Research classified by Journal of Economic Literature (JEL) codes

1. Transaction Cost Economics

2023

• Jessica Martin & Stéphane Villeneuve, 2023, "Risk-sharing and optimal contracts with large exogenous risks," Decisions in Economics and Finance, Springer;Associazione per la Matematica, volume 46, issue 1, pages 1-43, June, DOI: 10.1007/s10203-023-00386-1.
• Kittiphod Charoontham & Thunyarat Amornpetchkul, 2023, "Compensation reform analysis on inflated credit rating attenuation," Economia e Politica Industriale: Journal of Industrial and Business Economics, Springer;Associazione Amici di Economia e Politica Industriale, volume 50, issue 3, pages 627-645, September, DOI: 10.1007/s40812-022-00215-3.
• Sanxi Li & Xinyu Li & Zhan Qu, 2023, "Does vertical integration increase product quality?," Economic Theory Bulletin, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), volume 11, issue 1, pages 69-80, April, DOI: 10.1007/s40505-022-00240-4.
• Xiangyu Shi, 2023, "Relative performance evaluation in organizations with information networks," Economic Theory Bulletin, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), volume 11, issue 2, pages 243-254, October, DOI: 10.1007/s40505-023-00256-4.
• Corina Birghila & Tim J. Boonen & Mario Ghossoub, 2023, "Optimal insurance under maxmin expected utility," Finance and Stochastics, Springer, volume 27, issue 2, pages 467-501, April, DOI: 10.1007/s00780-023-00497-y.
• Emma Hubert, 2023, "Continuous-time incentives in hierarchies," Finance and Stochastics, Springer, volume 27, issue 3, pages 605-661, July, DOI: 10.1007/s00780-023-00506-0.
• Takeshi Murooka & Takuro Yamashita, 2023, "Adverse selection and bounded rationality: an impossibility theorem," The Japanese Economic Review, Springer, volume 74, issue 3, pages 439-444, July, DOI: 10.1007/s42973-022-00119-w.
• Hideshi Itoh, 2023, "What do contracts do to facilitate relationships?," The Japanese Economic Review, Springer, volume 74, issue 3, pages 333-354, July, DOI: 10.1007/s42973-023-00132-7.
• Kevin Siqueira, 2023, "On-The-Job Training and Learning: Formal Training versus Learning by Doing," Journal of Labor Research, Springer, volume 44, issue 3, pages 181-198, December, DOI: 10.1007/s12122-023-09350-9.
• Christian Lukas, 2023, "On interim performance evaluations and interdependent period outcomes," Journal of Management Control: Zeitschrift für Planung und Unternehmenssteuerung, Springer, volume 34, issue 1, pages 67-108, March, DOI: 10.1007/s00187-023-00350-5.
• Toshiaki Wakabayashi, 2023, "A theory of management control packages and organizational identity," Journal of Management Control: Zeitschrift für Planung und Unternehmenssteuerung, Springer, volume 34, issue 4, pages 463-488, December, DOI: 10.1007/s00187-024-00366-5.
• Kee-Youn Kang, 2023, "Cryptocurrency and double spending history: transactions with zero confirmation," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), volume 75, issue 2, pages 453-491, February, DOI: 10.1007/s00199-021-01411-3.
• Rongzhu Ke & Xinyi Xu, 2023, "The existence of an optimal deterministic contract in moral hazard problems," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), volume 76, issue 2, pages 375-416, August, DOI: 10.1007/s00199-022-01467-9.
• Alejandro Francetich, 2023, "When partner knows best: asymmetric expertise in partnerships," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, volume 52, issue 2, pages 363-399, June, DOI: 10.1007/s00182-022-00821-4.
• Peter-J. Jost, 2023, "Auditing versus monitoring and the role of commitment," Review of Accounting Studies, Springer, volume 28, issue 2, pages 463-496, June, DOI: 10.1007/s11142-021-09647-z.
• Christian Hofmann & Steven Huddart & Thomas Pfeiffer, 2023, "An analysis of net-outcome contracting with applications to equity-based compensation," Review of Accounting Studies, Springer, volume 28, issue 3, pages 1657-1689, September, DOI: 10.1007/s11142-021-09666-w.
• Markus Gastinger & Henning Schmidtke, 2023, "Measuring precision precisely: A dictionary-based measure of imprecision," The Review of International Organizations, Springer, volume 18, issue 3, pages 553-571, July, DOI: 10.1007/s11558-022-09476-y.
• Takaya Kubota & Shin’ya Okuda, 2023, "Allocation of decision rights among two parties with asymmetric bargaining powers in bidirectional open innovation," SN Business & Economics, Springer, volume 3, issue 6, pages 1-17, June, DOI: 10.1007/s43546-023-00473-w.
• Dušan Tříska, 2023, "The Liblice Castle Story," Springer Books, Springer, in: Martin A. Leroch & Florian Rupp, "Power and Responsibility", DOI: 10.1007/978-3-031-23015-8_12.
• Fleckinger, Pierre & Martimort, David & Roux, Nicolas, 2023, "Should They Compete or Should They Cooperate? The View of Agency Theory," TSE Working Papers, Toulouse School of Economics (TSE), number 23-1421, Mar, revised Jan 2024.
• Lefebvre, Perrin & Martimort, David, 2023, "Delegation, Capture and Endogenous Information Structures," TSE Working Papers, Toulouse School of Economics (TSE), number 23-1418, Mar.
