Research classified by Journal of Economic Literature (JEL) codes

1. Transaction Cost Economics

2018

• Paula Cordero Salas & Brian E. Roe & Brent Sohngen, 2018, "Additionality When REDD Contracts Must be Self-Enforcing," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, volume 69, issue 1, pages 195-215, January, DOI: 10.1007/s10640-016-0072-9.
• Pierre Martinon & Pierre Picard & Anasuya Raj, 2018, "On the design of optimal health insurance contracts under ex post moral hazard," The Geneva Papers on Risk and Insurance Theory, Springer;International Association for the Study of Insurance Economics (The Geneva Association), volume 43, issue 2, pages 137-185, September, DOI: 10.1057/s10713-018-0034-y.
• Francisco Candel-Sánchez & Juan Perote-Peña, 2018, "Endogenous market regulation in a signaling model of lobby formation," Journal of Economics, Springer, volume 123, issue 1, pages 23-47, January, DOI: 10.1007/s00712-017-0547-3.
• Jong-Hee Hahn & Jinwoo Kim & Sang-Hyun Kim & Jihong Lee, 2018, "Price Discrimination with Loss Averse and Horizontally Differentiated Consumers," Korean Economic Review, Korean Economic Association, volume 34, pages 117-129.
• Meg Adachi-Sato & Kazuya Kamiya, 2018, "Combinations of Different Length Contracts in a Multiperiod Model: Short, Medium and Long-term Contracts," Discussion Paper Series, Research Institute for Economics & Business Administration, Kobe University, number DP2018-05, Mar.
• Marina Halac & Ilan Kremer & Eyal Winter, 2018, "Raising Capital from Heterogeneous Investors," Working Papers, Lancaster University Management School, Economics Department, number 245773051.
• Michel Mougeot & Florence Naegelen, 2019, "Nonresponsiveness, Severity Auditing, and Upcoding Deterrence," Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, volume 175, issue 2, pages 308-331, DOI: 10.1628/jite-2018-0011.
• Ajay Agrawal & Joshua Gans & Avi Goldfarb, 2018, "Prediction, Judgment, and Complexity: A Theory of Decision-Making and Artificial Intelligence," NBER Chapters, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc, "The Economics of Artificial Intelligence: An Agenda".
• Ajay K. Agrawal & Joshua S. Gans & Avi Goldfarb, 2018, "Prediction, Judgment and Complexity: A Theory of Decision Making and Artificial Intelligence," NBER Working Papers, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc, number 24243, Jan.
• Francisco Espinosa & Debraj Ray, 2018, "Noisy Agents," NBER Working Papers, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc, number 24627, May.
• Peter Q. Blair & Bobby W. Chung, 2018, "Job Market Signaling through Occupational Licensing," NBER Working Papers, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc, number 24791, Jul.
• Meng Liu & Erik Brynjolfsson & Jason Dowlatabadi, 2018, "Do Digital Platforms Reduce Moral Hazard? The Case of Uber and Taxis," NBER Working Papers, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc, number 25015, Sep.
• Claudia M. Landeo & Kathryn E. Spier, 2018, "Ordered Leniency: An Experimental Study of Law Enforcement with Self-Reporting," NBER Working Papers, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc, number 25094, Sep.
• Claudia M. Landeo & Kathryn E. Spier, 2018, "Optimal Law Enforcement with Ordered Leniency," NBER Working Papers, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc, number 25095, Sep.
• Reppas, Dimitrios, 2018, "Modeling Fisheries Agreements with Side Payments: The Case of Western Atlantic Bluefin Tuna," Strategic Behavior and the Environment, now publishers, volume 7, issue 3-4, pages 397-441, February, DOI: 10.1561/102.00000078.
• Shingo Ishiguro & Yosuke Yasuda, 2018, "Moral Hazard and Target Budgets," Discussion Papers in Economics and Business, Osaka University, Graduate School of Economics, number 18-03, Feb.
• Philippe Aghion & Ernst Fehr & Richard Holden & Tom Wilkening, 2018, "The Role of Bounded Rationality and Imperfect Information in Subgame Perfect Implementation—An Empirical Investigation," Journal of the European Economic Association, European Economic Association, volume 16, issue 1, pages 232-274.
• Jonathan de Quidt, 2018, "Your Loss Is My Gain: A Recruitment Experiment with Framed Incentives," Journal of the European Economic Association, European Economic Association, volume 16, issue 2, pages 522-559.
