea Attar & Thomas Mariotti & François Salanié, 2022, "Competitive nonlinear pricing under adverse selection," Working Papers, HAL, number hal-03629592, Apr.
- Paltseva, Elena & Toews , Gerhard & Troya-Martinez, Marta, 2022, "I’ll pay you later: Sustaining Relationships under the Threat of Expropriation," SITE Working Paper Series, Stockholm School of Economics, Stockholm Institute of Transition Economics, number 59, Jun.
- Koustougeras, Leonidas & Santos, Manuel & Xu, Fei, 2022, "Corruption and Adverse Selection," Umeå Economic Studies, Umeå University, Department of Economics, number 1007, Aug.
- Altunina Anastasiia, 2022, "Study-Work Trade-off in Contests With Capacity-Constrained Students," HSE Working papers, National Research University Higher School of Economics, number WP BRP 259/EC/2022.
- Carlos Contreras & Julio Angulo, 2022, "Innovation and Tariff-adjustment Options in Public-private Partnerships," Hacienda Pública Española / Review of Public Economics, IEF, volume 243, issue 4, pages 51-81, December.
- Dirk Hackbarth & Alejandro Rivera & Tak-Yuen Wong, 2022, "Optimal Short-Termism," Management Science, INFORMS, volume 68, issue 9, pages 6477-6505, September, DOI: 10.1287/mnsc.2021.4139.
- Stark, Oded & Budzinski, Wiktor & Jakubek, Marcin & Kosiorowski, Grzegorz, 2022, "On the Optimal Size of a Joint Savings Association," IZA Discussion Papers, IZA Network @ LISER, number 15383, Jun.
- Gerten, Elisa & Beckmann, Michael & Kräkel, Matthias, 2022, "Information and Communication Technology, Hierarchy, and Job Design," IZA Discussion Papers, IZA Network @ LISER, number 15491, Aug.
- Abel, Martin & Burger, Rulof, 2022, "Choice over Payment Schemes and Worker Effort," IZA Discussion Papers, IZA Network @ LISER, number 15769, Dec.
- Matthias Fahn & Takeshi Murooka, 2022, "Informal Incentives and Labor Markets," Economics working papers, Department of Economics, Johannes Kepler University Linz, Austria, number 2022-05, Apr.
- Oliver J. Board & Kim-Sau Chung, 2022, "Object-based unawareness: Theory and applications," The Journal of Mechanism and Institution Design, Society for the Promotion of Mechanism and Institution Design, University of York, volume 7, issue 1, pages 1-43, December, DOI: 10.22574/jmid.2022.12.001.
- José Valente & Mário Augusto & José Murteira, 2022, "Bargaining power and renegotiation of small private debt contracts," Annals of Finance, Springer, volume 18, issue 4, pages 485-510, December, DOI: 10.1007/s10436-022-00413-y.
- Nisvan Erkal & Steven Y. Wu & Brian E. Roe, 2022, "Putting relational contract theory to the test: experimental evidence," Experimental Economics, Springer;Economic Science Association, volume 25, issue 1, pages 111-139, February, DOI: 10.1007/s10683-021-09707-w.
- Nisvan Erkal & Steven Y. Wu & Brian E. Roe, 2022, "Correction to: Putting relational contract theory to the test: experimental evidence," Experimental Economics, Springer;Economic Science Association, volume 25, issue 1, pages 140-140, February, DOI: 10.1007/s10683-021-09712-z.
- Jean-Louis Bago & Bruce Shearer, 2022, "Risk preferences and contract choices," Experimental Economics, Springer;Economic Science Association, volume 25, issue 5, pages 1374-1398, November, DOI: 10.1007/s10683-022-09768-5.
- Jasmin Droege, 2022, "First impression biases in the performing arts: taste-based discrimination and the value of blind auditioning," Journal of Cultural Economics, Springer;The Association for Cultural Economics International, volume 46, issue 3, pages 391-437, September, DOI: 10.1007/s10824-021-09428-1.
- Benjamin Hemingway, 2022, "Banking Regulation and Collateral Screening in a Model of Information Asymmetry," Journal of Financial Services Research, Springer;Western Finance Association, volume 61, issue 3, pages 367-405, June, DOI: 10.1007/s10693-021-00357-w.
- Kohei Daido & Takeshi Murooka, 2022, "The Provision of High-powered Incentives under Multitasking," Discussion Paper Series, School of Economics, Kwansei Gakuin University, number 242, Nov.
