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Pierre Chaigneau

Personal Details

First Name:Pierre
Middle Name:
Last Name:Chaigneau
Suffix:
RePEc Short-ID:pch1493
https://sites.google.com/view/pierrechaigneau

Affiliation

School of Business
Queen's University

Kingston, Canada
http://business.queensu.ca/
RePEc:edi:sbqueca (more details at EDIRC)

Research output

as
Jump to: Working papers Articles

Working papers

  1. Chaigneau, Pierre & Edmans, Alex & Gottlieb, Daniel, 2021. "How Should Performance Signals Affect Contracts?," CEPR Discussion Papers 15755, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  2. Chaigneau, Pierre & Sahuguet, Nicolas, 2021. "The Complementarity between Signal Informativeness and Monitoring," CEPR Discussion Papers 15625, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  3. Chaigneau, Pierre & Edmans, Alex & Gottlieb, Daniel, 2019. "The informativeness principle without the first-order approach," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 102226, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
  4. Chaigneau, Pierre & Edmans, Alex & Gottlieb, Daniel, 2018. "Does improved information improve incentives?," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 102227, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
  5. Pierre Chaigneau & Nicolas Sahuguet & Bernard Sinclair-Desgagné, 2017. "Prudence and the convexity of compensation contracts," Post-Print halshs-02292785, HAL.
  6. Pierre Chaigneau & Louis Eeckhoudt, 2015. "Downside Risk Neutral Probabilities," Cahiers de recherche 1521, CIRPEE.
  7. Pierre Chaigneau & Alex Edmans & Daniel Gottlieb, 2014. "The Value of Informativeness for Contracting," NBER Working Papers 20542, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  8. Pierre Chaigneau & Alex Edmans & Daniel Gottlieb, 2014. "The Generalized Informativeness Principle," NBER Working Papers 20729, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  9. Chaigneau, Pierre & Edmans, Alex & Gottlieb, Daniel, 2014. "The Informativeness Principle Under Limited Liability," CEPR Discussion Papers 10143, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  10. Pierre Chaigneau & Nicolas Sahuguet, 2014. "Explaining the Association between Monitoring and Controversial CEO Pay Practices: an Optimal Contracting Perspective," Cahiers de recherche 1406, CIRPEE.
  11. Chaigneau, Pierre & Sahuguet, Nicolas, 2013. "The effect of monitoring on CEO pay practices in a matching equilibrium," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 55405, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
  12. Pierre Chaigneau & Nicolas Sahuguet, 2012. "Pay-for-Luck in CEO Compensation: Matching and Efficient Contracting," Cahiers de recherche 1224, CIRPEE.
  13. Pierre Chaigneau, 2012. "The Optimal Timing of CEO Compensation," Cahiers de recherche 1207, CIRPEE.
  14. Matthieu Bouvard & Pierre Chaigneau & Adolfo de Motta, 2012. "Transparency in the Financial System: Rollover Risk and Crises," Cahiers de recherche 1206, CIRPEE.
  15. Pierre Chaigneau, 2011. "Explaining the Structure of CEO Incentive Pay with Decreasing Relative Risk Aversion," FMG Discussion Papers dp693, Financial Markets Group.
  16. Pierre Chaigneau, 2010. "The Optimal Timing of Executive Compensation," FMG Discussion Papers dp660, Financial Markets Group.
  17. Pierre Chaigneau, 2010. "Aversion to the variability of pay and optimal incentive contracts," FMG Discussion Papers dp654, Financial Markets Group.

Articles

  1. Pierre Chaigneau & Louis Eeckhoudt, 2020. "Downside risk-neutral probabilities," Economic Theory Bulletin, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 8(1), pages 65-77, April.
  2. Chaigneau, Pierre & Edmans, Alex & Gottlieb, Daniel, 2019. "The informativeness principle without the first-order approach," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 113(C), pages 743-755.
  3. Chaigneau, Pierre & Sahuguet, Nicolas, 2018. "The Effect of Monitoring on CEO Compensation in a Matching Equilibrium," Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, Cambridge University Press, vol. 53(3), pages 1297-1339, June.
  4. Chaigneau, Pierre & Edmans, Alex & Gottlieb, Daniel, 2018. "Does improved information improve incentives?," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 130(2), pages 291-307.
  5. Pierre Chaigneau, 2018. "Managerial Compensation and Firm Value in the Presence of Socially Responsible Investors," Journal of Business Ethics, Springer, vol. 149(3), pages 747-768, May.
  6. Chaigneau, Pierre, 2018. "The optimal timing of CEO compensation," Finance Research Letters, Elsevier, vol. 24(C), pages 90-94.
  7. Chaigneau, Pierre & Sahuguet, Nicolas & Sinclair-Desgagné, Bernard, 2017. "Prudence and the convexity of compensation contracts," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 157(C), pages 14-16.
  8. Pierre Chaigneau, 2015. "Risk aversion, prudence, and compensation," The European Journal of Finance, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 21(15), pages 1357-1373, December.
  9. Matthieu Bouvard & Pierre Chaigneau & Adolfo De Motta, 2015. "Transparency in the Financial System: Rollover Risk and Crises," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 70(4), pages 1805-1837, August.
  10. Pierre Chaigneau, 2015. "Changes in probability distributions and the form of compensation contracts," Economic Theory Bulletin, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 3(2), pages 223-232, October.
  11. Chaigneau, Pierre, 2013. "Explaining the structure of CEO incentive pay with decreasing relative risk aversion," Journal of Economics and Business, Elsevier, vol. 67(C), pages 4-23.
  12. Chaigneau, Pierre, 2013. "Risk-shifting and the regulation of bank CEOs’ compensation," Journal of Financial Stability, Elsevier, vol. 9(4), pages 778-789.
  13. Chaigneau, Pierre, 2013. "Expliquer et contenir la prise de risque excessive des banques," L'Actualité Economique, Société Canadienne de Science Economique, vol. 89(2), pages 147-151, Juin.

