IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/eee/reveco/v94y2024ics1059056024003368.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Socially responsible investment: Ex-ante contracting or ex-post bargaining?

Author

Listed:
  • Adachi-Sato, Meg

Abstract

This paper shows how a socially and environmentally aware firm principal can motivate a profit-oriented manager to pursue positive environmental, social, and governance (ESG) outcomes. In the model, the manager produces a verifiable output that creates social costs but also engages in an unverifiable output that promotes ESG. The paper demonstrates that an ex-post bargaining contract is preferred to an ex-ante commitment contract if the unverifiable output substantially improves ESG or if there exist substantial social costs. The paper also examines how social impact bonds can be more effective than short-term debt when used to finance social programs.

Suggested Citation

  • Adachi-Sato, Meg, 2024. "Socially responsible investment: Ex-ante contracting or ex-post bargaining?," International Review of Economics & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 94(C).
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:reveco:v:94:y:2024:i:c:s1059056024003368
    DOI: 10.1016/j.iref.2024.05.038
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S1059056024003368
    Download Restriction: Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only
    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1016/j.iref.2024.05.038?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to

    for a different version of it.

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Fudenberg, Drew & Holmstrom, Bengt & Milgrom, Paul, 1990. "Short-term contracts and long-term agency relationships," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 51(1), pages 1-31, June.
    2. Heinkel, Robert & Kraus, Alan & Zechner, Josef, 2001. "The Effect of Green Investment on Corporate Behavior," Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, Cambridge University Press, vol. 36(4), pages 431-449, December.
    3. Meg Adachi-Sato, 2018. "Stock vesting conditions, control benefits and managerial replacement," Canadian Journal of Economics, Canadian Economics Association, vol. 51(1), pages 275-313, February.
    4. Roman Inderst & Holger M. Mueller, 2010. "CEO Replacement Under Private Information," The Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 23(8), pages 2935-2969, August.
    5. Farrell, Joseph & Shapiro, Carl, 1989. "Optimal Contracts with Lock-In," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 79(1), pages 51-68, March.
    6. Holmstrom, Bengt & Milgrom, Paul, 1991. "Multitask Principal-Agent Analyses: Incentive Contracts, Asset Ownership, and Job Design," The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 7(0), pages 24-52, Special I.
    7. Bernheim, B Douglas & Whinston, Michael D, 1998. "Incomplete Contracts and Strategic Ambiguity," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 88(4), pages 902-932, September.
    8. Rajan, Raghuram G, 1992. "Insiders and Outsiders: The Choice between Informed and Arm's-Length Debt," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 47(4), pages 1367-1400, September.
    9. Rey, Patrick & Salanie, Bernard, 1990. "Long-term, Short-term and Renegotiation: On the Value of Commitment in Contracting," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 58(3), pages 597-619, May.
    10. Tortorice, Daniel L. & Bloom, David E. & Kirby, Paige & Regan, John, 2020. "A Theory of Social Impact Bonds," IZA Discussion Papers 13431, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
    11. Mark V. Pauly, 2017. "Social Impact Bonds: New Product or New Package?," The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 33(4), pages 718-760.
    12. Bhagwan Chowdhry & Shaun William Davies & Brian Waters, 2019. "Investing for Impact," The Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 32(3), pages 864-904.
    13. Laux, Volker, 2012. "Stock option vesting conditions, CEO turnover, and myopic investment," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 106(3), pages 513-526.
    14. John Morgan & Justin Tumlinson, 2019. "Corporate Provision of Public Goods," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 65(10), pages 4489-4504, October.
    15. Kazuya Kamiya & Meg Adachi-Sato, 2013. "Multiperiod Contract Problems with VeriÖable and UnveriÖable Outputs," CIRJE F-Series CIRJE-F-896, CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo.
    16. Berry, Tammy K. & Bizjak, John M. & Lemmon, Michael L. & Naveen, Lalitha, 2006. "Organizational complexity and CEO labor markets: Evidence from diversified firms," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 12(4), pages 797-817, September.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Meg Adachi-Sato, 2021. "Socially Responsible Investment: Ex-ante Contracting or Ex-post Bargaining?," Discussion Paper Series DP2021-20, Research Institute for Economics & Business Administration, Kobe University, revised Feb 2023.
