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Government Financing of R&D: A Mechanism Design Approach

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  • Saul Lach
  • Zvika Neeman
  • Mark Schankerman

Abstract

We study how to design an optimal government loan program for risky R&D projects with positive externalities. With adverse selection, the optimal government contract involves a high interest rate but nearly zero cofinancing by the entrepreneur. This contrasts sharply with observed loan schemes. With adverse selection and moral hazard, allowing for two levels of effort by the entrepreneur, the optimal policy consists of a menu of at most two contracts, one with high interest and zero self-financing and a second with a lower interest plus cofinancing. Calibrated simulations assess welfare gains from the optimal policy, observed loan programs, and a direct subsidy to private venture capital firms. The gains vary with the size of the externalities, the cost of public funds, and the effectiveness of the private venture capital industry.

Suggested Citation

  • Saul Lach & Zvika Neeman & Mark Schankerman, 2021. "Government Financing of R&D: A Mechanism Design Approach," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 13(3), pages 238-272, August.
    • Handle: RePEc:aea:aejmic:v:13:y:2021:i:3:p:238-72
    DOI: 10.1257/mic.20190053
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    Cited by:

    1. Gehrig, Thomas & Stenbacka, Rune, 2023. "R&D and subsidy policy with imperfect project classification," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 222(C).
    2. Isabel Busom & Jorge-Andrés Vélez-Ospina, 2021. "Subsidising innovation over the business cycle," Industry and Innovation, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 28(6), pages 773-803, July.
    3. García-Vega, María & Vicente-Chirivella, Óscar, 2020. "Do university technology transfers increase firms’ innovation?," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 123(C).
    4. Rainer Widmann, 2023. "The Behavioral Additionality of Government Research Grants," Rationality and Competition Discussion Paper Series 417, CRC TRR 190 Rationality and Competition.
    5. Eduardo FERNANDEZ-ARIAS & Jiajun XU, 2020. "Pour une banque de développement efficace : prêts ou garanties ?," Working Paper 2fcdfcfb-d113-44d8-9e02-6, Agence française de développement.
    6. Lassi Ahlvik & Inge van den Bijgaart, 2022. "Screening Green Innovation through Carbon Pricing," CESifo Working Paper Series 9931, CESifo.
    7. Eduardo FERNANDEZ-ARIAS & Jiajun XU, 2020. "Effective development banking: loans or guarantees?," Working Paper 2fcdfcfb-d113-44d8-9e02-6, Agence française de développement.
    8. Maria Garcia-Vega & Oscar Vicente-Chirivella, 2019. "R&D and firm resilience during bad times," Discussion Papers 2019-13, University of Nottingham, GEP.

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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
    • D86 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Economics of Contract Law
    • G24 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Investment Banking; Venture Capital; Brokerage
    • G32 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Financing Policy; Financial Risk and Risk Management; Capital and Ownership Structure; Value of Firms; Goodwill
    • H81 - Public Economics - - Miscellaneous Issues - - - Governmental Loans; Loan Guarantees; Credits; Grants; Bailouts
    • L26 - Industrial Organization - - Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior - - - Entrepreneurship
    • O31 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Innovation; Research and Development; Technological Change; Intellectual Property Rights - - - Innovation and Invention: Processes and Incentives

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