Research classified by Journal of Economic Literature (JEL) codes

1. Transaction Cost Economics

2018

• Giovanni Ponti & Claudio Rossetti, 2018, "Unobserved Heterogeneity in Structural Behavioral Models Using Experimental Data," CSEF Working Papers, Centre for Studies in Economics and Finance (CSEF), University of Naples, Italy, number 512, Oct.
• Thomas Mettral, 2018, "Deterministic versus stochastic contracts in a dynamic principal-agent model," Economic Theory Bulletin, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), volume 6, issue 2, pages 209-218, October, DOI: 10.1007/s40505-018-0136-9.
• Josef Schosser & Jochen Wilhelm, 2018, "Costly state verification and truthtelling: a note on the theory of debt contracts," Economic Theory Bulletin, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), volume 6, issue 2, pages 129-139, October, DOI: 10.1007/s40505-018-0137-8.
• Ram Singh, 2018, "Public–private partnerships vs. traditional contracts for highways," Indian Economic Review, Springer, volume 53, issue 1, pages 29-63, December, DOI: 10.1007/s41775-018-0032-0.
• Jong-Hee Hahn & Jinwoo Kim & Sang-Hyun Kim & Jihong Lee, 2018, "Price discrimination with loss averse consumers," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), volume 65, issue 3, pages 681-728, May, DOI: 10.1007/s00199-017-1035-2.
• Yaoyao Wu & Jinqiang Yang & Zhentao Zou, 2018, "Ambiguity sharing and the lack of relative performance evaluation," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), volume 66, issue 1, pages 141-157, July, DOI: 10.1007/s00199-017-1056-x.
• Ilan Guttman & Iván Marinovic, 2018, "Debt contracts in the presence of performance manipulation," Review of Accounting Studies, Springer, volume 23, issue 3, pages 1005-1041, September, DOI: 10.1007/s11142-018-9450-6.
• Qintao Fan & Wei Li, 2018, "Leading indicator variables and managerial incentives in a dynamic agency setting," Review of Accounting Studies, Springer, volume 23, issue 4, pages 1715-1753, December, DOI: 10.1007/s11142-018-9461-3.
• Pei-Cheng Yu, 2018, "Seemingly Exploitative Contracts," Discussion Papers, School of Economics, The University of New South Wales, number 2018-15, Oct.
• Yuriy Gorodnichenko & Tho Pham & Oleksandr Talavera, 2018, "Social media, sentiment and public opinions: Evidence from #Brexit and #USElection," Working Papers, Swansea University, School of Management, number 2018-01, Jan.
• Auster, Sarah, 2018, "Robust contracting under common value uncertainty," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, volume 13, issue 1, January.
• Moriya, Fumitoshi & Yamashita, Takuro, 2018, "Asymmetric information allocation to avoid coordination failure," TSE Working Papers, Toulouse School of Economics (TSE), number 18-941, Jul.
• Catalina Martínez & Sarah Parlane, 2020, "On the Firms’ Decision to Hire Academic Scientists," Working Papers, School of Economics, University College Dublin, number 201801, Mar.
• Urmee Khan & Martin Dumav, 2018, "Moral Hazard with Non-Additive Uncertainty: When are Actions Implementable?," Working Papers, University of California at Riverside, Department of Economics, number 201808, Apr.
• Richard N. Langlois, 2018, "The Fisher Body Case and Organizational Economics," Working papers, University of Connecticut, Department of Economics, number 2018-13, Jul.
• Paulo Fagandini, 2018, "Hunting with two bullets: moral hazard with a second chance," Nova SBE Working Paper Series, Universidade Nova de Lisboa, Nova School of Business and Economics, number wp629.
• Helmut Bester & Matthias Dahm, 2018, "Credence Goods, Costly Diagnosis and Subjective Evaluation," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, volume 128, issue 611, pages 1367-1394, June, DOI: 10.1111/ecoj.12472.
• Georg Nöldeke & Larry Samuelson, 2018, "The Implementation Duality," Econometrica, Econometric Society, volume 86, issue 4, pages 1283-1324, July, DOI: 10.3982/ECTA13307.
