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Optimal Retail Contracts With Return Policies

Author

Listed:
  • Ying-Ju Chen
  • Zhengqing Gui
  • Ernst-Ludwig von Thadden
  • Xiaojian Zhao

Abstract

A central problem in vertical relationships is to minimize the mismatch between supply and demand. This paper studies a problem of contracting between a manufacturer and a retailer who privately observes the retail demand materialized after the contracting stage. Cash payments are bounded above by the retailer’s revenue, while the return of unsold inventories is bounded above by the order quantity net of the actual quantity sold. While the majority of the papers in the literature takes the contractual forms as given and investigates the consequences that these contracts may lead to in various contexts, without assuming any functional form of contracts, we show that the optimal contract can be implemented by a buy-back contract: the manufacturer requests an upfront payment from the retailer and buys back the unsold inventories at the retailer’s salvage value. The optimality of buy-back contracts is robust to several scenarios including competition between retailers.

Suggested Citation

  • Ying-Ju Chen & Zhengqing Gui & Ernst-Ludwig von Thadden & Xiaojian Zhao, 2021. "Optimal Retail Contracts With Return Policies," CRC TR 224 Discussion Paper Series crctr224_2021_292, University of Bonn and University of Mannheim, Germany.
    • Handle: RePEc:bon:boncrc:crctr224_2021_292
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    File URL: https://www.crctr224.de/research/discussion-papers/archive/dp292
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    Cited by:

    1. Wei Zhang & Long Gao & Mohammad Zolghadr & Dawei Jian & Mohsen ElHafsi, 2023. "Dynamic incentives for sustainable contract farming," Production and Operations Management, Production and Operations Management Society, vol. 32(7), pages 2049-2067, July.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Retail contracts; return policies; buy-back contracts; incentive problems; limited liability;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
    • D86 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Economics of Contract Law
    • L42 - Industrial Organization - - Antitrust Issues and Policies - - - Vertical Restraints; Resale Price Maintenance; Quantity Discounts
    • L60 - Industrial Organization - - Industry Studies: Manufacturing - - - General

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