• Xidong Guo & Sarah Parlane, 2023, "Private Practice in Public Hospitals: Should Senior Consultants Be Prioritized?," Working Papers, Geary Institute, University College Dublin, number 202301, Jan.
• Paweł Doligalski & Abdoulaye Ndiaye & Nicolas Werquin, 2023, "Redistribution with Performance Pay," Journal of Political Economy Macroeconomics, University of Chicago Press, volume 1, issue 2, pages 371-402, DOI: 10.1086/724511.
• Ernst Fehr & Gary Charness, 2023, "Social preferences: fundamental characteristics and economic consequences," ECON - Working Papers, Department of Economics - University of Zurich, number 432, Apr, revised Mar 2024.

2022

• Sam Kapon, 2022, "Dynamic Amnesty Programs," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, volume 112, issue 12, pages 4041-4075, December, DOI: 10.1257/aer.20211428.
• George Georgiadis & Michael Powell, 2022, "A/B Contracts," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, volume 112, issue 1, pages 267-303, January, DOI: 10.1257/aer.20200732.
• Erik Madsen, 2022, "Designing Deadlines," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, volume 112, issue 3, pages 963-997, March, DOI: 10.1257/aer.20200212.
• Geoffroy de Clippel & Jack Fanning & Kareen Rozen, 2022, "Bargaining over Contingent Contracts under Incomplete Information," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, volume 112, issue 5, pages 1522-1554, May, DOI: 10.1257/aer.20201026.
• Yunmi Kong & Isabelle Perrigne & Quang Vuong, 2022, "Multidimensional Auctions of Contracts: An Empirical Analysis," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, volume 112, issue 5, pages 1703-1736, May, DOI: 10.1257/aer.20200864.
• Neele Balke & Thibaut Lamadon, 2022, "Productivity Shocks, Long-Term Contracts, and Earnings Dynamics," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, volume 112, issue 7, pages 2139-2177, July, DOI: 10.1257/aer.20161622.
• Satoshi Fukuda & Yuichiro Kamada, 2022, "Negotiations with Limited Specifiability," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, volume 14, issue 1, pages 216-244, February, DOI: 10.1257/mic.20190089.
• Rumen Kostadinov & Aditya Kuvalekar, 2022, "Learning in Relational Contracts," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, volume 14, issue 1, pages 284-329, February, DOI: 10.1257/mic.20190203.
• Tarek Ghani & Tristan Reed, 2022, "Relationships on the Rocks: Contract Evolution in a Market for Ice," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, volume 14, issue 1, pages 330-365, February, DOI: 10.1257/mic.20190166.
• William Fuchs & Brett Green & David Levine, 2022, "Optimal Arrangements for Distribution in Developing Markets: Theory and Evidence," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, volume 14, issue 1, pages 411-450, February, DOI: 10.1257/mic.20190085.
• Alexander MacKay, 2022, "Contract Duration and the Costs of Market Transactions," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, volume 14, issue 3, pages 164-212, August, DOI: 10.1257/mic.20200128.
• Dimitri Migrow & Sergei Severinov, 2022, "Investment and Information Acquisition," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, volume 14, issue 3, pages 480-529, August, DOI: 10.1257/mic.20200115.
• Marina Halac & Elliot Lipnowski & Daniel Rappoport, 2022, "Addressing Strategic Uncertainty with Incentives and Information," AEA Papers and Proceedings, American Economic Association, volume 112, pages 431-437, May, DOI: 10.1257/pandp.20221087.
• Stark, Oded & Budzinski, Wiktor & Jakubek, Marcin & Kosiorowski, Grzegorz, , "On the optimal size of a joint savings association," Discussion Papers, University of Bonn, Center for Development Research (ZEF), number 320803, DOI: 10.22004/ag.econ.320803.
• Elisa Gerten & Michael Beckmann & Elisa Gerten & Matthias Kräkel, 2022, "Information and Communication Technology, Hierarchy, and Job Design," ECONtribute Discussion Papers Series, University of Bonn and University of Cologne, Germany, number 189, Aug.
• Qianjun Lyu, 2022, "Optimal Refund Mechanism," ECONtribute Discussion Papers Series, University of Bonn and University of Cologne, Germany, number 214, Dec.
• Joshua S. Gans & Richard Holden, 2022, "Mechanism Design Approaches to Blockchain Consensus," Papers, arXiv.org, number 2206.10065, Jun.
• Benjamin H'ebert & Weijie Zhong, 2022, "Engagement Maximization," Papers, arXiv.org, number 2207.00685, Jul, revised Dec 2025.
• Svetoslav Borisov, 2022, "DeFi – Potential, Advantages and Challenges," Economic Studies journal, Bulgarian Academy of Sciences - Economic Research Institute, issue 4, pages 33-54.
• Marco Guerrazzi & Pier Giuseppe Giribone, 2022, "The dynamics of working hours and wages under implicit contracts," Bulletin of Economic Research, Wiley Blackwell, volume 74, issue 4, pages 1075-1094, October, DOI: 10.1111/boer.12333.
• Florian Hoffmann & Roman Inderst & Marcus Opp, 2022, "The Economics of Deferral and Clawback Requirements," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, volume 77, issue 4, pages 2423-2470, August, DOI: 10.1111/jofi.13160.
• Franz Ostrizek, 2022, "Vague by Design: Performance Evaluation and Learning From Wages," CRC TR 224 Discussion Paper Series, University of Bonn and University of Mannheim, Germany, number crctr224_2022_358, Jun.
