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Strategic Delegation in Two-Sided Platforms: Tool or Trap, Conditional on Network-Effect Symmetry

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  • Pan, Xiaojun

Abstract

Can observable managerial incentive contracts substitute for price transparency as a commitment device in two-sided platforms? Extending the framework of Hagiu and Halaburda (2014), we show that under monopoly, two-dimensional public delegation precisely reproduces the transparent-equilibrium allocation. Under Hotelling competition, a network-effect symmetry threshold partitions the parameter space: in the tool region (approximately symmetric network effects), delegation Pareto-dominates no delegation; in the trap region (highly asymmetric), the classical Fershtman-Judd dilemma re-emerges. Total social welfare under delegation equals that under transparency in both regions. Policy implication: in asymmetric markets, restricting asymmetric incentive contracts can resolve the dilemma among platform owners, although the restriction lowers consumer and total welfare relative to the unrestricted equilibrium.

Suggested Citation

  • Pan, Xiaojun, 2026. "Strategic Delegation in Two-Sided Platforms: Tool or Trap, Conditional on Network-Effect Symmetry," EconStor Preprints 341118, ZBW - Leibniz Information Centre for Economics.
    • Handle: RePEc:zbw:esprep:341118
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Keywords

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    JEL classification:

    • D43 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection
    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
    • D86 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Economics of Contract Law
    • L13 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
    • L86 - Industrial Organization - - Industry Studies: Services - - - Information and Internet Services; Computer Software

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