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Stable and Strategy-Proof Matching with Flexible Allotments

Author

Listed:
  • John William Hatfield
  • Scott Duke Kominers
  • Alexander Westkamp

Abstract

We introduce a framework of matching with flexible allotments that can be used to model firms with cross-division hiring restrictions. Our framework also allows us to nest some prior models of matching with distributional constraints. Building upon our recent work on observable substitutability, we show that multi-division choice functions with flexible allotments enable stable and strategy-proof matching; these results illustrate the value of clearly mapping when stable and strategy-proof matching is possible.

Suggested Citation

  • John William Hatfield & Scott Duke Kominers & Alexander Westkamp, 2017. "Stable and Strategy-Proof Matching with Flexible Allotments," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 107(5), pages 214-219, May.
    • Handle: RePEc:aea:aecrev:v:107:y:2017:i:5:p:214-19
    Note: DOI: 10.1257/aer.p20171050
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Avataneo, Michelle & Turhan, Bertan, 2021. "Slot-specific priorities with capacity transfers," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 129(C), pages 536-548.
    2. Bando, Keisuke & Hirai, Toshiyuki & Zhang, Jun, 2021. "Substitutes and stability for many-to-many matching with contracts," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 129(C), pages 503-512.
    3. Aygün, Orhan & Turhan, Bertan, 2020. "Dynamic reserves in matching markets," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 188(C).
    4. Dimakopoulos, Philipp D. & Heller, C.-Philipp, 2019. "Matching with waiting times: The German entry-level labor market for lawyers," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 115(C), pages 289-313.
    5. Honda, Edward, 2021. "A modified deferred acceptance algorithm for conditionally lexicographic-substitutable preferences," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 94(C).
    6. Kasuya, Yusuke, 2021. "Group incentive compatibility and welfare for matching with contracts," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 202(C).
    7. Kitahara, Minoru & Okumura, Yasunori, 2019. "On the number of employed in the matching model," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 83(C), pages 63-69.

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • C78 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
    • D21 - Microeconomics - - Production and Organizations - - - Firm Behavior: Theory
    • D86 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Economics of Contract Law

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