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Equilibrium conditions for Catch-22 situations

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  • Joshua S. Gans

    (University of Toronto, Canada)

Abstract

This paper examines whether Catch-22 situations persist as equilibrium phenomena based on Gatekeepers' preferences rather than arbitrary rules. We model a game-theoretic scenario inspired by Heller's paradox, featuring a Requester (either Sane or Insane) who signals before a Gatekeeper decides to grant or deny their request. Our analysis identifies conditions where Catch-22 situations emerge as equilibria and evaluates their efficiency properties. Results demonstrate that such situations can arise naturally as efficient responses by Gatekeepers facing asymmetric information. The model is extended to labor markets, where "experience required for jobs, but jobs required for experience" creates similar dynamics.

Suggested Citation

  • Joshua S. Gans, 2025. "Equilibrium conditions for Catch-22 situations," The Journal of Mechanism and Institution Design, Society for the Promotion of Mechanism and Institution Design, University of York, vol. 10(1), pages 45-65, December.
    • Handle: RePEc:jmi:articl:jmi-v10i1a2
    DOI: 10.22574/jmid.2025.12.002
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    Keywords

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    JEL classification:

    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
    • J24 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Demand and Supply of Labor - - - Human Capital; Skills; Occupational Choice; Labor Productivity
    • D86 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Economics of Contract Law

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