• Pedro Gete & Juan-Pedro Gómez, 2018, "Dealing with Overleverage: Restricting Leverage vs. Restricting Variable Compensation," Quarterly Journal of Finance (QJF), World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd., volume 8, issue 01, pages 1-29, March, DOI: 10.1142/S2010139218500015.
• Cici, Gjergji & Kempf, Alexander & Peitzmeier, Claudia, 2019, "Knowledge spillovers in the mutual fund industry through labor mobility," CFR Working Papers, University of Cologne, Centre for Financial Research (CFR), number 18-04, revised 2019.
• Hoffmann, Florian & Inderst, Roman & Turlo, Sergey, 2018, "Regulating Cancellation Rights with Consumer Experimentation," EconStor Preprints, ZBW - Leibniz Information Centre for Economics, number 253659.
• Bester, Helmut & Lang, Matthias & Li, Jianpei, 2018, "Signaling versus costly information acquisition," Discussion Papers, Free University Berlin, School of Business & Economics, number 2018/11.
• Hoffmann, Florian & Inderst, Roman & Opp, Marcus M., 2018, "Only time will tell: A theory of deferred compensation," SAFE Working Paper Series, Leibniz Institute for Financial Research SAFE, number 218, DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.3232708.

2017

• Yaping Shan, 2017, "Incentives for Research Agents and Performance-vested Equity-based Compensation," Adelaide Economics Working Papers, Adelaide University, School of Economics, number 2017-15, Dec.
• James Feyrer & Erin T. Mansur & Bruce Sacerdote, 2017, "Geographic Dispersion of Economic Shocks: Evidence from the Fracking Revolution," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, volume 107, issue 4, pages 1313-1334, April.
• Avinatan Hassidim & Assaf Romm & Ran I. Shorrer, 2017, "Redesigning the Israeli Psychology Master's Match," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, volume 107, issue 5, pages 205-209, May.
• John William Hatfield & Scott Duke Kominers & Alexander Westkamp, 2017, "Stable and Strategy-Proof Matching with Flexible Allotments," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, volume 107, issue 5, pages 214-219, May.
• Sandro Ambuehl & Axel Ockenfels, 2017, "The Ethics of Incentivizing the Uninformed: A Vignette Study," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, volume 107, issue 5, pages 91-95, May.
• Roland Strausz, 2017, "A Theory of Crowdfunding: A Mechanism Design Approach with Demand Uncertainty and Moral Hazard," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, volume 107, issue 6, pages 1430-1476, June.
• Oliver Hart, 2017, "Incomplete Contracts and Control," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, volume 107, issue 7, pages 1731-1752, July.
• Bengt Holmström, 2017, "Pay for Performance and Beyond," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, volume 107, issue 7, pages 1753-1777, July.
• Özlem Bedre-Defolie & Gary Biglaiser, 2017, "Contracts as a Barrier to Entry in Markets with Nonpivotal Buyers," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, volume 107, issue 7, pages 2041-2071, July.
• Luis Garicano & Luis Rayo, 2017, "Relational Knowledge Transfers," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, volume 107, issue 9, pages 2695-2730, September.
• Jin Li & Niko Matouschek & Michael Powell, 2017, "Power Dynamics in Organizations," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, volume 9, issue 1, pages 217-241, February.
• Tommy Staahl Gabrielsen & Bjørn Olav Johansen, 2017, "Resale Price Maintenance with Secret Contracts and Retail Service Externalities," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, volume 9, issue 1, pages 63-87, February.
• Robert W. Staiger & Alan O. Sykes, 2017, "How Important Can the Non-violation Clause Be for the GATT/WTO?," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, volume 9, issue 2, pages 149-187, May.
• Roberto Burguet, 2017, "Procurement Design with Corruption," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, volume 9, issue 2, pages 315-341, May.
• Christopher P. Chambers & M. Bumin Yenmez, 2017, "Choice and Matching," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, volume 9, issue 3, pages 126-147, August.
• Mostafa Beshkar & Eric W. Bond, 2017, "Cap and Escape in Trade Agreements," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, volume 9, issue 4, pages 171-202, November.
• Marianna Belloc & Samuel Bowles, 2017, "Persistence and Change in Culture and Institutions under Autarchy, Trade, and Factor Mobility," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, volume 9, issue 4, pages 245-276, November.
