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Control rights in complex partnerships revisited

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  • Takasago, Takao

Abstract

We extend Francesconi and Muthoo (2011) by allowing parities to have different bargaining powers and applying the generalized Nash bargaining solution. We claim that the relative bargaining power plays an important role in determining the optimal allocation of authority. We obtain the generalized results and point to the possibility that the introduction of generalized Nash bargaining may lead to opposite conclusions. Moreover, our model encompasses the case of pure public goods and can also be regarded as a generalization of Schmitz (2013).

Suggested Citation

  • Takasago, Takao, 2019. "Control rights in complex partnerships revisited," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 183(C), pages 1-1.
  • Handle: RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:183:y:2019:i:c:35
    DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2019.108587
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Hart, Oliver & Moore, John, 1990. "Property Rights and the Nature of the Firm," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 98(6), pages 1119-1158, December.
    2. Muthoo,Abhinay, 1999. "Bargaining Theory with Applications," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521576475.
    3. Marco Francesconi & Abhinay Muthoo, 2011. "Control Rights In Complex Partnerships," Journal of the European Economic Association, European Economic Association, vol. 9(3), pages 551-589, June.
    4. Schmitz, Patrick W., 2013. "Incomplete contracts and optimal ownership of public goods," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 118(1), pages 94-96.
    5. Grossman, Sanford J & Hart, Oliver D, 1986. "The Costs and Benefits of Ownership: A Theory of Vertical and Lateral Integration," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 94(4), pages 691-719, August.
    6. Timothy Besley & Maitreesh Ghatak, 2001. "Government Versus Private Ownership of Public Goods," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 116(4), pages 1343-1372.
    7. Hart, Oliver, 1995. "Firms, Contracts, and Financial Structure," OUP Catalogue, Oxford University Press, number 9780198288817.
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Generalized Nash bargaining power; Control rights; Incomplete contracts;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D23 - Microeconomics - - Production and Organizations - - - Organizational Behavior; Transaction Costs; Property Rights
    • D86 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Economics of Contract Law
    • H41 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods - - - Public Goods
    • L31 - Industrial Organization - - Nonprofit Organizations and Public Enterprise - - - Nonprofit Institutions; NGOs; Social Entrepreneurship

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