Research classified by Journal of Economic Literature (JEL) codes

1. Transaction Cost Economics

2019

• Daniel Bird & Alexander Frug, 2019, "Monotone contracts," Economics Working Papers, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra, number 1647, Apr.
• Juan José Ganuza & Gerard Llobet, 2019, "The simple economics of white elephants," Economics Working Papers, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra, number 1681, Nov.
• Vladimir Asriyan & Victoria Vanasco, 2019, "Security design in non-exclusive markets with asymmetric information," Economics Working Papers, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra, number 1712, Nov, revised Jun 2021.
• Natalya Yu. VLASOVA & Elena L. MOLOKOVA, 2019, "Mechanisms for coordinating stakeholders of the higher education market: Theoretical approaches to identification," Upravlenets, Ural State University of Economics, volume 10, issue 2, pages 21-30, May, DOI: 10.29141/2218-5003-2019-10-2-3.
• Corinne Langinier & Philippe Marcoul, 2019, "Subjective performance of patent examiners, implicit contracts, and self‐funded patent offices," Managerial and Decision Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., volume 40, issue 3, pages 251-266, April, DOI: 10.1002/mde.2999.
• Pietrewicz, Lesław, 2019, "Blockchain: A Coordination Mechanism," Proceedings of the ENTRENOVA - ENTerprise REsearch InNOVAtion Conference (2019), Rovinj, Croatia, IRENET - Society for Advancing Innovation and Research in Economy, Zagreb, "Proceedings of the ENTRENOVA - ENTerprise REsearch InNOVAtion Conference, Rovinj, Croatia, 12-14 September 2019".
• Voigtländer, Michael, 2019, "Das Bestellerprinzip in der Immobilienvermittlung: Internationale Praxis und ökonomische Effekte
  [The "principal pays" principle in real estate brokerage: International practice and economic effects]," IW-Trends – Vierteljahresschrift zur empirischen Wirtschaftsforschung, Institut der deutschen Wirtschaft (IW) / German Economic Institute, volume 46, issue 1, pages 3-24, DOI: 10.2373/1864-810X.19-01-01.
• Schottmüller-Einwag, Ute & Dilger, Alexander, 2019, "Zur Empfehlung von Abfindungsobergrenzen für Vorstandsmitglieder," Discussion Papers of the Institute for Organisational Economics, University of Münster, Institute for Organisational Economics, number 4/2019.
• Dilger, Alexander & Schottmüller-Einwag, Ute, 2019, "Corporate governance reporting: Compliance with upper limits for severance payments to members of executive boards in Germany," Discussion Papers of the Institute for Organisational Economics, University of Münster, Institute for Organisational Economics, number 7/2019.

2018

• Muhammad Anas Zarqa & Mohammed Al-Suhaibani & Nader Naifar, 2018, "Preference Sukuk to Share Revenue صكوك المشاركة التفضيلية في الإيراد," Journal of King Abdulaziz University: Islamic Economics, King Abdulaziz University, Islamic Economics Institute., volume 31, issue 3, pages 3-29, October, DOI: 10.4197/Islec.31-3.1.
• Mikhail Drugov & Dmitry Ryvkin, 2018, "Tournament Rewards and Heavy Tails," Working Papers, New Economic School (NES), number w0250, Oct.
• Andreea Enache & Jean-Pierre Florens, 2018, "Nonparametric Estimation for Regulation Models," Annals of Economics and Statistics, GENES, issue 131, pages 45-58, DOI: 10.15609/annaeconstat2009.131.0045.
• Arun G. Chandrasekhar & Cynthia Kinnan & Horacio Larreguy, 2018, "Social Networks as Contract Enforcement: Evidence from a Lab Experiment in the Field," American Economic Journal: Applied Economics, American Economic Association, volume 10, issue 4, pages 43-78, October.
• Melis Kartal, 2018, "Honest Equilibria in Reputation Games: The Role of Time Preferences," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, volume 10, issue 1, pages 278-314, February.
• Behrang Kamali Shahdadi, 2018, "Matching with Moral Hazard: Assigning Attorneys to Poor Defendants," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, volume 10, issue 3, pages 1-33, August.
• Yuval Salant & Ron Siegel, 2018, "Contracts with Framing," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, volume 10, issue 3, pages 315-346, August.
• Deniz Dizdar, 2018, "Two-Sided Investment and Matching with Multidimensional Cost Types and Attributes," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, volume 10, issue 3, pages 86-123, August.
• John Y. Zhu, 2018, "A Foundation for Efficiency Wage Contracts," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, volume 10, issue 4, pages 248-288, November.
• Claudia M. Landeo & Kathryn E. Spier, 2018, "Optimal Law Enforcement with Ordered Leniency," Working Papers, Peruvian Economic Association, number 126, Sep.
• Claudia M. Landeo & Kathryn E. Spier, 2018, "Ordered Leniency: An Experimental Study of Law Enforcement with Self-Reporting," Working Papers, Peruvian Economic Association, number 127, Sep.
• Dmytro Fedchyshyn & Iryna Ignatenko, 2018, "Protection of land ownership of foreigners in Ukraine," Juridical Tribune - Review of Comparative and International Law, Bucharest Academy of Economic Studies, volume 8, issue Special, pages 27-38, October.
