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Governance and Regulation of Platforms

In: Handbook of New Institutional Economics

Author

Listed:
  • Martin Peitz

    (University of Mannheim and MaCCI)

Abstract

In this chapter, we discuss how platforms manage the interaction between various users. First, we discuss and exemplify governance decisions by platforms that affect access and interactions of users regarding a platform service. Here, we investigate the choice of price structure and the choice of non-price strategies. We also address the horizontal and vertical scope of these platforms. Second, we consider platform decisions that generate spillovers to other platforms or channels, and we explore private incentives and welfare effects. Third, we discuss the role of government regulation in a broad sense, that is, the laws and regulations that constrain platforms and shape their incentives regarding their governance decisions. Emphasis is given to interventions against anticompetitive conduct and practices that may lead to consumer harm.

Suggested Citation

  • Martin Peitz, 2025. "Governance and Regulation of Platforms," Springer Books, in: Claude Ménard & Mary M. Shirley (ed.), Handbook of New Institutional Economics, edition 0, chapter 23, pages 565-593, Springer.
    • Handle: RePEc:spr:sprchp:978-3-031-50810-3_23
    DOI: 10.1007/978-3-031-50810-3_23
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    Keywords

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    JEL classification:

    • L12 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Monopoly; Monopolization Strategies
    • L13 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
    • L41 - Industrial Organization - - Antitrust Issues and Policies - - - Monopolization; Horizontal Anticompetitive Practices
    • L42 - Industrial Organization - - Antitrust Issues and Policies - - - Vertical Restraints; Resale Price Maintenance; Quantity Discounts
    • D42 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Monopoly
    • D47 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Market Design
    • K21 - Law and Economics - - Regulation and Business Law - - - Antitrust Law
    • K23 - Law and Economics - - Regulation and Business Law - - - Regulated Industries and Administrative Law
    • M21 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting; Personnel Economics - - Business Economics - - - Business Economics

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