CEO Replacement Under Private Information
This article examines the optimal CEO compensation and replacement policy when the CEO is privately informed about the firm's continuation value under his leadership. Ex ante moral hazard implies that the CEO must receive ex post quasi rents, which endogenously biases him toward continuation. Our model shows that to induce "bad" CEOs to quit, it may be best to make continuation costly (through steep incentive pay) rather than simply rewarding quitting (through severance pay). Incentive pay makes continuation attractive for "good" CEOs, who can expect high future on-the-job pay, but unattractive for "bad" CEOs, who may instead prefer to take their outside option payoff. Our model generates novel empirical implications that jointly relate CEO compensation and turnover to corporate governance, firm size, cash-flow risk, and the informativeness of performance measurement. The Author 2010. Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of The Society for Financial Studies. All rights reserved. For Permissions, please e-mail: firstname.lastname@example.org., Oxford University Press.
Volume (Year): 23 (2010)
Issue (Month): 8 (August)
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