• Iryna Nykyforchyn & Nataliia Suduk, 2018, "Main Contractor – Subcontractor Relations In The Framework Of Contract Theory," Baltic Journal of Economic Studies, Publishing house "Baltija Publishing", volume 4, issue 3, DOI: 10.30525/2256-0742/2018-4-3-184-188.
• Zenan Wu & Xi Weng, 2018, "Managerial turnover and entrenchment," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, volume 27, issue 4, pages 742-771, October, DOI: 10.1111/jems.12248.
• David Martimort & Jérôme Pouyet & Francesco Ricci, 2018, "Extracting information or resource? The Hotelling rule revisited under asymmetric information," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, volume 49, issue 2, pages 311-347, June, DOI: 10.1111/1756-2171.12233.
• Florian Ederer & Richard Holden & Margaret Meyer, 2018, "Gaming and strategic opacity in incentive provision," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, volume 49, issue 4, pages 819-854, December, DOI: 10.1111/1756-2171.12253.
• Florian Hoffmann & Roman Inderst & Sergey Turlo, 2018, "Regulating Cancellation Rights With Consumer Experimentation," CRC TR 224 Discussion Paper Series, University of Bonn and University of Mannheim, Germany, number crctr224_2018_045, Oct.
• Zhengqing Gui & Ernst-Ludwig von Thadden & Xiaojian Zhao, 2018, "Incentive-Compatibility, Limited Liability and Costly Liquidation in Financial Contracting," CRC TR 224 Discussion Paper Series, University of Bonn and University of Mannheim, Germany, number crctr224_2018_064, Dec.
• Cerrone Claudia & Manna Ester, 2018, "Pay for Performance with Motivated Employees," The B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy, De Gruyter, volume 18, issue 1, pages 1-8, January, DOI: 10.1515/bejeap-2017-0190.
• Matsushima Hitoshi, 2018, "Connected Price Dynamics with Revealed Preferences and Auctioneer’s Discretion in VCG Combinatorial Auction," The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, De Gruyter, volume 18, issue 1, pages 1-16, January, DOI: 10.1515/bejte-2016-0168.
• D’Agostino Elena & Lisciandra Maurizio, 2018, "Binding and Non-Binding Contracts: A Theoretical Appraisal," Review of Law & Economics, De Gruyter, volume 14, issue 2, pages 1-27, July, DOI: 10.1515/rle-2016-0006.
• Emil DINGA, 2018, "On The Logic Of Corruption Generating," Contemporary Economy Journal, Constantin Brancoveanu University, volume 3, issue 3, pages 6-11.
• Antoine Prévet, 2018, "Révélation de l’information par un principal au budget limité," Revue économique, Presses de Sciences-Po, volume 69, issue 5, pages 709-722.
• Andrea Attar & Thomas Mariotti & François Salanié, 2018, "Concurrence non exclusive et sélection adverse," Revue économique, Presses de Sciences-Po, volume 69, issue 6, pages 1009-1023.
• Watson, Joel & Miller, David A & Olsen, Trond E, 2020, "Relational Contracting, Negotiation, and External Enforcement," University of California at San Diego, Economics Working Paper Series, Department of Economics, UC San Diego, number qt6ts1j6hf, Jul.
• Juan M. Ortner & Martin C. Schmalz, 2018, "Disagreement and Optimal Security Design," CESifo Working Paper Series, CESifo, number 6906.
• Charles F. Mason, 2018, "Optimal Contracts for Discouraging Deforestation with Risk Averse Agents," CESifo Working Paper Series, CESifo, number 7067.
• Michael Hoy & Afrasiab Mirza & Asha Sadanand, 2018, "Guaranteed Renewable Life Insurance Under Demand Uncertainty," CESifo Working Paper Series, CESifo, number 7103.
• Helmut Bester & Matthias Lang & Jianpei Li, 2018, "Signaling versus Auditing," CESifo Working Paper Series, CESifo, number 7183.
• Fahad Khalil & Jacques Lawarree & Alexander Rodivilov, 2018, "Learning from Failures: Optimal Contract for Experimentation and Production," CESifo Working Paper Series, CESifo, number 7310.
• Charles Bellemare & Alexander Sebald, 2018, "Self-Confidence and Reactions to Subjective Performance Evaluations," CESifo Working Paper Series, CESifo, number 7325.
• Alessandro De Chiara, 2018, "Courts' Decisions, Cooperative Investments, and Incomplete Contracts," CEU Working Papers, Department of Economics, Central European University, number 2018_5, Jul.
• Mikhail Drugov & Dmitry Ryvkin, 2018, "Tournament Rewards and Heavy Tails," Working Papers, Center for Economic and Financial Research (CEFIR), number w0250, Oct.
• Meg Adachi-Sato, 2018, "Stock vesting conditions, control benefits and managerial replacement," Canadian Journal of Economics, Canadian Economics Association, volume 51, issue 1, pages 275-313, February, DOI: 10.1111/caje.12323.
• Alvaro Remesal, 2018, "Clawback Provisions, Executive Pay, and Accounting Manipulation," Working Papers, CEMFI, number wp2018_1808, Sep.
• Bernabe Lopez-Martin & David Perez-Reyna, 2018, "Contracts, Firm Dynamics and Aggregate Productivity," Documentos CEDE, Universidad de los Andes, Facultad de Economía, CEDE, number 16821, Oct.
• Llobet, Gerard & Ganuza Fernandez, Juan Jose, 2018, "The Simple Economics of White Elephants," CEPR Discussion Papers, Centre for Economic Policy Research, number 12557, Jan.
