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Unpacking strategic alliances: The structure and purpose of alliance versus supplier relationships

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  • Mayer, Kyle J.
  • Teece, David J.

Abstract

While strategic alliances have received a great deal of attention from academic researchers and practitioners, we still know relatively little about the contracts that govern these alliance relationships and their difference from more complex buyer-supplier contracts. Through an exploration of 15 alliance contracts to develop jet engines between a major aerospace manufacturer and eleven different alliance partners, we seek to understand the structure and purpose of these alliance contracts and their differences from standard buyer-supplier contracts. The alliance contracts we study are designed to share risk, facilitate learning and the exchange of knowledge, specify roles and responsibilities, and provide administrative mechanisms for adapting and resolving disputes. What emerges from this study is a better understanding of how alliances differ from other types of interfirm relationships and how these differences are reflected in the alliance contract.

Suggested Citation

  • Mayer, Kyle J. & Teece, David J., 2008. "Unpacking strategic alliances: The structure and purpose of alliance versus supplier relationships," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 66(1), pages 106-127, April.
  • Handle: RePEc:eee:jeborg:v:66:y:2008:i:1:p:106-127
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    Cited by:

    1. Malhotra, Deepak & Lumineau, Fabrice, 2011. "Trust and collaboration in the aftermath of conflict: the effects of contract structure," MPRA Paper 38358, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    2. Reuer, Jeffrey & Devarakonda, S.V., 2016. "Mechanisms of hybrid governance : Administrative committees in non-equity alliances," Other publications TiSEM 063d9ccc-59c8-4e76-a77d-8, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
    3. Astrid A. ter Wiel & Paul W. L. Vlaar, 2011. "When Firms do not Benefit from Collaborative Experience: Differences in the Intensity and Nature of Interorganizational Relationships," Chapters,in: The Nature of the New Firm, chapter 7 Edward Elgar Publishing.
    4. Teece, David J., 2010. "Technological Innovation and the Theory of the Firm," Handbook of the Economics of Innovation, Elsevier.
    5. Jackie Krafft & Francesco Quatraro & Pier Saviotti, 2014. "Knowledge characteristics and the dynamics of technological alliances in pharmaceuticals: empirical evidence from Europe, US and Japan," Journal of Evolutionary Economics, Springer, vol. 24(3), pages 587-622, July.
    6. Albert Jolink & Eva Niesten, 2012. "Hybrid Governance," Chapters,in: Handbook on the Economics and Theory of the Firm, chapter 12 Edward Elgar Publishing.
    7. Czarnitzki, Dirk & Hottenrott, Hanna, 2012. "Collaborative R&D as a strategy to attenuate financing constraints," ZEW Discussion Papers 12-049, ZEW - Zentrum für Europäische Wirtschaftsforschung / Center for European Economic Research.
    8. Matthias Meier & Martina Lütkewitte & Thomas Mellewigt & Carolin Decker, 2016. "How managers can build trust in strategic alliances: a meta-analysis on the central trust-building mechanisms," Journal of Business Economics, Springer, vol. 86(3), pages 229-257, April.
    9. Rebolledo, Claudia & Nollet, Jean, 2011. "Learning from suppliers in the aerospace industry," International Journal of Production Economics, Elsevier, vol. 129(2), pages 328-337, February.
    10. repec:eee:reensy:v:133:y:2015:i:c:p:167-175 is not listed on IDEAS

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