    2. Meg Adachi-Sato, 2021. "Contract Duration and Socially Responsible Investment," Discussion Paper Series DP2021-14, Research Institute for Economics & Business Administration, Kobe University.
    3. Mitkov, Yuliyan, 2024. "A theory of debt maturity and innovation," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 218(C).
    4. Allen, Franklin & Barbalau, Adelina, 2024. "Security design: A review," Journal of Financial Intermediation, Elsevier, vol. 60(C).
    5. Meg Adachi-Sato, 2010. "Insular Decision Making in the Board Room: Why Boards Retain and Hire Substandard CEOs," CIRJE F-Series CIRJE-F-710, CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo.
    6. Meg Adachi-Sato, 2015. "Insular Decision Making in the Board Room: Why Boards Retain and Hire Substandard CEOs," Manchester School, University of Manchester, vol. 83(2), pages 183-216, March.
    7. Alex Edmans & Xavier Gabaix, 2016. "Executive Compensation: A Modern Primer," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 54(4), pages 1232-1287, December.
    8. Macera, Rosario, 2018. "Intertemporal incentives under loss aversion," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 178(C), pages 551-594.
    9. Christian Gollier & Sébastien Pouget, 2022. "Investment Strategies and Corporate Behaviour with Socially Responsible Investors: A Theory of Active Ownership," Economica, London School of Economics and Political Science, vol. 89(356), pages 997-1023, October.
    10. Anja Schöttner & Veikko Thiele, 2010. "Promotion Tournaments and Individual Performance Pay," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 19(3), pages 699-731, September.
    11. Nieken, Petra & Schmitz, Patrick W., 2012. "Repeated moral hazard and contracts with memory: A laboratory experiment," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 75(2), pages 1000-1008.
    12. Sunil Dutta & Stefan Reichelstein, 2000. "Controlling Investment Decisions: Hurdle Rates and Intertemporal Cost Allocation," CESifo Working Paper Series 354, CESifo.
    13. Dirk Sliwka, 2007. "Trust as a Signal of a Social Norm and the Hidden Costs of Incentive Schemes," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 97(3), pages 999-1012, June.
    14. Laffont, Jean-Jacques, 1994. "The New Economics of Regulation Ten Years After," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 62(3), pages 507-537, May.
    15. Oriana Bandiera, 1999. "On the Structure of Tenancy contracts: Theory and Evidence fron 19th Century Rural Sicily," STICERD - Development Economics Papers - From 2008 this series has been superseded by Economic Organisation and Public Policy Discussion Papers 19, Suntory and Toyota International Centres for Economics and Related Disciplines, LSE.
    16. Inderst, Roman & Mueller, Holger M., 2008. "Bank capital structure and credit decisions," Journal of Financial Intermediation, Elsevier, vol. 17(3), pages 295-314, July.
    17. Zhao, Rui R., 2006. "Renegotiation-proof contract in repeated agency," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 131(1), pages 263-281, November.
    18. Sami, Hind, 2009. "Random monitoring in financing relationships," The Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 49(2), pages 239-252, May.
    19. James M. Malcomson, 2012. "Relational Incentive Contracts [The Handbook of Organizational Economics]," Introductory Chapters,, Princeton University Press.
    20. Cronqvist, Henrik & Fahlenbrach, Rüdiger, 2013. "CEO contract design: How do strong principals do it?," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 108(3), pages 659-674.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    ;
    ;
    ;
    ;
    ;
    ;

    JEL classification:

    • D86 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Economics of Contract Law
    • G11 - Financial Economics - - General Financial Markets - - - Portfolio Choice; Investment Decisions
    • G23 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Non-bank Financial Institutions; Financial Instruments; Institutional Investors
    • M12 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting; Personnel Economics - - Business Administration - - - Personnel Management; Executives; Executive Compensation
    • M14 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting; Personnel Economics - - Business Administration - - - Corporate Culture; Diversity; Social Responsibility

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:eee:reveco:v:94:y:2024:i:c:s1059056024003368. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Catherine Liu (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/620165 .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.