Research classified by Journal of Economic Literature (JEL) codes

1. Transaction Cost Economics

2019

• Sofia Moroni, 2019, "Experimentation in Organizations," Working Paper, Department of Economics, University of Pittsburgh, number 6631, Jan.
• Ekmekci, Mehmet & Maestri, Lucas, 2019, "Reputation and screening in a noisy environment with irreversible actions," MPRA Paper, University Library of Munich, Germany, number 100885, Aug.
• Kang, Kee-Youn, 2019, "Cryptocurrency, Delivery Lag, and Double Spending History," MPRA Paper, University Library of Munich, Germany, number 93598, May.
• Hoppe, Eva I. & Schmitz, Patrick W., 2019, "How (Not) to Foster Innovations in Public Infrastructure Projects," MPRA Paper, University Library of Munich, Germany, number 95615.
• Schmitz, Patrick W., 2019, "Incomplete Contracts, Limited Liability, and the Optimality of Joint Ownership," MPRA Paper, University Library of Munich, Germany, number 95637.
• Guerrazzi, Marco & Giribone, Pier Giuseppe, 2019, "The dynamics of working hours and wages under implicit contracts," MPRA Paper, University Library of Munich, Germany, number 95978, Sep.
• Doruk Cetemen & Felix Zhiyu Feng & Can Urgun, 2019, "Contracting with Non-Exponential Discounting: Moral Hazard and Dynamic Inconsistency," Working Papers, Princeton University. Economics Department., number 2019-17, Aug.
• Sylvain Chassang & Christian Zehnder, 2019, "Secure Survey Design in Organizations: Theory and Experiments," Working Papers, Princeton University. Economics Department., number 2019-22, Apr.
• Fahn, Matthias, 2019, "Reciprocity in Dynamic Employment Relationships," Rationality and Competition Discussion Paper Series, CRC TRR 190 Rationality and Competition, number 198, Nov.
• William Fuchs & Andrzej Skrzypacz, 2019, "Costs and benefits of dynamic trading in a lemons market," Review of Economic Dynamics, Elsevier for the Society for Economic Dynamics, volume 33, pages 105-127, July, DOI: 10.1016/j.red.2019.03.002.
• Andrea Attar & Thomas Mariotti & François Salanié, 2019, "The Social Costs of Side Trading," CEIS Research Paper, Tor Vergata University, CEIS, number 463, Jul, revised 10 Jul 2019.
• Anjan Mukherji, 2019, "Marxian Economics: Notes from a Neo-classical Viewpoint," Arthaniti: Journal of Economic Theory and Practice, , volume 18, issue 1, pages 1-16, June, DOI: 10.1177/0976747918814968.
• Antonio ABATEMARCO & Alberto BENNARDO, 2018, "Communication Costs and Incentives to Acquire Soft and Hard Knowledge," CELPE Discussion Papers, CELPE - CEnter for Labor and Political Economics, University of Salerno, Italy, number 157, Dec.
• Luca Picariello, 2019, "Organizational Design with Portable Skills," CSEF Working Papers, Centre for Studies in Economics and Finance (CSEF), University of Naples, Italy, number 546, Oct, revised 03 Jan 2025.
• Luca Picariello, 2019, "Promotions and Training: Do Competitive Firms Set the Bar too High?," CSEF Working Papers, Centre for Studies in Economics and Finance (CSEF), University of Naples, Italy, number 552, Dec.
• Saltuk Özerturk & Huseyin Yildirim, 2019, "Credit Attribution and Collaborative Work," Departmental Working Papers, Southern Methodist University, Department of Economics, number 1907, Nov.
• Yoshinori Wada, 2019, "Discriminatory tax and subsidy on environmental behaviors," Environmental Economics and Policy Studies, Springer;Society for Environmental Economics and Policy Studies - SEEPS, volume 21, issue 1, pages 25-36, January, DOI: 10.1007/s10018-018-0220-2.
• Marina Albanese & Cecilia Navarra & Ermanno Tortia, 2019, "Equilibrium unemployment as a worker insurance device: wage setting in worker owned enterprises," Economia Politica: Journal of Analytical and Institutional Economics, Springer;Fondazione Edison, volume 36, issue 3, pages 653-671, October, DOI: 10.1007/s40888-018-00139-z.
