Why Do Platforms Charge Proportional Fees? Commitment and Seller Participation
Download full text from publisher
References listed on IDEAS
- Morton I. Kamien & Yair Tauman, 1986.
"Fees Versus Royalties and the Private Value of a Patent,"
The Quarterly Journal of Economics,
Oxford University Press, vol. 101(3), pages 471-491.
- Morton I. Kamien & Yair Tauman, 1984. "Fees Versus Royalties and the Private Value of a Patent," Discussion Papers 583, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
- repec:eee:jouret:v:87:y:2011:i:3:p:332-344 is not listed on IDEAS
- Hagiu Andrei, 2007. "Merchant or Two-Sided Platform?," Review of Network Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 6(2), pages 1-19, June.
- Jean‐Charles Rochet & Jean Tirole, 2006. "Two‐sided markets: a progress report," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 37(3), pages 645-667, September.
- Miao Chun-Hui, 2014. "Do Card Users Benefit From the Use of Proportional Fees?," Review of Network Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 12(3), pages 323-341, January.
- Wang, X. Henry, 1998. "Fee versus royalty licensing in a Cournot duopoly model," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 60(1), pages 55-62, July.
- Andrei Hagiu, 2009. "Two-Sided Platforms: Product Variety and Pricing Structures," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 18(4), pages 1011-1043, December.
- repec:rje:randje:v:37:y:2006:3:p:720-737 is not listed on IDEAS
- Oz Shy & Zhu Wang, 2011. "Why Do Payment Card Networks Charge Proportional Fees?," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 101(4), pages 1575-1590, June.
- Sen, Debapriya, 2005. "Fee versus royalty reconsidered," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 53(1), pages 141-147, October.
CitationsCitations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
- Zhu Wang & Julian Wright, 2012. "Ad-valorem platform fees and efficient price discrimination," Working Paper 12-08, Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond.
- Niedermayer Andras, 2015. "Does a Platform Monopolist Want Competition?," Review of Network Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 14(1), pages 1-44, March.
- Wismer, Sebastian, 2013.
"Intermediated vs. Direct Sales and a No-Discrimination Rule,"
Annual Conference 2013 (Duesseldorf): Competition Policy and Regulation in a Global Economic Order
79999, Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association.
- Sebastian Wismer, 2013. "Intermediated vs. Direct Sales and a No-Discrimination Rule," Working Papers 131, Bavarian Graduate Program in Economics (BGPE).
- repec:fip:fedreq:00062 is not listed on IDEAS
- repec:bla:randje:v:48:y:2017:i:2:p:467-484 is not listed on IDEAS
- Niedermayer, Andreas, 2015. "Does a Platform Monopolist Want Competition?," Discussion Paper Series of SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems 523, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich.
More about this item
KeywordsIntermediation; Platform Tariff; Hold-Up Problem;
- D40 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - General
- L14 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Transactional Relationships; Contracts and Reputation
- L81 - Industrial Organization - - Industry Studies: Services - - - Retail and Wholesale Trade; e-Commerce
StatisticsAccess and download statistics
All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:bav:wpaper:115_mutherswismer. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Frederik Wiynck). General contact details of provider: http://edirc.repec.org/data/vierlde.html .
If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.
If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.
Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.