- Meg Adachi-Sato, 2022, "A Long-term Contract with a Possibility of Dismissal for a Multitasking Agent," Discussion Paper Series, Research Institute for Economics & Business Administration, Kobe University, number DP2022-23, May.
- Jose de Jesus Herrera-Velasquez, 2022, "Agency Problems in a Competitive Conglomerate with Production Constraints," KIER Working Papers, Kyoto University, Institute of Economic Research, number 1083, Sep.
- Laszlo Csorba, 2022, "The Effect of a Stronger Bargain Position on the Perfection and Completeness of a Contract," Financial and Economic Review, Magyar Nemzeti Bank (Central Bank of Hungary), volume 21, issue 3, pages 101-121.
- Chongwoo Choe & Shingo Ishiguro, 2022, "Relational Contracts and Hierarchy," Monash Economics Working Papers, Monash University, Department of Economics, number 2022-08, May.
- Barney Hartman-Glaser & Simon Mayer & Konstantin Milbradt, 2022, "A Theory of Cash Flow-Based Financing with Distress Resolution," NBER Working Papers, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc, number 29712, Jan.
- Joshua S. Gans & Richard T. Holden, 2022, "A Solomonic Solution to Ownership Disputes: An Application to Blockchain Front-Running," NBER Working Papers, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc, number 29780, Feb.
- Joshua S. Gans & Richard T. Holden, 2022, "Mechanism Design Approaches to Blockchain Consensus," NBER Working Papers, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc, number 30189, Jun.
- Braz Camargo & Fabian Lange & Elena Pastorino, 2022, "On the Role of Learning, Human Capital, and Performance Incentives for Wages," NBER Working Papers, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc, number 30191, Jun.
- Kohei Daido & Takeshi Murooka, 2022, "The Provision of High-powered Incentives under Multitasking," OSIPP Discussion Paper, Osaka School of International Public Policy, Osaka University, number 22E005, Nov.
- Di Guo & Xinyu Hua & Kun Jiang, 2022, "Indemnification, Monitoring, and Competition: Evidence from R&D Contracts," American Law and Economics Review, American Law and Economics Association, volume 24, issue 1, pages 203-246.
- Patrick W Schmitz, 2022, "How (Not) to Purchase Novel Goods and Services: Specific Performance Versus at-will Contracts," The Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, volume 132, issue 647, pages 2563-2577.
- Dyotona Dasgupta & Prabal Roy Chowdhury, 2022, "Simultaneous borrowing and saving in microfinance
[Microfinance beyond group lending]," Oxford Economic Papers, Oxford University Press, volume 74, issue 3, pages 920-935. - John Y Zhu, 2022, "Anticipating Disagreement in Dynamic Contracting
[An incomplete contracts approach to financial contracting]," Review of Finance, European Finance Association, volume 26, issue 5, pages 1241-1265. - Pierre Chaigneau & Alex Edmans & Daniel Gottlieb, 2022, "How Should Performance Signals Affect Contracts?," The Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, volume 35, issue 1, pages 168-206.
- Scott L. Mitchell & Mark D. Packard & Brent B. Clark, 2022, "Decentralizing corporate governance? A praxeological inquiry," International Journal of Disclosure and Governance, Palgrave Macmillan, volume 19, issue 4, pages 413-429, December, DOI: 10.1057/s41310-022-00151-7.
- Schmitz, Patrick W., 2022, "How (Not) to Purchase Novel Goods and Services: Specific Performance Versus At-Will Contracts," MPRA Paper, University Library of Munich, Germany, number 112839.
- Bukvić, Rajko, 2022, "Пет сила vs Дуги реп
[Five Forces vs Long Tail]," MPRA Paper, University Library of Munich, Germany, number 114557. - Pitterle, Claudia, 2022, "Consumer behavior and decision making from officed- based doctors A systematic literature review," MPRA Paper, University Library of Munich, Germany, number 117730.
- Banerjee, Swapnendu & Chakraborty, Somenath, 2022, "Individual versus Team Production with Social Preferences," MPRA Paper, University Library of Munich, Germany, number 120996, Dec.
- Todorova, Tamara, 2022, "Оливър Уилямсън: Новатор На 20 Век И Основател На Новата Институционална Икономика
[Oliver Williamson: an innovator of the 20th century and founder of the new institutional economics]," MPRA Paper, University Library of Munich, Germany, number 121077. - Archawa Paweenawat, 2022, "Relative Performance Contracts versus Group Contracts with Hidden Savings," PIER Discussion Papers, Puey Ungphakorn Institute for Economic Research, number 176, Mar.