• Thomas Hellmann & Veikko Thiele, 2017, "Partner Uncertainty and the Dynamic Boundary of the Firm," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, volume 9, issue 4, pages 277-302, November.
• Ján Palguta & Filip Pertold, 2017, "Manipulation of Procurement Contracts: Evidence from the Introduction of Discretionary Thresholds," American Economic Journal: Economic Policy, American Economic Association, volume 9, issue 2, pages 293-315, May.
• Dosi, Cesare & Moretto, Michele, , "Cost Uncertainty and Time Overruns in Public Procurement: a Scoring Auction for a Contract with Delay Penalties," ETA: Economic Theory and Applications, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM), number 253215, DOI: 10.22004/ag.econ.253215.
• Izabela Jelovac & Samuel Kembou Nzale, 2017, "Regulation and Altruism," AMSE Working Papers, Aix-Marseille School of Economics, France, number 1737, Oct.
• Oscar Mauricio Valencia-Arana & Jose Eduardo Gomez-Gonzalez & Andrés Garcia-Suaza, 2017, "Young Innovative Firms, Investment-Cash Flow Sensitivities and Technological Misallocation," Borradores de Economia, Banco de la Republica de Colombia, number 1004, Jun, DOI: 10.32468/be.1004.
• Sjaak Hurkens & Matthew Ellman, 2018, "A Theory of Crowdfunding -A Mechanism Design Approach with Demand Uncertainty and Moral Hazard: Comment," Working Papers, Barcelona School of Economics, number 1012, Jan.
• Chang-Koo Chi & Kyoung Jin Choi, 2017, "The impact of firm size on dynamic incentives and investment," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, volume 48, issue 1, pages 147-177, March.
• Martin Pollrich, 2017, "Mediated audits," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, volume 48, issue 1, pages 44-68, March.
• Yaping Shan, 2017, "Optimal contracts for research agents," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, volume 48, issue 1, pages 94-124, March.
• Matthias Kräkel, 2017, "Authority and Incentives in Organizations," Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Wiley Blackwell, volume 119, issue 2, pages 295-311, April, DOI: 10.1111/sjoe.12172.
• Kazutoshi Sugimura & Masaru Itatani & Masaki Bessho, 2017, "Scope of Rules Concerning Personal Guarantee Agreements (Report of Workshops (4))," Bank of Japan Research Laboratory Series, Bank of Japan, number 17-E-4, Mar.
• Baake Pio & Harasser Andreas & Heiny Friederike, 2017, "Information Acquisition in Vertical Relations," The B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy, De Gruyter, volume 17, issue 1, pages 1-13, February, DOI: 10.1515/bejeap-2015-0211.
• Van Tassel Eric, 2017, "Structuring Subsidies in a Long-Term Credit Relationship," The B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy, De Gruyter, volume 17, issue 4, pages 1-12, October, DOI: 10.1515/bejeap-2017-0028.
• Hervé Lanotte & Jean-Baptiste Traversac, 2017, "Mécanismes d’incitation et de garantie de la gouvernance territoriale dans l’industrie du champagne," Revue d'économie régionale et urbaine, Armand Colin, volume 0, issue 2, pages 271-296.
• Jean Guillaume Forand & Jan Zapal, 2017, "The Demand and Supply of Favours in Dynamic Relationships," CERGE-EI Working Papers, The Center for Economic Research and Graduate Education - Economics Institute, Prague, number wp605, Sep.
• Alex Edmans & Xavier Gabaix & Dirk Jenter, 2017, "Executive Compensation: A Survey of Theory and Evidence," CESifo Working Paper Series, CESifo, number 6585.
• Matthias Fahn & Nicolas Klein, 2017, "Relational Contracts with Private Information on the Future Value of the Relationship: The Upside of Implicit Downsizing Costs," CESifo Working Paper Series, CESifo, number 6590.
• Matthias Fahn & Anne Schade & Katharina Schüßler, 2017, "What Drives Reciprocal Behavior? The Optimal Provision of Incentives over the Course of Careers," CESifo Working Paper Series, CESifo, number 6635.
• Jean-Marc Bourgeon & Pierre Picard, 2017, "Nitpicky Insurers and the Law of Contracts," CESifo Working Paper Series, CESifo, number 6669.