• Sarath Sanga, 2018, "Incomplete Contracts: An Empirical Approach," The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Oxford University Press, volume 34, issue 4, pages 650-679.
• Eric Van Tassel, 2018, "Multiple borrowing and adverse selection in credit markets," Oxford Economic Papers, Oxford University Press, volume 70, issue 1, pages 286-299.
• Benjamin Hébert, 2018, "Moral Hazard and the Optimality of Debt," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, volume 85, issue 4, pages 2214-2252.
• Marco Buso & Cesare Dosi & Michele Moretto, 2018, "Termination Fees and Contract Design in Public-Private Partnerships," "Marco Fanno" Working Papers, Dipartimento di Scienze Economiche "Marco Fanno", number 0227, Oct.
• Pierre Martinon & Pierre Picard & Anasuya Raj, 2018, "On the design of optimal health insurance contracts under ex post moral hazard," The Geneva Risk and Insurance Review, Palgrave Macmillan;International Association for the Study of Insurance Economics (The Geneva Association), volume 43, issue 2, pages 137-185, September, DOI: 10.1057/s10713-018-0034-y.
• Massimiliano Vatiero, 2018, "Smart contracts and transaction costs," Discussion Papers, Dipartimento di Economia e Management (DEM), University of Pisa, Pisa, Italy, number 2018/238, Oct.
• Ahmed, Rafayal, 2018, "Dynamic Screening with Differentially Informed Principals," MPRA Paper, University Library of Munich, Germany, number 118463, Apr.
• Alexandrov, Alexei & Pittman, Russell & Ukhaneva, Olga, 2018, "Pricing of Complements in the U.S. freight railroads: Cournot versus Coase," MPRA Paper, University Library of Munich, Germany, number 86279, Apr.
• Tirelli, Mario, 2018, "Optimal financial contracts with unobservable investments," MPRA Paper, University Library of Munich, Germany, number 86444, Feb.
• Goldlücke, Susanne & Schmitz, Patrick W., 2018, "Pollution Claim Settlements Reconsidered: Hidden Information and Bounded Payments," MPRA Paper, University Library of Munich, Germany, number 90800.
• Hoppe, Eva I. & Schmitz, Patrick W., 2018, "Hidden Action and Outcome Contractibility: An Experimental Test of Moral Hazard Theory," MPRA Paper, University Library of Munich, Germany, number 95618.
• Seewald, Norbert, 2018, "Chancen und Grenzen von Leistungsanreizen in Behoerden. Macht und Ohnmacht von Leistungszahlungen und Zielvereinbarungen," Books, Rainer Hampp Verlag, number 9783957103086.
• Celik, Gorkem & Shin, Dongsoo & Strausz, Roland, 2018, "Aggregate Information and Organizational Structures," Rationality and Competition Discussion Paper Series, CRC TRR 190 Rationality and Competition, number 105, Jun.
• Fahn, Matthias & Klein, Nicolas, 2018, "Relational Contracts with Private Information On the Future Value of the Relationship," Rationality and Competition Discussion Paper Series, CRC TRR 190 Rationality and Competition, number 106, Jul.
• Lang, Matthias, 2018, "Communicating Subjective Evaluations," Rationality and Competition Discussion Paper Series, CRC TRR 190 Rationality and Competition, number 120, Oct.
• Englmaier, Florian & Fahn, Matthias, 2018, "Size Matters - \'Over\'investments in a Relational Contracting Setting," Rationality and Competition Discussion Paper Series, CRC TRR 190 Rationality and Competition, number 62, Jan.
• Mettral, Thomas, 2018, "Deterministic versus Stochastic Contracts in a Dynamic Principal-Agent Model," Rationality and Competition Discussion Paper Series, CRC TRR 190 Rationality and Competition, number 93, Apr.
• Elliot Lipnowski & Joao Ramos, 2018, "Repeated Delegation," 2018 Meeting Papers, Society for Economic Dynamics, number 1292.
• Barney Hartman-Glaser & Benjamin Hebert, 2018, "The Insurance is the Lemon: Failing to Index Contracts," 2018 Meeting Papers, Society for Economic Dynamics, number 160.
• Ana Babus & Kinda Hachem, 2018, "Markets for Financial Innovation," 2018 Meeting Papers, Society for Economic Dynamics, number 355.
