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Negotiations with Limited Specifiability

Author

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  • Satoshi Fukuda
  • Yuichiro Kamada

Abstract

We study negotiations with limited specifiability⁠—each party may not be able to fully specify a negotiation outcome. We construct a class of negotiation protocols to conduct comparative statics on specifiability as well as move structures. We find that asynchronicity of proposal announcements narrows down the equilibrium pay-off set, in particular, leading to a unique prediction in negotiations with a "common interest" alternative. The equilibrium payoff set is not a singleton in general, and depends on the fine details of how limitation on specifiability is imposed. The equilibrium payoff set is weakly larger under limited specifiability than under unlimited specifiability.

Suggested Citation

  • Satoshi Fukuda & Yuichiro Kamada, 2022. "Negotiations with Limited Specifiability," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 14(1), pages 216-244, February.
    • Handle: RePEc:aea:aejmic:v:14:y:2022:i:1:p:216-44
    DOI: 10.1257/mic.20190089
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    Cited by:

    1. Harstad, Bård, 2023. "Pledge-and-review bargaining," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 207(C).

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
    • D83 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness
    • D86 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Economics of Contract Law

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