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Take a Break: A Model of Fatigue, Recovery, and the Economics of Remote Work

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Abstract

I propose a model in which workers experience fatigue over time and can restore productivity by taking breaks. Optimal schedules feature evenly spaced, full-recovery breaks; when breaks are costless, they should occur frequently, but switching costs make the optimal number finite. The model is embedded in a principal-agent framework with contractual frictions. When employers control the schedule, workers overwork; when workers self-manage, they overrest. Both lead to inefficiencies. These results shed light on the trade-offs in remote work arrangements, especially following COVID-19. The analysis highlights how control rights, incentive design, and recovery constraints interactÑand why neither rigid supervision nor full autonomy guarantees efficiency.

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  • Maria Saez Marti, 2025. "Take a Break: A Model of Fatigue, Recovery, and the Economics of Remote Work," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 2268R1, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
    • Handle: RePEc:cwl:cwldpp:2268r1
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Labor supply; fatigue; rest breaks; productivity; remote work; principal-agent problem; control rights; incomplete contracts; time allocation.;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D13 - Microeconomics - - Household Behavior - - - Household Production and Intrahouse Allocation
    • J22 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Demand and Supply of Labor - - - Time Allocation and Labor Supply
    • D86 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Economics of Contract Law
    • M54 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting; Personnel Economics - - Personnel Economics - - - Labor Management

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