Optimal Incentive Contracts with Job Destruction Risk
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References listed on IDEAS
- Mortensen, Dale & Pissarides, Christopher, 2011.
"Job Creation and Job Destruction in the Theory of Unemployment,"
Russian Presidential Academy of National Economy and Public Administration, vol. 1, pages 1-19.
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- DeMarzo, Peter M. & Livdan, Dmitry & Tchistyi, Alexei, 2014. "Risking Other People's Money: Gambling, Limited Liability, and Optimal Incentives," Research Papers 3149, Stanford University, Graduate School of Business.
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More about this item
Keywordsdynamic moral hazard; job destruction; jump risk;
- D86 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Economics of Contract Law
NEP fieldsThis paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2017-10-22 (All new papers)
- NEP-CTA-2017-10-22 (Contract Theory & Applications)
- NEP-DGE-2017-10-22 (Dynamic General Equilibrium)
- NEP-HRM-2017-10-22 (Human Capital & Human Resource Management)
- NEP-MIC-2017-10-22 (Microeconomics)
- NEP-ORE-2017-10-22 (Operations Research)
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