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Unpacking strategic alliances: The structure and purpose of alliance versus supplier relationships

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  • Mayer, Kyle J.
  • Teece, David J.

Abstract

While strategic alliances have received a great deal of attention from academic researchers and practitioners, we still know relatively little about the contracts that govern these alliance relationships and their difference from more complex buyer-supplier contracts. Through an exploration of 15 alliance contracts to develop jet engines between a major aerospace manufacturer and eleven different alliance partners, we seek to understand the structure and purpose of these alliance contracts and their differences from standard buyer-supplier contracts. The alliance contracts we study are designed to share risk, facilitate learning and the exchange of knowledge, specify roles and responsibilities, and provide administrative mechanisms for adapting and resolving disputes. What emerges from this study is a better understanding of how alliances differ from other types of interfirm relationships and how these differences are reflected in the alliance contract.

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  • Mayer, Kyle J. & Teece, David J., 2008. "Unpacking strategic alliances: The structure and purpose of alliance versus supplier relationships," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 66(1), pages 106-127, April.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:jeborg:v:66:y:2008:i:1:p:106-127
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    3. Teece, David J., 2010. "Technological Innovation and the Theory of the Firm," Handbook of the Economics of Innovation, in: Bronwyn H. Hall & Nathan Rosenberg (ed.), Handbook of the Economics of Innovation, edition 1, volume 1, chapter 0, pages 679-730, Elsevier.
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    5. Helen M. Lloyd & Inger Ekman & Heather L. Rogers & Vítor Raposo & Paulo Melo & Valentina D. Marinkovic & Sandra C. Buttigieg & Einav Srulovici & Roman Andrzej Lewandowski & Nicky Britten, 2020. "Supporting Innovative Person-Centred Care in Financially Constrained Environments: The WE CARE Exploratory Health Laboratory Evaluation Strategy," IJERPH, MDPI, vol. 17(9), pages 1-19, April.
    6. Gressgård, Leif Jarle & Hansen, Kåre, 2015. "Knowledge exchange and learning from failures in distributed environments: The role of contractor relationship management and work characteristics," Reliability Engineering and System Safety, Elsevier, vol. 133(C), pages 167-175.
    7. Malhotra, Deepak & Lumineau, Fabrice, 2011. "Trust and collaboration in the aftermath of conflict: the effects of contract structure," MPRA Paper 38358, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    8. Reuer, Jeffrey & Devarakonda, S.V., 2015. "Mechanisms of hybrid governance : Administrative committees in non-equity alliances," Other publications TiSEM 063d9ccc-59c8-4e76-a77d-8, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
    9. de Man, Ard-Pieter & Luvison, Dave, 2019. "Collaborative business models: Aligning and operationalizing alliances," Business Horizons, Elsevier, vol. 62(4), pages 473-482.
    10. Prasad, Acklesh & Green, Peter & Heales, Jon, 2012. "On IT governance structures and their effectiveness in collaborative organizational structures," International Journal of Accounting Information Systems, Elsevier, vol. 13(3), pages 199-220.
    11. Tulin Dzhengiz, 2020. "A Literature Review of Inter-Organizational Sustainability Learning," Sustainability, MDPI, vol. 12(12), pages 1-52, June.
    12. Nurhayati, Kartika & Tavasszy, Lóránt & Rezaei, Jafar, 2023. "Joint B2B supply chain decision-making: Drivers, facilitators and barriers," International Journal of Production Economics, Elsevier, vol. 256(C).
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    14. Albert Jolink & Eva Niesten, 2012. "Hybrid Governance," Chapters, in: Michael Dietrich & Jackie Krafft (ed.), Handbook on the Economics and Theory of the Firm, chapter 12, Edward Elgar Publishing.
    15. Czarnitzki, Dirk & Hottenrott, Hanna, 2012. "Collaborative R&D as a strategy to attenuate financing constraints," ZEW Discussion Papers 12-049, ZEW - Leibniz Centre for European Economic Research.
    16. Louise Bildsten, 2014. "Buyer-supplier relationships in industrialized building," Construction Management and Economics, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 32(1-2), pages 146-159, February.
    17. Jolink, Albert & Niesten, Eva, 2012. "Recent qualitative advances on hybrid organizations: Taking stock, looking ahead," Scandinavian Journal of Management, Elsevier, vol. 28(2), pages 149-161.
    18. Li, Ying & Shou, Yongyi & Ding, Ronggui & Sun, Tao & Zhou, Qing, 2019. "Governing local sourcing practices of overseas projects for the Belt and Road Initiative: A framework and evaluation," Transportation Research Part E: Logistics and Transportation Review, Elsevier, vol. 126(C), pages 212-226.
    19. Rebolledo, Claudia & Nollet, Jean, 2011. "Learning from suppliers in the aerospace industry," International Journal of Production Economics, Elsevier, vol. 129(2), pages 328-337, February.

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