Research classified by Journal of Economic Literature (JEL) codes

1. Transaction Cost Economics

2018

• Meg Adachi-Sato, 2018, "Stock vesting conditions, control benefits and managerial replacement," Canadian Journal of Economics, Canadian Economics Association, volume 51, issue 1, pages 275-313, February, DOI: 10.1111/caje.12323.
• Alvaro Remesal, 2018, "Clawback Provisions, Executive Pay, and Accounting Manipulation," Working Papers, CEMFI, number wp2018_1808, Sep.
• Bernabe Lopez-Martin & David Perez-Reyna, 2018, "Contracts, Firm Dynamics and Aggregate Productivity," Documentos CEDE, Universidad de los Andes, Facultad de Economía, CEDE, number 16821, Oct.
• Llobet, Gerard & Ganuza Fernandez, Juan Jose, 2018, "The Simple Economics of White Elephants," CEPR Discussion Papers, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers, number 12557, Jan.
• Hackbarth, Dirk & Rivera, Alejandro & Wong, Tak-Yuen, 2018, "Optimal Short-Termism," CEPR Discussion Papers, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers, number 12588, Jan.
• Schmalz, Martin & Ortner, Juan, 2018, "Disagreement and Security Design," CEPR Discussion Papers, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers, number 12596, Jan.
• Troya Martinez, Marta & Wren-Lewis, Liam, 2022, "Managing Relational Contracts," CEPR Discussion Papers, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers, number 12645, Jul.
• Gerardi, Dino, 2018, "Dynamic Contracting with Limited Commitment and the Ratchet Effect," CEPR Discussion Papers, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers, number 12699, Feb.
• Felli, Leonardo & Harris, Christopher J, 2018, "Firm-Specific Training," CEPR Discussion Papers, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers, number 12748, Feb.
• Rampini, Adriano A., 2018, "Financing Durable Assets," CEPR Discussion Papers, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers, number 12997, Jun.
• Fafchamps, Marcel & Davies, Elwyn, 2018, "When No Bad Deed Goes Punished: Relational Contracting in Ghana and the UK," CEPR Discussion Papers, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers, number 13057, Jul.
• Felli, Leonardo & Anderlini, Luca & Immordino, Giovanni, 2018, "Costly Pretrial Agreements," CEPR Discussion Papers, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers, number 13074, Jul.
• Platteau, Jean-Philippe & Bourguignon, François, 2018, "Should a Poverty-Averse Donor Always Increase the Share of Governance-Improving Countries?," CEPR Discussion Papers, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers, number 13163, Sep.
• Schmitz, Patrick W. & Kusterer, David J., 2018, "Government versus Private Ownership of Public Goods: Experimental Evidence," CEPR Discussion Papers, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers, number 13204, Sep.
• Schmitz, Patrick W. & ,, 2018, "How (Not) to Foster Innovations in Public Infrastructure Projects," CEPR Discussion Papers, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers, number 13406, Dec.
• Fanasch, Patrizia & Frick, Bernd, 2018, "What Makes Cooperatives Successful? Identifying the Determinants of Their Organizational Performance," Journal of Wine Economics, Cambridge University Press, volume 13, issue 3, pages 282-308, August.
• Pio Baake & Lilo Wagner, 2018, "EU Roaming Regulation: Theoretical Model Suggests a Positive Assessment," DIW Weekly Report, DIW Berlin, German Institute for Economic Research, volume 8, issue 6, pages 59-64.
• Pio Baake & Lilo Wagner, 2018, "EU-Roaming-Verordnung: Theoretisches Modell deutet auf positive Wirkung hin," DIW Wochenbericht, DIW Berlin, German Institute for Economic Research, volume 85, issue 5, pages 77-82.
• Victor Hiller & Natacha Raffin, 2018, "Corporate Social Responsibility and workers' motivation at the industry equilibrium," EconomiX Working Papers, University of Paris Nanterre, EconomiX, number 2018-34.
• Luca Livio, 2018, "Friends or Foes? Optimal Incentives for Reciprocal Agents," Working Papers ECARES, ULB -- Universite Libre de Bruxelles, number 2018-03, Jan.
• Terstiege, Stefan, 2018, "On the signal realization set in contracting with information disclosure," Economics Letters, Elsevier, volume 163, issue C, pages 83-86, DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2017.12.014.
• Eliaz, Kfir & Spiegler, Ran, 2018, "Managing intrinsic motivation in a long-run relationship," Economics Letters, Elsevier, volume 165, issue C, pages 6-9, DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2018.01.018.
• Dumav, Martin & Khan, Urmee, 2018, "Moral hazard with non-additive uncertainty: When are actions implementable?," Economics Letters, Elsevier, volume 171, issue C, pages 110-114, DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2018.06.028.
• Balmaceda, Felipe, 2018, "Optimal task assignments with loss-averse agents," European Economic Review, Elsevier, volume 105, issue C, pages 1-26, DOI: 10.1016/j.euroecorev.2018.03.006.
• Goldlücke, Susanne & Schmitz, Patrick W., 2018, "Pollution claim settlements reconsidered: Hidden information and bounded payments," European Economic Review, Elsevier, volume 110, issue C, pages 211-222, DOI: 10.1016/j.euroecorev.2018.08.005.