• Hackbarth, Dirk & Rivera, Alejandro & Wong, Tak-Yuen, 2018, "Optimal Short-Termism," CEPR Discussion Papers, Centre for Economic Policy Research, number 12588, Jan.
• Schmalz, Martin & Ortner, Juan, 2018, "Disagreement and Security Design," CEPR Discussion Papers, Centre for Economic Policy Research, number 12596, Jan.
• Troya Martinez, Marta & Wren-Lewis, Liam, 2022, "Managing Relational Contracts," CEPR Discussion Papers, Centre for Economic Policy Research, number 12645, Jul.
• Gerardi, Dino, 2018, "Dynamic Contracting with Limited Commitment and the Ratchet Effect," CEPR Discussion Papers, Centre for Economic Policy Research, number 12699, Feb.
• Felli, Leonardo & Harris, Christopher J, 2018, "Firm-Specific Training," CEPR Discussion Papers, Centre for Economic Policy Research, number 12748, Feb.
• Rampini, Adriano A., 2018, "Financing Durable Assets," CEPR Discussion Papers, Centre for Economic Policy Research, number 12997, Jun.
• Fafchamps, Marcel & Davies, Elwyn, 2018, "When No Bad Deed Goes Punished: Relational Contracting in Ghana and the UK," CEPR Discussion Papers, Centre for Economic Policy Research, number 13057, Jul.
• Felli, Leonardo & Anderlini, Luca & Immordino, Giovanni, 2018, "Costly Pretrial Agreements," CEPR Discussion Papers, Centre for Economic Policy Research, number 13074, Jul.
• Platteau, Jean-Philippe & Bourguignon, François, 2018, "Should a Poverty-Averse Donor Always Increase the Share of Governance-Improving Countries?," CEPR Discussion Papers, Centre for Economic Policy Research, number 13163, Sep.
• Schmitz, Patrick W. & Kusterer, David J., 2018, "Government versus Private Ownership of Public Goods: Experimental Evidence," CEPR Discussion Papers, Centre for Economic Policy Research, number 13204, Sep.
• Schmitz, Patrick W. & ,, 2018, "How (Not) to Foster Innovations in Public Infrastructure Projects," CEPR Discussion Papers, Centre for Economic Policy Research, number 13406, Dec.
• Fanasch, Patrizia & Frick, Bernd, 2018, "What Makes Cooperatives Successful? Identifying the Determinants of Their Organizational Performance," Journal of Wine Economics, Cambridge University Press, volume 13, issue 3, pages 282-308, August.
• Pio Baake & Lilo Wagner, 2018, "EU Roaming Regulation: Theoretical Model Suggests a Positive Assessment," DIW Weekly Report, DIW Berlin, German Institute for Economic Research, volume 8, issue 6, pages 59-64.
• Pio Baake & Lilo Wagner, 2018, "EU-Roaming-Verordnung: Theoretisches Modell deutet auf positive Wirkung hin," DIW Wochenbericht, DIW Berlin, German Institute for Economic Research, volume 85, issue 5, pages 77-82.
• Victor Hiller & Natacha Raffin, 2018, "Corporate Social Responsibility and workers' motivation at the industry equilibrium," EconomiX Working Papers, University of Paris Nanterre, EconomiX, number 2018-34.
• Luca Livio, 2018, "Friends or Foes? Optimal Incentives for Reciprocal Agents," Working Papers ECARES, ULB -- Universite Libre de Bruxelles, number 2018-03, Jan.
• Terstiege, Stefan, 2018, "On the signal realization set in contracting with information disclosure," Economics Letters, Elsevier, volume 163, issue C, pages 83-86, DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2017.12.014.
• Eliaz, Kfir & Spiegler, Ran, 2018, "Managing intrinsic motivation in a long-run relationship," Economics Letters, Elsevier, volume 165, issue C, pages 6-9, DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2018.01.018.
• Dumav, Martin & Khan, Urmee, 2018, "Moral hazard with non-additive uncertainty: When are actions implementable?," Economics Letters, Elsevier, volume 171, issue C, pages 110-114, DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2018.06.028.
• Balmaceda, Felipe, 2018, "Optimal task assignments with loss-averse agents," European Economic Review, Elsevier, volume 105, issue C, pages 1-26, DOI: 10.1016/j.euroecorev.2018.03.006.
• Goldlücke, Susanne & Schmitz, Patrick W., 2018, "Pollution claim settlements reconsidered: Hidden information and bounded payments," European Economic Review, Elsevier, volume 110, issue C, pages 211-222, DOI: 10.1016/j.euroecorev.2018.08.005.
• Märkle-Huß, Joscha & Feuerriegel, Stefan & Neumann, Dirk, 2018, "Contract durations in the electricity market: Causal impact of 15min trading on the EPEX SPOT market," Energy Economics, Elsevier, volume 69, issue C, pages 367-378, DOI: 10.1016/j.eneco.2017.11.019.
• Buso, Marco & Stenger, Anne, 2018, "Public-private partnerships as a policy response to climate change," Energy Policy, Elsevier, volume 119, issue C, pages 487-494, DOI: 10.1016/j.enpol.2018.04.063.
• Eguia, Jon X. & Llorente-Saguer, Aniol & Morton, Rebecca & Nicolò, Antonio, 2018, "Equilibrium selection in sequential games with imperfect information," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 109, issue C, pages 465-483, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2018.01.008.