• Manoj Mohanan & Grant Miller & Katherine Donato & Yulya Truskinovsky & Marcos Vera-Hernández, 2017, "Different Strokes for Different Folks: Experimental Evidence on the Effectiveness of Input and Output Incentive Contracts for Health Care Providers with Different Levels of Skills," Working Papers, Center for Global Development, number 464, Oct.
• Juan-José Ganuza & Gerard Llobet, 2017, "The Simple Economics of White Elephants," Working Papers, CEMFI, number wp2017_1701, Jan.
• Oscar Mauricio Valencia-Arana & Jose Eduardo Gomez-Gonzalez & AndrÔøΩs Garcia-Suaza, 2017, "Young Innovative Firms, Investment-Cash Flow Sensitivities and Technological Misallocation," Documentos de Trabajo, Universidad del Rosario, number 15638, Jun.
• Maria del Pilar Castillo & Gi�como Balbinotto N., 2017, "A model of desertion. From a principal-agent theory perspective," Revista Cuadernos de Economia, Universidad Nacional de Colombia, FCE, CID, volume 36, issue 70, pages 19-47.
• Juan Esteban Carranza & �lvaro J. Riascos & Natalia Serna, 2017, "Market Power, Contracts and Outcomes: The Case of Patients with Long-Term Diseases in the Colombian Health Care System," Documentos de Trabajo, Quantil, number 15283, Jan.
• ATTAR Andrea & d’ASPREMONT Claude, 2017, "Trading under Asymmetric Information: Positive and Normative Implications," LIDAM Discussion Papers CORE, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE), number 2017009, Mar.
• Gersbach, Hans & Becker, Johannes Gerd, 2017, "Threshold Contracts," CEPR Discussion Papers, Centre for Economic Policy Research, number 11766, Jan.
• Pouyet, Jérôme & Martimort, David & Ricci, Francesco, 2017, "Extracting Information or Resource? The Hotelling Rule Revisited under Asymmetric Information," CEPR Discussion Papers, Centre for Economic Policy Research, number 11769, Jan.
• Rayo, Luis & Fudenberg, Drew, 2017, "Training and Effort Dynamics in Apprenticeship," CEPR Discussion Papers, Centre for Economic Policy Research, number 12126, Jul.
• Edmans, Alex & Gabaix, Xavier & Jenter, Dirk, 2017, "Executive Compensation: A Survey of Theory and Evidence," CEPR Discussion Papers, Centre for Economic Policy Research, number 12148, Jul.
• Schmitz, Patrick W., 2017, "Asymmetric Information and the Property Rights Approach to the Theory of the Firm," CEPR Discussion Papers, Centre for Economic Policy Research, number 12174, Jul.
• Platteau, Jean-Philippe & Bourguignon, François, 2017, "Optimal Management of Transfers: an Odd Paradox," CEPR Discussion Papers, Centre for Economic Policy Research, number 12234, Aug.
• Schmitz, Patrick W., 2017, "Incomplete Contracts, Shared Ownership, and Investment Incentives," CEPR Discussion Papers, Centre for Economic Policy Research, number 12258, Aug.
• Spagnolo, Giancarlo & Calzolari, Giacomo & Felli, Leonardo & Koenen, Johannes & Stahl, Konrad, 2017, "Relational Contracts, Competition and Innovation: Theory and Evidence from German Car Manufacturers," CEPR Discussion Papers, Centre for Economic Policy Research, number 12267, Sep.
• Platteau, Jean-Philippe & Bourguignon, François, 2017, "Aid Effectiveness: Revisiting the Trade-off Between Needs and Governance," CEPR Discussion Papers, Centre for Economic Policy Research, number 12277, Sep.
• Marina ALBANESE & Cecilia NAVARRA & Ermanno TORTIA, 2017, "Equilibrium unemployment as a worker insurance device: Wage setting in worker owned enterprises," CIRIEC Working Papers, CIRIEC - Université de Liège, number 1705, May.
• François Pannequin & Anne Corcos, 2017, "Compulsory insurance and voluntary self-insurance: substitutes or complements? A matter of risk attitudes," Working Papers, Center for Research in Economics and Statistics, number 2017-78, Aug.
