Research classified by Journal of Economic Literature (JEL) codes
Top JEL
/ D: Microeconomics
/ / D8: Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty
/ / / D86: Economics of Contract Law
This JEL code is mentioned in the following RePEc Biblio entries:
2023
- Qi Liu & Bo Sun, 2023, "Relative Wealth Concerns, Executive Compensation, and Managerial Risk-Taking," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, volume 15, issue 2, pages 568-598, May, DOI: 10.1257/mic.20200325.
- Bobak Pakzad-Hurson, 2023, "Stable and Efficient Resource Allocation with Contracts," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, volume 15, issue 2, pages 627-659, May, DOI: 10.1257/mic.20210109.
- Anh Nguyen & Teck Yong Tan, 2023, "Markets with Within-Type Adverse Selection," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, volume 15, issue 2, pages 699-726, May, DOI: 10.1257/mic.20210112.
- Samuel Häfner & Curtis R. Taylor, 2023, "Working for References," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, volume 15, issue 3, pages 33-77, August, DOI: 10.1257/mic.20210299.
- Ian Appel & Jillian Grennan, 2023, "Control of Decentralized Autonomous Organizations," AEA Papers and Proceedings, American Economic Association, volume 113, pages 182-185, May, DOI: 10.1257/pandp.20231119.
- Joshua S. Gans & Richard Holden, 2023, "A Solomonic Solution to Blockchain Front-Running," AEA Papers and Proceedings, American Economic Association, volume 113, pages 248-252, May, DOI: 10.1257/pandp.20231029.
- Robert M. Townsend & Nicolas X. Zhang, 2023, "Technologies That Replace a "Central Planner"," AEA Papers and Proceedings, American Economic Association, volume 113, pages 257-262, May, DOI: 10.1257/pandp.20231031.
- J. Aislinn Bohren & Daniel N. Hauser, 2023, "Optimal Lending Contracts with Retrospective and Prospective Bias," AEA Papers and Proceedings, American Economic Association, volume 113, pages 665-672, May, DOI: 10.1257/pandp.20231115.
- Buso, Marco & Dosi, Cesare & Moretto, Michele, undated, "Dynamic Regulation of Public Franchises with Imperfectly Correlated Demand Shocks," FEEM Working Papers, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM), number 330499, DOI: 10.22004/ag.econ.330499.
- Denuit, Michel & Dhaene, Jan & Ghossoub, Mario & Robert, Christian Y., 2023, "Comonotonicity and Pareto Optimality, with Application to Collaborative Insurance," LIDAM Discussion Papers ISBA, Université catholique de Louvain, Institute of Statistics, Biostatistics and Actuarial Sciences (ISBA), number 2023005, Jan.
- Roweno J. R. K. Heijmans, 2023, "Unraveling Coordination Problems," Papers, arXiv.org, number 2307.08557, Jul, revised Aug 2023.
- Ro’i Zultan & Eldar Dadon, 2023, "Missing the forest for the trees: when monitoring quantitative measures distorts task prioritization," Working Papers, Ben-Gurion University of the Negev, Department of Economics, number 2319.
- Rodney Garratt & Cyril Monnet, 2023, "An impossibility theorem on truth-telling in fully decentralised systems," BIS Working Papers, Bank for International Settlements, number 1117, Aug.
- Marco Buso & Luciano Greco, 2023, "The optimality of public–private partnerships under financial and fiscal constraints," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, volume 32, issue 4, pages 856-881, October, DOI: 10.1111/jems.12520.
- Peter M. Demarzo & Ron Kaniel, 2023, "Contracting in Peer Networks," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, volume 78, issue 5, pages 2725-2778, October, DOI: 10.1111/jofi.13260.
- Gorkem Celik & Dongsoo Shin & Roland Strausz, 2023, "Aggregate Information and Organizational Structures," Journal of Industrial Economics, Wiley Blackwell, volume 71, issue 1, pages 256-290, March, DOI: 10.1111/joie.12314.
- Ola Kvaløy & Trond E. Olsen, 2023, "Balanced Scorecards: A Relational Contract Approach," Journal of Accounting Research, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., volume 61, issue 2, pages 619-652, May, DOI: 10.1111/1475-679X.12465.
- Sarah Auster & Nicola Pavoni, 2023, "Optimal Delegation and Information Transmission under Limited Awareness," CRC TR 224 Discussion Paper Series, University of Bonn and University of Mannheim, Germany, number crctr224_2023_256v3, Apr.
- Demougin Dominique & Upton Harvey, 2023, "Relative Income Concerns, Dismissal, and the Use of Pay-for-Performance," The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, De Gruyter, volume 23, issue 1, pages 405-441, January, DOI: 10.1515/bejte-2021-0107.
- Suzuki Yutaka, 2023, "Collusion, Shading, and Optimal Organization Design," The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, De Gruyter, volume 23, issue 2, pages 537-575, June, DOI: 10.1515/bejte-2020-0130.
- Schottmüller-Einwag Ute & Dilger Alexander, 2023, "Entwicklungen der Vorstandsabfindungen von 2010 bis 2019," ORDO. Jahrbuch für die Ordnung von Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft, De Gruyter, volume 72, issue 1, pages 127-151, December, DOI: 10.1515/ordo-2023-2011.
- Parikshit Ghosh & Debraj Ray, 2023, "The Social Equilibrium of Relational Arrangements," Working papers, Centre for Development Economics, Delhi School of Economics, number 336, May.