• Claudia Landeo & Kathryn Spier, 2018, "Optimal Law Enforcement with Ordered Leniency," Working Papers, University of Alberta, Department of Economics, number 2018-06, Apr.
• Claudia Landeo & Kathryn Spier, 2018, "Ordered Leniency: An Experimental Study of Law Enforcement with Self-Reporting," Working Papers, University of Alberta, Department of Economics, number 2018-13, Sep.
• Corinne Langinier & Philippe Marcoul, 2018, "Subjective Performance of Patent Examiners, Implicit Contracts and Self-Funded Patent Offices," Working Papers, University of Alberta, Department of Economics, number 2018-14, Oct.
• Suting Hong & Konstantinos Serfes & Veikko Thiele, 2018, "Competition in the Venture Capital Market and the Success of Startup Companies: Theory and Evidence," School of Economics Working Paper Series, LeBow College of Business, Drexel University, number 2018-2, Feb.
• Prateek Goorha, 2018, "Contextual Contracts: On a Context-sensitive Approach to Contract Theory," Journal of Interdisciplinary Economics, , volume 30, issue 2, pages 191-209, July.
• Oindrila Dey, 2018, "Leniency, Status and Output Informativeness," Review of Market Integration, India Development Foundation, volume 10, issue 1, pages 1-18, April, DOI: 10.1177/0974929218764045.
• Giovanni Ponti & Claudio Rossetti, 2018, "Unobserved Heterogeneity in Structural Behavioral Models Using Experimental Data," CSEF Working Papers, Centre for Studies in Economics and Finance (CSEF), University of Naples, Italy, number 512, Oct.
• Thomas Mettral, 2018, "Deterministic versus stochastic contracts in a dynamic principal-agent model," Economic Theory Bulletin, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), volume 6, issue 2, pages 209-218, October, DOI: 10.1007/s40505-018-0136-9.
• Josef Schosser & Jochen Wilhelm, 2018, "Costly state verification and truthtelling: a note on the theory of debt contracts," Economic Theory Bulletin, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), volume 6, issue 2, pages 129-139, October, DOI: 10.1007/s40505-018-0137-8.
• Ram Singh, 2018, "Public–private partnerships vs. traditional contracts for highways," Indian Economic Review, Springer, volume 53, issue 1, pages 29-63, December, DOI: 10.1007/s41775-018-0032-0.
• Jong-Hee Hahn & Jinwoo Kim & Sang-Hyun Kim & Jihong Lee, 2018, "Price discrimination with loss averse consumers," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), volume 65, issue 3, pages 681-728, May, DOI: 10.1007/s00199-017-1035-2.
• Yaoyao Wu & Jinqiang Yang & Zhentao Zou, 2018, "Ambiguity sharing and the lack of relative performance evaluation," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), volume 66, issue 1, pages 141-157, July, DOI: 10.1007/s00199-017-1056-x.
• Ilan Guttman & Iván Marinovic, 2018, "Debt contracts in the presence of performance manipulation," Review of Accounting Studies, Springer, volume 23, issue 3, pages 1005-1041, September, DOI: 10.1007/s11142-018-9450-6.
• Qintao Fan & Wei Li, 2018, "Leading indicator variables and managerial incentives in a dynamic agency setting," Review of Accounting Studies, Springer, volume 23, issue 4, pages 1715-1753, December, DOI: 10.1007/s11142-018-9461-3.
• Pei-Cheng Yu, 2018, "Seemingly Exploitative Contracts," Discussion Papers, School of Economics, The University of New South Wales, number 2018-15, Oct.
• Yuriy Gorodnichenko & Tho Pham & Oleksandr Talavera, 2018, "Social media, sentiment and public opinions: Evidence from #Brexit and #USElection," Working Papers, Swansea University, School of Management, number 2018-01, Jan.
• Auster, Sarah, 2018, "Robust contracting under common value uncertainty," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, volume 13, issue 1, January.
• Moriya, Fumitoshi & Yamashita, Takuro, 2018, "Asymmetric information allocation to avoid coordination failure," TSE Working Papers, Toulouse School of Economics (TSE), number 18-941, Jul.
• Catalina Martínez & Sarah Parlane, 2020, "On the Firms’ Decision to Hire Academic Scientists," Working Papers, School of Economics, University College Dublin, number 201801, Mar.