• Roland Eisenhuth, 2019, "Reference-dependent mechanism design," Economic Theory Bulletin, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), volume 7, issue 1, pages 77-103, May, DOI: 10.1007/s40505-018-0144-9.
• Yu Chen, 2019, "Monotonicity in optimal mechanisms in general quasi-linear environments with a continuum of types," Economic Theory Bulletin, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), volume 7, issue 2, pages 277-290, December, DOI: 10.1007/s40505-018-00161-1.
• Andres Zambrano, 2019, "Motivating informed decisions," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), volume 67, issue 3, pages 645-664, April, DOI: 10.1007/s00199-017-1087-3.
• Eduardo Zilberman & Vinicius Carrasco & Pedro Hemsley, 2019, "Risk sharing contracts with private information and one-sided commitment," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), volume 68, issue 1, pages 53-81, July, DOI: 10.1007/s00199-018-1112-1.
• Alice Peng-Ju Su, 2019, "Team incentives with imperfect mutual inference," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, volume 48, issue 2, pages 687-712, June, DOI: 10.1007/s00182-018-00656-y.
• Emmanuelle Auriol & Josepa Miquel-Florensa, 2019, "Taxing fragmented aid to improve aid efficiency," The Review of International Organizations, Springer, volume 14, issue 3, pages 453-477, September, DOI: 10.1007/s11558-018-9329-0.
• Dragan Ilić & Sonja Pisarov & Peter S. Schmidt, 2019, "Preaching water but drinking wine? Relative performance evaluation in international banking," Swiss Journal of Economics and Statistics, Springer;Swiss Society of Economics and Statistics, volume 155, issue 1, pages 1-25, December, DOI: 10.1186/s41937-019-0032-8.
• Rahul Deb & Mallesh M. Pai & Maher Said, 2019, "Dynamic Incentives for Buy-Side Analysts," Working Papers, New York University, Leonard N. Stern School of Business, Department of Economics, number 19-01.
• Antoni Cunyat, 2019, "Crowding-out effect and sorting in competitive labour markets with motivated workers," Applied Economics Letters, Taylor & Francis Journals, volume 26, issue 4, pages 326-330, February, DOI: 10.1080/13504851.2018.1468550.
• Eduard Alonso-Paulí, 2019, "Contracting with a quiet-life manager," Economic Research-Ekonomska Istraživanja, Taylor & Francis Journals, volume 32, issue 1, pages 2231-2251, January, DOI: 10.1080/1331677X.2019.1645717.
• Hitoshi Matsushima, 2019, "Information Design in Blockchain: A Role of Trusted Intermediaries," CIRJE F-Series, CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo, number CIRJE-F-1121, Jul.
• Rahul Deb & Matthew Mitchell & Mallesh Pai, 2019, "Our distrust is very expensive," Working Papers, University of Toronto, Department of Economics, number tecipa-632, Mar.
• Romain Gauriot & Lionel Page, 2019, "Fooled by Performance Randomness: Overrewarding Luck," The Review of Economics and Statistics, MIT Press, volume 101, issue 4, pages 658-666, October.
• Attar, Andrea & Mariotti, Thomas & Salanié, François, 2019, "The Social Costs of Side Trading," TSE Working Papers, Toulouse School of Economics (TSE), number 19-1017, Jun, revised Oct 2019.
• Sand-Zantman, Wilfried & Dosis, Anastasios, 2019, "The Ownership of Data," TSE Working Papers, Toulouse School of Economics (TSE), number 19-1025, Jul, revised Sep 2020.
• Attar, Andrea & Mariotti, Thomas & Salanié, François, 2019, "Regulating Insurance Markets: Multiple Contracting and Adverse Selection," TSE Working Papers, Toulouse School of Economics (TSE), number 19-1033, Aug, revised Sep 2021.
• Juan Beccuti & Marc Moeller, 2019, "Screening by Mode of Trade," Diskussionsschriften, Universitaet Bern, Departement Volkswirtschaft, number dp1908, Nov.
• Sarah Parlane & L. (Lisa B.) Ryan, 2019, "Optimal Contracts for Renewable Electricity," Working Papers, School of Economics, University College Dublin, number 201920, Sep.
• Luca Anderlini & Leonardo Felli & Giovanni Immordino, 2019, "Costly Pretrial Agreements," The Journal of Legal Studies, University of Chicago Press, volume 48, issue 1, pages 159-188, DOI: 10.1086/699841.