- Giuseppe Dari-Mattiacci & Sander Onderstal & Francesco Parisi & Ram Singh, 2023, "Information-Forcing Effects of Non-Disclosure Rules," Working papers, Centre for Development Economics, Delhi School of Economics, number 338, Aug.
- Miller, David A & Watson, Joel, 2023, "An Active-Contracting Perspective on Equilibrium Selection in Relational Contracts," University of California at San Diego, Economics Working Paper Series, Department of Economics, UC San Diego, number qt2dg817mv, Jan.
- Matthias Fahn & Nicolas Klein, 2023, "Non-Common Priors, Incentives, and Promotions: The Role of Learning," CESifo Working Paper Series, CESifo, number 10481.
- Ernst Fehr & Gary Charness, 2023, "Social Preferences: Fundamental Characteristics and Economic Consequences," CESifo Working Paper Series, CESifo, number 10488.
- Francesco Celentano & Mark Rempel, 2023, "Public Listing Choice with Persistent Hidden Information," Swiss Finance Institute Research Paper Series, Swiss Finance Institute, number 23-28, Apr.
- Alexander Braun & Niklas Häusle & Paul D. Thistle, 2023, "Risk Classification with On-Demand Insurance," Swiss Finance Institute Research Paper Series, Swiss Finance Institute, number 23-49, Jun.
- Gottlieb, Daniel & Chaigneau, Pierre & Edmans, Alex, 2023, "A Theory of Fair CEO Pay," CEPR Discussion Papers, Centre for Economic Policy Research, number 17782, Jan.
- Schmitz, Patrick W., 2023, "Incentivizing Research with (Un)conditional Teaching Duties: Punishment or Rent Extraction?," CEPR Discussion Papers, Centre for Economic Policy Research, number 17885, Feb.
- Deb, Rahul & Pai, Mallesh & Said, Maher, 2023, "Indirect Persuasion," CEPR Discussion Papers, Centre for Economic Policy Research, number 17955, Mar.
- Macchiavello, Rocco & Morjaria, Ameet, 2023, "Relational Contracts: Recent Empirical Advancements and Open Questions," CEPR Discussion Papers, Centre for Economic Policy Research, number 17962, Mar.
- Schmitz, Patrick W., 2023, "Completely Relationship-Specific Investments, Transaction Costs, and the Property Rights Theory," CEPR Discussion Papers, Centre for Economic Policy Research, number 18048, Mar.
- Alasalmi, Juho & Goldlücke, Susanne & Jordan, Michelle, 2023, "Hidden Overtime: Optimal Contracts with (Self-)Deceptive Effort Reports," CEPR Discussion Papers, Centre for Economic Policy Research, number 18105, Apr.
- Schmitz, Patrick W., 2023, "The Proper Scope of Government Reconsidered: Asymmetric Information and Incentive Contracts," CEPR Discussion Papers, Centre for Economic Policy Research, number 18208, Jun.
- Auster, Sarah & pavoni, Nicola, 2023, "Optimal delegation and information transmission under limited awareness," CEPR Discussion Papers, Centre for Economic Policy Research, number 18296, Jul.
- Dumav, Martin & Khan, Urmee & Rigotti, Luca, 2023, "Optimal contracts when the players think different," UC3M Working papers. Economics, Universidad Carlos III de Madrid. Departamento de EconomÃa, number 38519, Oct.
- Arve, Malin & Zwart, Gijsbert, 2023, "Optimal procurement and investment in new technologies under uncertainty," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, volume 147, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.jedc.2023.104605.
- Demougin, Dominique & Upton, Harvey, 2023, "Relative income concerns and the Easterlin Paradox: A theoretical framework," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, volume 127, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.econmod.2023.106448.
- Loyola, Gino & Portilla, Yolanda, 2023, "Optimal incentives for managerial innovation," The North American Journal of Economics and Finance, Elsevier, volume 68, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.najef.2023.101982.
- Schmitz, Patrick W., 2023, "Incentivizing research with (un)conditional teaching duties: Punishment or rent extraction?," Economics Letters, Elsevier, volume 224, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2023.111012.
- Schmitz, Patrick W., 2023, "Completely relationship-specific investments, transaction costs, and the property rights theory," Economics Letters, Elsevier, volume 226, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2023.111103.
- Hoffman, Ryan & Kambhampati, Ashwin & Kaplan, Scott, 2023, "Pay equality among heterogeneous agents," Economics Letters, Elsevier, volume 229, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2023.111188.
- Schmitz, Patrick W., 2023, "The proper scope of government reconsidered: Asymmetric information and incentive contracts," European Economic Review, Elsevier, volume 157, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.euroecorev.2023.104511.
- Boonen, Tim J. & Ghossoub, Mario, 2023, "Bowley vs. Pareto optima in reinsurance contracting," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, volume 307, issue 1, pages 382-391, DOI: 10.1016/j.ejor.2022.08.003.
- Zhao, Chuan & Guo, Qidong & Jia, Rongwen & Dong, Kangyin & Wang, Kun, 2023, "How does clean energy transition promote original design manufacturers? A three-party evolutionary game analysis," Energy Economics, Elsevier, volume 126, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.eneco.2023.106965.
- Xie, Yimei & Ding, Chuan & Li, Yang & Wang, Kaihong, 2023, "Optimal incentive contract in continuous time with different behavior relationships between agents," International Review of Financial Analysis, Elsevier, volume 86, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.irfa.2023.102521.
- Dasgupta, Dyotona & Mookherjee, Dilip, 2023, "A theory of progressive lending," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 137, issue C, pages 211-227, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2022.11.005.
