Author
Listed:
- David Bardey
(UNIANDES - Universidad de los Andes [Bogota])
- Philippe de Donder
(TSE-R - Toulouse School of Economics - UT Capitole - Université Toulouse Capitole - Comue de Toulouse - Communauté d'universités et établissements de Toulouse - EHESS - École des hautes études en sciences sociales - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - INRAE - Institut National de Recherche pour l’Agriculture, l’Alimentation et l’Environnement)
- Vera Zaporozhets
(TSE-R - Toulouse School of Economics - UT Capitole - Université Toulouse Capitole - Comue de Toulouse - Communauté d'universités et établissements de Toulouse - EHESS - École des hautes études en sciences sociales - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - INRAE - Institut National de Recherche pour l’Agriculture, l’Alimentation et l’Environnement)
Abstract
This survey examines the economic literature on the incentives that shape both the use and the development of diagnostic tests, with a particular focus on companion (biomarker) tests central to precision medicine. Misdiagnosis, underdiagnosis, and overdiagnosis represent a substantial global burden, driving healthcare costs and adverse patient outcomes. The study synthesizes theoretical, empirical, and experimental evidence to assess how healthcare providers' decisions regarding diagnostic tests are influenced by payment schemes, altruism, and time constraints. Fee-for-service arrangements are shown to encourage excessive testing, while capitation and salary-based contracts help contain costs, though sometimes at the expense of quality. Physicians' non-monetary motivations, such as altruism and reputational concerns, interact with financial incentives in complex ways, occasionally leading to unintended consequences such as undertesting. From a normative perspective, the literature highlights the trade-offs inherent in reimbursement design: mandating even costless diagnostic tests is not always optimal, and greater altruism does not necessarily enhance welfare. Current practices, such as reimbursing biomarker tests separately from associated treatments in the U.S., are criticized for discouraging their adoption. At the industry level, the survey explores incentives for developing innovative tests. Pre-approval companion tests can improve drug approval prospects and justify higher prices, whereas post-approval test development faces weaker incentives due to reduced market size. Competition among firms strengthens incentives relative to monopolistic settings, but test introduction may also dampen price competition. The findings suggest that pay-for-performance schemes, procurement design, and value-based pricing can help better align private and social incentives for both test use and development. Overall, the survey underscores the importance of carefully designed reimbursement mechanisms and policy tools to promote the efficient integration of diagnostic innovations into healthcare systems.
Suggested Citation
David Bardey & Philippe de Donder & Vera Zaporozhets, 2025.
"Economic Incentives to Develop and to Use Diagnostic Tests: A Literature Review,"
Post-Print
hal-05468072, HAL.
Handle:
RePEc:hal:journl:hal-05468072
DOI: 10.58567/jea04040006
Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://hal.science/hal-05468072v1
Download full text from publisher
Other versions of this item:
- De Donder, Philippe & Bardey, David & Zaporozhets, Vera, 2024.
"Economic Incentives to Develop and to Use Diagnostic Tests - A Literature Review,"
TSE Working Papers
24-1507, Toulouse School of Economics (TSE), revised Sep 2025.
- David Bardey & Philippe de Donder & Vera Zaporozhets, 2024.
"Economic Incentives to Develop and to Use Diagnostic Tests - A Literature Review,"
Working Papers
hal-04472497, HAL.
- David Bardey & Philippe De Donder & Vera Zaporozhets, 2024.
"Economic Incentives to Develop and to Use Diagnostic Tests a Literature Review,"
Documentos CEDE
21024, Universidad de los Andes, Facultad de Economía, CEDE.
More about this item
Keywords
;
;
;
JEL classification:
- D86 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Economics of Contract Law
- H51 - Public Economics - - National Government Expenditures and Related Policies - - - Government Expenditures and Health
- I11 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Health - - - Analysis of Health Care Markets
Statistics
Access and download statistics
Corrections
All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:hal:journl:hal-05468072. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.
We have no bibliographic references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .
If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: CCSD (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/ .
Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through
the various RePEc services.