Relative Wealth Concerns, Executive Compensation, and Systemic Risk-Taking
Download full text from publisher
References listed on IDEAS
- Abel, Andrew B, 1990.
"Asset Prices under Habit Formation and Catching Up with the Joneses,"
American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 80(2), pages 38-42, May.
- Andrew B. Abel, "undated". "Asset Prices Under Habit Formation and Catching Up With the Jones," Rodney L. White Center for Financial Research Working Papers 1-90, Wharton School Rodney L. White Center for Financial Research.
- Abel, A.B., 1990. "Asset Prices Under Habit Formation And Catching Up With The Joneses," Weiss Center Working Papers 1-90, Wharton School - Weiss Center for International Financial Research.
- Andrew B. Abel, "undated". "Asset Prices Under Habit Formation and Catching Up With the Jones," Rodney L. White Center for Financial Research Working Papers 01-90, Wharton School Rodney L. White Center for Financial Research.
- A. Abel, 2010. "Asset prices under habit formation and catching up with the Jones," Levine's Working Paper Archive 1395, David K. Levine.
- Andrew B. Abel, 1990. "Asset Prices under Habit Formation and Catching up with the Joneses," NBER Working Papers 3279, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Emre Ozdenoren & Kathy Yuan, 2017. "Contractual Externalities and Systemic Risk," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 84(4), pages 1789-1817.
- Fabio Feriozzi, 2011. "Paying for observable luck," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 42(2), pages 387-415, June.
- Florian Hoffmann & Sebastian Pfeil, 2010. "Reward for Luck in a Dynamic Agency Model," Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 23(9), pages 3329-3345.
- Chaigneau, Pierre & Sahuguet, Nicolas, 2013. "The effect of monitoring on CEO pay practices in a matching equilibrium," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 55405, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
- Paul Oyer, 2004.
"Why Do Firms Use Incentives That Have No Incentive Effects?,"
Journal of Finance,
American Finance Association, vol. 59(4), pages 1619-1650, August.
- Paul Oyer, 2000. "Why Do Firms Use Incentives that Have No Incentive Effects?," Econometric Society World Congress 2000 Contributed Papers 1440, Econometric Society.
- Oyer, Paul, 2001. "Why Do Firms Use Incentives That Have No Incentive Effects?," Research Papers 1686, Stanford University, Graduate School of Business.
- Salvatore Miglietta, 2014. "Incentives and Relative Wealth Concerns," Quarterly Journal of Finance (QJF), World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd., vol. 4(04), pages 1-34.
- Marianne Bertrand & Sendhil Mullainathan, 2001. "Are CEOs Rewarded for Luck? The Ones Without Principals Are," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 116(3), pages 901-932.
More about this item
KeywordsRelative wealth concerns; Managerial compensation; Pay-for-luck; Excessive risk-taking;
- D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
- D86 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Economics of Contract Law
NEP fieldsThis paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-BEC-2016-05-28 (Business Economics)
- NEP-HRM-2016-05-28 (Human Capital & Human Resource Management)
- NEP-LMA-2016-05-28 (Labor Markets - Supply, Demand, & Wages)
StatisticsAccess and download statistics
All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:fip:fedgif:1164. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (). General contact details of provider: http://edirc.repec.org/data/frbgvus.html .
If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.
If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.
Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.