Research classified by Journal of Economic Literature (JEL) codes

1. Transaction Cost Economics

2017

• Weinert, Jan-Hendrik, 2017, "The fair surrender value of a tontine," ICIR Working Paper Series, Goethe University Frankfurt, International Center for Insurance Regulation (ICIR), number 26/17.
• Schottmüller-Einwag, Ute, 2017, "Theoretische Erklärungsansätze für die Entsprechenserklärungen zu Abfindungen für Vorstandsmitglieder
  [Theoretical explanation approaches for the declarations of conformity regarding severance payments for members of the management board]," Discussion Papers of the Institute for Organisational Economics, University of Münster, Institute for Organisational Economics, number 7/2017.
• Schumacher, Heiner & Thysen, Heidi, 2017, "Equilibrium Contracts and Boundedly Rational Expectations," VfS Annual Conference 2017 (Vienna): Alternative Structures for Money and Banking, Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association, number 168085.
• Fahn, Matthias & Schade, Anne & Schüßler, Katharina, 2017, "Gift exchange vs. repeated interaction as a source of reciprocal behavior," VfS Annual Conference 2017 (Vienna): Alternative Structures for Money and Banking, Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association, number 168150.

2016

• Yaping Shan, 2016, "Optimal Contracts for Research Agents," School of Economics and Public Policy Working Papers, University of Adelaide, School of Economics and Public Policy, number 2016-14, Nov.
• Malin Arve & David Martimort, 2016, "Dynamic Procurement under Uncertainty: Optimal Design and Implications for Incomplete Contracts," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, volume 106, issue 11, pages 3238-3274, November.
• Peter Koudijs & Hans-Joachim Voth, 2016, "Leverage and Beliefs: Personal Experience and Risk-Taking in Margin Lending," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, volume 106, issue 11, pages 3367-3400, November.
• Brett Green & Curtis R. Taylor, 2016, "Breakthroughs, Deadlines, and Self-Reported Progress: Contracting for Multistage Projects," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, volume 106, issue 12, pages 3660-3699, December.
• Rajshri Jayaraman & Debraj Ray & Francis de Véricourt, 2016, "Anatomy of a Contract Change," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, volume 106, issue 2, pages 316-358, February.
• Edward L. Glaeser & Andrew Hillis & Scott Duke Kominers & Michael Luca, 2016, "Crowdsourcing City Government: Using Tournaments to Improve Inspection Accuracy," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, volume 106, issue 5, pages 114-118, May.
• Enrique Ide & Juan-Pablo Montero & Nicolás Figueroa, 2016, "Discounts as a Barrier to Entry," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, volume 106, issue 7, pages 1849-1877, July.
• V. V. Chari & Patrick J. Kehoe, 2016, "Bailouts, Time Inconsistency, and Optimal Regulation: A Macroeconomic View," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, volume 106, issue 9, pages 2458-2493, September.
• Charles T. Carlstrom & Timothy S. Fuerst & Matthias Paustian, 2016, "Optimal Contracts, Aggregate Risk, and the Financial Accelerator," American Economic Journal: Macroeconomics, American Economic Association, volume 8, issue 1, pages 119-147, January.
• Ana Fostel & John Geanakoplos, 2016, "Financial Innovation, Collateral, and Investment," American Economic Journal: Macroeconomics, American Economic Association, volume 8, issue 1, pages 242-284, January.
• Josef Schroth, 2016, "Optimal Intermediary Rents," American Economic Journal: Macroeconomics, American Economic Association, volume 8, issue 1, pages 98-118, January.
• Christodoulos Stefanadis, 2016, "Naked Exclusion and the Volatility of Innovation," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, volume 8, issue 3, pages 39-50, August.
• Jeanine Miklós-Thal & Greg Shaffer, 2016, "Naked Exclusion with Private Offers," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, volume 8, issue 4, pages 174-194, November.
• Ahamad, Mazbahul, , "Envious Preferences in Two-sided Matching," 2016 Annual Meeting, July 31-August 2, Boston, Massachusetts, Agricultural and Applied Economics Association, number 235482, DOI: 10.22004/ag.econ.235482.
• Sant'Anna, Ana Claudia & Bergtold, Jason & Caldas, Marcellus & Granco, Gabriel, 2016, "Analyzing sugarcane production contracts in Brazil: What do the farmers really want?," 2016 Annual Meeting, July 31-August 2, Boston, Massachusetts, Agricultural and Applied Economics Association, number 235655, DOI: 10.22004/ag.econ.235655.
• Steven Rosefielde, 2016, "Grexit and Brexit: Rational choice, compatibility, and coercive adaptation," Acta Oeconomica, Akadémiai Kiadó, Hungary, volume 66, issue supplemen, pages 77-91, December.
• Mark Armstrong, 2016, "Nonlinear Pricing," Annual Review of Economics, Annual Reviews, volume 8, issue 1, pages 583-614, October.
• David Pérez-Castrillo & Inés Macho-Stadler, 2016, "Moral Hazard: Base Models and Two Extensions," Working Papers, Barcelona School of Economics, number 883, Feb.
• Kohei Daido & Takeshi Murooka, 2016, "Team Incentives and Reference‐Dependent Preferences," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, volume 25, issue 4, pages 958-989, December, DOI: 10.1111/jems.12166.