• Märkle-Huß, Joscha & Feuerriegel, Stefan & Neumann, Dirk, 2018, "Contract durations in the electricity market: Causal impact of 15min trading on the EPEX SPOT market," Energy Economics, Elsevier, volume 69, issue C, pages 367-378, DOI: 10.1016/j.eneco.2017.11.019.
• Buso, Marco & Stenger, Anne, 2018, "Public-private partnerships as a policy response to climate change," Energy Policy, Elsevier, volume 119, issue C, pages 487-494, DOI: 10.1016/j.enpol.2018.04.063.
• Eguia, Jon X. & Llorente-Saguer, Aniol & Morton, Rebecca & Nicolò, Antonio, 2018, "Equilibrium selection in sequential games with imperfect information," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 109, issue C, pages 465-483, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2018.01.008.
• Hoppe, Eva I. & Schmitz, Patrick W., 2018, "Hidden action and outcome contractibility: An experimental test of moral hazard theory," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 109, issue C, pages 544-564, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2018.02.006.
• Diasakos, Theodoros M. & Koufopoulos, Kostas, 2018, "(Neutrally) Optimal Mechanism under Adverse Selection: The canonical insurance problem," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 111, issue C, pages 159-186, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2018.04.007.
• Bichler, Martin & Paulsen, Per, 2018, "A principal-agent model of bidding firms in multi-unit auctions," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, volume 111, issue C, pages 20-40, DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2018.06.002.
• Veiga, André, 2018, "A note on how to sell a network good," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, volume 59, issue C, pages 114-126, DOI: 10.1016/j.ijindorg.2017.12.009.
• Asseyer, Andreas, 2018, "Optimal monitoring in dynamic procurement contracts," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, volume 59, issue C, pages 222-252, DOI: 10.1016/j.ijindorg.2018.03.004.
• Bester, Helmut & Ouyang, Yaofu, 2018, "Optimal procurement of a credence good under limited liability," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, volume 61, issue C, pages 96-129, DOI: 10.1016/j.ijindorg.2018.08.008.
• Luo, Jie & Wang, Cheng, 2018, "Optimal sovereign lending and default," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, volume 111, issue C, pages 190-213, DOI: 10.1016/j.jinteco.2018.01.006.
• Roussey, Ludivine & Soubeyran, Raphael, 2018, "Overburdened judges," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, volume 55, issue C, pages 21-32, DOI: 10.1016/j.irle.2018.02.003.
• Chen, Tai-Yuan & Zhang, Guochang & Zhou, Yi, 2018, "Enforceability of non-compete covenants, discretionary investments, and financial reporting practices: Evidence from a natural experiment," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, volume 65, issue 1, pages 41-60, DOI: 10.1016/j.jacceco.2017.11.012.
• Herweg, Fabian & Karle, Heiko & Müller, Daniel, 2018, "Incomplete contracting, renegotiation, and expectation-based loss aversion," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, volume 145, issue C, pages 176-201, DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2017.07.033.
• Bac, Mehmet, 2018, "Wages, performance and harassment," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, volume 145, issue C, pages 232-248, DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2017.11.008.
• Macera, Rosario, 2018, "Present or future incentives? On the optimality of fixed wages with moral hazard," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, volume 147, issue C, pages 129-144, DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2017.12.004.
• Baldursson, Fridrik Mar & von der Fehr, Nils-Henrik M., 2018, "Natural resources and sovereign expropriation," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, volume 92, issue C, pages 580-607, DOI: 10.1016/j.jeem.2017.08.004.
• Donaldson, Jason Roderick & Piacentino, Giorgia, 2018, "Contracting to compete for flows," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, volume 173, issue C, pages 289-319, DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2017.10.003.
• Beccuti, Juan & Möller, Marc, 2018, "Dynamic adverse selection with a patient seller," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, volume 173, issue C, pages 95-117, DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2017.10.009.
• Felli, Leonardo & Harris, Christopher, 2018, "Firm-specific training," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, volume 175, issue C, pages 585-623, DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2018.01.010.
• Thomas, Jonathan P. & Worrall, Tim, 2018, "Dynamic relational contracts under complete information," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, volume 175, issue C, pages 624-651, DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2018.02.004.
• Espino, Emilio & Kozlowski, Julian & Sánchez, Juan M., 2018, "Investment and bilateral insurance," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, volume 176, issue C, pages 311-341, DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2018.04.002.
• Drozd, Lukasz A. & Serrano-Padial, Ricardo, 2018, "Financial contracting with enforcement externalities," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, volume 178, issue C, pages 153-189, DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2018.09.002.
• Chen, Yi-Chun & Li, Jiangtao, 2018, "Revisiting the foundations of dominant-strategy mechanisms," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, volume 178, issue C, pages 294-317, DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2018.10.001.
• Macera, Rosario, 2018, "Intertemporal incentives under loss aversion," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, volume 178, issue C, pages 551-594, DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2018.10.003.
• Chaigneau, Pierre & Edmans, Alex & Gottlieb, Daniel, 2018, "Does improved information improve incentives?," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, volume 130, issue 2, pages 291-307, DOI: 10.1016/j.jfineco.2018.05.002.