- Mattsson, Lars-Göran & Weibull, Jörgen W., 2023, "An analytically solvable principal-agent model," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 140, issue C, pages 33-49, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2023.03.002.
- Altınok, Ahmet, 2023, "Group lending, sorting, and risk sharing," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 140, issue C, pages 456-480, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2023.05.003.
- Min, Daehong, 2023, "Screening for experiments," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 142, issue C, pages 73-100, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2023.07.009.
- Bisceglia, Michele & Piccolo, Salvatore & Tarantino, Emanuele, 2023, "M&A advisory and the merger review process," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, volume 87, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.ijindorg.2023.102919.
- Wong, Tak-Yuen & Wong, Ho-Po Crystal, 2023, "Securities auctions with pre-project information management," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, volume 88, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.ijindorg.2023.102929.
- Bernard, Christophe & Mitraille, Sébastien, 2023, "Outsourcing horizontally differentiated tasks under asymmetric information," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, volume 89, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.ijindorg.2023.102971.
- Liu, Wenyue & Cadenillas, Abel, 2023, "Optimal insurance contracts for a shot-noise Cox claim process and persistent insured's actions," Insurance: Mathematics and Economics, Elsevier, volume 109, issue C, pages 69-93, DOI: 10.1016/j.insmatheco.2023.01.002.
- Zhu, Michael B. & Ghossoub, Mario & Boonen, Tim J., 2023, "Equilibria and efficiency in a reinsurance market," Insurance: Mathematics and Economics, Elsevier, volume 113, issue C, pages 24-49, DOI: 10.1016/j.insmatheco.2023.07.004.
- Chy, Mahfuz & Kyung, Hoyoun, 2023, "The effect of bond market transparency on bank loan contracting," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, volume 75, issue 2, DOI: 10.1016/j.jacceco.2022.101536.
- Balletta, Luigi & Lavezzi, Andrea Mario, 2023, "The economics of extortion: Theory and the case of the Sicilian Mafia," Journal of Comparative Economics, Elsevier, volume 51, issue 4, pages 1109-1141, DOI: 10.1016/j.jce.2023.05.003.
- Kosenko, Andrew & Stiglitz, Joseph & Yun, Jungyoll, 2023, "Bilateral information disclosure in adverse selection markets with nonexclusive competition," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, volume 205, issue C, pages 144-168, DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2022.10.015.
- Demougin, Dominique & Helm, Carsten, 2023, "Overwhelmed by routine tasks: A multitasking principal agent perspective," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, volume 216, issue C, pages 654-669, DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2023.10.021.
- Kambhampati, Ashwin, 2023, "Randomization is optimal in the robust principal-agent problem," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, volume 207, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2022.105585.
- Cetemen, Doruk & Feng, Felix Zhiyu & Urgun, Can, 2023, "Renegotiation and dynamic inconsistency: Contracting with non-exponential discounting," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, volume 208, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2023.105606.
- Mookherjee, Dilip & Tsumagari, Masatoshi, 2023, "Regulatory mechanism design with extortionary collusion," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, volume 208, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2023.105614.
- Babus, Ana & Hachem, Kinda, 2023, "Markets for financial innovation," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, volume 208, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2023.105615.
- Ishiguro, Shingo & Yasuda, Yosuke, 2023, "Moral hazard and subjective evaluation," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, volume 209, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2023.105619.
- Tan, Teck Yong, 2023, "Optimal transparency of monitoring capability," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, volume 209, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2023.105620.
- Garrett, Daniel F. & Georgiadis, George & Smolin, Alex & Szentes, Balázs, 2023, "Optimal technology design," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, volume 209, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2023.105621.
- Kim, Yonggyun, 2023, "Comparing information in general monotone decision problems," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, volume 211, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2023.105679.
- Bloch, Francis & Dutta, Bhaskar & Dziubiński, Marcin, 2023, "Selecting a winner with external referees," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, volume 211, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2023.105687.
- Kirkegaard, René, 2023, "Endogenous criteria for success," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, volume 214, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2023.105760.
- Bhaskar, V & Roketskiy, Nikita, 2023, "The ratchet effect: A learning perspective," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, volume 214, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2023.105762.
- Bienz, Carsten & Thorburn, Karin S. & Walz, Uwe, 2023, "Fund ownership, wealth, and risk-taking: Evidence on private equity managers," Journal of Financial Intermediation, Elsevier, volume 54, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.jfi.2023.101025.
- Zhang, Xinhua & Hueng, C. James & Lemke, Robert J., 2023, "A self-selection pricing mechanism for residential electricity: Measures of sustainability and equity to balance market mechanisms and government controls," Journal of Policy Modeling, Elsevier, volume 45, issue 6, pages 1167-1183, DOI: 10.1016/j.jpolmod.2023.10.002.
- Bellani, Luna & Fabella, Vigile Marie & Scervini, Francesco, 2023, "Strategic compromise, policy bundling and interest group power: Theory and evidence on education policy," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, volume 77, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2022.102283.
- Denderski, Piotr & Stoltenberg, Christian A., 2023, "On the existence of private unemployment insurance with advance information on future job losses," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, volume 224, issue C, DOI: 10.1016/j.jpubeco.2023.104946.
- Wang, Li & Zhang, Xin-Hua & Zhang, Yue-Jun, 2023, "Designing the pricing mechanism of residents’ self-selection sales electricity based on household size," International Review of Economics & Finance, Elsevier, volume 83, issue C, pages 860-878, DOI: 10.1016/j.iref.2022.10.015.
- Brzustowski, Thomas & Georgiadis Harris, Alkis & Szentes, Balázs, 2023, "Smart contracts and the Coase conjecture," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library, number 117950, May.
