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The Design of Optimal Collateralized Contracts

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Abstract

This paper presents a two-period optimal contracting model of collateral. A borrower values a capital good and a composite non-capital good. He privately observes an income shock in the composite good in the second period. Collateralization of both goods occurs in the optimal contract, whereas it does not under full information. Relative to full information, the capital good in the optimal contract is over-consumed in the initial loan period and under-consumed in the repayment period. The relation between forfeiture of assets and contractual distortion is summarized by a formula showing higher distortions associated with larger increases in forfeited collateral. Forfeiture is decreasing in income at the tails of the income distribution, and low income types forfeit more than high income types. We obtain a closed form solution in a parameterized model. Forfeited collateral is globally decreasing in income with pooling at the bottom when the borrower's initial assets are low.

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  • Dan Cao & Roger Lagunoff, 2016. "The Design of Optimal Collateralized Contracts," Working Papers gueconwpa~16-16-01, Georgetown University, Department of Economics, revised 01 Jun 2017.
  • Handle: RePEc:geo:guwopa:gueconwpa~16-16-01
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Optimal contract; asymmetric information; collateral; forfeiture; collateralized contract.;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
    • D86 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Economics of Contract Law
    • D53 - Microeconomics - - General Equilibrium and Disequilibrium - - - Financial Markets
    • D14 - Microeconomics - - Household Behavior - - - Household Saving; Personal Finance
    • G21 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Banks; Other Depository Institutions; Micro Finance Institutions; Mortgages
    • G22 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Insurance; Insurance Companies; Actuarial Studies

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