• Kirsch, Steffen & Burghof, Hans-Peter, 2018, "The efficiency of savings-linked relationship lending for housing finance," Journal of Housing Economics, Elsevier, volume 42, issue C, pages 55-68, DOI: 10.1016/j.jhe.2018.05.003.
• Bourguignon, François & Platteau, Jean-Philippe, 2018, "Optimal management of transfers: An odd paradox," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, volume 162, issue C, pages 143-157, DOI: 10.1016/j.jpubeco.2018.01.001.
• Pyddoke, Roger & Lindgren, Hanna, 2018, "Outcomes from new contracts with “strong” incentives for increasing ridership in bus transport in Stockholm," Research in Transportation Economics, Elsevier, volume 69, issue C, pages 197-206, DOI: 10.1016/j.retrec.2018.07.022.
• Charoontham, Kittiphod & Amornpetchkul, Thunyarat (Bam), 2018, "Performance-based payment scheme to hedge against credit rating inflation," Research in International Business and Finance, Elsevier, volume 44, issue C, pages 471-479, DOI: 10.1016/j.ribaf.2017.07.117.
• Raszap Skorbiansky, Sharon, 2018, "Investing in communication: An experimental study of communication in a relational contract setting," Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics (formerly The Journal of Socio-Economics), Elsevier, volume 74, issue C, pages 85-96, DOI: 10.1016/j.socec.2018.03.008.
• Flannery, Timothy & Roberts, Stephen, 2018, "The use of non-monotonic contracts in a single period game: An experimental investigation," Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics (formerly The Journal of Socio-Economics), Elsevier, volume 77, issue C, pages 177-185, DOI: 10.1016/j.socec.2018.10.002.
• Chaigneau, Pierre & Edmans, Alex & Gottlieb, Daniel, 2018, "Does improved information improve incentives?," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library, number 102227, Nov.
• Felli, Leonardo & Harris, Christopher, 2018, "Firm-specific training," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library, number 87222, May.
• Claudia M. Landeo, 2018, "Exclusionary vertical restraints and antitrust: experimental law and economics contributions," Chapters, Edward Elgar Publishing, chapter 3, in: Joshua C. Teitelbaum & Kathryn Zeiler, "Research Handbook on Behavioral Law and Economics".
• Claudia M. Landeo, 2018, "Law and economics and tort litigation institutions: theory and experiments," Chapters, Edward Elgar Publishing, chapter 9, in: Joshua C. Teitelbaum & Kathryn Zeiler, "Research Handbook on Behavioral Law and Economics".
• Andrea Attar & Claude d’Aspremont, 2018, "Trading under asymmetric information: Positive and normative implications," Chapters, Edward Elgar Publishing, chapter 15, in: Luis C. Corchón & Marco A. Marini, "Handbook of Game Theory and Industrial Organization, Volume I".
• Inés Macho-Stadler & David Pérez-Castrillo, 2018, "Moral hazard: Base models and two extensions," Chapters, Edward Elgar Publishing, chapter 16, in: Luis C. Corchón & Marco A. Marini, "Handbook of Game Theory and Industrial Organization, Volume I".
• Katsuya Hihara & Naoki Makimoto, 2018, "Analyses of Risk-sharing Contract of Airport and Airline Vertical Relationship: Bargaining and Agency Analyses," Advances in Airline Economics, Emerald Group Publishing Limited, "Airline Economics in Asia", DOI: 10.1108/S2212-160920180000007014.
• Chandan Kumar, 2018, "Opportunism and Hold-up in the Incomplete Public Private Partnership (PPP) Contracts," Working Papers, eSocialSciences, number id:12687, Apr.
• Maria De Paola & Francesca Gioia & Vincenzo Scoppa, 2018, "Free-riding and knowledge spillovers in teams: The role of social ties," Natural Field Experiments, The Field Experiments Website, number 00704.
• Marco Buso & Cesare Dosi & Michele Moretto, 2018, "Termination Fees and Contract Design in Public-Private Partnerships," Working Papers, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei, number 2018.32, Dec.
• Noam Tanner, 2018, "Optimal Delegation Under Unknown Bias: The Role of Concavity," Supervisory Research and Analysis Working Papers, Federal Reserve Bank of Boston, number RPA 18-1, Mar.
• Lukasz A. Drozd & Ricardo Serrano-Padial, 2018, "Financial Contracting with Enforcement Externalities," Working Papers, Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia, number 18-21, Oct, DOI: https://doi.org/10.21799/frbp.wp.20.
• Suting Hong & Robert M. Hunt & Konstantinos Serfes, 2018, "Dynamic Pricing of Credit Cards and the Effects of Regulation," Working Papers, Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia, number 18-23, Nov, DOI: 10.21799/frbp.wp.2018.23.
• Borys Grochulski & Russell Wong, 2018, "Contingent Debt and Performance Pricing in an Optimal Capital Structure Model with Financial Distress and Reorganization," Working Paper, Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond, number 18-17, Nov.
• Luca Anderlini & Leonardo Felli & Giovanni Immordino, 2018, "Costly Pre-Trial Agreements," Working Papers, Georgetown University, Department of Economics, number gueconwpa~18-18-11, Sep.
• Luca Anderlini & Leonardo Felli & Alessandro Riboni, 2018, "Legal Efficiency and Consistency," Working Papers, Georgetown University, Department of Economics, number gueconwpa~18-18-12, Sep.
