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Multiple Lenders, Strategic Default, and Covenants

Author

Listed:
  • Andrea Attar

    (TSE-R - Toulouse School of Economics - UT Capitole - Université Toulouse Capitole - Comue de Toulouse - Communauté d'universités et établissements de Toulouse - INRA - Institut National de la Recherche Agronomique - EHESS - École des hautes études en sciences sociales - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique, TSM - Toulouse School of Management Research - UT Capitole - Université Toulouse Capitole - Comue de Toulouse - Communauté d'universités et établissements de Toulouse - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - TSM - Toulouse School of Management - UT Capitole - Université Toulouse Capitole - Comue de Toulouse - Communauté d'universités et établissements de Toulouse)

  • Catherine Casamatta

    (TSE-R - Toulouse School of Economics - UT Capitole - Université Toulouse Capitole - Comue de Toulouse - Communauté d'universités et établissements de Toulouse - INRA - Institut National de la Recherche Agronomique - EHESS - École des hautes études en sciences sociales - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique, TSM - Toulouse School of Management Research - UT Capitole - Université Toulouse Capitole - Comue de Toulouse - Communauté d'universités et établissements de Toulouse - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - TSM - Toulouse School of Management - UT Capitole - Université Toulouse Capitole - Comue de Toulouse - Communauté d'universités et établissements de Toulouse)

  • Arnold Chassagnon

    (PSE - Paris School of Economics - UP1 - Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne - ENS-PSL - École normale supérieure - Paris - PSL - Université Paris Sciences et Lettres - EHESS - École des hautes études en sciences sociales - ENPC - École nationale des ponts et chaussées - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - INRAE - Institut National de Recherche pour l’Agriculture, l’Alimentation et l’Environnement, PJSE - Paris Jourdan Sciences Economiques - UP1 - Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne - ENS-PSL - École normale supérieure - Paris - PSL - Université Paris Sciences et Lettres - INRA - Institut National de la Recherche Agronomique - EHESS - École des hautes études en sciences sociales - ENPC - École nationale des ponts et chaussées - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique)

  • Jean-Paul Décamps

    (LBNC - Laboratoire Biens, Normes, Contrats - AU - Avignon Université, TSM - Toulouse School of Management Research - UT Capitole - Université Toulouse Capitole - Comue de Toulouse - Communauté d'universités et établissements de Toulouse - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - TSM - Toulouse School of Management - UT Capitole - Université Toulouse Capitole - Comue de Toulouse - Communauté d'universités et établissements de Toulouse)

Abstract

We study capital markets in which investors compete by designing financial contracts to control an entrepreneur's ability to side trade and default on multiple loans. We show that covenants may have anticompetitive effects: in particular, they prevent investors from providing additional funds and reduce the entrepreneur's investment capacity. As a result, a large number of inefficient allocations is supported at equilibrium. We propose a subsidy mechanism similar to guarantee funds in financial markets that efficiently controls the entrepreneur's side trading and sustains the competitive allocation as the unique equilibrium one.
(This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)

Suggested Citation

  • Andrea Attar & Catherine Casamatta & Arnold Chassagnon & Jean-Paul Décamps, 2019. "Multiple Lenders, Strategic Default, and Covenants," PSE-Ecole d'économie de Paris (Postprint) halshs-02282023, HAL.
    • Handle: RePEc:hal:pseptp:halshs-02282023
    DOI: 10.1257/mic.20170189
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    Cited by:

    1. Degryse, H.A. & Ioannidou, V. & von Schedvin, E.L., 2011. "On the Non-Exclusivity of Loan Contracts : An Empirical Investigation," Discussion Paper 2011-130, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
    2. Chodorow-Reich, Gabriel & Darmouni, Olivier & Luck, Stephan & Plosser, Matthew, 2022. "Bank liquidity provision across the firm size distribution," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 144(3), pages 908-932.
    3. Green, Daniel & Liu, Ernest, 2021. "A dynamic theory of multiple borrowing," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 139(2), pages 389-404.
    4. Andrea Attar & Catherine Casamatta & Arnold Chassagnon & Jean Paul Décamps, 2019. "Contracting Sequentially with Multiple Lenders: The Role of Menus," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 51(4), pages 977-990, June.
    5. Claude Fluet & Paolo G. Garella, 2014. "Debt Rescheduling with Multiple Lenders: Relying on the Information of Others," Economica, London School of Economics and Political Science, vol. 81(324), pages 698-720, October.
    6. Campello, Murillo & Connolly, Robert A. & Kankanhalli, Gaurav & Steiner, Eva, 2022. "Do real estate values boost corporate borrowing? Evidence from contract-level data," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 144(2), pages 611-644.

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • D21 - Microeconomics - - Production and Organizations - - - Firm Behavior: Theory
    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
    • D86 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Economics of Contract Law
    • G21 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Banks; Other Depository Institutions; Micro Finance Institutions; Mortgages
    • G32 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Financing Policy; Financial Risk and Risk Management; Capital and Ownership Structure; Value of Firms; Goodwill

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