Robust contracting under common value uncertainty
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- repec:eee:gamebe:v:114:y:2019:i:c:p:285-307 is not listed on IDEAS
- Eran Hanany & Peter Klibanoff & Sujoy Mukerji, 2018. "Incomplete Information Games with Ambiguity Averse Players," Working Papers 868, Queen Mary University of London, School of Economics and Finance.
More about this item
KeywordsAmbiguity aversion; optimal contracting; lemons problem;
- D81 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Criteria for Decision-Making under Risk and Uncertainty
- D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
- D86 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Economics of Contract Law
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