• Péter Benczúr & Cosmin L. Ilut, 2016, "Evidence For Relational Contracts In Sovereign Bank Lending," Journal of the European Economic Association, European Economic Association, volume 14, issue 2, pages 375-404, April.
• Bård Harstad, 2016, "The Dynamics Of Climate Agreements," Journal of the European Economic Association, European Economic Association, volume 14, issue 3, pages 719-752, June.
• Jordi Brandts & Matthew Ellman & Gary Charness, 2016, "Let'S Talk: How Communication Affects Contract Design," Journal of the European Economic Association, European Economic Association, volume 14, issue 4, pages 943-974, August.
• Philippe Choné & Laurent Linnemer, 2016, "Nonlinear pricing and exclusion:II. Must-stock products," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, volume 47, issue 3, pages 631-660, August.
• F. Barigozzi & P. Tedeschi, 2016, "Informed Principals in the Credit Market when Borrowers and Lenders Are Heterogeneous," Working Papers, Dipartimento Scienze Economiche, Universita' di Bologna, number wp1051, Jan.
• F. Barigozzi & N. Burani, 2016, "Competition Between For-Profit and Non-Profit Firms: Incentives, Workers Self-Selection, and Wage Differentials," Working Papers, Dipartimento Scienze Economiche, Universita' di Bologna, number wp1072, Jul.
• M. Bigoni & S. Bortolotti & F. Parisi & A. Porat, 2016, "Unbundling Efficient Breach: An Experiment," Working Papers, Dipartimento Scienze Economiche, Universita' di Bologna, number wp1088, Nov.
• Luis Garicano & Luis Rayo, 2016, "Relational knowledge transfers," CEP Discussion Papers, Centre for Economic Performance, LSE, number dp1412, Mar.
• Ines Macho-Stadler & David Pérez-Castrillo, 2016, "Moral Hazard: Base Models and Two Extensions," CESifo Working Paper Series, CESifo, number 5851.
• Michel A. Habib & D. Bruce Johnsen, 2016, "The Quality-Assuring Role of Mutual Fund Advisory Fees," Swiss Finance Institute Research Paper Series, Swiss Finance Institute, number 16-16, Feb, revised Apr 2016.
• Vanessa Kummer & Maik Meusel & Philipp Renner & Karl Schmedders, 2016, "New and Revised Results for 'Building Reputation for Contract Renewal: Implications for Performance Dynamics and Contract Duration'," Swiss Finance Institute Research Paper Series, Swiss Finance Institute, number 16-32, May.
• Maria De Paola & Francesca Gioia & Vincenzo Scoppa, 2016, "Free-Riding And Knowledge Spillovers In Teams: The Role Of Social Ties," Working Papers, Università della Calabria, Dipartimento di Economia, Statistica e Finanza "Giovanni Anania" - DESF, number 201609, Sep.
• Garicano, Luis & Rayo, Luis, 2016, "Relational Knowledge Transfers," CEPR Discussion Papers, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers, number 11138, Mar.
• Schmitz, Patrick W. & Kusterer, David J., 2016, "The Management of Innovation: Experimental Evidence," CEPR Discussion Papers, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers, number 11215, Apr.
• Schmitz, Patrick W. & Goldlücke, Susanne, 2016, "Pollution Claim Settlements Reconsidered: Hidden Information and Bounded Payments," CEPR Discussion Papers, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers, number 11217, Apr.
• Schmitz, Patrick W., 2016, "The Negotiators Who Knew Too Much: Transaction Costs and Incomplete Information," CEPR Discussion Papers, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers, number 11276, May.
• Heider, Florian & Calcagno, Riccardo, 2016, "Liquidity, Information Aggregation, and Market-Based Pay in an Efficient Market," CEPR Discussion Papers, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers, number 11298, May.
• Bhaskar, Venkataraman & Mailath, George J., 2016, "The curse of long horizons," CEPR Discussion Papers, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers, number 11431, Aug.
• Mariotti, Thomas & Attar, Andrea & Salanié, François, 2016, "Multiple Contracting in Insurance Markets," CEPR Discussion Papers, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers, number 11631, Nov.
• Schmitz, Patrick W. & Müller, Daniel, 2016, "Optimal Ownership of Public Goods in the Presence of Transaction Costs," CEPR Discussion Papers, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers, number 11632, Nov.
• Luca Anderlini & Leonardo Felli & Alessandro Riboni, 2016, "Legal Efficiency and Consistency," Working Papers, Center for Research in Economics and Statistics, number 2016-22, May.
• Pio Baake & Andreas Harasser & Friederike Heiny, 2016, "Information Acquisition in Vertical Relations," Discussion Papers of DIW Berlin, DIW Berlin, German Institute for Economic Research, number 1543.
• Oindrila Dey & Swapnendu Banerjee, 2016, "Stochastic Appraisal: A Theory with an Application to Random Favouritism," Indian Economic Review, Department of Economics, Delhi School of Economics, volume 51, issue 1, pages 83-103.
• Dosis, Anastasios, 2016, "An Efficient Mechanism for Competitive Markets with Adverse Selection," ESSEC Working Papers, ESSEC Research Center, ESSEC Business School, number WP1604, Feb.
• Dosis, Anastasios, 2016, "Investment, Adverse Selection and Optimal Redistributive Taxation," ESSEC Working Papers, ESSEC Research Center, ESSEC Business School, number WP1605, Feb.