• Hoppe, Eva I. & Schmitz, Patrick W., 2018, "Hidden action and outcome contractibility: An experimental test of moral hazard theory," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 109, issue C, pages 544-564, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2018.02.006.
• Diasakos, Theodoros M. & Koufopoulos, Kostas, 2018, "(Neutrally) Optimal Mechanism under Adverse Selection: The canonical insurance problem," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 111, issue C, pages 159-186, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2018.04.007.
• Bichler, Martin & Paulsen, Per, 2018, "A principal-agent model of bidding firms in multi-unit auctions," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 111, issue C, pages 20-40, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2018.06.002.
• Veiga, André, 2018, "A note on how to sell a network good," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, volume 59, issue C, pages 114-126, DOI: 10.1016/j.ijindorg.2017.12.009.
• Asseyer, Andreas, 2018, "Optimal monitoring in dynamic procurement contracts," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, volume 59, issue C, pages 222-252, DOI: 10.1016/j.ijindorg.2018.03.004.
• Bester, Helmut & Ouyang, Yaofu, 2018, "Optimal procurement of a credence good under limited liability," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, volume 61, issue C, pages 96-129, DOI: 10.1016/j.ijindorg.2018.08.008.
• Luo, Jie & Wang, Cheng, 2018, "Optimal sovereign lending and default," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, volume 111, issue C, pages 190-213, DOI: 10.1016/j.jinteco.2018.01.006.
• Roussey, Ludivine & Soubeyran, Raphael, 2018, "Overburdened judges," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, volume 55, issue C, pages 21-32, DOI: 10.1016/j.irle.2018.02.003.
• Chen, Tai-Yuan & Zhang, Guochang & Zhou, Yi, 2018, "Enforceability of non-compete covenants, discretionary investments, and financial reporting practices: Evidence from a natural experiment," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, volume 65, issue 1, pages 41-60, DOI: 10.1016/j.jacceco.2017.11.012.
• Herweg, Fabian & Karle, Heiko & Müller, Daniel, 2018, "Incomplete contracting, renegotiation, and expectation-based loss aversion," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, volume 145, issue C, pages 176-201, DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2017.07.033.
• Bac, Mehmet, 2018, "Wages, performance and harassment," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, volume 145, issue C, pages 232-248, DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2017.11.008.
• Macera, Rosario, 2018, "Present or future incentives? On the optimality of fixed wages with moral hazard," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, volume 147, issue C, pages 129-144, DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2017.12.004.
• Baldursson, Fridrik Mar & von der Fehr, Nils-Henrik M., 2018, "Natural resources and sovereign expropriation," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, volume 92, issue C, pages 580-607, DOI: 10.1016/j.jeem.2017.08.004.
• Donaldson, Jason Roderick & Piacentino, Giorgia, 2018, "Contracting to compete for flows," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, volume 173, issue C, pages 289-319, DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2017.10.003.
• Beccuti, Juan & Möller, Marc, 2018, "Dynamic adverse selection with a patient seller," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, volume 173, issue C, pages 95-117, DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2017.10.009.
• Felli, Leonardo & Harris, Christopher, 2018, "Firm-specific training," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, volume 175, issue C, pages 585-623, DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2018.01.010.
• Thomas, Jonathan P. & Worrall, Tim, 2018, "Dynamic relational contracts under complete information," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, volume 175, issue C, pages 624-651, DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2018.02.004.
• Espino, Emilio & Kozlowski, Julian & Sánchez, Juan M., 2018, "Investment and bilateral insurance," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, volume 176, issue C, pages 311-341, DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2018.04.002.
• Drozd, Lukasz A. & Serrano-Padial, Ricardo, 2018, "Financial contracting with enforcement externalities," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, volume 178, issue C, pages 153-189, DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2018.09.002.
• Chen, Yi-Chun & Li, Jiangtao, 2018, "Revisiting the foundations of dominant-strategy mechanisms," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, volume 178, issue C, pages 294-317, DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2018.10.001.
• Macera, Rosario, 2018, "Intertemporal incentives under loss aversion," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, volume 178, issue C, pages 551-594, DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2018.10.003.
• Chaigneau, Pierre & Edmans, Alex & Gottlieb, Daniel, 2018, "Does improved information improve incentives?," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, volume 130, issue 2, pages 291-307, DOI: 10.1016/j.jfineco.2018.05.002.
• Kirsch, Steffen & Burghof, Hans-Peter, 2018, "The efficiency of savings-linked relationship lending for housing finance," Journal of Housing Economics, Elsevier, volume 42, issue C, pages 55-68, DOI: 10.1016/j.jhe.2018.05.003.
• Bourguignon, François & Platteau, Jean-Philippe, 2018, "Optimal management of transfers: An odd paradox," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, volume 162, issue C, pages 143-157, DOI: 10.1016/j.jpubeco.2018.01.001.
• Pyddoke, Roger & Lindgren, Hanna, 2018, "Outcomes from new contracts with “strong” incentives for increasing ridership in bus transport in Stockholm," Research in Transportation Economics, Elsevier, volume 69, issue C, pages 197-206, DOI: 10.1016/j.retrec.2018.07.022.
• Charoontham, Kittiphod & Amornpetchkul, Thunyarat (Bam), 2018, "Performance-based payment scheme to hedge against credit rating inflation," Research in International Business and Finance, Elsevier, volume 44, issue C, pages 471-479, DOI: 10.1016/j.ribaf.2017.07.117.
