Size Matters - \'Over\'investments in a Relational Contracting Setting
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- Florian Englmaier & Matthias Fahn, 2015. "Size Matters - "Over"investments in a Relational Contracting Setting," CESifo Working Paper Series 5154, CESifo.
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Cited by:
- Matthias Fahn & Valeria Merlo & Georg Wamser, 2019.
"The Commitment Role of Equity Financing,"
Journal of the European Economic Association, European Economic Association, vol. 17(4), pages 1232-1260.
- Matthias Fahn & Valeria Merlo & Georg Wamser, 2014. "The Commitment Role of Equity Financing," CESifo Working Paper Series 4841, CESifo.
- Matthias Fahn & Valeria Merlo & Georg Wamser, 2017. "The Commitment Role of Equity Financing," Economics working papers 2017-12, Department of Economics, Johannes Kepler University Linz, Austria.
- Fahn, Matthias & Wamser, Georg & Merlo, Valeria, 2017. "The Commitment Role of Equity Financing," Rationality and Competition Discussion Paper Series 41, CRC TRR 190 Rationality and Competition.
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More about this item
Keywords
relational contracts; corporate finance; capital investments;All these keywords.
JEL classification:
- C73 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games
- D21 - Microeconomics - - Production and Organizations - - - Firm Behavior: Theory
- D86 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Economics of Contract Law
- G32 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Financing Policy; Financial Risk and Risk Management; Capital and Ownership Structure; Value of Firms; Goodwill
NEP fields
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:- NEP-CFN-2018-01-22 (Corporate Finance)
- NEP-CTA-2018-01-22 (Contract Theory and Applications)
- NEP-HRM-2018-01-22 (Human Capital and Human Resource Management)
- NEP-MIC-2018-01-22 (Microeconomics)
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