• Urmee Khan & Martin Dumav, 2018, "Moral Hazard with Non-Additive Uncertainty: When are Actions Implementable?," Working Papers, University of California at Riverside, Department of Economics, number 201808, Apr.
• Richard N. Langlois, 2018, "The Fisher Body Case and Organizational Economics," Working papers, University of Connecticut, Department of Economics, number 2018-13, Jul.
• Paulo Fagandini, 2018, "Hunting with two bullets: moral hazard with a second chance," Nova SBE Working Paper Series, Universidade Nova de Lisboa, Nova School of Business and Economics, number wp629.
• Helmut Bester & Matthias Dahm, 2018, "Credence Goods, Costly Diagnosis and Subjective Evaluation," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, volume 128, issue 611, pages 1367-1394, June, DOI: 10.1111/ecoj.12472.
• Georg Nöldeke & Larry Samuelson, 2018, "The Implementation Duality," Econometrica, Econometric Society, volume 86, issue 4, pages 1283-1324, July, DOI: 10.3982/ECTA13307.
• Pedro Gete & Juan-Pedro Gómez, 2018, "Dealing with Overleverage: Restricting Leverage vs. Restricting Variable Compensation," Quarterly Journal of Finance (QJF), World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd., volume 8, issue 01, pages 1-29, March, DOI: 10.1142/S2010139218500015.
• Cici, Gjergji & Kempf, Alexander & Peitzmeier, Claudia, 2019, "Knowledge spillovers in the mutual fund industry through labor mobility," CFR Working Papers, University of Cologne, Centre for Financial Research (CFR), number 18-04, revised 2019.
• Hoffmann, Florian & Inderst, Roman & Turlo, Sergey, 2018, "Regulating Cancellation Rights with Consumer Experimentation," EconStor Preprints, ZBW - Leibniz Information Centre for Economics, number 253659.
• Bester, Helmut & Lang, Matthias & Li, Jianpei, 2018, "Signaling versus costly information acquisition," Discussion Papers, Free University Berlin, School of Business & Economics, number 2018/11.
• Hoffmann, Florian & Inderst, Roman & Opp, Marcus M., 2018, "Only time will tell: A theory of deferred compensation," SAFE Working Paper Series, Leibniz Institute for Financial Research SAFE, number 218, DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.3232708.

2017

• Yaping Shan, 2017, "Incentives for Research Agents and Performance-vested Equity-based Compensation," Adelaide Economics Working Papers, Adelaide University, School of Economics, number 2017-15, Dec.
• James Feyrer & Erin T. Mansur & Bruce Sacerdote, 2017, "Geographic Dispersion of Economic Shocks: Evidence from the Fracking Revolution," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, volume 107, issue 4, pages 1313-1334, April.
• Avinatan Hassidim & Assaf Romm & Ran I. Shorrer, 2017, "Redesigning the Israeli Psychology Master's Match," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, volume 107, issue 5, pages 205-209, May.
• John William Hatfield & Scott Duke Kominers & Alexander Westkamp, 2017, "Stable and Strategy-Proof Matching with Flexible Allotments," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, volume 107, issue 5, pages 214-219, May.
• Sandro Ambuehl & Axel Ockenfels, 2017, "The Ethics of Incentivizing the Uninformed: A Vignette Study," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, volume 107, issue 5, pages 91-95, May.
• Roland Strausz, 2017, "A Theory of Crowdfunding: A Mechanism Design Approach with Demand Uncertainty and Moral Hazard," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, volume 107, issue 6, pages 1430-1476, June.
• Oliver Hart, 2017, "Incomplete Contracts and Control," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, volume 107, issue 7, pages 1731-1752, July.
• Bengt Holmström, 2017, "Pay for Performance and Beyond," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, volume 107, issue 7, pages 1753-1777, July.
• Özlem Bedre-Defolie & Gary Biglaiser, 2017, "Contracts as a Barrier to Entry in Markets with Nonpivotal Buyers," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, volume 107, issue 7, pages 2041-2071, July.
• Luis Garicano & Luis Rayo, 2017, "Relational Knowledge Transfers," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, volume 107, issue 9, pages 2695-2730, September.
• Jin Li & Niko Matouschek & Michael Powell, 2017, "Power Dynamics in Organizations," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, volume 9, issue 1, pages 217-241, February.
• Tommy Staahl Gabrielsen & Bjørn Olav Johansen, 2017, "Resale Price Maintenance with Secret Contracts and Retail Service Externalities," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, volume 9, issue 1, pages 63-87, February.