• Dan Cao & Roger Lagunoff, 2018, "Optimal Collateralized Contracts," Working Papers, Georgetown University, Department of Economics, number gueconwpa~18-18-14, Sep.
• Dmitri V. Vinogradov & Elena V. Shadrina, 2018, "Discouragement through incentives," Working Papers, Business School - Economics, University of Glasgow, number 2018_05, Dec.
• Nian Yang & Jun Yang & Yu Chen, 2018, "Contracting in a Continuous-Time Model with Three-Sided Moral Hazard and Cost Synergies," Graz Economics Papers, University of Graz, Department of Economics, number 2018-06, Feb.
• Xi Chen & Yu Chen & Xuhu Wan, 2018, "Delegated Project Search," Graz Economics Papers, University of Graz, Department of Economics, number 2018-11, May.
• David Rietzke & Yu Chen, 2018, "Push or Pull? Performance-Pay, Incentives, and Information," Graz Economics Papers, University of Graz, Department of Economics, number 2018-12, May.
• Meng Wei Chen & Yu Chen & Zhen-Hua Wu & Ningru Zhao, 2018, "Government Intervention, Innovation, and Entrepreneurship," Graz Economics Papers, University of Graz, Department of Economics, number 2018-15, Sep.
• Pierre Martinon & Pierre Picard & Anasuya Raj, 2018, "On the Design of Optimal Health Insurance Contracts under Ex Post Moral Hazard," Post-Print, HAL, number hal-01348551, Jul, DOI: 10.1057/s10713-018-0034-y.
• François Bourguignon & Jean-Philippe Platteau, 2018, "Optimal management of transfers: An odd paradox," Post-Print, HAL, number hal-01784348, DOI: 10.1016/j.jpubeco.2018.01.001.
• Michel Mougeot & Florence Naegelen, 2018, "Nonresponsiveness, Severity Auditing, and Upcoding Deterrence," Post-Print, HAL, number hal-01816853, DOI: 10.1628/jite-2018-0011.
• Andrea Attard & Claude d'Aspremont, 2018, "Trading under Asymmetric Information: Positive and Normative Implications," Post-Print, HAL, number hal-01899095.
• Victor Hiller & Natacha Raffin, 2018, "Corporate social responsibility and workers’ motivation at the industry equilibrium," Post-Print, HAL, number hal-02366293, Jun.
• Ludivine Roussey & Raphaël Soubeyran, 2018, "Overburdened judges," Post-Print, HAL, number hal-02621924, DOI: 10.1016/j.irle.2018.02.003.
• Andreea Enache & Jean-Pierre Florens, 2018, "Non parametric estimation for regulation models," Post-Print, HAL, number hal-03270298, Sep, DOI: 10.15609/annaeconstat2009.131.0045.
• Philippe Aghion & Ernst Fehr & Richard Holden & Tom Wilkening, 2018, "The Role of Bounded Rationality and Imperfect Information in Subgame Perfect Implementation—An Empirical Investigation," Post-Print, HAL, number halshs-01756795, Feb, DOI: 10.1093/jeea/jvx026.
• David Martimort & Aggey Semenov & Lars Stole, 2018, "A complete characterization of equilibria in an intrinsic common agency screening game," Post-Print, HAL, number halshs-01885428, DOI: 10.3982/TE2266.
• Brice Corgnet & Roberto Hernán-Gonzalez, 2019, "Revisiting the Trade-off Between Risk and Incentives: The Shocking Effect of Random Shocks?," Post-Print, HAL, number halshs-01937875, Mar, DOI: 10.1287/mnsc.2017.2914.
• François Bourguignon & Jean-Philippe Platteau, 2018, "Optimal management of transfers: An odd paradox," PSE-Ecole d'économie de Paris (Postprint), HAL, number hal-01784348, DOI: 10.1016/j.jpubeco.2018.01.001.
• David Martimort & Jérôme Pouyet & Francesco Ricci, 2018, "Extracting Information or Resource ? The Hotelling Rule Revisited under Asym- metric Information," PSE-Ecole d'économie de Paris (Postprint), HAL, number halshs-01631594, DOI: 10.1111/1756-2171.12233.
• Philippe Aghion & Ernst Fehr & Richard Holden & Tom Wilkening, 2018, "The Role of Bounded Rationality and Imperfect Information in Subgame Perfect Implementation—An Empirical Investigation," PSE-Ecole d'économie de Paris (Postprint), HAL, number halshs-01756795, Feb, DOI: 10.1093/jeea/jvx026.
• David Martimort & Aggey Semenov & Lars Stole, 2018, "A complete characterization of equilibria in an intrinsic common agency screening game," PSE-Ecole d'économie de Paris (Postprint), HAL, number halshs-01885428, DOI: 10.3982/TE2266.
• Jean-Marc Bourgeon & Pierre Picard, 2019, "Insurance Law and Incomplete Contracts," Working Papers, HAL, number hal-01830360, Nov.
• Ludivine Roussey & Raphaël Soubeyran, 2018, "Overburdened judges," Working Papers, HAL, number hal-02791013.
• Victor Hiller & Natacha Raffin, 2018, "Corporate Social Responsibility and workers' motivation at the industry equilibrium," Working Papers, HAL, number hal-04141784.