• Benjamin Lester & Ali Shourideh & Venky Venkateswaran & Ariel Zetlin-Jones, 2019, "Screening and Adverse Selection in Frictional Markets," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, volume 127, issue 1, pages 338-377, DOI: 10.1086/700730.
• Emilien Prost, 2019, "Legitimacy and Incentives in a Labour Relationship," Working Papers of BETA, Bureau d'Economie Théorique et Appliquée, UDS, Strasbourg, number 2019-19.
• Emilien Prost, 2019, "Which kind of ability bolsters legitimacy?," Working Papers of BETA, Bureau d'Economie Théorique et Appliquée, UDS, Strasbourg, number 2019-20.
• Emilien Prost & Gaye del Lo, 2019, "The Hidden Effect of Meritocratic Promotion Procedure: Experimental Evidence," Working Papers of BETA, Bureau d'Economie Théorique et Appliquée, UDS, Strasbourg, number 2019-21.
• Daniel Bird & Alexander Frug, 2019, "Monotone contracts," Economics Working Papers, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra, number 1647, Apr.
• Juan José Ganuza & Gerard Llobet, 2019, "The simple economics of white elephants," Economics Working Papers, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra, number 1681, Nov.
• Vladimir Asriyan & Victoria Vanasco, 2019, "Security design in non-exclusive markets with asymmetric information," Economics Working Papers, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra, number 1712, Nov, revised Jun 2021.
• Natalya Yu. VLASOVA & Elena L. MOLOKOVA, 2019, "Mechanisms for coordinating stakeholders of the higher education market: Theoretical approaches to identification," Upravlenets, Ural State University of Economics, volume 10, issue 2, pages 21-30, May, DOI: 10.29141/2218-5003-2019-10-2-3.
• Corinne Langinier & Philippe Marcoul, 2019, "Subjective performance of patent examiners, implicit contracts, and self‐funded patent offices," Managerial and Decision Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., volume 40, issue 3, pages 251-266, April, DOI: 10.1002/mde.2999.
• Pietrewicz, Lesław, 2019, "Blockchain: A Coordination Mechanism," Proceedings of the ENTRENOVA - ENTerprise REsearch InNOVAtion Conference (2019), Rovinj, Croatia, IRENET - Society for Advancing Innovation and Research in Economy, Zagreb, "Proceedings of the ENTRENOVA - ENTerprise REsearch InNOVAtion Conference, Rovinj, Croatia, 12-14 September 2019".
• Voigtländer, Michael, 2019, "Das Bestellerprinzip in der Immobilienvermittlung: Internationale Praxis und ökonomische Effekte
  [The "principal pays" principle in real estate brokerage: International practice and economic effects]," IW-Trends – Vierteljahresschrift zur empirischen Wirtschaftsforschung, Institut der deutschen Wirtschaft (IW) / German Economic Institute, volume 46, issue 1, pages 3-24, DOI: 10.2373/1864-810X.19-01-01.
• Schottmüller-Einwag, Ute & Dilger, Alexander, 2019, "Zur Empfehlung von Abfindungsobergrenzen für Vorstandsmitglieder," Discussion Papers of the Institute for Organisational Economics, University of Münster, Institute for Organisational Economics, number 4/2019.
• Dilger, Alexander & Schottmüller-Einwag, Ute, 2019, "Corporate governance reporting: Compliance with upper limits for severance payments to members of executive boards in Germany," Discussion Papers of the Institute for Organisational Economics, University of Münster, Institute for Organisational Economics, number 7/2019.

2018

• Muhammad Anas Zarqa & Mohammed Al-Suhaibani & Nader Naifar, 2018, "Preference Sukuk to Share Revenue صكوك المشاركة التفضيلية في الإيراد," Journal of King Abdulaziz University: Islamic Economics, King Abdulaziz University, Islamic Economics Institute., volume 31, issue 3, pages 3-29, October, DOI: 10.4197/Islec.31-3.1.
• Mikhail Drugov & Dmitry Ryvkin, 2018, "Tournament Rewards and Heavy Tails," Working Papers, New Economic School (NES), number w0250, Oct.
• Andreea Enache & Jean-Pierre Florens, 2018, "Nonparametric Estimation for Regulation Models," Annals of Economics and Statistics, GENES, issue 131, pages 45-58, DOI: 10.15609/annaeconstat2009.131.0045.