• Cheng Ho Cheung, 2022, "Legal Environment and Contractual Choice," The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, De Gruyter, volume 22, issue 2, pages 557-577, June, DOI: 10.1515/bejte-2020-0098.
• Kim Byung-Cheol, 2022, "Monopolistic Screening Under Mental Accounting: Applications to Loan Markets with Collateral," Review of Network Economics, De Gruyter, volume 21, issue 3, pages 111-142, October, DOI: 10.1515/rne-2023-0030.
• Hervé Lanotte & Aurélie Ringeval-Deluze & Erick Pruchnicki, 2022, "Les effets stabilisateurs sur la CGV des contrats pluriannuels d’approvisionnement entre firmes leaders et firmes subordonnées : l’exemple du champagne," Revue d'économie industrielle, De Boeck Université, volume 0, issue 1, pages 29-66.
• Fabio Antonialli & Rodrigo Marçal Gandia & Isabelle Nicolaï, 2022, "Quels modèles de gouvernance pour des scénarios de mobilité urbaine incluant des véhicules autonomes ?," Revue d'économie industrielle, De Boeck Université, volume 0, issue 2, pages 55-87.
• Hua, Xiameng & Watson, Joel, 2022, "Starting small in project choice: A discrete-time setting with a continuum of types," University of California at San Diego, Economics Working Paper Series, Department of Economics, UC San Diego, number qt1fb0j67c, Sep.
• Fabian Herweg & Maximilian Kähny, 2022, "Do Zombies Rise when Interest Rates Fall? A Relationship Banking Model," CESifo Working Paper Series, CESifo, number 9628.
• Matthias Fahn & Takeshi Murooka, 2022, "Informal Incentives and Labor Markets," CESifo Working Paper Series, CESifo, number 9740.
• Dominique Demougin & Carsten Helm, 2022, "Overwhelmed by Routine Tasks: A Multi-Tasking Principle Agent Perspective," CESifo Working Paper Series, CESifo, number 9753.
• Clara Graziano & Annalisa Luporini, 2022, "Do Firms Gain from Managerial Overconfidence? The Role of Severance Pay," CESifo Working Paper Series, CESifo, number 9801.
• Matthew J. Walker & Jason Shachat & Lijia Wei, 2022, "Contingent Payments in Procurement Interactions - Experimental Evidence," Working Papers, Chapman University, Economic Science Institute, number 22-18.
• François Bourguignon & Jean-Philippe Platteau, 2022, "Aid allocation: The role of external discipline," International Economics, CEPII research center, issue 172, pages 278-296.
• Hoffmann, Florian & Inderst, Roman & Opp, Marcus, 2022, "The Economics of Deferral and Clawback Requirements," CEPR Discussion Papers, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers, number 16882, Jan.
• Dumav, Martin & Fuchs, William & Lee, Jangwoo, 2022, "Self-Enforcing Contracts with Persistence," CEPR Discussion Papers, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers, number 16888, Jan.
• Gottardi, Piero & Mezzetti, Claudio, 2022, "Shuttle Diplomacy," CEPR Discussion Papers, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers, number 16934, Jan.
• Schmitz, Patrick W., 2022, "How (Not) to Purchase Novel Goods and Services: Specific Performance Versus At-Will Contracts," CEPR Discussion Papers, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers, number 17109, Mar.
• Paltseva, Elena & Toews, Gerhard & Troya Martinez, Marta, 2022, "I'll pay you later: Relational Contracts in the Oil Industry," CEPR Discussion Papers, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers, number 17121, Mar.
• Bhaskar, Venkataraman & Olszewski, Wojciech & Wiseman, Thomas, 2022, "Robust relational contracts with subjective performance evaluation," CEPR Discussion Papers, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers, number 17312, May.
• Kuong, John Chi-Fong & Maurin, Vincent, 2022, "The Design of a Central Counterparty," CEPR Discussion Papers, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers, number 17679, Nov.
• Deb, Rahul & Said, Maher & Pai, Mallesh, 2022, "Dynamic Incentives for Buy-Side Analysts," CEPR Discussion Papers, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers, number 17772, Dec.
• Светослав Борисов, 2022, "Регулаторни И Данъчни Предизвикателства Пред Пазара На Криптоактиви," Electronic magazine "Dialogue", D. A. Tsenov Academy of Economics, Svishtov, Bulgaria, issue 1 Year 20, pages 31-57.
• Hebert, Benjamin & Zhong, Weijie, 2022, "Engagement Maximization," Research Papers, Stanford University, Graduate School of Business, number 4035, Jul.
• Zhao, Siqi, 2022, "Robust contracting and corporate-termism," Economics Letters, Elsevier, volume 213, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2022.110344.
• Maslov, Alexander & Noiset, Luc & Schwartz, Jesse A., 2022, "A closer look at two conjectures about irregular marginal revenue," Economics Letters, Elsevier, volume 218, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2022.110728.
• Wu, Xi & Gan, Li, 2022, "One-sided commitment in life insurance contracts: Evidence from Health and Retirement Study," Economics Letters, Elsevier, volume 219, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2022.110825.
• Krause, Andreas, 2022, "The optimal exclusion length of borrowers after default," Economics Letters, Elsevier, volume 220, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2022.110881.