• Dosis, Anastasios, 2016, "Bertand Competition and the Existence of Pure Strategy Nash Equilibrium in Markets with Adverse Selection," ESSEC Working Papers, ESSEC Research Center, ESSEC Business School, number WP1606, Feb.
• Dosis, Anastasios, 2016, "A More General Definition of Equilibrium in Markets with Adverse Selection," ESSEC Working Papers, ESSEC Research Center, ESSEC Business School, number WP1607, Feb.
• Dosis, Anastasios, 2016, "On Signalling and Screening," ESSEC Working Papers, ESSEC Research Center, ESSEC Business School, number WP1608, Feb.
• Kratz, Marie & Lok, Y-H & McNeil, Alexander J., 2016, "Multinomial VaR Backtests: A simple implicit approach to backtesting expected shortfall," ESSEC Working Papers, ESSEC Research Center, ESSEC Business School, number WP1617, Nov.
• DeMarzo, Peter M. & Sannikov, Yuliy, 2016, "Learning, Termination, and Payout Policy in Dynamic Incentive Contracts," Research Papers, Stanford University, Graduate School of Business, number 3432, May.
• Juan F. Escobar & Carlos Pulgar, 2016, "Motivating with Simple Contracts," Documentos de Trabajo, Centro de Economía Aplicada, Universidad de Chile, number 325.
• Terstiege, Stefan, 2016, "On information acquisition by buyers and information disclosure by sellers," Economics Letters, Elsevier, volume 140, issue C, pages 60-63, DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2016.01.010.
• Ozerturk, Saltuk, 2016, "Minority perception of exclusion and promotion hurdles," Economics Letters, Elsevier, volume 141, issue C, pages 55-59, DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2016.02.006.
• Burani, Nadia & Palestini, Arsen, 2016, "What determines volunteer work? On the effects of adverse selection and intrinsic motivation," Economics Letters, Elsevier, volume 144, issue C, pages 29-32, DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2016.04.014.
• Gattai, Valeria & Natale, Piergiovanna, 2016, "Investment spillovers and the allocation of property rights," Economics Letters, Elsevier, volume 145, issue C, pages 109-113, DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2016.05.025.
• Schmitz, Patrick W., 2016, "The negotiators who knew too much: Transaction costs and incomplete information," Economics Letters, Elsevier, volume 145, issue C, pages 33-37, DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2016.05.009.
• Karle, Heiko & Schumacher, Heiner & Staat, Christian, 2016, "Signaling quality with increased incentives," European Economic Review, Elsevier, volume 85, issue C, pages 8-21, DOI: 10.1016/j.euroecorev.2016.02.002.
• Müller, Daniel & Schmitz, Patrick W., 2016, "Transaction costs and the property rights approach to the theory of the firm," European Economic Review, Elsevier, volume 87, issue C, pages 92-107, DOI: 10.1016/j.euroecorev.2016.04.013.
• Macias, Antonio J. & Moeller, Thomas, 2016, "Target signaling with material adverse change clauses in merger agreements," Journal of Empirical Finance, Elsevier, volume 39, issue PA, pages 69-92, DOI: 10.1016/j.jempfin.2016.09.002.
• Kim, Hwa-Sung, 2016, "Performance-based bonuses for investment and abandonment decisions," Finance Research Letters, Elsevier, volume 18, issue C, pages 120-126, DOI: 10.1016/j.frl.2016.04.009.
• Barkaoui, Ahmed & Dragicevic, Arnaud Z., 2016, "Nash bargaining and renegotiation with social preferences: case of the roundwood log supply contracts in the French timber market," Forest Policy and Economics, Elsevier, volume 69, issue C, pages 90-100, DOI: 10.1016/j.forpol.2016.04.007.
• Shao, Ran, 2016, "Generalized coarse matching," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 100, issue C, pages 142-148, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2016.09.008.
• Roger, Guillaume, 2016, "Participation in moral hazard problems," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 95, issue C, pages 10-24, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2015.11.005.
• Kräkel, Matthias, 2016, "Peer effects and incentives," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 97, issue C, pages 120-127, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2016.04.005.
• He, Wei & Li, Jiangtao, 2016, "Efficient dynamic mechanisms with interdependent valuations," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 97, issue C, pages 166-173, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2016.04.008.
• Terstiege, Stefan, 2016, "Gathering imperfect information before signing a contract," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 97, issue C, pages 70-87, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2016.03.009.
• Boleslavsky, Raphael & Lewis, Tracy R., 2016, "Evolving influence: Mitigating extreme conflicts of interest in advisory relationships," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 98, issue C, pages 110-134, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2016.05.005.
• Heyes, Anthony & Martin, Steve, 2016, "Fuzzy products," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, volume 45, issue C, pages 1-9, DOI: 10.1016/j.ijindorg.2015.12.003.
• Habib, Michel A. & Johnsen, D. Bruce, 2016, "The quality-assuring role of mutual fund advisory fees," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, volume 46, issue C, pages 1-19, DOI: 10.1016/j.irle.2015.11.003.
• Baldenius, Tim & Glover, Jonathan & Xue, Hao, 2016, "Relational contracts with and between agents," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, volume 61, issue 2, pages 369-390, DOI: 10.1016/j.jacceco.2016.01.002.