• Arun G. Chandrasekhar & Cynthia Kinnan & Horacio Larreguy, 2018, "Social Networks as Contract Enforcement: Evidence from a Lab Experiment in the Field," American Economic Journal: Applied Economics, American Economic Association, volume 10, issue 4, pages 43-78, October.
• Melis Kartal, 2018, "Honest Equilibria in Reputation Games: The Role of Time Preferences," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, volume 10, issue 1, pages 278-314, February.
• Behrang Kamali Shahdadi, 2018, "Matching with Moral Hazard: Assigning Attorneys to Poor Defendants," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, volume 10, issue 3, pages 1-33, August.
• Yuval Salant & Ron Siegel, 2018, "Contracts with Framing," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, volume 10, issue 3, pages 315-346, August.
• Deniz Dizdar, 2018, "Two-Sided Investment and Matching with Multidimensional Cost Types and Attributes," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, volume 10, issue 3, pages 86-123, August.
• John Y. Zhu, 2018, "A Foundation for Efficiency Wage Contracts," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, volume 10, issue 4, pages 248-288, November.
• Claudia M. Landeo & Kathryn E. Spier, 2018, "Optimal Law Enforcement with Ordered Leniency," Working Papers, Peruvian Economic Association, number 126, Sep.
• Claudia M. Landeo & Kathryn E. Spier, 2018, "Ordered Leniency: An Experimental Study of Law Enforcement with Self-Reporting," Working Papers, Peruvian Economic Association, number 127, Sep.
• Dmytro Fedchyshyn & Iryna Ignatenko, 2018, "Protection of land ownership of foreigners in Ukraine," Juridical Tribune - Review of Comparative and International Law, Bucharest Academy of Economic Studies, volume 8, issue Special, pages 27-38, October.
• Iryna Nykyforchyn & Nataliia Suduk, 2018, "Main Contractor – Subcontractor Relations In The Framework Of Contract Theory," Baltic Journal of Economic Studies, Publishing house "Baltija Publishing", volume 4, issue 3, DOI: 10.30525/2256-0742/2018-4-3-184-188.
• Zenan Wu & Xi Weng, 2018, "Managerial turnover and entrenchment," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, volume 27, issue 4, pages 742-771, October, DOI: 10.1111/jems.12248.
• David Martimort & Jérôme Pouyet & Francesco Ricci, 2018, "Extracting information or resource? The Hotelling rule revisited under asymmetric information," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, volume 49, issue 2, pages 311-347, June, DOI: 10.1111/1756-2171.12233.
• Florian Ederer & Richard Holden & Margaret Meyer, 2018, "Gaming and strategic opacity in incentive provision," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, volume 49, issue 4, pages 819-854, December, DOI: 10.1111/1756-2171.12253.
• Florian Hoffmann & Roman Inderst & Sergey Turlo, 2018, "Regulating Cancellation Rights With Consumer Experimentation," CRC TR 224 Discussion Paper Series, University of Bonn and University of Mannheim, Germany, number crctr224_2018_045, Oct.
• Zhengqing Gui & Ernst-Ludwig von Thadden & Xiaojian Zhao, 2018, "Incentive-Compatibility, Limited Liability and Costly Liquidation in Financial Contracting," CRC TR 224 Discussion Paper Series, University of Bonn and University of Mannheim, Germany, number crctr224_2018_064, Dec.
• Cerrone Claudia & Manna Ester, 2018, "Pay for Performance with Motivated Employees," The B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy, De Gruyter, volume 18, issue 1, pages 1-8, January, DOI: 10.1515/bejeap-2017-0190.
• Matsushima Hitoshi, 2018, "Connected Price Dynamics with Revealed Preferences and Auctioneer’s Discretion in VCG Combinatorial Auction," The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, De Gruyter, volume 18, issue 1, pages 1-16, January, DOI: 10.1515/bejte-2016-0168.
• D’Agostino Elena & Lisciandra Maurizio, 2018, "Binding and Non-Binding Contracts: A Theoretical Appraisal," Review of Law & Economics, De Gruyter, volume 14, issue 2, pages 1-27, July, DOI: 10.1515/rle-2016-0006.
