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Robust participation incentives in dynamic kidney exchange

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  • Miralles, Antonio
  • Piccione, Erica

Abstract

Robustness to plausible distributions of outcomes helps rationalize straightforward participation incentives for Compatible patient–donor Pairs in dynamic kidney exchange programs. The CP faces ambiguity on the distribution of outcomes in every matching round and evaluates participation conditions – minimum guaranteed quality and committed number of rounds before fallback – according to every plausible distribution. When the decay of the donor’s organ quality between rounds is negligible, the ex-ante and ex-post individually rational socially optimal contract involves a minimum guarantee exactly equal to the fallback option and an unlimited, self-enforced stay at the pool. The model also easily explains that no contract can attract a CP with sufficiently high reservation value to the exchange pool.

Suggested Citation

  • Miralles, Antonio & Piccione, Erica, 2026. "Robust participation incentives in dynamic kidney exchange," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 263(C).
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:263:y:2026:i:c:s016517652600128x
    DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2026.112934
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    JEL classification:

    • D04 - Microeconomics - - General - - - Microeconomic Policy: Formulation; Implementation; Evaluation
    • D86 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Economics of Contract Law
    • D91 - Microeconomics - - Micro-Based Behavioral Economics - - - Role and Effects of Psychological, Emotional, Social, and Cognitive Factors on Decision Making
    • I18 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Health - - - Government Policy; Regulation; Public Health

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