• Robert W. Staiger & Alan O. Sykes, 2017, "How Important Can the Non-violation Clause Be for the GATT/WTO?," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, volume 9, issue 2, pages 149-187, May.
• Roberto Burguet, 2017, "Procurement Design with Corruption," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, volume 9, issue 2, pages 315-341, May.
• Christopher P. Chambers & M. Bumin Yenmez, 2017, "Choice and Matching," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, volume 9, issue 3, pages 126-147, August.
• Mostafa Beshkar & Eric W. Bond, 2017, "Cap and Escape in Trade Agreements," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, volume 9, issue 4, pages 171-202, November.
• Marianna Belloc & Samuel Bowles, 2017, "Persistence and Change in Culture and Institutions under Autarchy, Trade, and Factor Mobility," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, volume 9, issue 4, pages 245-276, November.
• Thomas Hellmann & Veikko Thiele, 2017, "Partner Uncertainty and the Dynamic Boundary of the Firm," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, volume 9, issue 4, pages 277-302, November.
• Ján Palguta & Filip Pertold, 2017, "Manipulation of Procurement Contracts: Evidence from the Introduction of Discretionary Thresholds," American Economic Journal: Economic Policy, American Economic Association, volume 9, issue 2, pages 293-315, May.
• Dosi, Cesare & Moretto, Michele, , "Cost Uncertainty and Time Overruns in Public Procurement: a Scoring Auction for a Contract with Delay Penalties," ETA: Economic Theory and Applications, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM), number 253215, DOI: 10.22004/ag.econ.253215.
• Izabela Jelovac & Samuel Kembou Nzale, 2017, "Regulation and Altruism," AMSE Working Papers, Aix-Marseille School of Economics, France, number 1737, Oct.
• Oscar Mauricio Valencia-Arana & Jose Eduardo Gomez-Gonzalez & Andrés Garcia-Suaza, 2017, "Young Innovative Firms, Investment-Cash Flow Sensitivities and Technological Misallocation," Borradores de Economia, Banco de la Republica de Colombia, number 1004, Jun, DOI: 10.32468/be.1004.
• Sjaak Hurkens & Matthew Ellman, 2018, "A Theory of Crowdfunding -A Mechanism Design Approach with Demand Uncertainty and Moral Hazard: Comment," Working Papers, Barcelona School of Economics, number 1012, Jan.
• Chang-Koo Chi & Kyoung Jin Choi, 2017, "The impact of firm size on dynamic incentives and investment," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, volume 48, issue 1, pages 147-177, March.
• Martin Pollrich, 2017, "Mediated audits," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, volume 48, issue 1, pages 44-68, March.
• Yaping Shan, 2017, "Optimal contracts for research agents," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, volume 48, issue 1, pages 94-124, March.
• Matthias Kräkel, 2017, "Authority and Incentives in Organizations," Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Wiley Blackwell, volume 119, issue 2, pages 295-311, April, DOI: 10.1111/sjoe.12172.
• Kazutoshi Sugimura & Masaru Itatani & Masaki Bessho, 2017, "Scope of Rules Concerning Personal Guarantee Agreements (Report of Workshops (4))," Bank of Japan Research Laboratory Series, Bank of Japan, number 17-E-4, Mar.
• Baake Pio & Harasser Andreas & Heiny Friederike, 2017, "Information Acquisition in Vertical Relations," The B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy, De Gruyter, volume 17, issue 1, pages 1-13, February, DOI: 10.1515/bejeap-2015-0211.
• Van Tassel Eric, 2017, "Structuring Subsidies in a Long-Term Credit Relationship," The B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy, De Gruyter, volume 17, issue 4, pages 1-12, October, DOI: 10.1515/bejeap-2017-0028.
• Hervé Lanotte & Jean-Baptiste Traversac, 2017, "Mécanismes d’incitation et de garantie de la gouvernance territoriale dans l’industrie du champagne," Revue d'économie régionale et urbaine, Armand Colin, volume 0, issue 2, pages 271-296.
• Jean Guillaume Forand & Jan Zapal, 2017, "The Demand and Supply of Favours in Dynamic Relationships," CERGE-EI Working Papers, The Center for Economic Research and Graduate Education - Economics Institute, Prague, number wp605, Sep.