• Alasseur, Clémence & Chaton, Corinne & Hubert, Emma, 2022, "Optimal contracts under adverse selection for staple goods such as energy: Effectiveness of in-kind insurance," Energy Economics, Elsevier, volume 106, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.eneco.2021.105785.
• Fedorov, Semyon & Lavrutich, Maria & Hagspiel, Verena & Lerdahl, Thomas, 2022, "Risk and benefit sharing schemes in oil exploration and production," Energy Economics, Elsevier, volume 116, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.eneco.2022.106401.
• Azrieli, Yaron, 2022, "Delegated expertise: Implementability with peer-monitoring," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 132, issue C, pages 240-254, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2021.12.008.
• Bhattacharjee, Swagata, 2022, "Dynamic contracting for innovation under ambiguity," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 132, issue C, pages 534-552, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2022.01.015.
• Rao, Neel, 2022, "Search equilibrium with unobservable investment," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 133, issue C, pages 300-330, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2022.03.011.
• Rodivilov, Alexander, 2022, "Monitoring innovation," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 135, issue C, pages 297-326, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2022.06.011.
• Awaya, Yu & Do, Jihwan, 2022, "Incentives under equal-pay constraint and subjective peer evaluation," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 135, issue C, pages 41-59, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2022.05.007.
• Abrardi, Laura & Cambini, Carlo, 2022, "Carpe Data: Protecting online privacy with naive users," Information Economics and Policy, Elsevier, volume 60, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.infoecopol.2022.100988.
• Wolfstetter, Elmar G., 2022, "Universal high-speed broadband provision: A simple auction approach," Information Economics and Policy, Elsevier, volume 60, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.infoecopol.2022.100994.
• Choi, Kyoung Jin & Jeon, Junkee & Lee, Ho-Seok & Lin, Hsuan-Chih, 2022, "Optimal long-term contracts with disability insurance under limited commitment," Insurance: Mathematics and Economics, Elsevier, volume 104, issue C, pages 99-132, DOI: 10.1016/j.insmatheco.2022.02.007.
• Bourguignon, François & Platteau, Jean-Philippe, 2022, "Aid allocation: The role of external discipline," International Economics, Elsevier, volume 172, issue C, pages 278-296, DOI: 10.1016/j.inteco.2021.06.008.
• Nakanishi, Yoshinobu, 2022, "Determinants of the number of bidders and win-reserve ratio in open competitive tendering: Relationship-specific investments and incomplete contracts," Japan and the World Economy, Elsevier, volume 63, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.japwor.2022.101147.
• Cici, Gjergji & Kempf, Alexander & Peitzmeier, Claudia, 2022, "Knowledge spillovers in the mutual fund industry through labor mobility," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, volume 134, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.jbankfin.2021.106310.
• Byun, Seong, 2022, "The role of intrinsic incentives and corporate culture in motivating innovation," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, volume 134, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.jbankfin.2021.106325.
• Stark, Oded & Budzinski, Wiktor & Jakubek, Marcin & Kosiorowski, Grzegorz, 2022, "On the optimal size of a joint savings association," Journal of Comparative Economics, Elsevier, volume 50, issue 3, pages 804-814, DOI: 10.1016/j.jce.2022.04.002.
• Canidio, Andrea & Karle, Heiko, 2022, "The focusing effect in negotiations," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, volume 197, issue C, pages 1-20, DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2022.01.029.
• Gerlach, Heiko & Li, Junqian, 2022, "Experts, trust and competition," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, volume 198, issue C, pages 552-578, DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2022.04.020.
• Feng, Jun & Ho, Chun-Yu & Qin, Xiangdong, 2022, "Internal and external reference dependence of incomplete contracts: Experimental evidences," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, volume 203, issue C, pages 189-209, DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2022.09.009.
• Harstad, Bård & Lancia, Francesco & Russo, Alessia, 2022, "Prices vs. quantities for self-enforcing agreements," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, volume 111, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.jeem.2021.102595.
• Hansen, Peter G., 2022, "New formulations of ambiguous volatility with an application to optimal dynamic contracting," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, volume 199, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2021.105205.
• Szydlowski, Martin & Yoon, Ji Hee, 2022, "Ambiguity in dynamic contracts," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, volume 199, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2021.105229.
• He, Wei & Li, Jiangtao, 2022, "Correlation-robust auction design," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, volume 200, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2021.105403.
• Lavi, Ron & Shamash, Elisheva S., 2022, "Principal-agent VCG contracts," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, volume 201, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2022.105443.
• Wang, Cheng & Yang, Youzhi, 2022, "Optimal CEO turnover," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, volume 203, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2022.105475.
• Lopomo, Giuseppe & Rigotti, Luca & Shannon, Chris, 2022, "Detectability, duality, and surplus extraction," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, volume 204, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2022.105465.
• Hua, Xiameng & Watson, Joel, 2022, "Starting small in project choice: A discrete-time setting with a continuum of types," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, volume 204, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2022.105490.
• Nishimura, Takeshi, 2022, "Informed principal problems in bilateral trading," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, volume 204, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2022.105498.
• Breig, Zachary, 2022, "Repeated contracting without commitment," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, volume 204, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2022.105514.
• Jung, Jin Yong, 2022, "Effects of changes in preferences in moral hazard problems," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, volume 205, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2022.105527.
• Ekmekci, Mehmet & Maestri, Lucas, 2022, "Wait or act now? Learning dynamics in stopping games," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, volume 205, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2022.105541.
