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Normative Perception of Power Abuse

Author

Listed:
  • Leonard Hoeft

    (Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods)

  • Wladislaw Mill

    (University of Mannheim)

  • Alexander Vostroknutov

    (Maastricht University)

Abstract

We study how the powerful perceive power abuse, and how negative experience related to it influences the appropriateness judgments of the powerless. We create an environment conducive to unfair exploitation in a repeated Public Goods game where one player (punisher) is given a further ability to costlessly subtract money from others (victims). Punishers who abuse their power rationalize their behavior by believing that free-riding, while forcing others to contribute, is not inappropriate. More importantly, victims of such abuse also start to believe that punishers’ free-riding and punishment are justifiable. Our findings demonstrate the capacity of humans to exculpate abusive behavior.

Suggested Citation

  • Leonard Hoeft & Wladislaw Mill & Alexander Vostroknutov, 2019. "Normative Perception of Power Abuse," Discussion Paper Series of the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods 2019_06, Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods.
  • Handle: RePEc:mpg:wpaper:2019_06
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Leonard Hoeft & Michael Kurschilgen & Wladislaw Mill & Simone Vannuccini, 2022. "Norms as Obligations," Munich Papers in Political Economy 22, Munich School of Politics and Public Policy and the School of Management at the Technical University of Munich.
    2. Hoeft, Leonard & Mill, Wladislaw, 2024. "Abuse of power," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 220(C), pages 305-324.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    power abuse; norms; public goods; punishment;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C91 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Laboratory, Individual Behavior
    • C92 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Laboratory, Group Behavior
    • K42 - Law and Economics - - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior - - - Illegal Behavior and the Enforcement of Law
    • H41 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods - - - Public Goods
    • D73 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Bureaucracy; Administrative Processes in Public Organizations; Corruption

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