• Ludivine Roussey & Raphaël Soubeyran, 2018, "Overburdened judges," Working Papers, HAL, number halshs-01936006.
• Ludivine Roussey & Raphaël Soubeyran, 2018, "Overburdened judges," CEE-M Working Papers, CEE-M, Universtiy of Montpellier, CNRS, INRA, Montpellier SupAgro, number halshs-01936006.
• Chi, Chang Koo & Olsen, Trond E., 2018, "Relational Incentive Contracts and Performance Measurement," Discussion Paper Series in Economics, Norwegian School of Economics, Department of Economics, number 7/2018, Apr.
• Chi, Chang Koo & Olsen, Trond E., 2018, "Relational Incentive Contracts and Performance Measurement," Discussion Papers, Norwegian School of Economics, Department of Business and Management Science, number 2018/6, Apr.
• Miller, David & Olsen, Trond E. & Watson, Joel, 2018, "Relational Contracting, Negotiation, and External Enforcement," Discussion Papers, Norwegian School of Economics, Department of Business and Management Science, number 2018/8, May.
• Chandan Kumar, 2018, "Opportunism and hold-up in the incomplete public private partnership (PPP) contracts," Indira Gandhi Institute of Development Research, Mumbai Working Papers, Indira Gandhi Institute of Development Research, Mumbai, India, number 2018-012, Mar.
• Ehtisham Ahmad & Annalisa Vinella & Kezhou Xiao, 2018, "Contracting arrangements and public private partnerships for sustainable development," Public Sector Economics, Institute of Public Finance, volume 42, issue 2, pages 145-169, DOI: 10.3326/pse.42.2.8.
• Catalina Martínez & Sarah Parlane, 2018, "On the firms’ decision to hire academic scientists," Working Papers, Instituto de Políticas y Bienes Públicos (IPP), CSIC, number 1801, Feb.
• Federica Di Marcantonio & Pavel Ciaian & Vicente Castellanos, 2018, "Unfair trading practices in the dairy farm sector: Evidence from selected EU regions," JRC Research Reports, Joint Research Centre, number JRC112770, Sep.
• Kräkel, Matthias, 2018, "Empowerment and the Dark Side of Delegation," IZA Discussion Papers, IZA Network @ LISER, number 11289, Jan.
• António Osório, 2018, "Brownian Signals: Information Quality, Quantity and Timing in Repeated Games," Computational Economics, Springer;Society for Computational Economics, volume 52, issue 2, pages 387-404, August, DOI: 10.1007/s10614-017-9685-5.
• Paula Cordero Salas & Brian E. Roe & Brent Sohngen, 2018, "Additionality When REDD Contracts Must be Self-Enforcing," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, volume 69, issue 1, pages 195-215, January, DOI: 10.1007/s10640-016-0072-9.
• Pierre Martinon & Pierre Picard & Anasuya Raj, 2018, "On the design of optimal health insurance contracts under ex post moral hazard," The Geneva Papers on Risk and Insurance Theory, Springer;International Association for the Study of Insurance Economics (The Geneva Association), volume 43, issue 2, pages 137-185, September, DOI: 10.1057/s10713-018-0034-y.
• Francisco Candel-Sánchez & Juan Perote-Peña, 2018, "Endogenous market regulation in a signaling model of lobby formation," Journal of Economics, Springer, volume 123, issue 1, pages 23-47, January, DOI: 10.1007/s00712-017-0547-3.
• Jong-Hee Hahn & Jinwoo Kim & Sang-Hyun Kim & Jihong Lee, 2018, "Price Discrimination with Loss Averse and Horizontally Differentiated Consumers," Korean Economic Review, Korean Economic Association, volume 34, pages 117-129.
• Meg Adachi-Sato & Kazuya Kamiya, 2018, "Combinations of Different Length Contracts in a Multiperiod Model: Short, Medium and Long-term Contracts," Discussion Paper Series, Research Institute for Economics & Business Administration, Kobe University, number DP2018-05, Mar.
• Marina Halac & Ilan Kremer & Eyal Winter, 2018, "Raising Capital from Heterogeneous Investors," Working Papers, Lancaster University Management School, Economics Department, number 245773051.
• Michel Mougeot & Florence Naegelen, 2019, "Nonresponsiveness, Severity Auditing, and Upcoding Deterrence," Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, volume 175, issue 2, pages 308-331, DOI: 10.1628/jite-2018-0011.
• Ajay Agrawal & Joshua Gans & Avi Goldfarb, 2018, "Prediction, Judgment, and Complexity: A Theory of Decision-Making and Artificial Intelligence," NBER Chapters, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc, "The Economics of Artificial Intelligence: An Agenda".
• Ajay K. Agrawal & Joshua S. Gans & Avi Goldfarb, 2018, "Prediction, Judgment and Complexity: A Theory of Decision Making and Artificial Intelligence," NBER Working Papers, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc, number 24243, Jan.
• Francisco Espinosa & Debraj Ray, 2018, "Noisy Agents," NBER Working Papers, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc, number 24627, May.
• Peter Q. Blair & Bobby W. Chung, 2018, "Job Market Signaling through Occupational Licensing," NBER Working Papers, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc, number 24791, Jul.
• Meng Liu & Erik Brynjolfsson & Jason Dowlatabadi, 2018, "Do Digital Platforms Reduce Moral Hazard? The Case of Uber and Taxis," NBER Working Papers, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc, number 25015, Sep.