• Orlov, Dmitry, 2022, "Frequent monitoring in dynamic contracts," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, volume 206, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2022.105550.
• Ewens, Michael & Gorbenko, Alexander & Korteweg, Arthur, 2022, "Venture capital contracts," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, volume 143, issue 1, pages 131-158, DOI: 10.1016/j.jfineco.2021.06.042.
• Donaldson, Jason Roderick & Piacentino, Giorgia, 2022, "Money runs," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, volume 126, issue C, pages 35-57, DOI: 10.1016/j.jmoneco.2021.11.007.
• Dumav, Martin & Fuchs, William & Lee, Jangwoo, 2022, "Self-enforcing contracts with persistence," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, volume 128, issue C, pages 72-87, DOI: 10.1016/j.jmoneco.2022.03.010.
• Liu, Xiaojie & Shen, Jim Huangnan & Deng, Kent, 2022, "Endowment Structure, property rights and reforms of large state-owned enterprises (SOEs) in China: Past, present and future," Structural Change and Economic Dynamics, Elsevier, volume 62, issue C, pages 675-692, DOI: 10.1016/j.strueco.2022.05.006.
• Chaigneau, Pierre & Edmans, Alex & Gottlieb, Daniel, 2022, "How should performance signals affect contracts?," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library, number 109005, Jan.
• Gottlieb, Daniel & Moreira, Humberto, 2022, "Simple contracts with adverse selection and moral hazard," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library, number 114348, Jul.
• Amine Ben Amar & AbdelKader O. El Alaoui, 2022, "Profit- and loss-sharing partnership: the case of the two-tier mudharaba in Islamic banking," International Journal of Islamic and Middle Eastern Finance and Management, Emerald Group Publishing Limited, volume 16, issue 1, pages 81-102, May, DOI: 10.1108/IMEFM-12-2020-0630.
• Slava Mikhed & Sahil Raina & Barry Scholnick & Man Zhang, 2022, "Debtor Fraud in Consumer Debt Renegotiation," Working Papers, Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia, number 22-35, Oct, DOI: 10.21799/frbp.wp.2022.35.
• Andrea Attar & Thomas Mariotti & François Salanié, 2022, "Regulating Insurance Markets: Multiple Contracting and Adverse Selection," Post-Print, HAL, number hal-03796415, Aug, DOI: 10.1111/iere.12570.
• Saib Mhamed & Mokhtari Fayçal, 2022, "
  [Institutional quality and economic development in MENA region Comparative analysis]," Post-Print, HAL, number hal-03904809, Dec.
• Takeshi Murooka & Takuro Yamashita, 2022, "Adverse selection and bounded rationality: an impossibility theorem," Post-Print, HAL, number hal-04047796, Sep, DOI: 10.1007/s42973-022-00119-w.
• François Bourguignon & Jean-Philippe Platteau, 2022, "Aid allocation: The role of external discipline," Post-Print, HAL, number halshs-03324977, Dec, DOI: 10.1016/j.inteco.2021.06.008.
• Perrin Lefebvre & David Martimort, 2022, "Delegation, capture and endogenous information structures," Post-Print, HAL, number halshs-03758829, DOI: 10.1177/09516298221107552.
• David Martimort & Lars A. Stole, 2022, "Participation constraints in discontinuous adverse selection models," Post-Print, HAL, number halshs-03758833, Jul, DOI: 10.3982/TE3030.
• Clémence Alasseur & Corinne Chaton & Emma Hubert, 2022, "Optimal contracts under adverse selection for staple goods such as energy: Effectiveness of in-kind insurance," Post-Print, HAL, number halshs-03983355, Feb, DOI: 10.1016/j.eneco.2021.105785.
• François Bourguignon & Jean-Philippe Platteau, 2022, "Aid allocation: The role of external discipline," PSE-Ecole d'économie de Paris (Postprint), HAL, number halshs-03324977, Dec, DOI: 10.1016/j.inteco.2021.06.008.
• Perrin Lefebvre & David Martimort, 2022, "Delegation, capture and endogenous information structures," PSE-Ecole d'économie de Paris (Postprint), HAL, number halshs-03758829, DOI: 10.1177/09516298221107552.
• David Martimort & Lars A. Stole, 2022, "Participation constraints in discontinuous adverse selection models," PSE-Ecole d'économie de Paris (Postprint), HAL, number halshs-03758833, Jul, DOI: 10.3982/TE3030.
• Andrea Attar & Thomas Mariotti & François Salanié, 2022, "Competitive nonlinear pricing under adverse selection," Working Papers, HAL, number hal-03629592, Apr.
• Paltseva, Elena & Toews , Gerhard & Troya-Martinez, Marta, 2022, "I’ll pay you later: Sustaining Relationships under the Threat of Expropriation," SITE Working Paper Series, Stockholm School of Economics, Stockholm Institute of Transition Economics, number 59, Jun.
• Koustougeras, Leonidas & Santos, Manuel & Xu, Fei, 2022, "Corruption and Adverse Selection," Umeå Economic Studies, Umeå University, Department of Economics, number 1007, Aug.
• Altunina Anastasiia, 2022, "Study-Work Trade-off in Contests With Capacity-Constrained Students," HSE Working papers, National Research University Higher School of Economics, number WP BRP 259/EC/2022.
• Carlos Contreras & Julio Angulo, 2022, "Innovation and Tariff-adjustment Options in Public-private Partnerships," Hacienda Pública Española / Review of Public Economics, IEF, volume 243, issue 4, pages 51-81, December.