• Larmande, François & Stolowy, Hervé, 2017, "Managerial Risk Aversion and Accounting Conservatism," HEC Research Papers Series, HEC Paris, number 1215, Jun, revised 27 Jul 2017.
• Guttman, Ilan & Marinovic, Ivan, 2017, "Debt Contractsin the Presence of Performance Manipulation," Research Papers, Stanford University, Graduate School of Business, number 3495, Jan.
• Hartman-Glaser, Barney & Hebert, Benjamin, 2017, "The Insurance Is the Lemon: Failing to Index Contracts," Research Papers, Stanford University, Graduate School of Business, number repec:ecl:stabus:3569, Dec.
• Miglo, Anton, 2017, "Timing of earnings and capital structure," The North American Journal of Economics and Finance, Elsevier, volume 40, issue C, pages 1-15, DOI: 10.1016/j.najef.2017.01.001.
• Dosis, Anastasios, 2017, "Nash equilibrium in competitive insurance," Economics Letters, Elsevier, volume 152, issue C, pages 5-8, DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2016.12.030.
• Müller, Daniel & Schmitz, Patrick W., 2017, "Optimal ownership of public goods in the presence of transaction costs," Economics Letters, Elsevier, volume 152, issue C, pages 88-92, DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2017.01.011.
• Dworczak, Piotr & Zhang, Anthony Lee, 2017, "Implementability, Walrasian equilibria, and efficient matchings," Economics Letters, Elsevier, volume 153, issue C, pages 57-60, DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2017.01.022.
• Li, Rui, 2017, "Moral hazard in investment and endogenous risk taking," Economics Letters, Elsevier, volume 157, issue C, pages 112-115, DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2017.05.018.
• Chaigneau, Pierre & Sahuguet, Nicolas & Sinclair-Desgagné, Bernard, 2017, "Prudence and the convexity of compensation contracts," Economics Letters, Elsevier, volume 157, issue C, pages 14-16, DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2017.05.014.
• Martimort, David & Semenov, Aggey & Stole, Lars, 2017, "Optimal stationary contract with two-sided imperfect enforcement and persistent adverse selection," Economics Letters, Elsevier, volume 159, issue C, pages 18-22, DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2017.07.007.
• Schmitz, Patrick W., 2017, "Asymmetric information and the property rights approach to the theory of the firm," Economics Letters, Elsevier, volume 159, issue C, pages 96-99, DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2017.07.026.
• Dragicevic, Arnaud Z. & Barkaoui, Ahmed, 2017, "Forest-based industrial network: Case of the French timber market," Forest Policy and Economics, Elsevier, volume 75, issue C, pages 23-33, DOI: 10.1016/j.forpol.2016.11.013.
• Dufwenberg, Martin & Servátka, Maroš & Vadovič, Radovan, 2017, "Honesty and informal agreements," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 102, issue C, pages 269-285, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2016.12.008.
• Kirkegaard, René, 2017, "Moral hazard and the spanning condition without the first-order approach," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 102, issue C, pages 373-387, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2017.01.001.
• Wilson, Alistair J. & Wu, Hong, 2017, "At-will relationships: How an option to walk away affects cooperation and efficiency," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 102, issue C, pages 487-507, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2017.02.007.
• Gottardi, Piero & Tallon, Jean Marc & Ghirardato, Paolo, 2017, "Flexible contracts," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 103, issue C, pages 145-167, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2016.01.013.
• Kusterer, David J. & Schmitz, Patrick W., 2017, "The management of innovation: Experimental evidence," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 104, issue C, pages 706-725, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2017.06.011.
• Su, Alice Peng-Ju, 2017, "Information revelation in the Property Right Theory of the firms," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, volume 52, issue C, pages 133-164, DOI: 10.1016/j.ijindorg.2017.02.004.
• Escobar, Juan F. & Pulgar, Carlos, 2017, "Motivating with simple contracts," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, volume 54, issue C, pages 192-214, DOI: 10.1016/j.ijindorg.2017.07.002.
• Guo, Di & Hua, Xinyu & Jiang, Kun, 2017, "Agency and strategic contracts: Theory and evidence from R&D agreements in the pharmaceutical industry," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, volume 54, issue C, pages 37-64, DOI: 10.1016/j.ijindorg.2017.06.007.