• Alex Edmans & Xavier Gabaix & Dirk Jenter, 2017, "Executive Compensation: A Survey of Theory and Evidence," CESifo Working Paper Series, CESifo, number 6585.
• Matthias Fahn & Nicolas Klein, 2017, "Relational Contracts with Private Information on the Future Value of the Relationship: The Upside of Implicit Downsizing Costs," CESifo Working Paper Series, CESifo, number 6590.
• Matthias Fahn & Anne Schade & Katharina Schüßler, 2017, "What Drives Reciprocal Behavior? The Optimal Provision of Incentives over the Course of Careers," CESifo Working Paper Series, CESifo, number 6635.
• Jean-Marc Bourgeon & Pierre Picard, 2017, "Nitpicky Insurers and the Law of Contracts," CESifo Working Paper Series, CESifo, number 6669.
• Manoj Mohanan & Grant Miller & Katherine Donato & Yulya Truskinovsky & Marcos Vera-Hernández, 2017, "Different Strokes for Different Folks: Experimental Evidence on the Effectiveness of Input and Output Incentive Contracts for Health Care Providers with Different Levels of Skills," Working Papers, Center for Global Development, number 464, Oct.
• Juan-José Ganuza & Gerard Llobet, 2017, "The Simple Economics of White Elephants," Working Papers, CEMFI, number wp2017_1701, Jan.
• Oscar Mauricio Valencia-Arana & Jose Eduardo Gomez-Gonzalez & AndrÔøΩs Garcia-Suaza, 2017, "Young Innovative Firms, Investment-Cash Flow Sensitivities and Technological Misallocation," Documentos de Trabajo, Universidad del Rosario, number 15638, Jun.
• Maria del Pilar Castillo & Gi�como Balbinotto N., 2017, "A model of desertion. From a principal-agent theory perspective," Revista Cuadernos de Economia, Universidad Nacional de Colombia, FCE, CID, volume 36, issue 70, pages 19-47.
• Juan Esteban Carranza & �lvaro J. Riascos & Natalia Serna, 2017, "Market Power, Contracts and Outcomes: The Case of Patients with Long-Term Diseases in the Colombian Health Care System," Documentos de Trabajo, Quantil, number 15283, Jan.
• ATTAR Andrea & d’ASPREMONT Claude, 2017, "Trading under Asymmetric Information: Positive and Normative Implications," LIDAM Discussion Papers CORE, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE), number 2017009, Mar.
• Gersbach, Hans & Becker, Johannes Gerd, 2017, "Threshold Contracts," CEPR Discussion Papers, Centre for Economic Policy Research, number 11766, Jan.
• Pouyet, Jérôme & Martimort, David & Ricci, Francesco, 2017, "Extracting Information or Resource? The Hotelling Rule Revisited under Asymmetric Information," CEPR Discussion Papers, Centre for Economic Policy Research, number 11769, Jan.
• Rayo, Luis & Fudenberg, Drew, 2017, "Training and Effort Dynamics in Apprenticeship," CEPR Discussion Papers, Centre for Economic Policy Research, number 12126, Jul.
• Edmans, Alex & Gabaix, Xavier & Jenter, Dirk, 2017, "Executive Compensation: A Survey of Theory and Evidence," CEPR Discussion Papers, Centre for Economic Policy Research, number 12148, Jul.
• Schmitz, Patrick W., 2017, "Asymmetric Information and the Property Rights Approach to the Theory of the Firm," CEPR Discussion Papers, Centre for Economic Policy Research, number 12174, Jul.
• Platteau, Jean-Philippe & Bourguignon, François, 2017, "Optimal Management of Transfers: an Odd Paradox," CEPR Discussion Papers, Centre for Economic Policy Research, number 12234, Aug.
• Schmitz, Patrick W., 2017, "Incomplete Contracts, Shared Ownership, and Investment Incentives," CEPR Discussion Papers, Centre for Economic Policy Research, number 12258, Aug.
• Spagnolo, Giancarlo & Calzolari, Giacomo & Felli, Leonardo & Koenen, Johannes & Stahl, Konrad, 2017, "Relational Contracts, Competition and Innovation: Theory and Evidence from German Car Manufacturers," CEPR Discussion Papers, Centre for Economic Policy Research, number 12267, Sep.
• Platteau, Jean-Philippe & Bourguignon, François, 2017, "Aid Effectiveness: Revisiting the Trade-off Between Needs and Governance," CEPR Discussion Papers, Centre for Economic Policy Research, number 12277, Sep.