• Emil DINGA, 2018, "On The Logic Of Corruption Generating," Contemporary Economy Journal, Constantin Brancoveanu University, volume 3, issue 3, pages 6-11.
• Antoine Prévet, 2018, "Révélation de l’information par un principal au budget limité," Revue économique, Presses de Sciences-Po, volume 69, issue 5, pages 709-722.
• Andrea Attar & Thomas Mariotti & François Salanié, 2018, "Concurrence non exclusive et sélection adverse," Revue économique, Presses de Sciences-Po, volume 69, issue 6, pages 1009-1023.
• Watson, Joel & Miller, David A & Olsen, Trond E, 2020, "Relational Contracting, Negotiation, and External Enforcement," University of California at San Diego, Economics Working Paper Series, Department of Economics, UC San Diego, number qt6ts1j6hf, Jul.
• Juan M. Ortner & Martin C. Schmalz, 2018, "Disagreement and Optimal Security Design," CESifo Working Paper Series, CESifo, number 6906.
• Charles F. Mason, 2018, "Optimal Contracts for Discouraging Deforestation with Risk Averse Agents," CESifo Working Paper Series, CESifo, number 7067.
• Michael Hoy & Afrasiab Mirza & Asha Sadanand, 2018, "Guaranteed Renewable Life Insurance Under Demand Uncertainty," CESifo Working Paper Series, CESifo, number 7103.
• Helmut Bester & Matthias Lang & Jianpei Li, 2018, "Signaling versus Auditing," CESifo Working Paper Series, CESifo, number 7183.
• Fahad Khalil & Jacques Lawarree & Alexander Rodivilov, 2018, "Learning from Failures: Optimal Contract for Experimentation and Production," CESifo Working Paper Series, CESifo, number 7310.
• Charles Bellemare & Alexander Sebald, 2018, "Self-Confidence and Reactions to Subjective Performance Evaluations," CESifo Working Paper Series, CESifo, number 7325.
• Alessandro De Chiara, 2018, "Courts' Decisions, Cooperative Investments, and Incomplete Contracts," CEU Working Papers, Department of Economics, Central European University, number 2018_5, Jul.
• Mikhail Drugov & Dmitry Ryvkin, 2018, "Tournament Rewards and Heavy Tails," Working Papers, Center for Economic and Financial Research (CEFIR), number w0250, Oct.
• Meg Adachi-Sato, 2018, "Stock vesting conditions, control benefits and managerial replacement," Canadian Journal of Economics, Canadian Economics Association, volume 51, issue 1, pages 275-313, February, DOI: 10.1111/caje.12323.
• Alvaro Remesal, 2018, "Clawback Provisions, Executive Pay, and Accounting Manipulation," Working Papers, CEMFI, number wp2018_1808, Sep.
• Bernabe Lopez-Martin & David Perez-Reyna, 2018, "Contracts, Firm Dynamics and Aggregate Productivity," Documentos CEDE, Universidad de los Andes, Facultad de Economía, CEDE, number 16821, Oct.
• Llobet, Gerard & Ganuza Fernandez, Juan Jose, 2018, "The Simple Economics of White Elephants," CEPR Discussion Papers, Centre for Economic Policy Research, number 12557, Jan.
• Hackbarth, Dirk & Rivera, Alejandro & Wong, Tak-Yuen, 2018, "Optimal Short-Termism," CEPR Discussion Papers, Centre for Economic Policy Research, number 12588, Jan.
• Schmalz, Martin & Ortner, Juan, 2018, "Disagreement and Security Design," CEPR Discussion Papers, Centre for Economic Policy Research, number 12596, Jan.
• Troya Martinez, Marta & Wren-Lewis, Liam, 2022, "Managing Relational Contracts," CEPR Discussion Papers, Centre for Economic Policy Research, number 12645, Jul.
• Gerardi, Dino, 2018, "Dynamic Contracting with Limited Commitment and the Ratchet Effect," CEPR Discussion Papers, Centre for Economic Policy Research, number 12699, Feb.
• Felli, Leonardo & Harris, Christopher J, 2018, "Firm-Specific Training," CEPR Discussion Papers, Centre for Economic Policy Research, number 12748, Feb.
• Rampini, Adriano A., 2018, "Financing Durable Assets," CEPR Discussion Papers, Centre for Economic Policy Research, number 12997, Jun.