• Byford, Martin C., 2017, "Moral hazard in strategic decision making," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, volume 55, issue C, pages 114-136, DOI: 10.1016/j.ijindorg.2017.10.001.
• De Chiara, Alessandro & Livio, Luca, 2017, "The threat of corruption and the optimal supervisory task," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, volume 133, issue C, pages 172-186, DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2016.11.006.
• Kim, Doyoung, 2017, "Motivating for new changes when agents have reputation concerns," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, volume 137, issue C, pages 37-53, DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2017.02.015.
• Omiya, Shungo & Tamada, Yasunari & Tsai, Tsung-Sheng, 2017, "Optimal delegation with self-interested agents and information acquisition," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, volume 137, issue C, pages 54-71, DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2017.03.003.
• Schmitz, Patrick W., 2017, "Incomplete contracts, shared ownership, and investment incentives," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, volume 144, issue C, pages 153-165, DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2017.09.021.
• Hedlund, Jonas, 2017, "Bayesian persuasion by a privately informed sender," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, volume 167, issue C, pages 229-268, DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2016.11.003.
• O'Brien, Daniel P., 2017, "All-units discounts and double moral hazard," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, volume 170, issue C, pages 1-28, DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2017.02.001.
• Ambrus, Attila & Egorov, Georgy, 2017, "Delegation and nonmonetary incentives," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, volume 171, issue C, pages 101-135, DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2017.06.002.
• Maestri, Lucas, 2017, "Dynamic contracting under adverse selection and renegotiation," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, volume 171, issue C, pages 136-173, DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2017.06.007.
• Hartog, Joop & Raposo, Pedro, 2017, "Are starting wages reduced by an insurance premium for preventing wage decline? Testing the prediction of Harris and Holmstrom (1982)," Labour Economics, Elsevier, volume 48, issue C, pages 105-119, DOI: 10.1016/j.labeco.2017.06.005.
• Gersbach, Hans & Rochet, Jean-Charles, 2017, "Capital regulation and credit fluctuations," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, volume 90, issue C, pages 113-124, DOI: 10.1016/j.jmoneco.2017.05.008.
• Chaudhuri, Sarbajit & Marjit, Sugata, 2017, "International trade and quality of labour," International Review of Economics & Finance, Elsevier, volume 49, issue C, pages 582-595, DOI: 10.1016/j.iref.2017.03.018.
• Edmans, Alex & Gabaix, Xavier & Jenter, Dirk, 2017, "Executive compensation: a survey of theory and evidence," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library, number 118967, Jul.
• Anderson, Ronald W. & Bustamante, Maria Cecilia & Guibaud, Stéphane & Zervos, Mihail, 2018, "Agency, firm growth, and managerial turnover," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library, number 68784, Feb.
• Eső, Péter & Szentes, Balázs, 2017, "Dynamic contracting: an irrelevance theorem," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library, number 69403, Jan.
• Ozdenoren, Emre & Yuan, Kathy, 2017, "Contractual externalities and systemic risk," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library, number 75998, Oct.
• Shen, Huangnan & Fang, Lei & Deng, Kent, 2017, "Rise of ‘Red Zaibatsu’ in China: entrenchment and expansion of large state-owned enterprises, 1990-2016," Economic History Working Papers, London School of Economics and Political Science, Department of Economic History, number 75214, Mar.
• Katsuya Hihara, 2017, "Airport and Airline Relationship of Multiple Functional Structures," Advances in Airline Economics, Emerald Group Publishing Limited, "The Economics of Airport Operations", DOI: 10.1108/S2212-160920170000006006.
• Masato YODO & Hirokazu MIZOBATA & Yusuke HAYASHIDA, 2017, "Empirical Analysis of VFM and Contract Structures in PFI Projects:an Analysis of PFI Projects in Japan," Economic Analysis, Economic and Social Research Institute (ESRI), volume 192, pages 47-66, March.
• Hans Gersbach & Akaki Mamageishvili & Oriol Tejada, 2017, "Sophisticated Attacks on Decoy Ballots: A Devil's Menu and the Market for Lemons," CER-ETH Economics working paper series, CER-ETH - Center of Economic Research (CER-ETH) at ETH Zurich, number 17/283, Dec.
