Paying for observable luck
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CitationsCitations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
- Pierre Chaigneau & Nicolas Sahuguet, "undated".
"The structure of CEO pay: pay-for-luck and stock-options,"
FMG Discussion Papers
dp713, Financial Markets Group.
- Chaigneau, Pierre & Sahuguet, Nicolas, 2012. "The structure of CEO pay: pay-for-luck and stock-options," CEPR Discussion Papers 9182, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Campbell, T. Colin & Thompson, Mary Elizabeth, 2015. "Why are CEOs paid for good luck? An empirical comparison of explanations for pay-for-luck asymmetry," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 35(C), pages 247-264.
- Pierre Chaigneau & Nicolas Sahuguet, 2012. "Pay-for-Luck in CEO Compensation: Matching and Efficient Contracting," Cahiers de recherche 1224, CIRPEE.
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