Research classified by Journal of Economic Literature (JEL) codes

1. Transaction Cost Economics

2017

• Dosi, Cesare & Moretto, Michele, , "Cost Uncertainty and Time Overruns in Public Procurement: a Scoring Auction for a Contract with Delay Penalties," ETA: Economic Theory and Applications, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM), number 253215, DOI: 10.22004/ag.econ.253215.
• Izabela Jelovac & Samuel Kembou Nzale, 2017, "Regulation and Altruism," AMSE Working Papers, Aix-Marseille School of Economics, France, number 1737, Oct.
• Oscar Mauricio Valencia-Arana & Jose Eduardo Gomez-Gonzalez & Andrés Garcia-Suaza, 2017, "Young Innovative Firms, Investment-Cash Flow Sensitivities and Technological Misallocation," Borradores de Economia, Banco de la Republica de Colombia, number 1004, Jun, DOI: 10.32468/be.1004.
• Sjaak Hurkens & Matthew Ellman, 2018, "A Theory of Crowdfunding -A Mechanism Design Approach with Demand Uncertainty and Moral Hazard: Comment," Working Papers, Barcelona School of Economics, number 1012, Jan.
• Chang-Koo Chi & Kyoung Jin Choi, 2017, "The impact of firm size on dynamic incentives and investment," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, volume 48, issue 1, pages 147-177, March.
• Martin Pollrich, 2017, "Mediated audits," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, volume 48, issue 1, pages 44-68, March.
• Yaping Shan, 2017, "Optimal contracts for research agents," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, volume 48, issue 1, pages 94-124, March.
• Matthias Kräkel, 2017, "Authority and Incentives in Organizations," Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Wiley Blackwell, volume 119, issue 2, pages 295-311, April, DOI: 10.1111/sjoe.12172.
• Kazutoshi Sugimura & Masaru Itatani & Masaki Bessho, 2017, "Scope of Rules Concerning Personal Guarantee Agreements (Report of Workshops (4))," Bank of Japan Research Laboratory Series, Bank of Japan, number 17-E-4, Mar.
• Baake Pio & Harasser Andreas & Heiny Friederike, 2017, "Information Acquisition in Vertical Relations," The B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy, De Gruyter, volume 17, issue 1, pages 1-13, February, DOI: 10.1515/bejeap-2015-0211.
• Van Tassel Eric, 2017, "Structuring Subsidies in a Long-Term Credit Relationship," The B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy, De Gruyter, volume 17, issue 4, pages 1-12, October, DOI: 10.1515/bejeap-2017-0028.
• Hervé Lanotte & Jean-Baptiste Traversac, 2017, "Mécanismes d’incitation et de garantie de la gouvernance territoriale dans l’industrie du champagne," Revue d'économie régionale et urbaine, Armand Colin, volume 0, issue 2, pages 271-296.
• Jean Guillaume Forand & Jan Zapal, 2017, "The Demand and Supply of Favours in Dynamic Relationships," CERGE-EI Working Papers, The Center for Economic Research and Graduate Education - Economics Institute, Prague, number wp605, Sep.
• Alex Edmans & Xavier Gabaix & Dirk Jenter, 2017, "Executive Compensation: A Survey of Theory and Evidence," CESifo Working Paper Series, CESifo, number 6585.
• Matthias Fahn & Nicolas Klein, 2017, "Relational Contracts with Private Information on the Future Value of the Relationship: The Upside of Implicit Downsizing Costs," CESifo Working Paper Series, CESifo, number 6590.
• Matthias Fahn & Anne Schade & Katharina Schüßler, 2017, "What Drives Reciprocal Behavior? The Optimal Provision of Incentives over the Course of Careers," CESifo Working Paper Series, CESifo, number 6635.
• Jean-Marc Bourgeon & Pierre Picard, 2017, "Nitpicky Insurers and the Law of Contracts," CESifo Working Paper Series, CESifo, number 6669.
• Manoj Mohanan & Grant Miller & Katherine Donato & Yulya Truskinovsky & Marcos Vera-Hernández, 2017, "Different Strokes for Different Folks: Experimental Evidence on the Effectiveness of Input and Output Incentive Contracts for Health Care Providers with Different Levels of Skills," Working Papers, Center for Global Development, number 464, Oct.