- Garrett, Daniel & Georgiadis, George & Smolin, Alex & Szentes, Balázs, 2023, "Optimal technology design," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library, number 118115, Apr.
- Sonia B. Di Giannatale & Itza Tlaloc Quetzalcoatl Curiel-Cabral & Genaro Basulto, 2023, "The Dynamics of Bargaining Power in a Principal-Agent Model," Working Papers, CIDE, División de Economía, number DTE 630, Jan.
- Deahyeon Park & Doo Jin Ryu, 2023, "Small-sized asset owners’ OCIO selections and evaluations," Journal of Derivatives and Quantitative Studies: ????????????, Emerald Group Publishing Limited, volume 31, issue 2, pages 162-171, February, DOI: 10.1108/JDQS-06-2022-0015.
- François Pannequin & Anne Corcos, 2023, "Risk Management and Public Policies: How prevention challenges monopolistic insurance markets," Documents de recherche, Centre d'Études des Politiques Économiques (EPEE), Université d'Evry Val d'Essonne, number 23-02.
- Ester Manna, 2023, "Bad NGOs? Competition in the market for donations and workers' misconduct," UB School of Economics Working Papers, University of Barcelona School of Economics, number 2023/457.
- Marco Buso & Cesare Dosi & Michele Moretto, 2023, "Dynamic Regulation of Public Franchises with Imperfectly Correlated Demand Shocks," Working Papers, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei, number 2023.03, Feb.
- Piotr Dworczak & Ellen V. Muir, 2023, "A mechanism-design approach to property rights," GRAPE Working Papers, GRAPE Group for Research in Applied Economics, number 86.
- Brice Corgnet & Roberto Hernan-Gonzalez & Yao Thibaut Kpegli & Adam Zylbersztejn, 2023, "Against the Odds! The Tradeoff Between Risk and Incentives is Alive and Well," Working Papers, Groupe d'Analyse et de Théorie Economique Lyon St-Etienne (GATE Lyon St-Etienne), Université de Lyon, number 2305.
- Brice Corgnet & Roberto Hernán González, 2023, "You Will not Regret it: On the Practice of Randomized Incentives," Working Papers, Groupe d'Analyse et de Théorie Economique Lyon St-Etienne (GATE Lyon St-Etienne), Université de Lyon, number 2314.
- Daniel F. Garrett & George Georgiadis & Alex Smolin & Balazs Szentes, 2023, "Optimal technology design," Post-Print, HAL, number hal-04224372, Apr, DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2023.105621.
- Marta Troya-Martinez & Liam Wren-Lewis, 2023, "Managing Relational Contracts," Post-Print, HAL, number halshs-03957183, Jun, DOI: 10.1093/jeea/jvac049.
- Marta Troya-Martinez & Liam Wren-Lewis, 2023, "Managing Relational Contracts," PSE-Ecole d'économie de Paris (Postprint), HAL, number halshs-03957183, Jun, DOI: 10.1093/jeea/jvac049.
- Andrea Attar & Thomas Mariotti & François Salanié, 2023, "Regulating insurance markets: multiple contracting and adverse selection," Working Papers, HAL, number hal-04012812, Mar.
- Cyril Rouault, 2023, "Contract Terms Monotonicity in Matching Markets," Working Papers, HAL, number hal-04352427, Dec.
- Kvaløy, Ola & Olsen, Trond E., 2023, "Relational incentive contracts for teams of multitasking agents," Discussion Papers, Norwegian School of Economics, Department of Business and Management Science, number 2023/10, Jun, revised 30 Jun 2023.
- Heijmans, Roweno J.R.K., 2023, "Unraveling Coordination Problems," Discussion Papers, Norwegian School of Economics, Department of Business and Management Science, number 2023/20, Nov.
- Matthew J. Walker & Elena Katok & Jason Shachat, 2023, "Trust and Trustworthiness in Procurement Contracts with Retainage," Management Science, INFORMS, volume 69, issue 6, pages 3492-3515, June, DOI: 10.1287/mnsc.2022.4516.
- MacLeod, W. Bentley & Malcomson, James, 2023, "Implicit Contracts, Incentive Compatibility, and Involuntary Unemployment: Thirty Years On," IZA Discussion Papers, IZA Network @ LISER, number 15881, Jan.
- Matthias Fahn & Nicolas Klein, 2023, "Non-Common Priors, Incentives, and Promotions: The Role of Learning," Economics working papers, Department of Economics, Johannes Kepler University Linz, Austria, number 2023-06, Jul.
- Rosa Ferrentino & Luca Vota, 2023, "The optimal financing of a conglomerate firm with hidden information and costly state verification," Annals of Finance, Springer, volume 19, issue 1, pages 23-62, March, DOI: 10.1007/s10436-022-00418-7.
- Maarten van Oosterhout & Gijsbert Zwart, 2023, "Distortions in Investment Timing and Quantity in Real Options with Asymmetric Information," De Economist, Springer, volume 171, issue 4, pages 347-365, December, DOI: 10.1007/s10645-023-09428-w.
- Petra Nieken & Patrick W. Schmitz, 2023, "Contracting under asymmetric information and externalities: an experimental study," Experimental Economics, Springer;Economic Science Association, volume 26, issue 5, pages 989-1021, November, DOI: 10.1007/s10683-023-09813-x.
- Suting Hong & Robert M. Hunt & Konstantinos Serfes, 2023, "Dynamic Pricing of Credit Cards and the Effects of Regulation," Journal of Financial Services Research, Springer;Western Finance Association, volume 64, issue 1, pages 81-131, August, DOI: 10.1007/s10693-022-00385-0.