• Raszap Skorbiansky, Sharon, 2018, "Investing in communication: An experimental study of communication in a relational contract setting," Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics (formerly The Journal of Socio-Economics), Elsevier, volume 74, issue C, pages 85-96, DOI: 10.1016/j.socec.2018.03.008.
• Flannery, Timothy & Roberts, Stephen, 2018, "The use of non-monotonic contracts in a single period game: An experimental investigation," Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics (formerly The Journal of Socio-Economics), Elsevier, volume 77, issue C, pages 177-185, DOI: 10.1016/j.socec.2018.10.002.
• Chaigneau, Pierre & Edmans, Alex & Gottlieb, Daniel, 2018, "Does improved information improve incentives?," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library, number 102227, Nov.
• Felli, Leonardo & Harris, Christopher, 2018, "Firm-specific training," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library, number 87222, May.
• Claudia M. Landeo, 2018, "Exclusionary vertical restraints and antitrust: experimental law and economics contributions," Chapters, Edward Elgar Publishing, chapter 3, in: Joshua C. Teitelbaum & Kathryn Zeiler, "Research Handbook on Behavioral Law and Economics".
• Claudia M. Landeo, 2018, "Law and economics and tort litigation institutions: theory and experiments," Chapters, Edward Elgar Publishing, chapter 9, in: Joshua C. Teitelbaum & Kathryn Zeiler, "Research Handbook on Behavioral Law and Economics".
• Andrea Attar & Claude d’Aspremont, 2018, "Trading under asymmetric information: Positive and normative implications," Chapters, Edward Elgar Publishing, chapter 15, in: Luis C. Corchón & Marco A. Marini, "Handbook of Game Theory and Industrial Organization, Volume I".
• Inés Macho-Stadler & David Pérez-Castrillo, 2018, "Moral hazard: Base models and two extensions," Chapters, Edward Elgar Publishing, chapter 16, in: Luis C. Corchón & Marco A. Marini, "Handbook of Game Theory and Industrial Organization, Volume I".
• Katsuya Hihara & Naoki Makimoto, 2018, "Analyses of Risk-sharing Contract of Airport and Airline Vertical Relationship: Bargaining and Agency Analyses," Advances in Airline Economics, Emerald Group Publishing Limited, "Airline Economics in Asia", DOI: 10.1108/S2212-160920180000007014.
• Chandan Kumar, 2018, "Opportunism and Hold-up in the Incomplete Public Private Partnership (PPP) Contracts," Working Papers, eSocialSciences, number id:12687, Apr.
• Maria De Paola & Francesca Gioia & Vincenzo Scoppa, 2018, "Free-riding and knowledge spillovers in teams: The role of social ties," Natural Field Experiments, The Field Experiments Website, number 00704.
• Marco Buso & Cesare Dosi & Michele Moretto, 2018, "Termination Fees and Contract Design in Public-Private Partnerships," Working Papers, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei, number 2018.32, Dec.
• Noam Tanner, 2018, "Optimal Delegation Under Unknown Bias: The Role of Concavity," Supervisory Research and Analysis Working Papers, Federal Reserve Bank of Boston, number RPA 18-1, Mar.
• Lukasz A. Drozd & Ricardo Serrano-Padial, 2018, "Financial Contracting with Enforcement Externalities," Working Papers, Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia, number 18-21, Oct, DOI: https://doi.org/10.21799/frbp.wp.20.
• Suting Hong & Robert M. Hunt & Konstantinos Serfes, 2018, "Dynamic Pricing of Credit Cards and the Effects of Regulation," Working Papers, Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia, number 18-23, Nov, DOI: 10.21799/frbp.wp.2018.23.
• Borys Grochulski & Russell Wong, 2018, "Contingent Debt and Performance Pricing in an Optimal Capital Structure Model with Financial Distress and Reorganization," Working Paper, Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond, number 18-17, Nov.
• Luca Anderlini & Leonardo Felli & Giovanni Immordino, 2018, "Costly Pre-Trial Agreements," Working Papers, Georgetown University, Department of Economics, number gueconwpa~18-18-11, Sep.
• Luca Anderlini & Leonardo Felli & Alessandro Riboni, 2018, "Legal Efficiency and Consistency," Working Papers, Georgetown University, Department of Economics, number gueconwpa~18-18-12, Sep.
• Dan Cao & Roger Lagunoff, 2018, "Optimal Collateralized Contracts," Working Papers, Georgetown University, Department of Economics, number gueconwpa~18-18-14, Sep.
• Dmitri V. Vinogradov & Elena V. Shadrina, 2018, "Discouragement through incentives," Working Papers, Business School - Economics, University of Glasgow, number 2018_05, Dec.
• Nian Yang & Jun Yang & Yu Chen, 2018, "Contracting in a Continuous-Time Model with Three-Sided Moral Hazard and Cost Synergies," Graz Economics Papers, University of Graz, Department of Economics, number 2018-06, Feb.
• Xi Chen & Yu Chen & Xuhu Wan, 2018, "Delegated Project Search," Graz Economics Papers, University of Graz, Department of Economics, number 2018-11, May.
• David Rietzke & Yu Chen, 2018, "Push or Pull? Performance-Pay, Incentives, and Information," Graz Economics Papers, University of Graz, Department of Economics, number 2018-12, May.