• Juan-José Ganuza & Gerard Llobet, 2017, "The Simple Economics of White Elephants," Working Papers, CEMFI, number wp2017_1701, Jan.
• Oscar Mauricio Valencia-Arana & Jose Eduardo Gomez-Gonzalez & AndrÔøΩs Garcia-Suaza, 2017, "Young Innovative Firms, Investment-Cash Flow Sensitivities and Technological Misallocation," Documentos de Trabajo, Universidad del Rosario, number 15638, Jun.
• Maria del Pilar Castillo & Gi�como Balbinotto N., 2017, "A model of desertion. From a principal-agent theory perspective," Revista Cuadernos de Economia, Universidad Nacional de Colombia, FCE, CID, volume 36, issue 70, pages 19-47.
• Juan Esteban Carranza & �lvaro J. Riascos & Natalia Serna, 2017, "Market Power, Contracts and Outcomes: The Case of Patients with Long-Term Diseases in the Colombian Health Care System," Documentos de Trabajo, Quantil, number 15283, Jan.
• ATTAR Andrea & d’ASPREMONT Claude, 2017, "Trading under Asymmetric Information: Positive and Normative Implications," LIDAM Discussion Papers CORE, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE), number 2017009, Mar.
• Gersbach, Hans & Becker, Johannes Gerd, 2017, "Threshold Contracts," CEPR Discussion Papers, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers, number 11766, Jan.
• Pouyet, Jérôme & Martimort, David & Ricci, Francesco, 2017, "Extracting Information or Resource? The Hotelling Rule Revisited under Asymmetric Information," CEPR Discussion Papers, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers, number 11769, Jan.
• Rayo, Luis & Fudenberg, Drew, 2017, "Training and Effort Dynamics in Apprenticeship," CEPR Discussion Papers, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers, number 12126, Jul.
• Edmans, Alex & Gabaix, Xavier & Jenter, Dirk, 2017, "Executive Compensation: A Survey of Theory and Evidence," CEPR Discussion Papers, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers, number 12148, Jul.
• Schmitz, Patrick W., 2017, "Asymmetric Information and the Property Rights Approach to the Theory of the Firm," CEPR Discussion Papers, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers, number 12174, Jul.
• Platteau, Jean-Philippe & Bourguignon, François, 2017, "Optimal Management of Transfers: an Odd Paradox," CEPR Discussion Papers, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers, number 12234, Aug.
• Schmitz, Patrick W., 2017, "Incomplete Contracts, Shared Ownership, and Investment Incentives," CEPR Discussion Papers, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers, number 12258, Aug.
• Spagnolo, Giancarlo & Calzolari, Giacomo & Felli, Leonardo & Koenen, Johannes & Stahl, Konrad, 2017, "Relational Contracts, Competition and Innovation: Theory and Evidence from German Car Manufacturers," CEPR Discussion Papers, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers, number 12267, Sep.
• Platteau, Jean-Philippe & Bourguignon, François, 2017, "Aid Effectiveness: Revisiting the Trade-off Between Needs and Governance," CEPR Discussion Papers, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers, number 12277, Sep.
• Marina ALBANESE & Cecilia NAVARRA & Ermanno TORTIA, 2017, "Equilibrium unemployment as a worker insurance device: Wage setting in worker owned enterprises," CIRIEC Working Papers, CIRIEC - Université de Liège, number 1705, May.
• François Pannequin & Anne Corcos, 2017, "Compulsory insurance and voluntary self-insurance: substitutes or complements? A matter of risk attitudes," Working Papers, Center for Research in Economics and Statistics, number 2017-78, Aug.
• Larmande, François & Stolowy, Hervé, 2017, "Managerial Risk Aversion and Accounting Conservatism," HEC Research Papers Series, HEC Paris, number 1215, Jun, revised 27 Jul 2017.
• Guttman, Ilan & Marinovic, Ivan, 2017, "Debt Contractsin the Presence of Performance Manipulation," Research Papers, Stanford University, Graduate School of Business, number 3495, Jan.