• Lin, Zhijun & Song, Byron Y. & Tian, Zhimin, 2016, "Does director-level reputation matter? Evidence from bank loan contracting," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, volume 70, issue C, pages 160-176, DOI: 10.1016/j.jbankfin.2016.04.021.
• Christensen, Else Gry Bro & Nafziger, Julia, 2016, "Packaging of sin goods – Commitment or exploitation?," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, volume 122, issue C, pages 62-74, DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2015.11.007.
• Chade, Hector & Kovrijnykh, Natalia, 2016, "Delegated information acquisition with moral hazard," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, volume 162, issue C, pages 55-92, DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2015.12.003.
• Bierbrauer, Felix & Netzer, Nick, 2016, "Mechanism design and intentions," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, volume 163, issue C, pages 557-603, DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2016.02.013.
• Krähmer, Daniel & Kováč, Eugen, 2016, "Optimal sequential delegation," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, volume 163, issue C, pages 849-888, DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2016.03.009.
• Arie, Guy, 2016, "Dynamic costs and moral hazard: A duality-based approach," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, volume 166, issue C, pages 1-50, DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2016.08.002.
• Piskorski, Tomasz & Westerfield, Mark M., 2016, "Optimal dynamic contracts with moral hazard and costly monitoring," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, volume 166, issue C, pages 242-281, DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2016.08.003.
• Frankel, Alexander, 2016, "Discounted quotas," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, volume 166, issue C, pages 396-444, DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2016.08.001.
• Carroll, Gabriel & Meng, Delong, 2016, "Robust contracting with additive noise," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, volume 166, issue C, pages 586-604, DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2016.10.002.
• Barigozzi, Francesca & Burani, Nadia, 2016, "Competition and screening with motivated health professionals," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, volume 50, issue C, pages 358-371, DOI: 10.1016/j.jhealeco.2016.06.003.
• Golosov, M. & Tsyvinski, A. & Werquin, N., 2016, "Recursive Contracts and Endogenously Incomplete Markets," Handbook of Macroeconomics, Elsevier, chapter 0, in: J. B. Taylor & Harald Uhlig, "Handbook of Macroeconomics", DOI: 10.1016/bs.hesmac.2016.03.007.
• Ewerhart, Christian, 2016, "An envelope approach to tournament design," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, volume 63, issue C, pages 1-9, DOI: 10.1016/j.jmateco.2015.11.004.
• Jin, Yi & Zeng, Zhixiong, 2016, "Risk, risk aversion, and a finance-augmented neoclassical economic model of production," International Journal of Production Economics, Elsevier, volume 176, issue C, pages 82-91, DOI: 10.1016/j.ijpe.2016.03.009.
• Ábrahám, Árpád & Koehne, Sebastian & Pavoni, Nicola, 2016, "Optimal income taxation when asset taxation is limited," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, volume 136, issue C, pages 14-29, DOI: 10.1016/j.jpubeco.2016.02.003.
• Liu, Xiaojie & Shen, Jim Huangnan & Deng, Kent, 2016, "A rational path towards a Pareto optimum for reforms of large state-owned enterprise in China, past, present and future," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library, number 67019, Jun.
• Acs, Zoltan J. & Braunerhjelm, Pontus & Karlsson, Charlie, 2016, "Philippe Aghion: recipient of the 2016 Global Award for Entrepreneurship Research," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library, number 69852, Sep.
• Liu, Xiaojie & Shen, Jim Huangnan & Deng, Kent, 2016, "A rational path towards a Pareto optimum for reforms of large state-owned enterprise in China, past, present and future," Economic History Working Papers, London School of Economics and Political Science, Department of Economic History, number 67019, Jun.
• Julie Ing, 2016, "Adverse selection, commitment and exhaustible resource taxation," CER-ETH Economics working paper series, CER-ETH - Center of Economic Research (CER-ETH) at ETH Zurich, number 16/263, Dec.
• Ester Manna & Alessandro De Chiara, 2016, "Delegation with a Reciprocal Agent," UB School of Economics Working Papers, University of Barcelona School of Economics, number 2016/346.
• Feng Gao & Zhiguo He & Bin Wei & Jianfeng Yu, 2016, "Optimal Long-Term Contracting with Learning," FRB Atlanta Working Paper, Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta, number 2016-10, Nov.
• Qi Liu & Bo Sun, 2016, "Managerial Compensation under Privately-Observed Hedging," International Finance Discussion Papers, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.), number 1160, Mar, DOI: 10.17016/IFDP.2016.1160.
• Qi Liu & Bo Sun, 2016, "Relative Wealth Concerns, Executive Compensation, and Systemic Risk-Taking," International Finance Discussion Papers, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.), number 1164, May, DOI: 10.17016/IFDP.2016.1164.
• Alexander Monge-Naranjo, 2016, "Student Loans Under the Risk of Youth Unemployment," Review, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, volume 98, issue 2, pages 129-158, DOI: 10.20955/r.2016.129-158.
• Emilio Espino & Julian Kozlowski & Juan M. Sanchez, 2016, "Stylized Facts on the Organization of Small Business Partnerships," Review, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, volume 98, issue 4, pages 297-310, DOI: 10.20955/r.2016.297-310.