- Daniel Broxterman & Tingyu Zhou, 2023, "Information Frictions in Real Estate Markets: Recent Evidence and Issues," The Journal of Real Estate Finance and Economics, Springer, volume 66, issue 2, pages 203-298, February, DOI: 10.1007/s11146-022-09918-9.
- Daniel Broxterman & Tingyu Zhou, 2023, "Correction to: Information Frictions in Real Estate Markets: Recent Evidence and Issues," The Journal of Real Estate Finance and Economics, Springer, volume 66, issue 2, pages 299-299, February, DOI: 10.1007/s11146-022-09922-z.
- Jenny Kragl & Alberto Palermo & Guoqian Xi & Joern Block, 2023, "Hiring family or non-family managers when non-economic (sustainability) goals matter? A multitask agency model," Small Business Economics, Springer, volume 61, issue 2, pages 675-700, August, DOI: 10.1007/s11187-022-00706-6.
- Alena Podaneva & Pierre Picard, 2023, "Facility Management Services in UK Hospitals: in-house or outsourcing," DEM Discussion Paper Series, Department of Economics at the University of Luxembourg, number 23-15.
- Jonathan Thomas & Tim Worrall, 2023, "Self-Enforcing Wage Contracts Redux," Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, volume 179, issue 3-4, pages 441-469, DOI: 10.1628/jite-2023-0039.
- W. Bentley MacLeod & James M. Malcomson, 2023, "Implicit Contracts, Incentive Compatibility, and Involuntary Unemployment: Thirty Years On," Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, volume 179, issue 3-4, pages 470-499, DOI: 10.1628/jite-2023-0040.
- David A. Miller & Joel Watson, 2023, "An Active-Contracting Perspective on Equilibrium Selection in Relational Contracts," Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, volume 179, issue 3-4, pages 530-561, DOI: 10.1628/jite-2023-0042.
- Parikshit Ghosh & Debraj Ray, 2023, "The Social Equilibrium of Relational Arrangements," Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, volume 179, issue 3-4, pages 579-615, DOI: 10.1628/jite-2023-0044.
- Ola Kvaløy & Trond E. Olsen, 2023, "Cooperation versus Competition between Agents in Relational Contracts," Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, volume 179, issue 3-4, pages 616-638, DOI: 10.1628/jite-2023-0045.
- Marina Halac, 2023, "Revealing the Value of Relationships," Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, volume 179, issue 3-4, pages 661-672, DOI: 10.1628/jite-2023-0047.
- Rocco Macchiavello & Ameet Morjaria, 2023, "Relational Contracts: Recent Empirical Advancements and Open Questions," Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, volume 179, issue 3-4, pages 673-700, DOI: 10.1628/jite-2023-0048.
- Rocco Macchiavello & Ameet Morjaria, 2023, "Relational Contracts: Recent Empirical Advancements and Open Questions," NBER Working Papers, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc, number 30978, Feb.
- Marta Troya-Martinez & Liam Wren-Lewis, 2023, "Managing Relational Contracts," Journal of the European Economic Association, European Economic Association, volume 21, issue 3, pages 941-986.
- Anastasios Dosis & Wilfried Sand-Zantman, 2023, "The Ownership of Data," The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Oxford University Press, volume 39, issue 3, pages 615-641.
- Marek Pycia & M Bumin Yenmez, 2023, "Matching with Externalities," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, volume 90, issue 2, pages 948-974.
- Michael Sockin & Mindy Z Xiaolan, 2023, "Delegated Learning and Contract Commonality in Asset Management," Review of Finance, European Finance Association, volume 27, issue 6, pages 1931-1975.
- Matthias Efing & Harald Hau & Patrick Kampkötter & Jean-Charles Rochet, 2023, "Bank Bonus Pay as a Risk Sharing Contract," The Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, volume 36, issue 1, pages 235-280.
- Hengjie Ai & Dana Kiku & Rui Li & Stijn Van, 2023, "A Quantitative Model of Dynamic Moral Hazard," The Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, volume 36, issue 4, pages 1408-1463.
- W. Bentley MacLeod & James Malcomson, 2023, "Implicit contracts, incentive compatibility, and involuntary unemployment: thirty years on," Economics Series Working Papers, University of Oxford, Department of Economics, number 997, Jan.
- Alexis Louaas & Pierre Picard, 2023, "Correction to: Optimal insurance coverage of low-probability catastrophic risks," The Geneva Risk and Insurance Review, Palgrave Macmillan;International Association for the Study of Insurance Economics (The Geneva Association), volume 48, issue 2, pages 271-271, September, DOI: 10.1057/s10713-023-00082-5.
- Csorba, László, 2023, "The perfect quality model and the quality of public finances," Public Finance Quarterly, Corvinus University of Budapest, volume 69, issue 2, pages 51-66, DOI: https://doi.org/10.35551/PFQ_2023_2.
- Schmitz, Patrick W., 2023, "Incentivizing Research with (Un)conditional Teaching Duties: Punishment or Rent Extraction?," MPRA Paper, University Library of Munich, Germany, number 116220.
- Schmitz, Patrick W., 2023, "Completely Relationship-Specific Investments, Transaction Costs, and the Property Rights Theory," MPRA Paper, University Library of Munich, Germany, number 117065.
- Schmitz, Patrick W., 2023, "The Proper Scope of Government Reconsidered: Asymmetric Information and Incentive Contracts," MPRA Paper, University Library of Munich, Germany, number 117742, Jun.