• Claudia M. Landeo & Kathryn E. Spier, 2018, "Ordered Leniency: An Experimental Study of Law Enforcement with Self-Reporting," NBER Working Papers, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc, number 25094, Sep.
• Claudia M. Landeo & Kathryn E. Spier, 2018, "Optimal Law Enforcement with Ordered Leniency," NBER Working Papers, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc, number 25095, Sep.
• Reppas, Dimitrios, 2018, "Modeling Fisheries Agreements with Side Payments: The Case of Western Atlantic Bluefin Tuna," Strategic Behavior and the Environment, now publishers, volume 7, issue 3-4, pages 397-441, February, DOI: 10.1561/102.00000078.
• Shingo Ishiguro & Yosuke Yasuda, 2018, "Moral Hazard and Target Budgets," Discussion Papers in Economics and Business, Osaka University, Graduate School of Economics, number 18-03, Feb.
• Philippe Aghion & Ernst Fehr & Richard Holden & Tom Wilkening, 2018, "The Role of Bounded Rationality and Imperfect Information in Subgame Perfect Implementation—An Empirical Investigation," Journal of the European Economic Association, European Economic Association, volume 16, issue 1, pages 232-274.
• Jonathan de Quidt, 2018, "Your Loss Is My Gain: A Recruitment Experiment with Framed Incentives," Journal of the European Economic Association, European Economic Association, volume 16, issue 2, pages 522-559.
• Sarath Sanga, 2018, "Incomplete Contracts: An Empirical Approach," The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Oxford University Press, volume 34, issue 4, pages 650-679.
• Eric Van Tassel, 2018, "Multiple borrowing and adverse selection in credit markets," Oxford Economic Papers, Oxford University Press, volume 70, issue 1, pages 286-299.
• Benjamin Hébert, 2018, "Moral Hazard and the Optimality of Debt," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, volume 85, issue 4, pages 2214-2252.
• Marco Buso & Cesare Dosi & Michele Moretto, 2018, "Termination Fees and Contract Design in Public-Private Partnerships," "Marco Fanno" Working Papers, Dipartimento di Scienze Economiche "Marco Fanno", number 0227, Oct.
• Pierre Martinon & Pierre Picard & Anasuya Raj, 2018, "On the design of optimal health insurance contracts under ex post moral hazard," The Geneva Risk and Insurance Review, Palgrave Macmillan;International Association for the Study of Insurance Economics (The Geneva Association), volume 43, issue 2, pages 137-185, September, DOI: 10.1057/s10713-018-0034-y.
• Massimiliano Vatiero, 2018, "Smart contracts and transaction costs," Discussion Papers, Dipartimento di Economia e Management (DEM), University of Pisa, Pisa, Italy, number 2018/238, Oct.
• Ahmed, Rafayal, 2018, "Dynamic Screening with Differentially Informed Principals," MPRA Paper, University Library of Munich, Germany, number 118463, Apr.
• Alexandrov, Alexei & Pittman, Russell & Ukhaneva, Olga, 2018, "Pricing of Complements in the U.S. freight railroads: Cournot versus Coase," MPRA Paper, University Library of Munich, Germany, number 86279, Apr.
• Tirelli, Mario, 2018, "Optimal financial contracts with unobservable investments," MPRA Paper, University Library of Munich, Germany, number 86444, Feb.
• Goldlücke, Susanne & Schmitz, Patrick W., 2018, "Pollution Claim Settlements Reconsidered: Hidden Information and Bounded Payments," MPRA Paper, University Library of Munich, Germany, number 90800.
• Hoppe, Eva I. & Schmitz, Patrick W., 2018, "Hidden Action and Outcome Contractibility: An Experimental Test of Moral Hazard Theory," MPRA Paper, University Library of Munich, Germany, number 95618.
• Seewald, Norbert, 2018, "Chancen und Grenzen von Leistungsanreizen in Behoerden. Macht und Ohnmacht von Leistungszahlungen und Zielvereinbarungen," Books, Rainer Hampp Verlag, number 9783957103086.
• Celik, Gorkem & Shin, Dongsoo & Strausz, Roland, 2018, "Aggregate Information and Organizational Structures," Rationality and Competition Discussion Paper Series, CRC TRR 190 Rationality and Competition, number 105, Jun.
• Fahn, Matthias & Klein, Nicolas, 2018, "Relational Contracts with Private Information On the Future Value of the Relationship," Rationality and Competition Discussion Paper Series, CRC TRR 190 Rationality and Competition, number 106, Jul.
• Lang, Matthias, 2018, "Communicating Subjective Evaluations," Rationality and Competition Discussion Paper Series, CRC TRR 190 Rationality and Competition, number 120, Oct.
• Englmaier, Florian & Fahn, Matthias, 2018, "Size Matters - \'Over\'investments in a Relational Contracting Setting," Rationality and Competition Discussion Paper Series, CRC TRR 190 Rationality and Competition, number 62, Jan.
• Mettral, Thomas, 2018, "Deterministic versus Stochastic Contracts in a Dynamic Principal-Agent Model," Rationality and Competition Discussion Paper Series, CRC TRR 190 Rationality and Competition, number 93, Apr.