- Celik, Gorkem & Shin, Dongsoo & Strausz, Roland, 2022, "Aggregate Information and Organizational Structures," Rationality and Competition Discussion Paper Series, CRC TRR 190 Rationality and Competition, number 356, Dec.
- Cheng Wang & Youzhi Yang, 2022, "Code and data files for "On the Pure Theory of Wage Dispersion"," Computer Codes, Review of Economic Dynamics, number 20-92, revised .
- Marc Escrihuela-Villar & Walter Ferrarese & Alberto Iozzi, 2022, "On the Role of Bargaining Power in Nash-in-Nash Bargaining: When More is Less," CEIS Research Paper, Tor Vergata University, CEIS, number 550, Dec, revised 22 Dec 2022.
- Przemysław Wechta, 2022, "Dividend policy from the perspective of social system theory," The Economic and Labour Relations Review, , volume 33, issue 3, pages 610-628, September, DOI: 10.1177/10353046221078879.
- Perrin Lefebvre & David Martimort, 2022, "Delegation, capture and endogenous information structures," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , volume 34, issue 3, pages 357-414, July, DOI: 10.1177/09516298221107552.
- Oindrila Dey & Swapnendu Banerjee, 2022, "Incentives, Status and Thereafter: A Critical Survey," South Asian Journal of Macroeconomics and Public Finance, , volume 11, issue 1, pages 95-115, June, DOI: 10.1177/2277978721990970.
- Prasun Bhattacharjee & Biswajit Mandal & Ravi Radhakrishnan, 2022, "Informal input sector and its impact on output market competitiveness," Indian Economic Review, Springer, volume 57, issue 2, pages 553-564, December, DOI: 10.1007/s41775-022-00146-9.
- Prasun Bhattacharjee & Biswajit Mandal & Ravi Radhakrishnan, 2022, "Correction to: Informal input sector and its impact on output market competitiveness," Indian Economic Review, Springer, volume 57, issue 2, pages 603-603, December, DOI: 10.1007/s41775-023-00160-5.
- Shingo Ishiguro, 2022, "Management cycles," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), volume 73, issue 1, pages 257-300, February, DOI: 10.1007/s00199-020-01337-2.
- Jaeyoung Sung, 2022, "Optimal contracting under mean-volatility joint ambiguity uncertainties," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), volume 74, issue 2, pages 593-642, September, DOI: 10.1007/s00199-021-01362-9.
- Andrei Barbos, 2022, "Optimal contracts with random monitoring," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, volume 51, issue 1, pages 119-154, March, DOI: 10.1007/s00182-021-00787-9.
- Gottlieb, Daniel & Moreira, Humberto, 2022, "Simple contracts with adverse selection and moral hazard," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, volume 17, issue 3, July.
- Martimort, David & Stole, Lars A., 2022, "Participation constraints in discontinuous adverse selection models," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, volume 17, issue 3, July.
- Moroni, Sofia, 2022, "Experimentation in Organizations," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, volume 17, issue 3, July.
- Schumacher, Heiner & Thysen, Heidi Christina, 2022, "Equilibrium contracts and boundedly rational expectations," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, volume 17, issue 1, January.
- Deb, Rahul & Mitchell, Matthew & Pai, Mallesh M., 2022, "(Bad) reputation in relational contracting," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, volume 17, issue 2, May.
- Bird, Daniel & Frug, Alexander, 2022, "Monotone contracts," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, volume 17, issue 3, July.
- Stefanie Huber & Tobias Schmidt, 2022, "Nevertheless, they persist: Cross-Country Differences in Homeownership Behavior," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers, Tinbergen Institute, number 22-009/II, Jan.
- Andrea M. Buffa & Dimitri Vayanos & Paul Woolley, 2022, "Asset Management Contracts and Equilibrium Prices," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, volume 130, issue 12, pages 3146-3201, DOI: 10.1086/720515.
- Andrey E. Shastitko, 2022, "Credible commitments in contract relations: Where are the limits of the possible?," Upravlenets, Ural State University of Economics, volume 13, issue 2, pages 20-33, May, DOI: 10.29141/2218-5003-2022-13-2-2.
- Keeler Marku & Sergio Ocampo & Jean-Baptiste Tondji, 2022, "Robust Contracts in Common Agency," University of Western Ontario, Departmental Research Report Series, University of Western Ontario, Department of Economics, number 20222.
