Information Acquisition in Vertical Relations
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DOI: 10.1515/bejeap-2015-0211
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Other versions of this item:
- Pio Baake & Andreas Harasser & Friederike Heiny, 2016. "Information Acquisition in Vertical Relations," Discussion Papers of DIW Berlin 1543, DIW Berlin, German Institute for Economic Research.
References listed on IDEAS
- Liang Guo & Ganesh Iyer, 2010. "Information Acquisition and Sharing in a Vertical Relationship," Marketing Science, INFORMS, vol. 29(3), pages 483-506, 05-06.
- Ed Nosal, 2006.
"Information Gathering By A Principal,"
International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 47(4), pages 1093-1111, November.
- Ed Nosal, 2003. "Information gathering by a principal," Working Papers (Old Series) 0307, Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland.
- Ayça Kaya, 2010.
"When Does It Pay To Get Informed?,"
International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 51(2), pages 533-551, May.
- Ayca Kaya, 2007. "When does it pay to get informed?," 2007 Meeting Papers 572, Society for Economic Dynamics.
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More about this item
Keywords
asymmetric information; information acquisition; vertical relations;All these keywords.
JEL classification:
- D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
- D83 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness
- D86 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Economics of Contract Law
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