- Takahara, Tsuyoshi & Kanda, Yutaka, 2023, "Designing the report card content for healthcare payment reduction," MPRA Paper, University Library of Munich, Germany, number 118529, Sep.
- Rodriguez, Fabrizio, 2023, "On Salesforce Compensation with Inventory Considerations," MPRA Paper, University Library of Munich, Germany, number 119514, Nov.
- Pham, Hien, 2023, "How Information Design Shapes Optimal Selling Mechanisms," MPRA Paper, University Library of Munich, Germany, number 120364, Apr, revised 06 Mar 2024.
- Pham, Hien, 2023, "How Information Design Shapes Optimal Selling Mechanisms," MPRA Paper, University Library of Munich, Germany, number 120462, Apr, revised 17 Mar 2024.
- Pham, Hien, 2023, "How Information Design Shapes Optimal Selling Mechanisms," MPRA Paper, University Library of Munich, Germany, number 120989, Apr, revised 06 Mar 2024.
- Amir Habibi, 2023, "Pay Transparency in Organizations," Rationality and Competition Discussion Paper Series, CRC TRR 190 Rationality and Competition, number 395, May.
- Shiv Dixit, 2023, "Online Appendix to "Contract Enforcement and Preventive Healthcare: Theory and Evidence"," Online Appendices, Review of Economic Dynamics, number 21-360.
- Shiv Dixit, 2023, "Code and data files for "Contract Enforcement and Preventive Healthcare: Theory and Evidence"," Computer Codes, Review of Economic Dynamics, number 21-360, revised .
- Xinyan Shi & Lydia Gan, 2023, "Equilibrium in Competitive Insurance Markets with Medical Tourism," Studies in Microeconomics, , volume 11, issue 2, pages 246-269, August, DOI: 10.1177/23210222211051439.
- Jessica Martin & Stéphane Villeneuve, 2023, "Risk-sharing and optimal contracts with large exogenous risks," Decisions in Economics and Finance, Springer;Associazione per la Matematica, volume 46, issue 1, pages 1-43, June, DOI: 10.1007/s10203-023-00386-1.
- Kittiphod Charoontham & Thunyarat Amornpetchkul, 2023, "Compensation reform analysis on inflated credit rating attenuation," Economia e Politica Industriale: Journal of Industrial and Business Economics, Springer;Associazione Amici di Economia e Politica Industriale, volume 50, issue 3, pages 627-645, September, DOI: 10.1007/s40812-022-00215-3.
- Sanxi Li & Xinyu Li & Zhan Qu, 2023, "Does vertical integration increase product quality?," Economic Theory Bulletin, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), volume 11, issue 1, pages 69-80, April, DOI: 10.1007/s40505-022-00240-4.
- Xiangyu Shi, 2023, "Relative performance evaluation in organizations with information networks," Economic Theory Bulletin, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), volume 11, issue 2, pages 243-254, October, DOI: 10.1007/s40505-023-00256-4.
- Corina Birghila & Tim J. Boonen & Mario Ghossoub, 2023, "Optimal insurance under maxmin expected utility," Finance and Stochastics, Springer, volume 27, issue 2, pages 467-501, April, DOI: 10.1007/s00780-023-00497-y.
- Emma Hubert, 2023, "Continuous-time incentives in hierarchies," Finance and Stochastics, Springer, volume 27, issue 3, pages 605-661, July, DOI: 10.1007/s00780-023-00506-0.
- Takeshi Murooka & Takuro Yamashita, 2023, "Adverse selection and bounded rationality: an impossibility theorem," The Japanese Economic Review, Springer, volume 74, issue 3, pages 439-444, July, DOI: 10.1007/s42973-022-00119-w.
- Hideshi Itoh, 2023, "What do contracts do to facilitate relationships?," The Japanese Economic Review, Springer, volume 74, issue 3, pages 333-354, July, DOI: 10.1007/s42973-023-00132-7.
- Kevin Siqueira, 2023, "On-The-Job Training and Learning: Formal Training versus Learning by Doing," Journal of Labor Research, Springer, volume 44, issue 3, pages 181-198, December, DOI: 10.1007/s12122-023-09350-9.
- Christian Lukas, 2023, "On interim performance evaluations and interdependent period outcomes," Journal of Management Control: Zeitschrift für Planung und Unternehmenssteuerung, Springer, volume 34, issue 1, pages 67-108, March, DOI: 10.1007/s00187-023-00350-5.
- Toshiaki Wakabayashi, 2023, "A theory of management control packages and organizational identity," Journal of Management Control: Zeitschrift für Planung und Unternehmenssteuerung, Springer, volume 34, issue 4, pages 463-488, December, DOI: 10.1007/s00187-024-00366-5.
- Kee-Youn Kang, 2023, "Cryptocurrency and double spending history: transactions with zero confirmation," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), volume 75, issue 2, pages 453-491, February, DOI: 10.1007/s00199-021-01411-3.
- Rongzhu Ke & Xinyi Xu, 2023, "The existence of an optimal deterministic contract in moral hazard problems," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), volume 76, issue 2, pages 375-416, August, DOI: 10.1007/s00199-022-01467-9.
- Alejandro Francetich, 2023, "When partner knows best: asymmetric expertise in partnerships," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, volume 52, issue 2, pages 363-399, June, DOI: 10.1007/s00182-022-00821-4.
- Peter-J. Jost, 2023, "Auditing versus monitoring and the role of commitment," Review of Accounting Studies, Springer, volume 28, issue 2, pages 463-496, June, DOI: 10.1007/s11142-021-09647-z.