• Hartman-Glaser, Barney & Hebert, Benjamin, 2017, "The Insurance Is the Lemon: Failing to Index Contracts," Research Papers, Stanford University, Graduate School of Business, number repec:ecl:stabus:3569, Dec.
• Miglo, Anton, 2017, "Timing of earnings and capital structure," The North American Journal of Economics and Finance, Elsevier, volume 40, issue C, pages 1-15, DOI: 10.1016/j.najef.2017.01.001.
• Dosis, Anastasios, 2017, "Nash equilibrium in competitive insurance," Economics Letters, Elsevier, volume 152, issue C, pages 5-8, DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2016.12.030.
• Müller, Daniel & Schmitz, Patrick W., 2017, "Optimal ownership of public goods in the presence of transaction costs," Economics Letters, Elsevier, volume 152, issue C, pages 88-92, DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2017.01.011.
• Dworczak, Piotr & Zhang, Anthony Lee, 2017, "Implementability, Walrasian equilibria, and efficient matchings," Economics Letters, Elsevier, volume 153, issue C, pages 57-60, DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2017.01.022.
• Li, Rui, 2017, "Moral hazard in investment and endogenous risk taking," Economics Letters, Elsevier, volume 157, issue C, pages 112-115, DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2017.05.018.
• Chaigneau, Pierre & Sahuguet, Nicolas & Sinclair-Desgagné, Bernard, 2017, "Prudence and the convexity of compensation contracts," Economics Letters, Elsevier, volume 157, issue C, pages 14-16, DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2017.05.014.
• Martimort, David & Semenov, Aggey & Stole, Lars, 2017, "Optimal stationary contract with two-sided imperfect enforcement and persistent adverse selection," Economics Letters, Elsevier, volume 159, issue C, pages 18-22, DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2017.07.007.
• Schmitz, Patrick W., 2017, "Asymmetric information and the property rights approach to the theory of the firm," Economics Letters, Elsevier, volume 159, issue C, pages 96-99, DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2017.07.026.
• Dragicevic, Arnaud Z. & Barkaoui, Ahmed, 2017, "Forest-based industrial network: Case of the French timber market," Forest Policy and Economics, Elsevier, volume 75, issue C, pages 23-33, DOI: 10.1016/j.forpol.2016.11.013.
• Dufwenberg, Martin & Servátka, Maroš & Vadovič, Radovan, 2017, "Honesty and informal agreements," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 102, issue C, pages 269-285, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2016.12.008.
• Kirkegaard, René, 2017, "Moral hazard and the spanning condition without the first-order approach," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 102, issue C, pages 373-387, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2017.01.001.
• Wilson, Alistair J. & Wu, Hong, 2017, "At-will relationships: How an option to walk away affects cooperation and efficiency," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 102, issue C, pages 487-507, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2017.02.007.
• Gottardi, Piero & Tallon, Jean Marc & Ghirardato, Paolo, 2017, "Flexible contracts," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 103, issue C, pages 145-167, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2016.01.013.
• Kusterer, David J. & Schmitz, Patrick W., 2017, "The management of innovation: Experimental evidence," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 104, issue C, pages 706-725, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2017.06.011.
• Su, Alice Peng-Ju, 2017, "Information revelation in the Property Right Theory of the firms," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, volume 52, issue C, pages 133-164, DOI: 10.1016/j.ijindorg.2017.02.004.
• Escobar, Juan F. & Pulgar, Carlos, 2017, "Motivating with simple contracts," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, volume 54, issue C, pages 192-214, DOI: 10.1016/j.ijindorg.2017.07.002.
• Guo, Di & Hua, Xinyu & Jiang, Kun, 2017, "Agency and strategic contracts: Theory and evidence from R&D agreements in the pharmaceutical industry," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, volume 54, issue C, pages 37-64, DOI: 10.1016/j.ijindorg.2017.06.007.
• Byford, Martin C., 2017, "Moral hazard in strategic decision making," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, volume 55, issue C, pages 114-136, DOI: 10.1016/j.ijindorg.2017.10.001.
• De Chiara, Alessandro & Livio, Luca, 2017, "The threat of corruption and the optimal supervisory task," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, volume 133, issue C, pages 172-186, DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2016.11.006.