• Elliot Lipnowski & Joao Ramos, 2018, "Repeated Delegation," 2018 Meeting Papers, Society for Economic Dynamics, number 1292.
• Barney Hartman-Glaser & Benjamin Hebert, 2018, "The Insurance is the Lemon: Failing to Index Contracts," 2018 Meeting Papers, Society for Economic Dynamics, number 160.
• Ana Babus & Kinda Hachem, 2018, "Markets for Financial Innovation," 2018 Meeting Papers, Society for Economic Dynamics, number 355.
• Claudia Landeo & Kathryn Spier, 2018, "Optimal Law Enforcement with Ordered Leniency," Working Papers, University of Alberta, Department of Economics, number 2018-06, Apr.
• Claudia Landeo & Kathryn Spier, 2018, "Ordered Leniency: An Experimental Study of Law Enforcement with Self-Reporting," Working Papers, University of Alberta, Department of Economics, number 2018-13, Sep.
• Corinne Langinier & Philippe Marcoul, 2018, "Subjective Performance of Patent Examiners, Implicit Contracts and Self-Funded Patent Offices," Working Papers, University of Alberta, Department of Economics, number 2018-14, Oct.
• Suting Hong & Konstantinos Serfes & Veikko Thiele, 2018, "Competition in the Venture Capital Market and the Success of Startup Companies: Theory and Evidence," School of Economics Working Paper Series, LeBow College of Business, Drexel University, number 2018-2, Feb.
• Prateek Goorha, 2018, "Contextual Contracts: On a Context-sensitive Approach to Contract Theory," Journal of Interdisciplinary Economics, , volume 30, issue 2, pages 191-209, July.
• Oindrila Dey, 2018, "Leniency, Status and Output Informativeness," Review of Market Integration, India Development Foundation, volume 10, issue 1, pages 1-18, April, DOI: 10.1177/0974929218764045.
• Giovanni Ponti & Claudio Rossetti, 2018, "Unobserved Heterogeneity in Structural Behavioral Models Using Experimental Data," CSEF Working Papers, Centre for Studies in Economics and Finance (CSEF), University of Naples, Italy, number 512, Oct.
• Thomas Mettral, 2018, "Deterministic versus stochastic contracts in a dynamic principal-agent model," Economic Theory Bulletin, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), volume 6, issue 2, pages 209-218, October, DOI: 10.1007/s40505-018-0136-9.
• Josef Schosser & Jochen Wilhelm, 2018, "Costly state verification and truthtelling: a note on the theory of debt contracts," Economic Theory Bulletin, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), volume 6, issue 2, pages 129-139, October, DOI: 10.1007/s40505-018-0137-8.
• Ram Singh, 2018, "Public–private partnerships vs. traditional contracts for highways," Indian Economic Review, Springer, volume 53, issue 1, pages 29-63, December, DOI: 10.1007/s41775-018-0032-0.
• Jong-Hee Hahn & Jinwoo Kim & Sang-Hyun Kim & Jihong Lee, 2018, "Price discrimination with loss averse consumers," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), volume 65, issue 3, pages 681-728, May, DOI: 10.1007/s00199-017-1035-2.
• Yaoyao Wu & Jinqiang Yang & Zhentao Zou, 2018, "Ambiguity sharing and the lack of relative performance evaluation," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), volume 66, issue 1, pages 141-157, July, DOI: 10.1007/s00199-017-1056-x.
• Ilan Guttman & Iván Marinovic, 2018, "Debt contracts in the presence of performance manipulation," Review of Accounting Studies, Springer, volume 23, issue 3, pages 1005-1041, September, DOI: 10.1007/s11142-018-9450-6.
• Qintao Fan & Wei Li, 2018, "Leading indicator variables and managerial incentives in a dynamic agency setting," Review of Accounting Studies, Springer, volume 23, issue 4, pages 1715-1753, December, DOI: 10.1007/s11142-018-9461-3.
• Pei-Cheng Yu, 2018, "Seemingly Exploitative Contracts," Discussion Papers, School of Economics, The University of New South Wales, number 2018-15, Oct.
• Yuriy Gorodnichenko & Tho Pham & Oleksandr Talavera, 2018, "Social media, sentiment and public opinions: Evidence from #Brexit and #USElection," Working Papers, Swansea University, School of Management, number 2018-01, Jan.
• Auster, Sarah, 2018, "Robust contracting under common value uncertainty," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, volume 13, issue 1, January.
• Moriya, Fumitoshi & Yamashita, Takuro, 2018, "Asymmetric information allocation to avoid coordination failure," TSE Working Papers, Toulouse School of Economics (TSE), number 18-941, Jul.
• Catalina Martínez & Sarah Parlane, 2020, "On the Firms’ Decision to Hire Academic Scientists," Working Papers, School of Economics, University College Dublin, number 201801, Mar.
• Urmee Khan & Martin Dumav, 2018, "Moral Hazard with Non-Additive Uncertainty: When are Actions Implementable?," Working Papers, University of California at Riverside, Department of Economics, number 201808, Apr.
• Richard N. Langlois, 2018, "The Fisher Body Case and Organizational Economics," Working papers, University of Connecticut, Department of Economics, number 2018-13, Jul.
• Paulo Fagandini, 2018, "Hunting with two bullets: moral hazard with a second chance," Nova SBE Working Paper Series, Universidade Nova de Lisboa, Nova School of Business and Economics, number wp629.