• FOSCHI, Matteo; SANTOS-PINTO, Luís Pedro, 2017, "Subjective Performance Evaluation of Employees with Biased Beliefs," Economics Working Papers, European University Institute, number ECO 2017/08.
• Cesare Dosi & Michele Moretto, 2017, "Cost Uncertainty and Time Overruns in Public Procurement: a Scoring Auction for a Contract with Delay Penalties," Working Papers, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei, number 2017.02, Jan.
• Lukasz A. Drozd & Ricardo Serrano-Padial, 2017, "Credit Enforcement Cycles," Working Papers, Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia, number 17-27, Aug.
• Benjamin Lester & Ali Shourideh & Venky Venkateswaran & Ariel Zetlin-Jones, 2017, "Screening and Adverse Selection in Frictional Markets," Working Papers, Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia, number 17-35, Oct.
• Borys Grochulski & Russell Wong & Yuzhe Zhang, 2017, "Optimal Incentive Contracts with Job Destruction Risk," Working Paper, Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond, number 17-11, Oct.
• Mikhail Drugov & Dmitry Ryvkin, 2017, "Tournament rewards and heavy tails," Working Papers, Department of Economics, Florida State University, number wp2017_05_01, May, revised Sep 2018.
• Georges Dionne & Sara Malekan, 2017, "Optimal Form of Retention for Securitized Loans under Moral Hazard," Risks, MDPI, volume 5, issue 4, pages 1-13, October.
• Izabela Jelovac & Samuel Kembou Nzale, 2017, "Regulation and altruism," Working Papers, Groupe d'Analyse et de Théorie Economique Lyon St-Etienne (GATE Lyon St-Etienne), Université de Lyon, number 1730.
• Magali Chaudey, 2017, "Why test the theory of incentives in a dynamic framework?," Working Papers, Groupe d'Analyse et de Théorie Economique Lyon St-Etienne (GATE Lyon St-Etienne), Université de Lyon, number 1733.
• Alfred Duncan & Charles Nola, 2017, "Disputes , Debt And Equity," Working Papers, Business School - Economics, University of Glasgow, number 2017_08, Jul.
• Yu Chen, 2017, "On the Equivalence of Bilateral and Collective Mechanism Design," Graz Economics Papers, University of Graz, Department of Economics, number 2017-01, Feb.
• Bo Chen & Yu Chen & David Rietzke, 2017, "Simple Contracts under Observable and Hidden Actions," Graz Economics Papers, University of Graz, Department of Economics, number 2017-07, Aug.
• Piero Gottardi & Jean-Marc Tallon & Paolo Ghirardato, 2017, "Flexible contracts," Post-Print, HAL, number hal-01238046, May, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2016.01.013.
• Arnaud Z. Dragicevic & Ahmed Barkaoui, 2017, "Forest-based industrial network: Case of the French timber market," Post-Print, HAL, number hal-01492064, DOI: 10.1016/j.forpol.2016.11.013.
• Catherine Locatelli, 2017, "EU-Russia trading relations: the challenges of a new gas architecture," Post-Print, HAL, number hal-01848661, Mar.
• Victor Hiller & Natacha Raffin, 2017, "Corporate social responsibility and workers’ motivation at the industry equilibrium," Post-Print, HAL, number hal-02366298, Sep.
• Anastasios Dosis, 2017, "Nash Equilibrium in Competitive Insurance," Post-Print, HAL, number hal-02980318, Dec, DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2016.12.030.
• David Martimort & Aggey Semenov & Lars Stole, 2017, "A Theory of Contracts with Limited Enforcement," Post-Print, HAL, number halshs-01509602, Apr, DOI: 10.1093/restud/rdw024.
• David Martimort & Aggey Semenov & Lars Stole, 2017, "Optimal stationary contract with two-sided imperfect enforcement and persistent adverse selection," Post-Print, HAL, number halshs-01630253, Oct, DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2017.07.007.
• David Martimort & Jérôme Pouyet & Francesco Ricci, 2018, "Extracting Information or Resource ? The Hotelling Rule Revisited under Asym- metric Information," Post-Print, HAL, number halshs-01631594, DOI: 10.1111/1756-2171.12233.