• Dirk Hackbarth & Alejandro Rivera & Tak-Yuen Wong, 2022, "Optimal Short-Termism," Management Science, INFORMS, volume 68, issue 9, pages 6477-6505, September, DOI: 10.1287/mnsc.2021.4139.
• Stark, Oded & Budzinski, Wiktor & Jakubek, Marcin & Kosiorowski, Grzegorz, 2022, "On the Optimal Size of a Joint Savings Association," IZA Discussion Papers, IZA Network @ LISER, number 15383, Jun.
• Gerten, Elisa & Beckmann, Michael & Kräkel, Matthias, 2022, "Information and Communication Technology, Hierarchy, and Job Design," IZA Discussion Papers, IZA Network @ LISER, number 15491, Aug.
• Abel, Martin & Burger, Rulof, 2022, "Choice over Payment Schemes and Worker Effort," IZA Discussion Papers, IZA Network @ LISER, number 15769, Dec.
• Matthias Fahn & Takeshi Murooka, 2022, "Informal Incentives and Labor Markets," Economics working papers, Department of Economics, Johannes Kepler University Linz, Austria, number 2022-05, Apr.
• Oliver J. Board & Kim-Sau Chung, 2022, "Object-based unawareness: Theory and applications," The Journal of Mechanism and Institution Design, Society for the Promotion of Mechanism and Institution Design, University of York, volume 7, issue 1, pages 1-43, December, DOI: 10.22574/jmid.2022.12.001.
• José Valente & Mário Augusto & José Murteira, 2022, "Bargaining power and renegotiation of small private debt contracts," Annals of Finance, Springer, volume 18, issue 4, pages 485-510, December, DOI: 10.1007/s10436-022-00413-y.
• Nisvan Erkal & Steven Y. Wu & Brian E. Roe, 2022, "Putting relational contract theory to the test: experimental evidence," Experimental Economics, Springer;Economic Science Association, volume 25, issue 1, pages 111-139, February, DOI: 10.1007/s10683-021-09707-w.
• Nisvan Erkal & Steven Y. Wu & Brian E. Roe, 2022, "Correction to: Putting relational contract theory to the test: experimental evidence," Experimental Economics, Springer;Economic Science Association, volume 25, issue 1, pages 140-140, February, DOI: 10.1007/s10683-021-09712-z.
• Jean-Louis Bago & Bruce Shearer, 2022, "Risk preferences and contract choices," Experimental Economics, Springer;Economic Science Association, volume 25, issue 5, pages 1374-1398, November, DOI: 10.1007/s10683-022-09768-5.
• Jasmin Droege, 2022, "First impression biases in the performing arts: taste-based discrimination and the value of blind auditioning," Journal of Cultural Economics, Springer;The Association for Cultural Economics International, volume 46, issue 3, pages 391-437, September, DOI: 10.1007/s10824-021-09428-1.
• Benjamin Hemingway, 2022, "Banking Regulation and Collateral Screening in a Model of Information Asymmetry," Journal of Financial Services Research, Springer;Western Finance Association, volume 61, issue 3, pages 367-405, June, DOI: 10.1007/s10693-021-00357-w.
• Kohei Daido & Takeshi Murooka, 2022, "The Provision of High-powered Incentives under Multitasking," Discussion Paper Series, School of Economics, Kwansei Gakuin University, number 242, Nov.
• Meg Adachi-Sato, 2022, "A Long-term Contract with a Possibility of Dismissal for a Multitasking Agent," Discussion Paper Series, Research Institute for Economics & Business Administration, Kobe University, number DP2022-23, May.
• Jose de Jesus Herrera-Velasquez, 2022, "Agency Problems in a Competitive Conglomerate with Production Constraints," KIER Working Papers, Kyoto University, Institute of Economic Research, number 1083, Sep.
• Laszlo Csorba, 2022, "The Effect of a Stronger Bargain Position on the Perfection and Completeness of a Contract," Financial and Economic Review, Magyar Nemzeti Bank (Central Bank of Hungary), volume 21, issue 3, pages 101-121.
• Chongwoo Choe & Shingo Ishiguro, 2022, "Relational Contracts and Hierarchy," Monash Economics Working Papers, Monash University, Department of Economics, number 2022-08, May.
• Barney Hartman-Glaser & Simon Mayer & Konstantin Milbradt, 2022, "A Theory of Cash Flow-Based Financing with Distress Resolution," NBER Working Papers, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc, number 29712, Jan.
• Joshua S. Gans & Richard T. Holden, 2022, "A Solomonic Solution to Ownership Disputes: An Application to Blockchain Front-Running," NBER Working Papers, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc, number 29780, Feb.
• Joshua S. Gans & Richard T. Holden, 2022, "Mechanism Design Approaches to Blockchain Consensus," NBER Working Papers, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc, number 30189, Jun.
• Braz Camargo & Fabian Lange & Elena Pastorino, 2022, "On the Role of Learning, Human Capital, and Performance Incentives for Wages," NBER Working Papers, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc, number 30191, Jun.
• Kohei Daido & Takeshi Murooka, 2022, "The Provision of High-powered Incentives under Multitasking," OSIPP Discussion Paper, Osaka School of International Public Policy, Osaka University, number 22E005, Nov.
• Di Guo & Xinyu Hua & Kun Jiang, 2022, "Indemnification, Monitoring, and Competition: Evidence from R&D Contracts," American Law and Economics Review, American Law and Economics Association, volume 24, issue 1, pages 203-246.
