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On the Non-Exclusivity of Loan Contracts : An Empirical Investigation

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  • Degryse, H.A.

    (Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management)

  • Ioannidou, V.

    (Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management)

  • von Schedvin, E.L.

    (Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management)

Abstract

Credit contracts are non-exclusive. A string of theoretical papers shows that nonexclusivity generates important negative contractual externalities. Employing a unique dataset, we identify how the contractual externality stemming from the non-exclusivity of credit contracts affects credit supply. In particular, using internal information on a creditor?s willingness to lend, we find that a creditor reduces its loan supply when a borrower initiates a loan at another creditor. Consistent with the theoretical literature on contractual externalities, the effect is more pronounced the larger the loans from the other creditor. We also find that the initial creditor?s willingness to lend does not change if its existing and future loans retain seniority over the other creditors? loans and are secured with assets whose value is high and stable over time.
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  • Degryse, H.A. & Ioannidou, V. & von Schedvin, E.L., 2011. "On the Non-Exclusivity of Loan Contracts : An Empirical Investigation," Other publications TiSEM f079a687-1e69-4c1d-81c0-e, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
    • Handle: RePEc:tiu:tiutis:f079a687-1e69-4c1d-81c0-ed7fb2de40fe
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    Cited by:

    1. Cerqueiro, G.M. & Ongena, S. & Roszbach, K., 2011. "Collateralization, Bank Loan Rates and Monitoring : Evidence from a Natural Experiment," Discussion Paper 2011-087, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
    2. Ono, Arito & Hasumi, Ryo & Hirata, Hideaki, 2014. "Differentiated use of small business credit scoring by relationship lenders and transactional lenders: Evidence from firm–bank matched data in Japan," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 42(C), pages 371-380.
    3. Konstantin Kosenko & Noam Michelson, 2018. "It Takes More than Two to Tango: Understanding the Dynamics behind Multiple Bank Lending and its Implications," Bank of Israel Working Papers 2018.11, Bank of Israel.
    4. Andrea Attar & Catherine Casamatta & Arnold Chassagnon & Jean-Paul Décamps, 2019. "Multiple Lenders, Strategic Default, and Covenants," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 11(2), pages 98-130, May.
    5. Olivier De Jonghe & Hans Dewachter & Klaas Mulier & Steven Ongena & Glenn Schepens, 2020. "Some Borrowers Are More Equal than Others: Bank Funding Shocks and Credit Reallocation [A theory of systemic risk and design of prudential bank regulation]," Review of Finance, European Finance Association, vol. 24(1), pages 1-43.
    6. Andrea Attar & Catherine Casamatta & Arnold Chassagnon & Jean Paul Décamps, 2019. "Contracting Sequentially with Multiple Lenders: The Role of Menus," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 51(4), pages 977-990, June.
    7. Jason Allen & H. Evren Damar & David Martinez-Miera, 2016. "Consumer Bankruptcy, Bank Mergers, and Information," Review of Finance, European Finance Association, vol. 20(4), pages 1289-1320.
    8. Andrea Attar & Catherine Casamatta & Arnold Chassagnon & Jean Paul Décamps, 2017. "On the Role of Menus in Sequential Contracting: a Multiple Lending Example," CEIS Research Paper 409, Tor Vergata University, CEIS, revised 13 Jul 2017.
    9. Salvatore Piccolo & Giancarlo Spagnolo, 2014. "Debt, Managers and Cartels," CSEF Working Papers 365, Centre for Studies in Economics and Finance (CSEF), University of Naples, Italy.
    10. Diana Bonfim & Gil Nogueira & Steven Ongena, 2016. "Sorry, We're Closed: Loan Conditions When Bank Branches Close and Firms Transfer to Another Bank," Working Papers w201607, Banco de Portugal, Economics and Research Department.
    11. Natacha Postel-Vinay, 2014. "Debt Dilution in 1920s America: Lighting the Fuse of a Mortgage Crisis," Working Papers 0053, European Historical Economics Society (EHES).
    12. Carbo-Valverde, Santiago & Degryse, Hans & Rodríguez-Fernández, Francisco, 2015. "The impact of securitization on credit rationing: Empirical evidence," Journal of Financial Stability, Elsevier, vol. 20(C), pages 36-50.
    13. Ongena, Steven & Braggion, Fabio, 2013. "A Century of Firm ? Bank Relationships: Did Banking Sector Deregulation Spur Firms to Add Banks and Borrow More?," CEPR Discussion Papers 9695, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    14. Thorsten Beck & Vasso Ioannidou & Larissa Schäfer, 2018. "Foreigners vs. Natives: Bank Lending Technologies and Loan Pricing," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 64(8), pages 3792-3820, August.
    15. P. I. Omede, 2020. "A Tale of Two Markets: How Lower-end Borrowers Are Punished for Bank Regulatory Failures in Nigeria," Journal of Consumer Policy, Springer, vol. 43(3), pages 519-542, September.

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    JEL classification:

    • G21 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Banks; Other Depository Institutions; Micro Finance Institutions; Mortgages
    • G34 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Mergers; Acquisitions; Restructuring; Corporate Governance
    • L13 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
    • L14 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Transactional Relationships; Contracts and Reputation

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