Relational Contracts with Private Information on the Future Value of the Relationship: The Upside of Implicit Downsizing Costs
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Other versions of this item:
- Matthias Fahn & Nicolas Klein, 2019. "Relational Contracts with Private Information on the Future Value of the Relationship: The Upside of Implicit Downsizing Costs," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 11(4), pages 33-58, November.
- Matthias Fahn & Nicolas Klein, 2017. "Relational Contracts with Private Information on the Future Value of the Relationship: The Upside of Implicit Downsizing Costs," Economics working papers 2017-14, Department of Economics, Johannes Kepler University Linz, Austria.
References listed on IDEAS
- Malcomson, James M., 2015.
"Relational incentive contracts with productivity shocks,"
Games and Economic Behavior,
Elsevier, vol. 92(C), pages 122-137.
- James Malcomson, 2012. "Relational Incentive Contracts with Productivity Shocks," Economics Series Working Papers 634, University of Oxford, Department of Economics.
- James M. Malcomson, 2012. "Relational Incentive Contracts," Introductory Chapters, in: Robert Gibbons & John Roberts (ed.), The Handbook of Organizational Economics, Princeton University Press.
- James M. Malcomson, 2016.
"Relational Incentive Contracts With Persistent Private Information,"
Econometric Society, vol. 84, pages 317-346, January.
- James Malcomson, 2012. "Relational Incentive Contracts with Persistent Private Information," Economics Series Working Papers 633, University of Oxford, Department of Economics.
More about this item
- C73 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games
- D86 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Economics of Contract Law
NEP fieldsThis paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-MIC-2017-11-19 (Microeconomics)
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