• Patrick W Schmitz, 2022, "How (Not) to Purchase Novel Goods and Services: Specific Performance Versus at-will Contracts," The Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, volume 132, issue 647, pages 2563-2577.
• Dyotona Dasgupta & Prabal Roy Chowdhury, 2022, "Simultaneous borrowing and saving in microfinance
  [Microfinance beyond group lending]," Oxford Economic Papers, Oxford University Press, volume 74, issue 3, pages 920-935.
• John Y Zhu, 2022, "Anticipating Disagreement in Dynamic Contracting
  [An incomplete contracts approach to financial contracting]," Review of Finance, European Finance Association, volume 26, issue 5, pages 1241-1265.
• Pierre Chaigneau & Alex Edmans & Daniel Gottlieb, 2022, "How Should Performance Signals Affect Contracts?," The Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, volume 35, issue 1, pages 168-206.
• Scott L. Mitchell & Mark D. Packard & Brent B. Clark, 2022, "Decentralizing corporate governance? A praxeological inquiry," International Journal of Disclosure and Governance, Palgrave Macmillan, volume 19, issue 4, pages 413-429, December, DOI: 10.1057/s41310-022-00151-7.
• Schmitz, Patrick W., 2022, "How (Not) to Purchase Novel Goods and Services: Specific Performance Versus At-Will Contracts," MPRA Paper, University Library of Munich, Germany, number 112839.
• Bukvić, Rajko, 2022, "Пет сила vs Дуги реп
  [Five Forces vs Long Tail]," MPRA Paper, University Library of Munich, Germany, number 114557.
• Pitterle, Claudia, 2022, "Consumer behavior and decision making from officed- based doctors A systematic literature review," MPRA Paper, University Library of Munich, Germany, number 117730.
• Banerjee, Swapnendu & Chakraborty, Somenath, 2022, "Individual versus Team Production with Social Preferences," MPRA Paper, University Library of Munich, Germany, number 120996, Dec.
• Todorova, Tamara, 2022, "Оливър Уилямсън: Новатор На 20 Век И Основател На Новата Институционална Икономика
  [Oliver Williamson: an innovator of the 20th century and founder of the new institutional economics]," MPRA Paper, University Library of Munich, Germany, number 121077.
• Archawa Paweenawat, 2022, "Relative Performance Contracts versus Group Contracts with Hidden Savings," PIER Discussion Papers, Puey Ungphakorn Institute for Economic Research, number 176, Mar.
• Celik, Gorkem & Shin, Dongsoo & Strausz, Roland, 2022, "Aggregate Information and Organizational Structures," Rationality and Competition Discussion Paper Series, CRC TRR 190 Rationality and Competition, number 356, Dec.
• Cheng Wang & Youzhi Yang, 2022, "Code and data files for "On the Pure Theory of Wage Dispersion"," Computer Codes, Review of Economic Dynamics, number 20-92, revised .
• Marc Escrihuela-Villar & Walter Ferrarese & Alberto Iozzi, 2022, "On the Role of Bargaining Power in Nash-in-Nash Bargaining: When More is Less," CEIS Research Paper, Tor Vergata University, CEIS, number 550, Dec, revised 22 Dec 2022.
• PrzemysÅ‚aw Wechta, 2022, "Dividend policy from the perspective of social system theory," The Economic and Labour Relations Review, , volume 33, issue 3, pages 610-628, September, DOI: 10.1177/10353046221078879.
• Perrin Lefebvre & David Martimort, 2022, "Delegation, capture and endogenous information structures," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , volume 34, issue 3, pages 357-414, July, DOI: 10.1177/09516298221107552.
• Oindrila Dey & Swapnendu Banerjee, 2022, "Incentives, Status and Thereafter: A Critical Survey," South Asian Journal of Macroeconomics and Public Finance, , volume 11, issue 1, pages 95-115, June, DOI: 10.1177/2277978721990970.
• Prasun Bhattacharjee & Biswajit Mandal & Ravi Radhakrishnan, 2022, "Informal input sector and its impact on output market competitiveness," Indian Economic Review, Springer, volume 57, issue 2, pages 553-564, December, DOI: 10.1007/s41775-022-00146-9.
• Prasun Bhattacharjee & Biswajit Mandal & Ravi Radhakrishnan, 2022, "Correction to: Informal input sector and its impact on output market competitiveness," Indian Economic Review, Springer, volume 57, issue 2, pages 603-603, December, DOI: 10.1007/s41775-023-00160-5.
• Shingo Ishiguro, 2022, "Management cycles," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), volume 73, issue 1, pages 257-300, February, DOI: 10.1007/s00199-020-01337-2.
• Jaeyoung Sung, 2022, "Optimal contracting under mean-volatility joint ambiguity uncertainties," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), volume 74, issue 2, pages 593-642, September, DOI: 10.1007/s00199-021-01362-9.
• Andrei Barbos, 2022, "Optimal contracts with random monitoring," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, volume 51, issue 1, pages 119-154, March, DOI: 10.1007/s00182-021-00787-9.
• Gottlieb, Daniel & Moreira, Humberto, 2022, "Simple contracts with adverse selection and moral hazard," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, volume 17, issue 3, July.
• Martimort, David & Stole, Lars A., 2022, "Participation constraints in discontinuous adverse selection models," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, volume 17, issue 3, July.