- Christian Hofmann & Steven Huddart & Thomas Pfeiffer, 2023, "An analysis of net-outcome contracting with applications to equity-based compensation," Review of Accounting Studies, Springer, volume 28, issue 3, pages 1657-1689, September, DOI: 10.1007/s11142-021-09666-w.
- Markus Gastinger & Henning Schmidtke, 2023, "Measuring precision precisely: A dictionary-based measure of imprecision," The Review of International Organizations, Springer, volume 18, issue 3, pages 553-571, July, DOI: 10.1007/s11558-022-09476-y.
- Takaya Kubota & Shin’ya Okuda, 2023, "Allocation of decision rights among two parties with asymmetric bargaining powers in bidirectional open innovation," SN Business & Economics, Springer, volume 3, issue 6, pages 1-17, June, DOI: 10.1007/s43546-023-00473-w.
- Dušan Tříska, 2023, "The Liblice Castle Story," Springer Books, Springer, in: Martin A. Leroch & Florian Rupp, "Power and Responsibility", DOI: 10.1007/978-3-031-23015-8_12.
- Fleckinger, Pierre & Martimort, David & Roux, Nicolas, 2023, "Should They Compete or Should They Cooperate? The View of Agency Theory," TSE Working Papers, Toulouse School of Economics (TSE), number 23-1421, Mar, revised Jan 2024.
- Lefebvre, Perrin & Martimort, David, 2023, "Delegation, Capture and Endogenous Information Structures," TSE Working Papers, Toulouse School of Economics (TSE), number 23-1418, Mar.
- Xidong Guo & Sarah Parlane, 2023, "Private Practice in Public Hospitals: Should Senior Consultants Be Prioritized?," Working Papers, Geary Institute, University College Dublin, number 202301, Jan.
- Paweł Doligalski & Abdoulaye Ndiaye & Nicolas Werquin, 2023, "Redistribution with Performance Pay," Journal of Political Economy Macroeconomics, University of Chicago Press, volume 1, issue 2, pages 371-402, DOI: 10.1086/724511.
- Ernst Fehr & Gary Charness, 2023, "Social preferences: fundamental characteristics and economic consequences," ECON - Working Papers, Department of Economics - University of Zurich, number 432, Apr, revised Mar 2024.
2022
- Sam Kapon, 2022, "Dynamic Amnesty Programs," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, volume 112, issue 12, pages 4041-4075, December, DOI: 10.1257/aer.20211428.
- George Georgiadis & Michael Powell, 2022, "A/B Contracts," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, volume 112, issue 1, pages 267-303, January, DOI: 10.1257/aer.20200732.
- Erik Madsen, 2022, "Designing Deadlines," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, volume 112, issue 3, pages 963-997, March, DOI: 10.1257/aer.20200212.
- Geoffroy de Clippel & Jack Fanning & Kareen Rozen, 2022, "Bargaining over Contingent Contracts under Incomplete Information," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, volume 112, issue 5, pages 1522-1554, May, DOI: 10.1257/aer.20201026.
- Yunmi Kong & Isabelle Perrigne & Quang Vuong, 2022, "Multidimensional Auctions of Contracts: An Empirical Analysis," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, volume 112, issue 5, pages 1703-1736, May, DOI: 10.1257/aer.20200864.
- Neele Balke & Thibaut Lamadon, 2022, "Productivity Shocks, Long-Term Contracts, and Earnings Dynamics," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, volume 112, issue 7, pages 2139-2177, July, DOI: 10.1257/aer.20161622.
- Satoshi Fukuda & Yuichiro Kamada, 2022, "Negotiations with Limited Specifiability," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, volume 14, issue 1, pages 216-244, February, DOI: 10.1257/mic.20190089.
- Rumen Kostadinov & Aditya Kuvalekar, 2022, "Learning in Relational Contracts," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, volume 14, issue 1, pages 284-329, February, DOI: 10.1257/mic.20190203.
- Tarek Ghani & Tristan Reed, 2022, "Relationships on the Rocks: Contract Evolution in a Market for Ice," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, volume 14, issue 1, pages 330-365, February, DOI: 10.1257/mic.20190166.
- William Fuchs & Brett Green & David Levine, 2022, "Optimal Arrangements for Distribution in Developing Markets: Theory and Evidence," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, volume 14, issue 1, pages 411-450, February, DOI: 10.1257/mic.20190085.
- Alexander MacKay, 2022, "Contract Duration and the Costs of Market Transactions," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, volume 14, issue 3, pages 164-212, August, DOI: 10.1257/mic.20200128.
- Dimitri Migrow & Sergei Severinov, 2022, "Investment and Information Acquisition," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, volume 14, issue 3, pages 480-529, August, DOI: 10.1257/mic.20200115.
- Marina Halac & Elliot Lipnowski & Daniel Rappoport, 2022, "Addressing Strategic Uncertainty with Incentives and Information," AEA Papers and Proceedings, American Economic Association, volume 112, pages 431-437, May, DOI: 10.1257/pandp.20221087.
- Stark, Oded & Budzinski, Wiktor & Jakubek, Marcin & Kosiorowski, Grzegorz, undated, "On the optimal size of a joint savings association," Discussion Papers, University of Bonn, Center for Development Research (ZEF), number 320803, DOI: 10.22004/ag.econ.320803.
- Elisa Gerten & Michael Beckmann & Elisa Gerten & Matthias Kräkel, 2022, "Information and Communication Technology, Hierarchy, and Job Design," ECONtribute Discussion Papers Series, University of Bonn and University of Cologne, Germany, number 189, Aug.