• Kim, Doyoung, 2017, "Motivating for new changes when agents have reputation concerns," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, volume 137, issue C, pages 37-53, DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2017.02.015.
• Omiya, Shungo & Tamada, Yasunari & Tsai, Tsung-Sheng, 2017, "Optimal delegation with self-interested agents and information acquisition," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, volume 137, issue C, pages 54-71, DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2017.03.003.
• Schmitz, Patrick W., 2017, "Incomplete contracts, shared ownership, and investment incentives," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, volume 144, issue C, pages 153-165, DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2017.09.021.
• Hedlund, Jonas, 2017, "Bayesian persuasion by a privately informed sender," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, volume 167, issue C, pages 229-268, DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2016.11.003.
• O'Brien, Daniel P., 2017, "All-units discounts and double moral hazard," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, volume 170, issue C, pages 1-28, DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2017.02.001.
• Ambrus, Attila & Egorov, Georgy, 2017, "Delegation and nonmonetary incentives," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, volume 171, issue C, pages 101-135, DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2017.06.002.
• Maestri, Lucas, 2017, "Dynamic contracting under adverse selection and renegotiation," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, volume 171, issue C, pages 136-173, DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2017.06.007.
• Hartog, Joop & Raposo, Pedro, 2017, "Are starting wages reduced by an insurance premium for preventing wage decline? Testing the prediction of Harris and Holmstrom (1982)," Labour Economics, Elsevier, volume 48, issue C, pages 105-119, DOI: 10.1016/j.labeco.2017.06.005.
• Gersbach, Hans & Rochet, Jean-Charles, 2017, "Capital regulation and credit fluctuations," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, volume 90, issue C, pages 113-124, DOI: 10.1016/j.jmoneco.2017.05.008.
• Chaudhuri, Sarbajit & Marjit, Sugata, 2017, "International trade and quality of labour," International Review of Economics & Finance, Elsevier, volume 49, issue C, pages 582-595, DOI: 10.1016/j.iref.2017.03.018.
• Edmans, Alex & Gabaix, Xavier & Jenter, Dirk, 2017, "Executive compensation: a survey of theory and evidence," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library, number 118967, Jul.
• Anderson, Ronald W. & Bustamante, Maria Cecilia & Guibaud, Stéphane & Zervos, Mihail, 2018, "Agency, firm growth, and managerial turnover," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library, number 68784, Feb.
• Eső, Péter & Szentes, Balázs, 2017, "Dynamic contracting: an irrelevance theorem," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library, number 69403, Jan.
• Shen, Huangnan & Fang, Lei & Deng, Kent, 2017, "Rise of ‘Red Zaibatsu’ in China: entrenchment and expansion of large state-owned enterprises, 1990-2016," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library, number 75214, Mar.
• Ozdenoren, Emre & Yuan, Kathy, 2017, "Contractual externalities and systemic risk," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library, number 75998, Oct.
• Shen, Huangnan & Fang, Lei & Deng, Kent, 2017, "Rise of ‘Red Zaibatsu’ in China: entrenchment and expansion of large state-owned enterprises, 1990-2016," Economic History Working Papers, London School of Economics and Political Science, Department of Economic History, number 75214, Mar.
• Katsuya Hihara, 2017, "Airport and Airline Relationship of Multiple Functional Structures," Advances in Airline Economics, Emerald Group Publishing Limited, "The Economics of Airport Operations", DOI: 10.1108/S2212-160920170000006006.
• Masato YODO & Hirokazu MIZOBATA & Yusuke HAYASHIDA, 2017, "Empirical Analysis of VFM and Contract Structures in PFI Projects:an Analysis of PFI Projects in Japan," Economic Analysis, Economic and Social Research Institute (ESRI), volume 192, pages 47-66, March.
• Hans Gersbach & Akaki Mamageishvili & Oriol Tejada, 2017, "Sophisticated Attacks on Decoy Ballots: A Devil's Menu and the Market for Lemons," CER-ETH Economics working paper series, CER-ETH - Center of Economic Research (CER-ETH) at ETH Zurich, number 17/283, Dec.
• FOSCHI, Matteo; SANTOS-PINTO, Luís Pedro, 2017, "Subjective Performance Evaluation of Employees with Biased Beliefs," Economics Working Papers, European University Institute, number ECO 2017/08.