• Fafchamps, Marcel & Davies, Elwyn, 2018, "When No Bad Deed Goes Punished: Relational Contracting in Ghana and the UK," CEPR Discussion Papers, Centre for Economic Policy Research, number 13057, Jul.
• Felli, Leonardo & Anderlini, Luca & Immordino, Giovanni, 2018, "Costly Pretrial Agreements," CEPR Discussion Papers, Centre for Economic Policy Research, number 13074, Jul.
• Platteau, Jean-Philippe & Bourguignon, François, 2018, "Should a Poverty-Averse Donor Always Increase the Share of Governance-Improving Countries?," CEPR Discussion Papers, Centre for Economic Policy Research, number 13163, Sep.
• Schmitz, Patrick W. & Kusterer, David J., 2018, "Government versus Private Ownership of Public Goods: Experimental Evidence," CEPR Discussion Papers, Centre for Economic Policy Research, number 13204, Sep.
• Schmitz, Patrick W. & ,, 2018, "How (Not) to Foster Innovations in Public Infrastructure Projects," CEPR Discussion Papers, Centre for Economic Policy Research, number 13406, Dec.
• Fanasch, Patrizia & Frick, Bernd, 2018, "What Makes Cooperatives Successful? Identifying the Determinants of Their Organizational Performance," Journal of Wine Economics, Cambridge University Press, volume 13, issue 3, pages 282-308, August.
• Pio Baake & Lilo Wagner, 2018, "EU Roaming Regulation: Theoretical Model Suggests a Positive Assessment," DIW Weekly Report, DIW Berlin, German Institute for Economic Research, volume 8, issue 6, pages 59-64.
• Pio Baake & Lilo Wagner, 2018, "EU-Roaming-Verordnung: Theoretisches Modell deutet auf positive Wirkung hin," DIW Wochenbericht, DIW Berlin, German Institute for Economic Research, volume 85, issue 5, pages 77-82.
• Victor Hiller & Natacha Raffin, 2018, "Corporate Social Responsibility and workers' motivation at the industry equilibrium," EconomiX Working Papers, University of Paris Nanterre, EconomiX, number 2018-34.
• Luca Livio, 2018, "Friends or Foes? Optimal Incentives for Reciprocal Agents," Working Papers ECARES, ULB -- Universite Libre de Bruxelles, number 2018-03, Jan.
• Terstiege, Stefan, 2018, "On the signal realization set in contracting with information disclosure," Economics Letters, Elsevier, volume 163, issue C, pages 83-86, DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2017.12.014.
• Eliaz, Kfir & Spiegler, Ran, 2018, "Managing intrinsic motivation in a long-run relationship," Economics Letters, Elsevier, volume 165, issue C, pages 6-9, DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2018.01.018.
• Dumav, Martin & Khan, Urmee, 2018, "Moral hazard with non-additive uncertainty: When are actions implementable?," Economics Letters, Elsevier, volume 171, issue C, pages 110-114, DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2018.06.028.
• Balmaceda, Felipe, 2018, "Optimal task assignments with loss-averse agents," European Economic Review, Elsevier, volume 105, issue C, pages 1-26, DOI: 10.1016/j.euroecorev.2018.03.006.
• Goldlücke, Susanne & Schmitz, Patrick W., 2018, "Pollution claim settlements reconsidered: Hidden information and bounded payments," European Economic Review, Elsevier, volume 110, issue C, pages 211-222, DOI: 10.1016/j.euroecorev.2018.08.005.
• Märkle-Huß, Joscha & Feuerriegel, Stefan & Neumann, Dirk, 2018, "Contract durations in the electricity market: Causal impact of 15min trading on the EPEX SPOT market," Energy Economics, Elsevier, volume 69, issue C, pages 367-378, DOI: 10.1016/j.eneco.2017.11.019.
• Buso, Marco & Stenger, Anne, 2018, "Public-private partnerships as a policy response to climate change," Energy Policy, Elsevier, volume 119, issue C, pages 487-494, DOI: 10.1016/j.enpol.2018.04.063.
• Eguia, Jon X. & Llorente-Saguer, Aniol & Morton, Rebecca & Nicolò, Antonio, 2018, "Equilibrium selection in sequential games with imperfect information," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 109, issue C, pages 465-483, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2018.01.008.
