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Non-Common Priors, Incentives, and Promotions: The Role of Learning

Author

Listed:
  • Matthias Fahn
  • Nicolas Klein

Abstract

Consider a repeated principal-agent setting with verifiable effort and an extra profit that can materialize only if the agent is talented. The agent is overconfident and updates beliefs using Bayes’ rule. The agent's principal-expected compensation decreases over time until high talent is revealed; thus he may be employed only if beliefs are sufficiently low. We apply these results to a firm's promotion policy, which may be based on success in a previous job even if jobs are uncorrelated. This provides an explanation for the "Peter Principle" in a setting with verifiable performance and highly confident workers (Benson et al., 2019).

Suggested Citation

  • Matthias Fahn & Nicolas Klein, 2023. "Non-Common Priors, Incentives, and Promotions: The Role of Learning," Economics working papers 2023-06, Department of Economics, Johannes Kepler University Linz, Austria.
    • Handle: RePEc:jku:econwp:2023-06
    Note: English
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Schumacher, Heiner & Thysen, Heidi Christina, 2022. "Equilibrium contracts and boundedly rational expectations," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 17(1), January.
    2. Alexander K. Koch & Julia Nafziger, 2012. "Job Assignments under Moral Hazard: The Peter Principle Revisited," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 21(4), pages 1029-1059, December.
    3. Paul Heidhues & Botond Koszegi, 2010. "Exploiting Naivete about Self-Control in the Credit Market," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 100(5), pages 2279-2303, December.
    4. Anja Sautmann, 2013. "Contracts for Agents with Biased Beliefs: Some Theory and an Experiment," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 5(3), pages 124-156, August.
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    Cited by:

    1. Englmaier, Florian & Fahn, Matthias & Glogowsky, Ulrich & Schwarz, Marco A., 2026. "When protection becomes exploitation: The impact of firing costs on Naïve Employees," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 254(C).

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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • C73 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games
    • D83 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness
    • D86 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Economics of Contract Law
    • D91 - Microeconomics - - Micro-Based Behavioral Economics - - - Role and Effects of Psychological, Emotional, Social, and Cognitive Factors on Decision Making
    • M51 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting; Personnel Economics - - Personnel Economics - - - Firm Employment Decisions; Promotions

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