• Helmut Bester & Matthias Dahm, 2018, "Credence Goods, Costly Diagnosis and Subjective Evaluation," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, volume 128, issue 611, pages 1367-1394, June, DOI: 10.1111/ecoj.12472.
• Georg Nöldeke & Larry Samuelson, 2018, "The Implementation Duality," Econometrica, Econometric Society, volume 86, issue 4, pages 1283-1324, July, DOI: 10.3982/ECTA13307.
• Pedro Gete & Juan-Pedro Gómez, 2018, "Dealing with Overleverage: Restricting Leverage vs. Restricting Variable Compensation," Quarterly Journal of Finance (QJF), World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd., volume 8, issue 01, pages 1-29, March, DOI: 10.1142/S2010139218500015.
• Cici, Gjergji & Kempf, Alexander & Peitzmeier, Claudia, 2019, "Knowledge spillovers in the mutual fund industry through labor mobility," CFR Working Papers, University of Cologne, Centre for Financial Research (CFR), number 18-04, revised 2019.
• Hoffmann, Florian & Inderst, Roman & Turlo, Sergey, 2018, "Regulating Cancellation Rights with Consumer Experimentation," EconStor Preprints, ZBW - Leibniz Information Centre for Economics, number 253659.
• Bester, Helmut & Lang, Matthias & Li, Jianpei, 2018, "Signaling versus costly information acquisition," Discussion Papers, Free University Berlin, School of Business & Economics, number 2018/11.
• Hoffmann, Florian & Inderst, Roman & Opp, Marcus M., 2018, "Only time will tell: A theory of deferred compensation," SAFE Working Paper Series, Leibniz Institute for Financial Research SAFE, number 218, DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.3232708.

2017

• Yaping Shan, 2017, "Incentives for Research Agents and Performance-vested Equity-based Compensation," School of Economics and Public Policy Working Papers, University of Adelaide, School of Economics and Public Policy, number 2017-15, Dec.
• James Feyrer & Erin T. Mansur & Bruce Sacerdote, 2017, "Geographic Dispersion of Economic Shocks: Evidence from the Fracking Revolution," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, volume 107, issue 4, pages 1313-1334, April.
• Avinatan Hassidim & Assaf Romm & Ran I. Shorrer, 2017, "Redesigning the Israeli Psychology Master's Match," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, volume 107, issue 5, pages 205-209, May.
• John William Hatfield & Scott Duke Kominers & Alexander Westkamp, 2017, "Stable and Strategy-Proof Matching with Flexible Allotments," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, volume 107, issue 5, pages 214-219, May.
• Sandro Ambuehl & Axel Ockenfels, 2017, "The Ethics of Incentivizing the Uninformed: A Vignette Study," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, volume 107, issue 5, pages 91-95, May.
• Roland Strausz, 2017, "A Theory of Crowdfunding: A Mechanism Design Approach with Demand Uncertainty and Moral Hazard," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, volume 107, issue 6, pages 1430-1476, June.
• Oliver Hart, 2017, "Incomplete Contracts and Control," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, volume 107, issue 7, pages 1731-1752, July.
• Bengt Holmström, 2017, "Pay for Performance and Beyond," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, volume 107, issue 7, pages 1753-1777, July.
• Özlem Bedre-Defolie & Gary Biglaiser, 2017, "Contracts as a Barrier to Entry in Markets with Nonpivotal Buyers," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, volume 107, issue 7, pages 2041-2071, July.
• Luis Garicano & Luis Rayo, 2017, "Relational Knowledge Transfers," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, volume 107, issue 9, pages 2695-2730, September.
• Jin Li & Niko Matouschek & Michael Powell, 2017, "Power Dynamics in Organizations," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, volume 9, issue 1, pages 217-241, February.
• Tommy Staahl Gabrielsen & Bjørn Olav Johansen, 2017, "Resale Price Maintenance with Secret Contracts and Retail Service Externalities," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, volume 9, issue 1, pages 63-87, February.
• Robert W. Staiger & Alan O. Sykes, 2017, "How Important Can the Non-violation Clause Be for the GATT/WTO?," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, volume 9, issue 2, pages 149-187, May.
• Roberto Burguet, 2017, "Procurement Design with Corruption," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, volume 9, issue 2, pages 315-341, May.
• Christopher P. Chambers & M. Bumin Yenmez, 2017, "Choice and Matching," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, volume 9, issue 3, pages 126-147, August.
• Mostafa Beshkar & Eric W. Bond, 2017, "Cap and Escape in Trade Agreements," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, volume 9, issue 4, pages 171-202, November.
• Marianna Belloc & Samuel Bowles, 2017, "Persistence and Change in Culture and Institutions under Autarchy, Trade, and Factor Mobility," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, volume 9, issue 4, pages 245-276, November.
• Thomas Hellmann & Veikko Thiele, 2017, "Partner Uncertainty and the Dynamic Boundary of the Firm," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, volume 9, issue 4, pages 277-302, November.
• Ján Palguta & Filip Pertold, 2017, "Manipulation of Procurement Contracts: Evidence from the Introduction of Discretionary Thresholds," American Economic Journal: Economic Policy, American Economic Association, volume 9, issue 2, pages 293-315, May.