• Meng Wei Chen & Yu Chen & Zhen-Hua Wu & Ningru Zhao, 2018, "Government Intervention, Innovation, and Entrepreneurship," Graz Economics Papers, University of Graz, Department of Economics, number 2018-15, Sep.
• Pierre Martinon & Pierre Picard & Anasuya Raj, 2018, "On the Design of Optimal Health Insurance Contracts under Ex Post Moral Hazard," Post-Print, HAL, number hal-01348551, Jul, DOI: 10.1057/s10713-018-0034-y.
• François Bourguignon & Jean-Philippe Platteau, 2018, "Optimal management of transfers: An odd paradox," Post-Print, HAL, number hal-01784348, DOI: 10.1016/j.jpubeco.2018.01.001.
• Michel Mougeot & Florence Naegelen, 2018, "Nonresponsiveness, Severity Auditing, and Upcoding Deterrence," Post-Print, HAL, number hal-01816853, DOI: 10.1628/jite-2018-0011.
• Andrea Attard & Claude d'Aspremont, 2018, "Trading under Asymmetric Information: Positive and Normative Implications," Post-Print, HAL, number hal-01899095.
• Victor Hiller & Natacha Raffin, 2018, "Corporate social responsibility and workers’ motivation at the industry equilibrium," Post-Print, HAL, number hal-02366293, Jun.
• Ludivine Roussey & Raphaël Soubeyran, 2018, "Overburdened judges," Post-Print, HAL, number hal-02621924, DOI: 10.1016/j.irle.2018.02.003.
• Andreea Enache & Jean-Pierre Florens, 2018, "Non parametric estimation for regulation models," Post-Print, HAL, number hal-03270298, Sep, DOI: 10.15609/annaeconstat2009.131.0045.
• Philippe Aghion & Ernst Fehr & Richard Holden & Tom Wilkening, 2018, "The Role of Bounded Rationality and Imperfect Information in Subgame Perfect Implementation—An Empirical Investigation," Post-Print, HAL, number halshs-01756795, Feb, DOI: 10.1093/jeea/jvx026.
• David Martimort & Aggey Semenov & Lars Stole, 2018, "A complete characterization of equilibria in an intrinsic common agency screening game," Post-Print, HAL, number halshs-01885428, DOI: 10.3982/TE2266.
• Brice Corgnet & Roberto Hernán-Gonzalez, 2019, "Revisiting the Trade-off Between Risk and Incentives: The Shocking Effect of Random Shocks?," Post-Print, HAL, number halshs-01937875, Mar, DOI: 10.1287/mnsc.2017.2914.
• François Bourguignon & Jean-Philippe Platteau, 2018, "Optimal management of transfers: An odd paradox," PSE-Ecole d'économie de Paris (Postprint), HAL, number hal-01784348, DOI: 10.1016/j.jpubeco.2018.01.001.
• David Martimort & Jérôme Pouyet & Francesco Ricci, 2018, "Extracting Information or Resource ? The Hotelling Rule Revisited under Asym- metric Information," PSE-Ecole d'économie de Paris (Postprint), HAL, number halshs-01631594, DOI: 10.1111/1756-2171.12233.
• Philippe Aghion & Ernst Fehr & Richard Holden & Tom Wilkening, 2018, "The Role of Bounded Rationality and Imperfect Information in Subgame Perfect Implementation—An Empirical Investigation," PSE-Ecole d'économie de Paris (Postprint), HAL, number halshs-01756795, Feb, DOI: 10.1093/jeea/jvx026.
• David Martimort & Aggey Semenov & Lars Stole, 2018, "A complete characterization of equilibria in an intrinsic common agency screening game," PSE-Ecole d'économie de Paris (Postprint), HAL, number halshs-01885428, DOI: 10.3982/TE2266.
• Jean-Marc Bourgeon & Pierre Picard, 2019, "Insurance Law and Incomplete Contracts," Working Papers, HAL, number hal-01830360, Nov.
• Ludivine Roussey & Raphaël Soubeyran, 2018, "Overburdened judges," Working Papers, HAL, number hal-02791013.
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• Ludivine Roussey & Raphaël Soubeyran, 2018, "Overburdened judges," CEE-M Working Papers, CEE-M, Universtiy of Montpellier, CNRS, INRA, Montpellier SupAgro, number halshs-01936006.
• Chi, Chang Koo & Olsen, Trond E., 2018, "Relational Incentive Contracts and Performance Measurement," Discussion Paper Series in Economics, Norwegian School of Economics, Department of Economics, number 7/2018, Apr.
• Chi, Chang Koo & Olsen, Trond E., 2018, "Relational Incentive Contracts and Performance Measurement," Discussion Papers, Norwegian School of Economics, Department of Business and Management Science, number 2018/6, Apr.
• Miller, David & Olsen, Trond E. & Watson, Joel, 2018, "Relational Contracting, Negotiation, and External Enforcement," Discussion Papers, Norwegian School of Economics, Department of Business and Management Science, number 2018/8, May.
• Chandan Kumar, 2018, "Opportunism and hold-up in the incomplete public private partnership (PPP) contracts," Indira Gandhi Institute of Development Research, Mumbai Working Papers, Indira Gandhi Institute of Development Research, Mumbai, India, number 2018-012, Mar.
• Ehtisham Ahmad & Annalisa Vinella & Kezhou Xiao, 2018, "Contracting arrangements and public private partnerships for sustainable development," Public Sector Economics, Institute of Public Finance, volume 42, issue 2, pages 145-169, DOI: 10.3326/pse.42.2.8.