• Cesare Dosi & Michele Moretto, 2017, "Cost Uncertainty and Time Overruns in Public Procurement: a Scoring Auction for a Contract with Delay Penalties," Working Papers, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei, number 2017.02, Jan.
• Lukasz A. Drozd & Ricardo Serrano-Padial, 2017, "Credit Enforcement Cycles," Working Papers, Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia, number 17-27, Aug.
• Benjamin Lester & Ali Shourideh & Venky Venkateswaran & Ariel Zetlin-Jones, 2017, "Screening and Adverse Selection in Frictional Markets," Working Papers, Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia, number 17-35, Oct.
• Borys Grochulski & Russell Wong & Yuzhe Zhang, 2017, "Optimal Incentive Contracts with Job Destruction Risk," Working Paper, Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond, number 17-11, Oct.
• Mikhail Drugov & Dmitry Ryvkin, 2017, "Tournament rewards and heavy tails," Working Papers, Department of Economics, Florida State University, number wp2017_05_01, May, revised Sep 2018.
• Georges Dionne & Sara Malekan, 2017, "Optimal Form of Retention for Securitized Loans under Moral Hazard," Risks, MDPI, volume 5, issue 4, pages 1-13, October.
• Izabela Jelovac & Samuel Kembou Nzale, 2017, "Regulation and altruism," Working Papers, Groupe d'Analyse et de Théorie Economique Lyon St-Etienne (GATE Lyon St-Etienne), Université de Lyon, number 1730.
• Magali Chaudey, 2017, "Why test the theory of incentives in a dynamic framework?," Working Papers, Groupe d'Analyse et de Théorie Economique Lyon St-Etienne (GATE Lyon St-Etienne), Université de Lyon, number 1733.
• Alfred Duncan & Charles Nola, 2017, "Disputes , Debt And Equity," Working Papers, Business School - Economics, University of Glasgow, number 2017_08, Jul.
• Yu Chen, 2017, "On the Equivalence of Bilateral and Collective Mechanism Design," Graz Economics Papers, University of Graz, Department of Economics, number 2017-01, Feb.
• Bo Chen & Yu Chen & David Rietzke, 2017, "Simple Contracts under Observable and Hidden Actions," Graz Economics Papers, University of Graz, Department of Economics, number 2017-07, Aug.
• Piero Gottardi & Jean-Marc Tallon & Paolo Ghirardato, 2017, "Flexible contracts," Post-Print, HAL, number hal-01238046, May, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2016.01.013.
• Arnaud Z. Dragicevic & Ahmed Barkaoui, 2017, "Forest-based industrial network: Case of the French timber market," Post-Print, HAL, number hal-01492064, DOI: 10.1016/j.forpol.2016.11.013.
• Victor Hiller & Natacha Raffin, 2017, "Corporate social responsibility and workers’ motivation at the industry equilibrium," Post-Print, HAL, number hal-02366298, Sep.
• Anastasios Dosis, 2017, "Nash Equilibrium in Competitive Insurance," Post-Print, HAL, number hal-02980318, Dec, DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2016.12.030.
• David Martimort & Aggey Semenov & Lars Stole, 2017, "A Theory of Contracts with Limited Enforcement," Post-Print, HAL, number halshs-01509602, Apr, DOI: 10.1093/restud/rdw024.
• David Martimort & Aggey Semenov & Lars Stole, 2017, "Optimal stationary contract with two-sided imperfect enforcement and persistent adverse selection," Post-Print, HAL, number halshs-01630253, Oct, DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2017.07.007.
• David Martimort & Jérôme Pouyet & Francesco Ricci, 2018, "Extracting Information or Resource ? The Hotelling Rule Revisited under Asym- metric Information," Post-Print, HAL, number halshs-01631594, DOI: 10.1111/1756-2171.12233.
• Pierre Chaigneau & Nicolas Sahuguet & Bernard Sinclair-Desgagné, 2017, "Prudence and the convexity of compensation contracts," Post-Print, HAL, number halshs-02292785, Aug, DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2017.05.014.