• Christopher S. Armstrong & Wayne R. Guay & Hamid Mehran & Joseph P. Weber, 2016, "The role of financial reporting and transparency in corporate governance," Economic Policy Review, Federal Reserve Bank of New York, issue Aug, pages 107-128.
• Lukasz A. Drozd & Ricardo Serrano-Padial, 2016, "Financial contracting with enforcement externalities," Working Papers, Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia, number 16-1, Jan.
• Benjamin Lester & Ali Shourideh & Venky Venkateswaran & Ariel Zetlin-Jones, 2016, "Screening and adverse selection in frictional markets," Working Papers, Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia, number 16-10, Mar.
• Borys Grochulski & Yuzhe Zhang, 2016, "Optimal Contracts with Reflection," Working Paper, Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond, number 16-14, Dec.
• Saenger, Christoph & Torero, Máximo & Qaim, Matin, 2016, "Impact of third-party enforcement of contracts in agricultural markets—A field experiment in Vietnam," IFPRI book chapters, International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI), chapter 11, in: Devaux, André; Donovan, Jason; Horton, Douglas E.; Torero, Maximo, "Innovation for inclusive value-chain development: Successes and challenges".
• Dan Cao & Roger Lagunoff, 2016, "The Design of Optimal Collateralized Contracts," Working Papers, Georgetown University, Department of Economics, number gueconwpa~16-16-01, Apr, revised 01 Jun 2017.
• Tymofiy Mylovanov & Andriy Zapechelnyuk, 2016, "Optimal Allocation With Ex-Post Verification And Limited Penalties," Working Papers, Business School - Economics, University of Glasgow, number 2016_21, Oct.
• Ahamadou MAICHANOU, 2016, "Agricultural insurance index-based: justification and implementation in Niger," Cahiers du GREThA (2007-2019), Groupe de Recherche en Economie Théorique et Appliquée (GREThA), number 2016-05.
• Ahamadou MAICHANOU, 2016, "Determinants of Borrowing and Households’ Risk of Credit in Rural Area in Niger," Cahiers du GREThA (2007-2019), Groupe de Recherche en Economie Théorique et Appliquée (GREThA), number 2016-06.
• Steven Suranovic, 2016, "Surge Pricing and Price Gouging: Public Misunderstanding as a Market Imperfection," Working Papers, The George Washington University, Institute for International Economic Policy, number 2015-21, May.
• Anthony Yezer & Pingkang Yu, 2016, "Costly Screening, Self-Selection, Fraud, and the Organization of Credit Markets," Working Papers, The George Washington University, Institute for International Economic Policy, number 2016-4, May.
• Ahmed Barkaoui & Arnaud Z. Dragicevic, 2016, "Nash bargaining and renegotiation with social preferences: case of the roundwood log supply contracts in the French timber market," Post-Print, HAL, number hal-01352691, DOI: 10.1016/j.forpol.2016.04.007.
• Laurent Linnemer & Philippe Choné, 2016, "Nonlinear pricing and exclusion:II. Must-stock products," Post-Print, HAL, number hal-01629751, Aug, DOI: 10.1111/1756-2171.12138.
• Stefan Ambec & Michel Poitevin, 2016, "Decision-making in organizations: when to delegate and whom to delegate," Post-Print, HAL, number hal-02638008, DOI: 10.1007/s10058-015-0185-6.
• Roland Bénabou & Jean Tirole, 2016, "Bonus Culture: Competitive Pay, Screening and Multitasking," Post-Print, HAL, number hal-04527031, Apr, DOI: 10.1086/684853.
• Malin Arve & David Martimort, 2016, "Dynamic Procurement under Uncertainty: Optimal Design and Implications for Incomplete Contracts," Post-Print, HAL, number halshs-01509599, Nov, DOI: 10.1257/aer.20150275.
• Malin Arve & David Martimort, 2016, "Dynamic Procurement under Uncertainty: Optimal Design and Implications for Incomplete Contracts," PSE-Ecole d'économie de Paris (Postprint), HAL, number halshs-01509599, Nov, DOI: 10.1257/aer.20150275.
• Kvaløy, Ola & Olsen, Trond E., 2016, "Teams in Relational Contracts," Discussion Papers, Norwegian School of Economics, Department of Business and Management Science, number 2016/23, Dec.
• Raattamaa, Tomas, 2016, "Essays on Delegated Search and Temporary Work Agencies," Umeå Economic Studies, Umeå University, Department of Economics, number 935, Aug.
• Edmans, Alex & Gabaix, Xavier, 2016, "Executive Compensation: A Modern Primer," Scholarly Articles, Harvard University Department of Economics, number 34651704.
• Matthias Kiefer & Edward Jones & Andrew Adams, 2016, "Principals, Agents and Incomplete Contracts: Are Surrender of Control and Renegotiation the Solution?," CFI Discussion Papers, Centre for Finance and Investment, Heriot Watt University, number 1603.
• Attar, Andrea & Mariotti, Thomas & Salanié, François, 2016, "On Competitive Nonlinear Pricing," IDEI Working Papers, Institut d'Économie Industrielle (IDEI), Toulouse, number 866, Nov, revised Mar 2018.
• Seung Han Yoo, 2016, "Organizational Design with Non-Contractible Quality," Discussion Paper Series, Institute of Economic Research, Korea University, number 1604.
