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Highway to sell: How to renew concessions if you want it

Author

Listed:
  • Bontems, Philippe
  • Calmette, Marie-Françoise
  • Martimort, David

Abstract

Motivated by the forthcoming terminations of most highways concessions in France, we propose a versatile model of dynamic regulation and contract renewals that describes a long-term relationship between the public authority and an incumbent operator with private information about its costs that may face potential entrants. We discuss various issues including the nature of discriminatory biases towards entrants, their consequences on investments, the public or private nature of the management of concessions, the role of the operator’s financial constraints, the consequences of allotments. So doing, we isolate a few principles that should guide policy-makers when deciding upon concession renewals.

Suggested Citation

  • Bontems, Philippe & Calmette, Marie-Françoise & Martimort, David, 2026. "Highway to sell: How to renew concessions if you want it," Economics of Transportation, Elsevier, vol. 45(C).
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:ecotra:v:45:y:2026:i:c:s2212012226000018
    DOI: 10.1016/j.ecotra.2026.100447
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    JEL classification:

    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
    • D86 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Economics of Contract Law
    • L51 - Industrial Organization - - Regulation and Industrial Policy - - - Economics of Regulation
    • L91 - Industrial Organization - - Industry Studies: Transportation and Utilities - - - Transportation: General
    • L98 - Industrial Organization - - Industry Studies: Transportation and Utilities - - - Government Policy

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