• Catalina Martínez & Sarah Parlane, 2018, "On the firms’ decision to hire academic scientists," Working Papers, Instituto de Políticas y Bienes Públicos (IPP), CSIC, number 1801, Feb.
• Federica Di Marcantonio & Pavel Ciaian & Vicente Castellanos, 2018, "Unfair trading practices in the dairy farm sector: Evidence from selected EU regions," JRC Research Reports, Joint Research Centre, number JRC112770, Sep.
• Kräkel, Matthias, 2018, "Empowerment and the Dark Side of Delegation," IZA Discussion Papers, IZA Network @ LISER, number 11289, Jan.
• António Osório, 2018, "Brownian Signals: Information Quality, Quantity and Timing in Repeated Games," Computational Economics, Springer;Society for Computational Economics, volume 52, issue 2, pages 387-404, August, DOI: 10.1007/s10614-017-9685-5.
• Paula Cordero Salas & Brian E. Roe & Brent Sohngen, 2018, "Additionality When REDD Contracts Must be Self-Enforcing," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, volume 69, issue 1, pages 195-215, January, DOI: 10.1007/s10640-016-0072-9.
• Pierre Martinon & Pierre Picard & Anasuya Raj, 2018, "On the design of optimal health insurance contracts under ex post moral hazard," The Geneva Papers on Risk and Insurance Theory, Springer;International Association for the Study of Insurance Economics (The Geneva Association), volume 43, issue 2, pages 137-185, September, DOI: 10.1057/s10713-018-0034-y.
• Francisco Candel-Sánchez & Juan Perote-Peña, 2018, "Endogenous market regulation in a signaling model of lobby formation," Journal of Economics, Springer, volume 123, issue 1, pages 23-47, January, DOI: 10.1007/s00712-017-0547-3.
• Jong-Hee Hahn & Jinwoo Kim & Sang-Hyun Kim & Jihong Lee, 2018, "Price Discrimination with Loss Averse and Horizontally Differentiated Consumers," Korean Economic Review, Korean Economic Association, volume 34, pages 117-129.
• Meg Adachi-Sato & Kazuya Kamiya, 2018, "Combinations of Different Length Contracts in a Multiperiod Model: Short, Medium and Long-term Contracts," Discussion Paper Series, Research Institute for Economics & Business Administration, Kobe University, number DP2018-05, Mar.
• Marina Halac & Ilan Kremer & Eyal Winter, 2018, "Raising Capital from Heterogeneous Investors," Working Papers, Lancaster University Management School, Economics Department, number 245773051.
• Michel Mougeot & Florence Naegelen, 2019, "Nonresponsiveness, Severity Auditing, and Upcoding Deterrence," Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, volume 175, issue 2, pages 308-331, DOI: 10.1628/jite-2018-0011.
• Ajay Agrawal & Joshua Gans & Avi Goldfarb, 2018, "Prediction, Judgment, and Complexity: A Theory of Decision-Making and Artificial Intelligence," NBER Chapters, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc, "The Economics of Artificial Intelligence: An Agenda".
• Ajay K. Agrawal & Joshua S. Gans & Avi Goldfarb, 2018, "Prediction, Judgment and Complexity: A Theory of Decision Making and Artificial Intelligence," NBER Working Papers, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc, number 24243, Jan.
• Francisco Espinosa & Debraj Ray, 2018, "Noisy Agents," NBER Working Papers, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc, number 24627, May.
• Peter Q. Blair & Bobby W. Chung, 2018, "Job Market Signaling through Occupational Licensing," NBER Working Papers, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc, number 24791, Jul.
• Meng Liu & Erik Brynjolfsson & Jason Dowlatabadi, 2018, "Do Digital Platforms Reduce Moral Hazard? The Case of Uber and Taxis," NBER Working Papers, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc, number 25015, Sep.
• Claudia M. Landeo & Kathryn E. Spier, 2018, "Ordered Leniency: An Experimental Study of Law Enforcement with Self-Reporting," NBER Working Papers, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc, number 25094, Sep.
• Claudia M. Landeo & Kathryn E. Spier, 2018, "Optimal Law Enforcement with Ordered Leniency," NBER Working Papers, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc, number 25095, Sep.
• Reppas, Dimitrios, 2018, "Modeling Fisheries Agreements with Side Payments: The Case of Western Atlantic Bluefin Tuna," Strategic Behavior and the Environment, now publishers, volume 7, issue 3-4, pages 397-441, February, DOI: 10.1561/102.00000078.
• Shingo Ishiguro & Yosuke Yasuda, 2018, "Moral Hazard and Target Budgets," Discussion Papers in Economics and Business, Osaka University, Graduate School of Economics, number 18-03, Feb.
• Philippe Aghion & Ernst Fehr & Richard Holden & Tom Wilkening, 2018, "The Role of Bounded Rationality and Imperfect Information in Subgame Perfect Implementation—An Empirical Investigation," Journal of the European Economic Association, European Economic Association, volume 16, issue 1, pages 232-274.
• Jonathan de Quidt, 2018, "Your Loss Is My Gain: A Recruitment Experiment with Framed Incentives," Journal of the European Economic Association, European Economic Association, volume 16, issue 2, pages 522-559.
• Sarath Sanga, 2018, "Incomplete Contracts: An Empirical Approach," The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Oxford University Press, volume 34, issue 4, pages 650-679.
