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Hybrid contracting in repeated interactions

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  • Ganglmair, Bernhard
  • Klix, Julian
  • Shin, Dongsoo

Abstract

Many business relationships begin with informal interactions and later transition to formal contracts. Using a repeated-games model with a finite horizon, we show that this hybrid-contracting approach can both prolong cooperation (intensive margin) and enable it across a broader range of settings (extensive margin). We model the contract as a "smooth-landing contract" that limits actions only near the end of the relationship. We show that this flexible design supports early cooperation and outperforms rigid contracts. Our findings are robust to changes in contracting costs and timing, with optimal contract length balancing profitability and implementability.

Suggested Citation

  • Ganglmair, Bernhard & Klix, Julian & Shin, Dongsoo, 2025. "Hybrid contracting in repeated interactions," ZEW Discussion Papers 25-046, ZEW - Leibniz Centre for European Economic Research.
    • Handle: RePEc:zbw:zewdip:327114
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Cubitt, Robin P. & Drouvelis, Michalis & Gächter, Simon & Kabalin, Ruslan, 2011. "Moral judgments in social dilemmas: How bad is free riding?," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 95(3), pages 253-264.
    2. Michael D. Ryall & Rachelle C. Sampson, 2009. "Formal Contracts in the Presence of Relational Enforcement Mechanisms: Evidence from Technology Development Projects," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 55(6), pages 906-925, June.
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    More about this item

    Keywords

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    JEL classification:

    • C73 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games
    • D86 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Economics of Contract Law
    • K12 - Law and Economics - - Basic Areas of Law - - - Contract Law
    • L14 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Transactional Relationships; Contracts and Reputation

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