• Christina Bannier & Eberhard Feess & Natalie Packham & Markus Walzl, 2016, "Incentive schemes, private information and the double-edged role of competition for agents," Working Papers, Faculty of Economics and Statistics, Universität Innsbruck, number 2016-20, Jul.
• Antoni Cunyat Cunyat, 2016, "Crowding out effect and sorting in competitive labor markets with motivated workers," Working Papers. Serie AD, Instituto Valenciano de Investigaciones Económicas, S.A. (Ivie), number 2016-06, Nov.
• De Paola, Maria & Gioia, Francesca & Scoppa, Vincenzo, 2016, "Free-Riding and Knowledge Spillovers in Teams: The Role of Social Ties," IZA Discussion Papers, IZA Network @ LISER, number 10257, Oct.
• Michela Cella & Federico Etro, 2016, "Contract competition between hierarchies, managerial compensation and imperfectly correlated shocks," Journal of Economics, Springer, volume 118, issue 3, pages 193-218, July, DOI: 10.1007/s00712-016-0472-x.
• David Michael Rietzke & Yu Chen, 2016, "Push or pull? Performance pay, incentives, and information," Working Papers, Lancaster University Management School, Economics Department, number 127987900.
• Matteo Foschi, 2016, "Contracting with Type-Dependent Naïveté," Discussion Papers in Economics, Division of Economics, School of Business, University of Leicester, number 16/03, Mar.
• Matteo Foschi, 2016, "Temptation in Markets with no Commitment: Give-aways, Scare-aways and Reversals," Discussion Papers in Economics, Division of Economics, School of Business, University of Leicester, number 16/12.
• Christensen, Else Gry Bro & Nafziger, Julia, 2016, "Packaging of sin goods - Commitment or exploitation?," Munich Reprints in Economics, University of Munich, Department of Economics, number 43476.
• Daido, Kohei & Murooka, Takeshi, 2016, "Team Incentives and Reference-Dependent Preferences," Munich Reprints in Economics, University of Munich, Department of Economics, number 43521.
• Matthias Verbeck & Elisabeth Schulte, 2016, "Contracting with Researchers," MAGKS Papers on Economics, Philipps-Universität Marburg, Faculty of Business Administration and Economics, Department of Economics (Volkswirtschaftliche Abteilung), number 201620.
• Gary Charness & Matthew Ellman, 2016, "Choosing and Not Choosing with and without Communication: Experimental Results on Contract Design and Selection," Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, volume 172, issue 1, pages 142-157, DOI: 10.1628/093245616X14500948554153.
• Gary Charness & Matthew Ellman, 2016, "Choosing and Not Choosing with and without Communication: Experimental Results on Contract Design and Selection," Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, volume 172, issue 1, pages 142-157, March, DOI: 10.1628/093245613X14500948554153.
• Claudia M. Landeo & Kathryn E. Spier, 2016, "Stipulated Damages as a Rent-Extraction Mechanism: Experimental Evidence," Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, volume 172, issue 2, pages 235-273, June, DOI: 10.1628/093245616X14534707121162.
• Michela Cella & Federico Etro, 2016, "Contract Competition between Hierarchies, Managerial Compensation and Imperfectly Correlated Shocks," Working Papers, University of Milano-Bicocca, Department of Economics, number 328, Feb, revised 07 Feb 2016.
• Valeria Gattai & Piergiovanna Natale, 2016, "Optimal Ownership Regime in the Presence of Investment Spillovers," Working Papers, University of Milano-Bicocca, Department of Economics, number 332, Mar, revised 29 Mar 2016.
• Zhijun Chen & Greg Shaffer, 2016, "Are Market-Share Contracts a Poor Man’s Exclusive Dealing?," Monash Economics Working Papers, Monash University, Department of Economics, number 44-16, Nov.
• Felix Bierbrauer & Nick Netzer, 2016, "Mechanism Design and Intentions," Discussion Paper Series of the Max Planck Institute for Behavioral Economics, Max Planck Institute for Behavioral Economics, number 2016_04, Feb.
• Juan Carlos Suárez Serrato & Xiao Yu Wang & Shuang Zhang, 2016, "The Limits of Meritocracy: Screening Bureaucrats Under Imperfect Verifiability," NBER Working Papers, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc, number 21963, Feb.
• W. Bentley MacLeod & Teck Yong Tan, 2016, "Optimal Contracting with Subjective Evaluation: The Effects of Timing, Malfeasance and Guile," NBER Working Papers, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc, number 22156, Apr.
• Marina Halac & Pierre Yared, 2016, "Commitment vs. Flexibility with Costly Verification," NBER Working Papers, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc, number 22936, Dec.
• Rui Zhang & Quanyan Zhu, 2016, "Attack-Aware Cyber Insurance of Interdependent Computer Networks," Working Papers, NET Institute, number 16-18, Sep.
• Fortmann, Lea & Cordero-Salas, Paula & Sohngen, Brent & Brian, Roe, 2016, "Incentive Contracts for Environmental Services and their Potential in REDD," International Review of Environmental and Resource Economics, now publishers, volume 9, issue 3-4, pages 363-409, September, DOI: 10.1561/101.00000080.
• Carmen Teodora Popa, 2016, "The Maintenance Contract Between The Past And Present, In Regulating Thew Civil Code In Force," Annals of Faculty of Economics, University of Oradea, Faculty of Economics, volume 1, issue 1, pages 159-172, July.