• Hoppe, Eva I. & Schmitz, Patrick W., 2018, "Hidden action and outcome contractibility: An experimental test of moral hazard theory," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 109, issue C, pages 544-564, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2018.02.006.
• Diasakos, Theodoros M. & Koufopoulos, Kostas, 2018, "(Neutrally) Optimal Mechanism under Adverse Selection: The canonical insurance problem," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 111, issue C, pages 159-186, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2018.04.007.
• Bichler, Martin & Paulsen, Per, 2018, "A principal-agent model of bidding firms in multi-unit auctions," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 111, issue C, pages 20-40, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2018.06.002.
• Veiga, André, 2018, "A note on how to sell a network good," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, volume 59, issue C, pages 114-126, DOI: 10.1016/j.ijindorg.2017.12.009.
• Asseyer, Andreas, 2018, "Optimal monitoring in dynamic procurement contracts," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, volume 59, issue C, pages 222-252, DOI: 10.1016/j.ijindorg.2018.03.004.
• Bester, Helmut & Ouyang, Yaofu, 2018, "Optimal procurement of a credence good under limited liability," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, volume 61, issue C, pages 96-129, DOI: 10.1016/j.ijindorg.2018.08.008.
• Luo, Jie & Wang, Cheng, 2018, "Optimal sovereign lending and default," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, volume 111, issue C, pages 190-213, DOI: 10.1016/j.jinteco.2018.01.006.
• Roussey, Ludivine & Soubeyran, Raphael, 2018, "Overburdened judges," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, volume 55, issue C, pages 21-32, DOI: 10.1016/j.irle.2018.02.003.
• Chen, Tai-Yuan & Zhang, Guochang & Zhou, Yi, 2018, "Enforceability of non-compete covenants, discretionary investments, and financial reporting practices: Evidence from a natural experiment," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, volume 65, issue 1, pages 41-60, DOI: 10.1016/j.jacceco.2017.11.012.
• Herweg, Fabian & Karle, Heiko & Müller, Daniel, 2018, "Incomplete contracting, renegotiation, and expectation-based loss aversion," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, volume 145, issue C, pages 176-201, DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2017.07.033.
• Bac, Mehmet, 2018, "Wages, performance and harassment," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, volume 145, issue C, pages 232-248, DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2017.11.008.
• Macera, Rosario, 2018, "Present or future incentives? On the optimality of fixed wages with moral hazard," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, volume 147, issue C, pages 129-144, DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2017.12.004.
• Baldursson, Fridrik Mar & von der Fehr, Nils-Henrik M., 2018, "Natural resources and sovereign expropriation," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, volume 92, issue C, pages 580-607, DOI: 10.1016/j.jeem.2017.08.004.
• Donaldson, Jason Roderick & Piacentino, Giorgia, 2018, "Contracting to compete for flows," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, volume 173, issue C, pages 289-319, DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2017.10.003.
• Beccuti, Juan & Möller, Marc, 2018, "Dynamic adverse selection with a patient seller," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, volume 173, issue C, pages 95-117, DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2017.10.009.
• Felli, Leonardo & Harris, Christopher, 2018, "Firm-specific training," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, volume 175, issue C, pages 585-623, DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2018.01.010.
• Thomas, Jonathan P. & Worrall, Tim, 2018, "Dynamic relational contracts under complete information," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, volume 175, issue C, pages 624-651, DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2018.02.004.
• Espino, Emilio & Kozlowski, Julian & Sánchez, Juan M., 2018, "Investment and bilateral insurance," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, volume 176, issue C, pages 311-341, DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2018.04.002.
• Drozd, Lukasz A. & Serrano-Padial, Ricardo, 2018, "Financial contracting with enforcement externalities," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, volume 178, issue C, pages 153-189, DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2018.09.002.
• Chen, Yi-Chun & Li, Jiangtao, 2018, "Revisiting the foundations of dominant-strategy mechanisms," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, volume 178, issue C, pages 294-317, DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2018.10.001.
• Macera, Rosario, 2018, "Intertemporal incentives under loss aversion," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, volume 178, issue C, pages 551-594, DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2018.10.003.
• Chaigneau, Pierre & Edmans, Alex & Gottlieb, Daniel, 2018, "Does improved information improve incentives?," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, volume 130, issue 2, pages 291-307, DOI: 10.1016/j.jfineco.2018.05.002.
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