• Marina ALBANESE & Cecilia NAVARRA & Ermanno TORTIA, 2017, "Equilibrium unemployment as a worker insurance device: Wage setting in worker owned enterprises," CIRIEC Working Papers, CIRIEC - Université de Liège, number 1705, May.
• François Pannequin & Anne Corcos, 2017, "Compulsory insurance and voluntary self-insurance: substitutes or complements? A matter of risk attitudes," Working Papers, Center for Research in Economics and Statistics, number 2017-78, Aug.
• Larmande, François & Stolowy, Hervé, 2017, "Managerial Risk Aversion and Accounting Conservatism," HEC Research Papers Series, HEC Paris, number 1215, Jun, revised 27 Jul 2017.
• Guttman, Ilan & Marinovic, Ivan, 2017, "Debt Contractsin the Presence of Performance Manipulation," Research Papers, Stanford University, Graduate School of Business, number 3495, Jan.
• Hartman-Glaser, Barney & Hebert, Benjamin, 2017, "The Insurance Is the Lemon: Failing to Index Contracts," Research Papers, Stanford University, Graduate School of Business, number repec:ecl:stabus:3569, Dec.
• Miglo, Anton, 2017, "Timing of earnings and capital structure," The North American Journal of Economics and Finance, Elsevier, volume 40, issue C, pages 1-15, DOI: 10.1016/j.najef.2017.01.001.
• Dosis, Anastasios, 2017, "Nash equilibrium in competitive insurance," Economics Letters, Elsevier, volume 152, issue C, pages 5-8, DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2016.12.030.
• Müller, Daniel & Schmitz, Patrick W., 2017, "Optimal ownership of public goods in the presence of transaction costs," Economics Letters, Elsevier, volume 152, issue C, pages 88-92, DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2017.01.011.
• Dworczak, Piotr & Zhang, Anthony Lee, 2017, "Implementability, Walrasian equilibria, and efficient matchings," Economics Letters, Elsevier, volume 153, issue C, pages 57-60, DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2017.01.022.
• Li, Rui, 2017, "Moral hazard in investment and endogenous risk taking," Economics Letters, Elsevier, volume 157, issue C, pages 112-115, DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2017.05.018.
• Chaigneau, Pierre & Sahuguet, Nicolas & Sinclair-Desgagné, Bernard, 2017, "Prudence and the convexity of compensation contracts," Economics Letters, Elsevier, volume 157, issue C, pages 14-16, DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2017.05.014.
• Martimort, David & Semenov, Aggey & Stole, Lars, 2017, "Optimal stationary contract with two-sided imperfect enforcement and persistent adverse selection," Economics Letters, Elsevier, volume 159, issue C, pages 18-22, DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2017.07.007.
• Schmitz, Patrick W., 2017, "Asymmetric information and the property rights approach to the theory of the firm," Economics Letters, Elsevier, volume 159, issue C, pages 96-99, DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2017.07.026.
• Dragicevic, Arnaud Z. & Barkaoui, Ahmed, 2017, "Forest-based industrial network: Case of the French timber market," Forest Policy and Economics, Elsevier, volume 75, issue C, pages 23-33, DOI: 10.1016/j.forpol.2016.11.013.
• Dufwenberg, Martin & Servátka, Maroš & Vadovič, Radovan, 2017, "Honesty and informal agreements," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 102, issue C, pages 269-285, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2016.12.008.
• Kirkegaard, René, 2017, "Moral hazard and the spanning condition without the first-order approach," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 102, issue C, pages 373-387, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2017.01.001.
• Wilson, Alistair J. & Wu, Hong, 2017, "At-will relationships: How an option to walk away affects cooperation and efficiency," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 102, issue C, pages 487-507, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2017.02.007.
• Gottardi, Piero & Tallon, Jean Marc & Ghirardato, Paolo, 2017, "Flexible contracts," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 103, issue C, pages 145-167, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2016.01.013.
• Kusterer, David J. & Schmitz, Patrick W., 2017, "The management of innovation: Experimental evidence," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 104, issue C, pages 706-725, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2017.06.011.
• Su, Alice Peng-Ju, 2017, "Information revelation in the Property Right Theory of the firms," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, volume 52, issue C, pages 133-164, DOI: 10.1016/j.ijindorg.2017.02.004.
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