• Moroni, Sofia, 2022, "Experimentation in Organizations," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, volume 17, issue 3, July.
• Schumacher, Heiner & Thysen, Heidi Christina, 2022, "Equilibrium contracts and boundedly rational expectations," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, volume 17, issue 1, January.
• Deb, Rahul & Mitchell, Matthew & Pai, Mallesh M., 2022, "(Bad) reputation in relational contracting," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, volume 17, issue 2, May.
• Bird, Daniel & Frug, Alexander, 2022, "Monotone contracts," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, volume 17, issue 3, July.
• Stefanie Huber & Tobias Schmidt, 2022, "Nevertheless, they persist: Cross-Country Differences in Homeownership Behavior," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers, Tinbergen Institute, number 22-009/II, Jan.
• Andrea M. Buffa & Dimitri Vayanos & Paul Woolley, 2022, "Asset Management Contracts and Equilibrium Prices," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, volume 130, issue 12, pages 3146-3201, DOI: 10.1086/720515.
• Andrey E. Shastitko, 2022, "Credible commitments in contract relations: Where are the limits of the possible?," Upravlenets, Ural State University of Economics, volume 13, issue 2, pages 20-33, May, DOI: 10.29141/2218-5003-2022-13-2-2.
• Keeler Marku & Sergio Ocampo & Jean-Baptiste Tondji, 2022, "Robust Contracts in Common Agency," University of Western Ontario, Departmental Research Report Series, University of Western Ontario, Department of Economics, number 20222.
• Tamara Todorova, 2022, "Oliver Williamson: Founder of the New Institutional Economics," Scientific Conference of the Department of General Economic Theory, University of Economics - Varna, issue 1, pages 279-286.
• Andrea Attar & Thomas Mariotti & François Salanié, 2022, "Regulating Insurance Markets: Multiple Contracting And Adverse Selection," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, volume 63, issue 3, pages 981-1020, August, DOI: 10.1111/iere.12570.
• Paulo Fagandini, 2022, "Wealth and the principal–agent matching," Managerial and Decision Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., volume 43, issue 2, pages 555-568, March, DOI: 10.1002/mde.3402.
• Swagata Bhattacharjee, 2022, "Delegation Using Forward Induction," International Game Theory Review (IGTR), World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd., volume 24, issue 03, pages 1-33, September, DOI: 10.1142/S0219198921500225.
• Chang Koo Chi & Kyoung Jin Choi, 2022, "A Dual Approach To Agency Problems: Existence," Working papers, Yonsei University, Yonsei Economics Research Institute, number 2022rwp-197, Jun.
• Peter J. Simmons & Anna Maria C. Menichini, 2022, "Efficient audits by pooling independent projects: Separation vs. conglomeration," Discussion Papers, Department of Economics, University of York, number 22/06, Oct.
• Lehr, William, 2022, "Smart Contracts: Myths and Implications for Economics and Financial Regulation," 31st European Regional ITS Conference, Gothenburg 2022: Reining in Digital Platforms? Challenging monopolies, promoting competition and developing regulatory regimes, International Telecommunications Society (ITS), number 265650.
• D'Acunto, Francesco & Xie, Jin & Yao, Jiaquan, 2022, "Trust and contracts: Empirical evidence," LawFin Working Paper Series, Goethe University, Center for Advanced Studies on the Foundations of Law and Finance (LawFin), number 32.
• Kaehny, Maximilian & Herweg, Fabian, 2022, "Do Zombies Rise When Interest Rates Fall? A Relationship-Banking Model," VfS Annual Conference 2022 (Basel): Big Data in Economics, Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association, number 264126.

2021

• Marina Halac & Elliot Lipnowski & Daniel Rappoport, 2021, "Rank Uncertainty in Organizations," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, volume 111, issue 3, pages 757-786, March, DOI: 10.1257/aer.20200555.
• Ernst Fehr & Michael Powell & Tom Wilkening, 2021, "Behavioral Constraints on the Design of Subgame-Perfect Implementation Mechanisms," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, volume 111, issue 4, pages 1055-1091, April, DOI: 10.1257/aer.20170297.
• Andrea Attar & Thomas Mariotti & François Salanié, 2021, "Entry-Proofness and Discriminatory Pricing under Adverse Selection," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, volume 111, issue 8, pages 2623-2659, August, DOI: 10.1257/aer.20190189.
• Manoj Mohanan & Katherine Donato & Grant Miller & Yulya Truskinovsky & Marcos Vera-Hernández, 2021, "Different Strokes for Different Folks? Experimental Evidence on the Effectiveness of Input and Output Incentive Contracts for Health Care Providers with Varying Skills," American Economic Journal: Applied Economics, American Economic Association, volume 13, issue 4, pages 34-69, October, DOI: 10.1257/app.20190220.
• Dana Foarta & Takuo Sugaya, 2021, "Wait-and-See or Step In? Dynamics of Interventions," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, volume 13, issue 1, pages 399-425, February, DOI: 10.1257/mic.20180321.
• Jorge Lemus & Emil Temnyalov & John L. Turner, 2021, "Liability Insurance: Equilibrium Contracts under Monopoly and Competition," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, volume 13, issue 1, pages 83-115, February, DOI: 10.1257/mic.20180245.
• Saul Lach & Zvika Neeman & Mark Schankerman, 2021, "Government Financing of R&D: A Mechanism Design Approach," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, volume 13, issue 3, pages 238-272, August, DOI: 10.1257/mic.20190053.