• Shingo Ishiguro, 2016, "Macroeconomic Dynamics with Limited Commitment in Financial and Labor Contracts," Discussion Papers in Economics and Business, Osaka University, Graduate School of Economics, number 16-25, Oct.
• David Martimort & Aggey Semenov & Lars Stole, 2016, "A Complete Characterization of Equilibria in Common Agency Screening Games," Working Papers, University of Ottawa, Department of Economics, number 1618E.
• Xi Yang & Nicholas D. Paulson & Madhu Khanna, 2016, "Optimal Mix of Vertical Integration and Contracting for Energy Crops: Effect of Risk Preferences and Land Quality," Applied Economic Perspectives and Policy, Agricultural and Applied Economics Association, volume 38, issue 4, pages 632-654.
• Hong Wang & Hong-min Chen, 2016, "Deterring Bidder Collusion: Auction Design Complements Antitrust Policy," Journal of Competition Law and Economics, Oxford University Press, volume 12, issue 1, pages 31-68.
• Péter Benczúr & Cosmin L. Ilut, 2016, "Evidence for Relational Contracts in Sovereign Bank Lending," Journal of the European Economic Association, European Economic Association, volume 14, issue 2, pages 375-404.
• Bård Harstad, 2016, "The Dynamics of Climate Agreements," Journal of the European Economic Association, European Economic Association, volume 14, issue 3, pages 719-752.
• Jordi Brandts & Matthew Ellman & Gary Charness, 2016, "Let’s Talk: How Communication Affects Contract Design," Journal of the European Economic Association, European Economic Association, volume 14, issue 4, pages 943-974.
• Benjamin E. Hermalin, 2016, "Why Whine about Wining and Dining?," The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Oxford University Press, volume 32, issue 1, pages 37-60.
• André Veiga & E. Glen Weyl, 2016, "Product Design in Selection Markets," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, volume 131, issue 2, pages 1007-1056.
• Mark Armstrong & Jidong Zhou, 2016, "Search Deterrence," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, volume 83, issue 1, pages 26-57.
• Anil K. Kashyap & Natalia Kovrijnykh, 2016, "Who Should Pay for Credit Ratings and How?," The Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, volume 29, issue 2, pages 420-456.
• Venkataraman Bhaskar & George Mailath, 2016, "The Curse of Long Horizons," PIER Working Paper Archive, Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania, number 16-013, Jul, revised 24 Jul 2016.
• V. Bhaskar & George J. Mailath, 2016, "The Curse of Long Horizons," PIER Working Paper Archive, Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania, number 18-029, Jul, revised 03 Dec 2018.
• Raul V. Fabella, 2016, "Why Fixed Rent Contracts are Less Prevalent: Weak Third Party Enforcement and Endogenous Principal Type," UP School of Economics Discussion Papers, University of the Philippines School of Economics, number 201606, Aug.
• Takuya Nakaizumi, 2016, "Hold-up Problem in Price Cap Regulation with Limited Ability of Commitment in High Inflation," The Pakistan Development Review, Pakistan Institute of Development Economics, volume 55, issue 4, pages 947-953.
• Müller, Daniel & Schmitz, Patrick W., 2016, "Vertragstheorie: Zum Nobelpreis 2016 für Oliver Hart und Bengt Holmström
  [Contract Theory: On the Contributions of the 2016 Nobel Laureates Oliver Hart and Bengt Holmström]," MPRA Paper, University Library of Munich, Germany, number 75233, Nov.
• Lonsdale, Chris & Sanderson, Joe & Watson, Glyn & Peng, Fei, 2016, "Beyond intentional trust: supplier opportunism and management control mechanisms in public sector procurement and contracting," MPRA Paper, University Library of Munich, Germany, number 76094, Apr.
• Chi, Chang Koo & Choi, Kyoung Jin, 2016, "The Impact of Firm Size on Dynamic Incentives and Investment," MPRA Paper, University Library of Munich, Germany, number 80867, May.
• Hegadekatti, Kartik, 2016, "Analysis of Contracts in Various Formats of Blockchain," MPRA Paper, University Library of Munich, Germany, number 82868, Dec.
• Müller, Daniel & Schmitz, Patrick W., 2016, "Transaction costs and the property rights approach to the theory of the firm," MPRA Paper, University Library of Munich, Germany, number 90790.
• Schmitz, Patrick W., 2016, "The Negotiators Who Knew Too Much: Transaction Costs and Incomplete Information," MPRA Paper, University Library of Munich, Germany, number 91458.
• Jean Paul Decamps & Catherine Casamatta & Arnold Chassagnon & Andrea Attar, 2016, "Multiple Lenders, Strategic Default and Covenants," 2016 Meeting Papers, Society for Economic Dynamics, number 701.
• Guido Menzio & Mikhail Golosov, 2016, "Agency Business Cycles," 2016 Meeting Papers, Society for Economic Dynamics, number 740.
• Nobel Prize Committee, 2016, "Oliver Hart and Bengt Holmström: Contract Theory," Nobel Prize in Economics documents, Nobel Prize Committee, number 2016-1, Oct.
• Nobel Prize Committee, 2016, "Contract theory," Nobel Prize in Economics documents, Nobel Prize Committee, number 2016-2, Oct.
• Oliver Hart, 2016, "Incomplete Contracts and Control," Nobel Prize in Economics documents, Nobel Prize Committee, number 2016-3, Dec.