- Tamara Todorova, 2022, "Oliver Williamson: Founder of the New Institutional Economics," Scientific Conference of the Department of General Economic Theory, University of Economics - Varna, issue 1, pages 279-286.
- Andrea Attar & Thomas Mariotti & François Salanié, 2022, "Regulating Insurance Markets: Multiple Contracting And Adverse Selection," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, volume 63, issue 3, pages 981-1020, August, DOI: 10.1111/iere.12570.
- Paulo Fagandini, 2022, "Wealth and the principal–agent matching," Managerial and Decision Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., volume 43, issue 2, pages 555-568, March, DOI: 10.1002/mde.3402.
- Swagata Bhattacharjee, 2022, "Delegation Using Forward Induction," International Game Theory Review (IGTR), World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd., volume 24, issue 03, pages 1-33, September, DOI: 10.1142/S0219198921500225.
- Chang Koo Chi & Kyoung Jin Choi, 2022, "A Dual Approach To Agency Problems: Existence," Working papers, Yonsei University, Yonsei Economics Research Institute, number 2022rwp-197, Jun.
- Peter J. Simmons & Anna Maria C. Menichini, 2022, "Efficient audits by pooling independent projects: Separation vs. conglomeration," Discussion Papers, Department of Economics, University of York, number 22/06, Oct.
- Lehr, William, 2022, "Smart Contracts: Myths and Implications for Economics and Financial Regulation," 31st European Regional ITS Conference, Gothenburg 2022: Reining in Digital Platforms? Challenging monopolies, promoting competition and developing regulatory regimes, International Telecommunications Society (ITS), number 265650.
- D'Acunto, Francesco & Xie, Jin & Yao, Jiaquan, 2022, "Trust and contracts: Empirical evidence," LawFin Working Paper Series, Goethe University, Center for Advanced Studies on the Foundations of Law and Finance (LawFin), number 32.
- Kaehny, Maximilian & Herweg, Fabian, 2022, "Do Zombies Rise When Interest Rates Fall? A Relationship-Banking Model," VfS Annual Conference 2022 (Basel): Big Data in Economics, Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association, number 264126.
2021
- Marina Halac & Elliot Lipnowski & Daniel Rappoport, 2021, "Rank Uncertainty in Organizations," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, volume 111, issue 3, pages 757-786, March, DOI: 10.1257/aer.20200555.
- Ernst Fehr & Michael Powell & Tom Wilkening, 2021, "Behavioral Constraints on the Design of Subgame-Perfect Implementation Mechanisms," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, volume 111, issue 4, pages 1055-1091, April, DOI: 10.1257/aer.20170297.
- Andrea Attar & Thomas Mariotti & François Salanié, 2021, "Entry-Proofness and Discriminatory Pricing under Adverse Selection," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, volume 111, issue 8, pages 2623-2659, August, DOI: 10.1257/aer.20190189.
- Manoj Mohanan & Katherine Donato & Grant Miller & Yulya Truskinovsky & Marcos Vera-Hernández, 2021, "Different Strokes for Different Folks? Experimental Evidence on the Effectiveness of Input and Output Incentive Contracts for Health Care Providers with Varying Skills," American Economic Journal: Applied Economics, American Economic Association, volume 13, issue 4, pages 34-69, October, DOI: 10.1257/app.20190220.
- Dana Foarta & Takuo Sugaya, 2021, "Wait-and-See or Step In? Dynamics of Interventions," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, volume 13, issue 1, pages 399-425, February, DOI: 10.1257/mic.20180321.
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- Matan Tsur, 2021, "A Bargaining-Based Model of Security Design," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, volume 13, issue 3, pages 443-473, August, DOI: 10.1257/mic.20190019.
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- Joel Watson, 2021, "Theoretical Foundations of Relational Incentive Contracts," Annual Review of Economics, Annual Reviews, volume 13, issue 1, pages 631-659, August, DOI: 10.1146/annurev-economics-090820-11.
- Carlos Segura-Rodriguez & Ashwin Kambhampati, 2021, "The Optimal Assortativity of Teams Inside the Firm," Documentos de Trabajo, Banco Central de Costa Rica, number 2103, Feb.
- Laura Doval & Vasiliki Skreta, 2021, "Purchase history and product personalization," Papers, arXiv.org, number 2103.11504, Mar, revised Jul 2023.
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- Elmar G. Wolfstetter, 2021, "Universal High-Speed Broadband Provision: An Alternative Policy Approach," CESifo Working Paper Series, CESifo, number 9014.
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