• Piero Gottardi & Jean-Marc Tallon & Paolo Ghirardato, 2017, "Flexible contracts," PSE-Ecole d'économie de Paris (Postprint), HAL, number hal-01238046, May, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2016.01.013.
• David Martimort & Aggey Semenov & Lars Stole, 2017, "A Theory of Contracts with Limited Enforcement," PSE-Ecole d'économie de Paris (Postprint), HAL, number halshs-01509602, Apr, DOI: 10.1093/restud/rdw024.
• David Martimort & Aggey Semenov & Lars Stole, 2017, "Optimal stationary contract with two-sided imperfect enforcement and persistent adverse selection," PSE-Ecole d'économie de Paris (Postprint), HAL, number halshs-01630253, Oct, DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2017.07.007.
• David Martimort & Jérôme Pouyet & Francesco Ricci, 2017, "Extracting Information or Resource? The Hotelling Rule Revisited under Asymmetric Information," PSE Working Papers, HAL, number halshs-01431170, Jan.
• Lisa Chauvet & Paul Collier & Andreas Fuster, 2017, "Supervision and Project Performance: A Principal-Agent Approach," Working Papers, HAL, number hal-01516966, May.
• Antoine Dubus, 2017, "Asymmetric Awareness and Heterogeneous Agents," Working Papers, HAL, number hal-01521487, May.
• François Larmande & Hervv Stolowy, 2017, "Managerial Risk Aversion and Accounting Conservatism," Working Papers, HAL, number hal-01941537, Jun.
• David Martimort & Jérôme Pouyet & Francesco Ricci, 2017, "Extracting Information or Resource? The Hotelling Rule Revisited under Asymmetric Information," Working Papers, HAL, number halshs-01431170, Jan.
• Izabela Jelovac & Samuel Kembou Nzale, 2017, "Regulation and Altruism," Working Papers, HAL, number halshs-01616193, Oct.
• Lindbeck, Assar & Weibull, Jörgen, 2017, "Delegation of Investment Decisions, and Optimal Renumeration of Agents," Working Paper Series, Research Institute of Industrial Economics, number 1171, May, revised 02 Aug 2020.
• Picariello, Luca, 2017, "Organizational Design with Portable Skills," Discussion Paper Series in Economics, Norwegian School of Economics, Department of Economics, number 2/2017, Feb.
• Kim, Doyoung, 2017, "Reputation Concerns And Authority In Organizations," Hitotsubashi Journal of Economics, Hitotsubashi University, volume 58, issue 2, pages 89-106, December, DOI: 10.15057/28956.
• Peter Blair & Bobby Chung, 2017, "Job Market Signaling through Occupational Licensing," Working Papers, Human Capital and Economic Opportunity Working Group, number 2017-50, Jun.
• Attar, Andrea & Mariotti, Thomas & Salanié, François, 2017, "Private Information and Insurance Rejections: A comment," IDEI Working Papers, Institut d'Économie Industrielle (IDEI), Toulouse, number 868, Mar.
• Lourdes Marcela Espinoza Vasquez & Raúl Rubin de Celis Cedro, 2017, "Regulador No Benevolente y Asimetrias de Informacion. Aproximacion con un Modelo de Agencia," Revista de Analisis Economico – Economic Analysis Review, Universidad Alberto Hurtado/School of Economics and Business, volume 32, issue 1, pages 23-45, April.
• Davies, Elwyn & Fafchamps, Marcel, 2017, "Pledging, Praising and Shaming: Experimental Labour Markets in Ghana," IZA Discussion Papers, IZA Network @ LISER, number 10520, Jan.
• Lisa L. Posey & Paul D. Thistle, 2017, "Automobile Insurance and Driver Ability: Contract Choice as a Screening Mechanism," The Geneva Papers on Risk and Insurance Theory, Springer;International Association for the Study of Insurance Economics (The Geneva Association), volume 42, issue 2, pages 141-170, September, DOI: 10.1057/s10713-017-0022-7.
• Zhen Wang & Tomislav Vukina, 2017, "Welfare effects of payment truncation in piece rate tournaments," Journal of Economics, Springer, volume 120, issue 3, pages 219-249, April, DOI: 10.1007/s00712-016-0516-2.