• Bengt Holmström, 2016, "Pay for Performance and Beyond," Nobel Prize in Economics documents, Nobel Prize Committee, number 2016-4, Dec.
• Oliver Hart, 2016, "Interview with 2016 Laureate in Economics Oliver Hart," Nobel Prize in Economics documents, Nobel Prize Committee, number 2016-5, Dec.
• Bengt Holmström, 2016, "Interview with 2016 Economics Laureate Bengt Holmström," Nobel Prize in Economics documents, Nobel Prize Committee, number 2016-6, Dec.
• Luca Anderlini & Leonardo Felli & Giovanni Immordino, 2016, "Costly Pretrial Agreements," CSEF Working Papers, Centre for Studies in Economics and Finance (CSEF), University of Naples, Italy, number 449, Jul.
• Lukasz Wozny, 2016, "Repeated moral hazard with costly self-control," KAE Working Papers, Warsaw School of Economics, Collegium of Economic Analysis, number 2016-017, Oct.
• Mahmoud Sami Nabi, 2016, "Revisiting equity and debt: access to finance and economic inefficiency," International Review of Economics, Springer;Happiness Economics and Interpersonal Relations (HEIRS), volume 63, issue 4, pages 393-429, December, DOI: 10.1007/s12232-016-0260-5.
• Paul Walker, 2016, "Simple Models of a Human-Capital-Based Firm: a Reference Point Approach," Journal of the Knowledge Economy, Springer;Portland International Center for Management of Engineering and Technology (PICMET), volume 7, issue 1, pages 219-247, March, DOI: 10.1007/s13132-014-0212-9.
• Suehyun Kwon, 2016, "Relational contracts in a persistent environment," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), volume 61, issue 1, pages 183-205, January, DOI: 10.1007/s00199-015-0891-x.
• Helmut Bester & Johannes Münster, 2016, "Subjective evaluation versus public information," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), volume 61, issue 4, pages 723-753, April, DOI: 10.1007/s00199-016-0953-8.
• Jean-Charles Rochet & Guillaume Roger, 2016, "Risky utilities," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), volume 62, issue 1, pages 361-382, June, DOI: 10.1007/s00199-015-0919-2.
• Antonio E. Bernardo & Hongbin Cai & Jiang Luo, 2016, "Earnings vs. stock-price based incentives in managerial compensation contracts," Review of Accounting Studies, Springer, volume 21, issue 1, pages 316-348, March, DOI: 10.1007/s11142-015-9339-6.
• Stefan Ambec & Michel Poitevin, 2016, "Decision-making in organizations: when to delegate and whom to delegate," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, volume 20, issue 2, pages 115-143, June, DOI: 10.1007/s10058-015-0185-6.
• Nadide Banu Olcay, 2016, "Dynamic incentive contracts with termination threats," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, volume 20, issue 4, pages 255-288, December, DOI: 10.1007/s10058-016-0192-2.
• Benjamin Lester & Ali Shourideh & Venky Venkateswaran & Ariel Zetlin-Jones, 2016, "Screening and Adverse Selection in Frictional Markets," Working Papers, New York University, Leonard N. Stern School of Business, Department of Economics, number 16-14.
• Burkett, Justin, 2016, "Optimally constraining a bidder using a simple budget," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, volume 11, issue 1, January.
• Ulbricht, Robert, 2016, "Optimal delegated search with adverse selection and moral hazard," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, volume 11, issue 1, January.
• Chassang, Sylvain & Zehnder, Christian, 2016, "Rewards and punishments: informal contracting through social preferences," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, volume 11, issue 3, September.
• Attanasio, O. & Augsburg, B. & de Haas, Ralph, 2016, "Microcredit Contracts, Risk Diversification and Loan Take-Up," Discussion Paper, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research, number 2016-020.
• Attanasio, O. & Augsburg, B. & de Haas, Ralph, 2016, "Microcredit Contracts, Risk Diversification and Loan Take-Up," Other publications TiSEM, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management, number 06168203-0b61-4376-a775-8.
• Attanasio, O. & Augsburg, B. & de Haas, Ralph, 2016, "Microcredit Contracts, Risk Diversification and Loan Take-Up," Other publications TiSEM, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management, number 6bd782c0-e7fb-48df-91d1-1.
• Attar, Andrea & Mariotti, Thomas & Salanié, François, 2016, "On Competitive Nonlinear Pricing," TSE Working Papers, Toulouse School of Economics (TSE), number 16-737, Nov, revised Mar 2018.
• Marco Battaglini & Bård Harstad, 2016, "Participation and Duration of Environmental Agreements," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, volume 124, issue 1, pages 160-204, DOI: 10.1086/684478.
• Roland Bénabou & Jean Tirole, 2016, "Bonus Culture: Competitive Pay, Screening, and Multitasking," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, volume 124, issue 2, pages 305-370, DOI: 10.1086/684853.
• Giuseppe Attanasi & Kene Boun My & Marco Buso & Anne Stenger, 2016, "Private investment with social benefits under uncertainty: the dark side of public financing," Working Papers of BETA, Bureau d'Economie Théorique et Appliquée, UDS, Strasbourg, number 2016-12.
• Andrei Barbos, 2016, "Dynamic Contracts with Random Monitoring," Working Papers, University of South Florida, Department of Economics, number 0416, Jun.