The contributions of Hart and Holmström to Contract Theory
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Keywordscontract theory; incentives; principal-agent problem; Nobel prize; risk; property rights JEL Codes: C72; D82; D86;
- C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
- D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
- D86 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Economics of Contract Law
NEP fieldsThis paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-CTA-2017-02-05 (Contract Theory & Applications)
- NEP-GTH-2017-02-05 (Game Theory)
- NEP-HIS-2017-02-05 (Business, Economic & Financial History)
- NEP-HPE-2017-02-05 (History & Philosophy of Economics)
- NEP-HRM-2017-02-05 (Human Capital & Human Resource Management)
- NEP-MIC-2017-02-05 (Microeconomics)
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