• Zoltan J. Acs & Pontus Braunerhjelm & Charlie Karlsson, 2017, "Philippe Aghion: recipient of the 2016 Global Award for Entrepreneurship Research," Small Business Economics, Springer, volume 48, issue 1, pages 1-8, January, DOI: 10.1007/s11187-016-9801-2.
• Philipp Renner & Simon Scheidegger, 2017, "Machine learning for dynamic incentive problems," Working Papers, Lancaster University Management School, Economics Department, number 203620397.
• Alvin Ulido Lumbanraja, 2017, "When Officials Dont Know What They Dont Know: Dunning-Kruger Effect in the Case of Green Budgeting for Local Government," LPEM FEBUI Working Papers, LPEM, Faculty of Economics and Business, University of Indonesia, number 201714, Nov, revised Nov 2017.
• Daniel Herold, 2017, "Compliance Programs, Signaling and Firms' Internal Coordination," MAGKS Papers on Economics, Philipps-Universität Marburg, Faculty of Business Administration and Economics, Department of Economics (Volkswirtschaftliche Abteilung), number 201749.
• Daniel Herold, 2017, "The Impact of Incentive Pay on Corporate Crime," MAGKS Papers on Economics, Philipps-Universität Marburg, Faculty of Business Administration and Economics, Department of Economics (Volkswirtschaftliche Abteilung), number 201752.
• Anastasios Papanastasiou, 2017, "Moral Hazard and Horizontal Information," Department of Economics Working Papers, McMaster University, number 2017-10, Jun.
• Sven Hoeppner & Lars Freund & Ben Depoorter, 2017, "The Moral-Hazard Effect of Liquidated Damages: An Experiment on Contract Remedies," Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, volume 173, issue 1, pages 84-105, March, DOI: 10.1628/093245616X14785139251341.
• Dongsoo Shin & Sungho Yun, 2017, "Limited Communication and Responsibility Budgeting," Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, volume 173, issue 3, pages 548-564, September, DOI: 10.1628/093245616X14701162930217.
• László Á. Kóczy & Hubert János Kiss, 2017, "Hart and Holmström’s Contributions to Contract Theory," Financial and Economic Review, Magyar Nemzeti Bank (Central Bank of Hungary), volume 16, issue 1, pages 162-174.
• Rohan DUTTA & Pierre-Yves YANNI, 2017, "On Inducing Agents with Term Limits to Take Appropriate Risk," Cahiers de recherche, Centre interuniversitaire de recherche en économie quantitative, CIREQ, number 06-2017.
• Hanming Fang & Zenan Wu, 2017, "Life Insurance and Life Settlement Markets with Overconfident Policyholders," NBER Working Papers, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc, number 23286, Mar.
• Joseph E. Stiglitz & Jungyoll Yun & Andrew Kosenko, 2017, "Equilibrium in a Competitive Insurance Market Under Adverse Selection with Endogenous Information," NBER Working Papers, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc, number 23556, Jun.
• Alex Edmans & Xavier Gabaix & Dirk Jenter, 2017, "Executive Compensation: A Survey of Theory and Evidence," NBER Working Papers, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc, number 23596, Jul.
• Sari Pekkala Kerr & William R. Kerr & Tina Xu, 2017, "Personality Traits of Entrepreneurs: A Review of Recent Literature," NBER Working Papers, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc, number 24097, Dec.
• Urs Schweizer, 2017, "Incentives to Acquire Information under Mandatory versus Voluntary Disclosure," The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Oxford University Press, volume 33, issue 1, pages 173-192.
• Susumu Cato & Akifumi Ishihara, 2017, "Transparency and Performance Evaluation in Sequential Agency," The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Oxford University Press, volume 33, issue 3, pages 475-506.
• Bernhard Ganglmair, 2017, "Efficient Material Breach of Contract," The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Oxford University Press, volume 33, issue 3, pages 507-540.
• Peter M. Demarzo & Yuliy Sannikov, 2017, "Learning, Termination, and Payout Policy in Dynamic Incentive Contracts," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, volume 84, issue 1, pages 182-236.
• Bård Harstad & Torben K. Mideksa, 2017, "Conservation Contracts and Political Regimes," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, volume 84, issue 4, pages 1708-1734.
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