• Pierre Chaigneau & Nicolas Sahuguet & Bernard Sinclair-Desgagné, 2017, "Prudence and the convexity of compensation contracts," Post-Print, HAL, number halshs-02292785, Aug, DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2017.05.014.
• Piero Gottardi & Jean-Marc Tallon & Paolo Ghirardato, 2017, "Flexible contracts," PSE-Ecole d'économie de Paris (Postprint), HAL, number hal-01238046, May, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2016.01.013.
• David Martimort & Aggey Semenov & Lars Stole, 2017, "A Theory of Contracts with Limited Enforcement," PSE-Ecole d'économie de Paris (Postprint), HAL, number halshs-01509602, Apr, DOI: 10.1093/restud/rdw024.
• David Martimort & Aggey Semenov & Lars Stole, 2017, "Optimal stationary contract with two-sided imperfect enforcement and persistent adverse selection," PSE-Ecole d'économie de Paris (Postprint), HAL, number halshs-01630253, Oct, DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2017.07.007.
• David Martimort & Jérôme Pouyet & Francesco Ricci, 2017, "Extracting Information or Resource? The Hotelling Rule Revisited under Asymmetric Information," PSE Working Papers, HAL, number halshs-01431170, Jan.
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• David Martimort & Jérôme Pouyet & Francesco Ricci, 2017, "Extracting Information or Resource? The Hotelling Rule Revisited under Asymmetric Information," Working Papers, HAL, number halshs-01431170, Jan.
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• Lisa L. Posey & Paul D. Thistle, 2017, "Automobile Insurance and Driver Ability: Contract Choice as a Screening Mechanism," The Geneva Papers on Risk and Insurance Theory, Springer;International Association for the Study of Insurance Economics (The Geneva Association), volume 42, issue 2, pages 141-170, September, DOI: 10.1057/s10713-017-0022-7.
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• László Á. Kóczy & Hubert János Kiss, 2017, "Hart and Holmström’s Contributions to Contract Theory," Financial and Economic Review, Magyar Nemzeti Bank (Central Bank of Hungary), volume 16, issue 1, pages 162-174.
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• Bernhard Ganglmair, 2017, "Efficient Material Breach of Contract," The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Oxford University Press, volume 33, issue 3, pages 507-540.
• Peter M. Demarzo & Yuliy Sannikov, 2017, "Learning, Termination, and Payout Policy in Dynamic Incentive Contracts," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, volume 84, issue 1, pages 182-236.
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• Ottorino Chillemi & Stefano Galavotti & Benefetto Gui, 2017, "Inefficient Rationing With Post-Contractual Information," "Marco Fanno" Working Papers, Dipartimento di Scienze Economiche "Marco Fanno", number 0214, Dec.
• Lisa L. Posey & Paul D. Thistle, 2017, "Automobile Insurance and Driver Ability: Contract Choice as a Screening Mechanism," The Geneva Risk and Insurance Review, Palgrave Macmillan;International Association for the Study of Insurance Economics (The Geneva Association), volume 42, issue 2, pages 141-170, September, DOI: 10.1057/s10713-017-0022-7.
• Yunan Li, 2017, "Efficient Mechanisms with Information Acquisition," PIER Working Paper Archive, Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania, number 16-007, Jun, revised 23 Jun 2017.
• Hanming Fang & Zenan Wu, 2017, "Life Insurance and Life Settlement Markets with Overconfident Policyholders," PIER Working Paper Archive, Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania, number 17-005, Mar, revised 20 Mar 2017.
• László Á. Kóczy & János Kiss Hubert, 2017, "The contributions of Hart and Holmström to Contract Theory," Working Paper Series, Óbuda University, Keleti Faculty of Business and Management, number 1701.
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• albanese, marina & navarra, cecilia & Tortia, Ermanno, 2017, "EQUILIBRIUM UNEMPLOYMENT AS A WORKER INSURANCE DEVICE. Wage setting in worker owned enterprises," MPRA Paper, University Library of Munich, Germany, number 77031, Feb.
• Gete, Pedro & Gomez, Juan Pedro, 2017, "Dealing with Overleverage: Restricting Leverage vs. Restricting Variable Compensation," MPRA Paper, University Library of Munich, Germany, number 80642, Jun.
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