• Eric Van Tassel, 2018, "Multiple borrowing and adverse selection in credit markets," Oxford Economic Papers, Oxford University Press, volume 70, issue 1, pages 286-299.
• Benjamin Hébert, 2018, "Moral Hazard and the Optimality of Debt," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, volume 85, issue 4, pages 2214-2252.
• Marco Buso & Cesare Dosi & Michele Moretto, 2018, "Termination Fees and Contract Design in Public-Private Partnerships," "Marco Fanno" Working Papers, Dipartimento di Scienze Economiche "Marco Fanno", number 0227, Oct.
• Pierre Martinon & Pierre Picard & Anasuya Raj, 2018, "On the design of optimal health insurance contracts under ex post moral hazard," The Geneva Risk and Insurance Review, Palgrave Macmillan;International Association for the Study of Insurance Economics (The Geneva Association), volume 43, issue 2, pages 137-185, September, DOI: 10.1057/s10713-018-0034-y.
• Massimiliano Vatiero, 2018, "Smart contracts and transaction costs," Discussion Papers, Dipartimento di Economia e Management (DEM), University of Pisa, Pisa, Italy, number 2018/238, Oct.
• Ahmed, Rafayal, 2018, "Dynamic Screening with Differentially Informed Principals," MPRA Paper, University Library of Munich, Germany, number 118463, Apr.
• Alexandrov, Alexei & Pittman, Russell & Ukhaneva, Olga, 2018, "Pricing of Complements in the U.S. freight railroads: Cournot versus Coase," MPRA Paper, University Library of Munich, Germany, number 86279, Apr.
• Tirelli, Mario, 2018, "Optimal financial contracts with unobservable investments," MPRA Paper, University Library of Munich, Germany, number 86444, Feb.
• Goldlücke, Susanne & Schmitz, Patrick W., 2018, "Pollution Claim Settlements Reconsidered: Hidden Information and Bounded Payments," MPRA Paper, University Library of Munich, Germany, number 90800.
• Hoppe, Eva I. & Schmitz, Patrick W., 2018, "Hidden Action and Outcome Contractibility: An Experimental Test of Moral Hazard Theory," MPRA Paper, University Library of Munich, Germany, number 95618.
• Seewald, Norbert, 2018, "Chancen und Grenzen von Leistungsanreizen in Behoerden. Macht und Ohnmacht von Leistungszahlungen und Zielvereinbarungen," Books, Rainer Hampp Verlag, number 9783957103086.
• Celik, Gorkem & Shin, Dongsoo & Strausz, Roland, 2018, "Aggregate Information and Organizational Structures," Rationality and Competition Discussion Paper Series, CRC TRR 190 Rationality and Competition, number 105, Jun.
• Fahn, Matthias & Klein, Nicolas, 2018, "Relational Contracts with Private Information On the Future Value of the Relationship," Rationality and Competition Discussion Paper Series, CRC TRR 190 Rationality and Competition, number 106, Jul.
• Lang, Matthias, 2018, "Communicating Subjective Evaluations," Rationality and Competition Discussion Paper Series, CRC TRR 190 Rationality and Competition, number 120, Oct.
• Englmaier, Florian & Fahn, Matthias, 2018, "Size Matters - \'Over\'investments in a Relational Contracting Setting," Rationality and Competition Discussion Paper Series, CRC TRR 190 Rationality and Competition, number 62, Jan.
• Mettral, Thomas, 2018, "Deterministic versus Stochastic Contracts in a Dynamic Principal-Agent Model," Rationality and Competition Discussion Paper Series, CRC TRR 190 Rationality and Competition, number 93, Apr.
• Elliot Lipnowski & Joao Ramos, 2018, "Repeated Delegation," 2018 Meeting Papers, Society for Economic Dynamics, number 1292.
• Barney Hartman-Glaser & Benjamin Hebert, 2018, "The Insurance is the Lemon: Failing to Index Contracts," 2018 Meeting Papers, Society for Economic Dynamics, number 160.
• Ana Babus & Kinda Hachem, 2018, "Markets for Financial Innovation," 2018 Meeting Papers, Society for Economic Dynamics, number 355.
• Claudia Landeo & Kathryn Spier, 2018, "Optimal Law Enforcement with Ordered Leniency," Working Papers, University of Alberta, Department of Economics, number 2018-06, Apr.
• Claudia Landeo & Kathryn Spier, 2018, "Ordered Leniency: An Experimental Study of Law Enforcement with Self-Reporting," Working Papers, University of Alberta, Department of Economics, number 2018-13, Sep.
• Corinne Langinier & Philippe Marcoul, 2018, "Subjective Performance of Patent Examiners, Implicit Contracts and Self-Funded Patent Offices," Working Papers, University of Alberta, Department of Economics, number 2018-14, Oct.
• Suting Hong & Konstantinos Serfes & Veikko Thiele, 2018, "Competition in the Venture Capital Market and the Success of Startup Companies: Theory and Evidence," School of Economics Working Paper Series, LeBow College of Business, Drexel University, number 2018-2, Feb.
• Prateek Goorha, 2018, "Contextual Contracts: On a Context-sensitive Approach to Contract Theory," Journal of Interdisciplinary Economics, , volume 30, issue 2, pages 191-209, July.
• Oindrila Dey, 2018, "Leniency, Status and Output Informativeness," Review of Market Integration, India Development Foundation, volume 10, issue 1, pages 1-18, April, DOI: 10.1177/0974929218764045.