- Qianjun Lyu, 2022, "Optimal Refund Mechanism," ECONtribute Discussion Papers Series, University of Bonn and University of Cologne, Germany, number 214, Dec.
- Joshua S. Gans & Richard Holden, 2022, "Mechanism Design Approaches to Blockchain Consensus," Papers, arXiv.org, number 2206.10065, Jun.
- Benjamin H'ebert & Weijie Zhong, 2022, "Engagement Maximization," Papers, arXiv.org, number 2207.00685, Jul, revised Dec 2025.
- Svetoslav Borisov, 2022, "DeFi – Potential, Advantages and Challenges," Economic Studies journal, Bulgarian Academy of Sciences - Economic Research Institute, issue 4, pages 33-54.
- Marco Guerrazzi & Pier Giuseppe Giribone, 2022, "The dynamics of working hours and wages under implicit contracts," Bulletin of Economic Research, Wiley Blackwell, volume 74, issue 4, pages 1075-1094, October, DOI: 10.1111/boer.12333.
- Florian Hoffmann & Roman Inderst & Marcus Opp, 2022, "The Economics of Deferral and Clawback Requirements," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, volume 77, issue 4, pages 2423-2470, August, DOI: 10.1111/jofi.13160.
- Franz Ostrizek, 2022, "Vague by Design: Performance Evaluation and Learning From Wages," CRC TR 224 Discussion Paper Series, University of Bonn and University of Mannheim, Germany, number crctr224_2022_358, Jun.
- Cheng Ho Cheung, 2022, "Legal Environment and Contractual Choice," The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, De Gruyter, volume 22, issue 2, pages 557-577, June, DOI: 10.1515/bejte-2020-0098.
- Kim Byung-Cheol, 2022, "Monopolistic Screening Under Mental Accounting: Applications to Loan Markets with Collateral," Review of Network Economics, De Gruyter, volume 21, issue 3, pages 111-142, October, DOI: 10.1515/rne-2023-0030.
- Hervé Lanotte & Aurélie Ringeval-Deluze & Erick Pruchnicki, 2022, "Les effets stabilisateurs sur la CGV des contrats pluriannuels d’approvisionnement entre firmes leaders et firmes subordonnées : l’exemple du champagne," Revue d'économie industrielle, De Boeck Université, volume 0, issue 1, pages 29-66.
- Fabio Antonialli & Rodrigo Marçal Gandia & Isabelle Nicolaï, 2022, "Quels modèles de gouvernance pour des scénarios de mobilité urbaine incluant des véhicules autonomes ?," Revue d'économie industrielle, De Boeck Université, volume 0, issue 2, pages 55-87.
- Hua, Xiameng & Watson, Joel, 2022, "Starting small in project choice: A discrete-time setting with a continuum of types," University of California at San Diego, Economics Working Paper Series, Department of Economics, UC San Diego, number qt1fb0j67c, Sep.
- Fabian Herweg & Maximilian Kähny, 2022, "Do Zombies Rise when Interest Rates Fall? A Relationship Banking Model," CESifo Working Paper Series, CESifo, number 9628.
- Matthias Fahn & Takeshi Murooka, 2022, "Informal Incentives and Labor Markets," CESifo Working Paper Series, CESifo, number 9740.
- Dominique Demougin & Carsten Helm, 2022, "Overwhelmed by Routine Tasks: A Multi-Tasking Principle Agent Perspective," CESifo Working Paper Series, CESifo, number 9753.
- Clara Graziano & Annalisa Luporini, 2022, "Do Firms Gain from Managerial Overconfidence? The Role of Severance Pay," CESifo Working Paper Series, CESifo, number 9801.
- Matthew J. Walker & Jason Shachat & Lijia Wei, 2022, "Contingent Payments in Procurement Interactions - Experimental Evidence," Working Papers, Chapman University, Economic Science Institute, number 22-18.
- François Bourguignon & Jean-Philippe Platteau, 2022, "Aid allocation: The role of external discipline," International Economics, CEPII research center, issue 172, pages 278-296.
- Hoffmann, Florian & Inderst, Roman & Opp, Marcus, 2022, "The Economics of Deferral and Clawback Requirements," CEPR Discussion Papers, Centre for Economic Policy Research, number 16882, Jan.
- Dumav, Martin & Fuchs, William & Lee, Jangwoo, 2022, "Self-Enforcing Contracts with Persistence," CEPR Discussion Papers, Centre for Economic Policy Research, number 16888, Jan.
- Gottardi, Piero & Mezzetti, Claudio, 2022, "Shuttle Diplomacy," CEPR Discussion Papers, Centre for Economic Policy Research, number 16934, Jan.
- Schmitz, Patrick W., 2022, "How (Not) to Purchase Novel Goods and Services: Specific Performance Versus At-Will Contracts," CEPR Discussion Papers, Centre for Economic Policy Research, number 17109, Mar.
- Paltseva, Elena & Toews, Gerhard & Troya Martinez, Marta, 2022, "I'll pay you later: Relational Contracts in the Oil Industry," CEPR Discussion Papers, Centre for Economic Policy Research, number 17121, Mar.
- Bhaskar, Venkataraman & Olszewski, Wojciech & Wiseman, Thomas, 2022, "Robust relational contracts with subjective performance evaluation," CEPR Discussion Papers, Centre for Economic Policy Research, number 17312, May.
- Kuong, John Chi-Fong & Maurin, Vincent, 2022, "The Design of a Central Counterparty," CEPR Discussion Papers, Centre for Economic Policy Research, number 17679, Nov.
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