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Optimal contracting with private military and security companies

Author

Listed:
  • Fahn, Matthias
  • Hadjer, Tahmina

Abstract

Private military and security companies (PMSCs) have been gaining increasing media and scholarly attention particularly due to their indispensable role in the wars in Afghanistan 2001 and Iraq 2003. Nevertheless, theoretical insights into the agency problems inherent when hiring {PMSCs} and how to optimally incentivize them are scarce. We study the complex relationship between intervening state, host state, and PMSC, taking into account the diverging interests of all involved parties as well as potential agency problems. We develop a theoretical model to characterize a state's optimal choice whether to perform a task associated with an intervening mission itself, or hire a {PMSC} and optimally design the contract. We find that it might be optimal to hire {PMSCs} even if they are expected to do a worse job than the intervening state would do itself. Furthermore, the government's reputation in rewarding {PMSCs} for a good performance is crucial and might render it optimal to only deal with a limited number of {PMSCs} — who are not necessarily always the most efficient providers.

Suggested Citation

  • Fahn, Matthias & Hadjer, Tahmina, 2014. "Optimal contracting with private military and security companies," Munich Reprints in Economics 22178, University of Munich, Department of Economics.
    • Handle: RePEc:lmu:muenar:22178
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    Cited by:

    1. is not listed on IDEAS
    2. Benjamin Tkach, 2019. "Private military and security companies, contract structure, market competition, and violence in Iraq," Conflict Management and Peace Science, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 36(3), pages 291-311, May.
    3. Mohammad Ali Nasiri Khalili & Mostafa Kafaei Razavi & Morteza Kafaee Razavi, 2016. "An Optimized Mathematical Model for Items Supplies Planning of a Logistic System," Modern Applied Science, Canadian Center of Science and Education, vol. 10(10), pages 133-133, October.

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    Keywords

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    JEL classification:

    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
    • F53 - International Economics - - International Relations, National Security, and International Political Economy - - - International Agreements and Observance; International Organizations
    • F51 - International Economics - - International Relations, National Security, and International Political Economy - - - International Conflicts; Negotiations; Sanctions
    • C73 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games

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