Citations

Many of the citations below have been collected in an experimental project, CitEc, where a more detailed citation analysis can be found. These are citations from works listed in RePEc that could be analyzed mechanically. So far, only a minority of all works could be analyzed. See under "Corrections" how you can help improve the citation analysis.

Working papers

  1. Chaigneau, Pierre & Edmans, Alex & Gottlieb, Daniel, 2018. "Does improved information improve incentives?," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 102227, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.

    Cited by:

    1. Chang, Jen-Wen, 2020. "Monitoring and competing principals: A double-edged sword," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 189(C).
    2. Hackbarth, Dirk & Rivera, Alejandro & Wong, Tak-Yuen, 2018. "Optimal Short-Termism," CEPR Discussion Papers 12588, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    3. Sebastian Gryglewicz & Barney Hartman-Glaser & Geoffery Zheng, 2020. "Growth Options, Incentives, and Pay for Performance: Theory and Evidence," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 66(3), pages 1248-1277, March.

  2. Pierre Chaigneau & Louis Eeckhoudt, 2015. "Downside Risk Neutral Probabilities," Cahiers de recherche 1521, CIRPEE.

    Cited by:

    1. Ekaterina Pirozhkova, 2017. "Banks' balance sheet, uncertainty and macroeconomy," EcoMod2017 10430, EcoMod.

  3. Pierre Chaigneau & Alex Edmans & Daniel Gottlieb, 2014. "The Value of Informativeness for Contracting," NBER Working Papers 20542, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.

    Cited by:

    1. Donaldson, Jason Roderick & Piacentino, Giorgia, 2018. "Contracting to compete for flows," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 173(C), pages 289-319.
    2. Alex Edmans & Xavier Gabaix, 2015. "Executive Compensation: A Modern Primer," NBER Working Papers 21131, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.

  4. Pierre Chaigneau & Alex Edmans & Daniel Gottlieb, 2014. "The Generalized Informativeness Principle," NBER Working Papers 20729, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.

    Cited by:

    1. Christian Ewerhart, 2014. "An envelope approach to tournament design," ECON - Working Papers 184, Department of Economics - University of Zurich, revised Oct 2015.

  5. Chaigneau, Pierre & Edmans, Alex & Gottlieb, Daniel, 2014. "The Informativeness Principle Under Limited Liability," CEPR Discussion Papers 10143, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.

    Cited by:

    1. Pierre Chaigneau & Alex Edmans & Daniel Gottlieb, 2014. "The Value of Informativeness for Contracting," NBER Working Papers 20542, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    2. FOSCHI, Matteo; SANTOS-PINTO, Luís Pedro, 2017. "Subjective Performance Evaluation of Employees with Biased Beliefs," Economics Working Papers ECO 2017/08, European University Institute.
    3. Miguel Anton & Florian Ederer & Mireia Gine & Martin Schmalz, 2016. "Common Ownership, Competition, and Top Management Incentives," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 2046, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
    4. Engert Andreas & Goldlücke Susanne, 2017. "Why Agents Need Discretion: The Business Judgment Rule as Optimal Standard of Care," Review of Law & Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 13(1), pages 1-38, March.
    5. Kelly Shue & Richard Townsend, 2016. "Growth through Rigidity: An Explanation for the Rise in CEO Pay," NBER Working Papers 21975, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    6. Donaldson, Jason Roderick & Piacentino, Giorgia, 2018. "Contracting to compete for flows," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 173(C), pages 289-319.
    7. Alex Edmans & Xavier Gabaix, 2015. "Executive Compensation: A Modern Primer," NBER Working Papers 21131, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    8. Calcagno, Riccardo & Heider, Florian, 2016. "Liquidity, Information Aggregation, and Market-Based Pay in an Efficient Market," CEPR Discussion Papers 11298, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    9. Bengt Holmström, 2017. "Pay for Performance and Beyond," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 107(7), pages 1753-1777, July.

  6. Chaigneau, Pierre & Sahuguet, Nicolas, 2013. "The effect of monitoring on CEO pay practices in a matching equilibrium," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 55405, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.

    Cited by:

    1. Qi Liu & Bo Sun, 2016. "Relative Wealth Concerns, Executive Compensation, and Systemic Risk-Taking," International Finance Discussion Papers 1164, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.).
    2. Ingolf Dittmann & Ko-Chia Yu & Dan Zhang, 2017. "How Important Are Risk-Taking Incentives in Executive Compensation?," Review of Finance, European Finance Association, vol. 21(5), pages 1805-1846.

  7. Pierre Chaigneau, 2012. "The Optimal Timing of CEO Compensation," Cahiers de recherche 1207, CIRPEE.

    Cited by:

    1. Wang, C., 1995. "Incentives, CEO Compensation, and Shareholder Wealth in a Dynamic Agency Model," GSIA Working Papers 1995-08, Carnegie Mellon University, Tepper School of Business.
    2. Emmanuel Iatridis, George, 2018. "Accounting discretion and executive cash compensation: An empirical investigation of corporate governance, credit ratings and firm value," Journal of International Financial Markets, Institutions and Money, Elsevier, vol. 55(C), pages 29-49.
    3. Josef Schroth, 2018. "Managerial Compensation and Stock Price Manipulation," Journal of Accounting Research, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 56(5), pages 1335-1381, December.
    4. Hoffmann, Florian & Inderst, Roman & Opp, Marcus, 2014. "Regulating Deferred Incentive Pay," CEPR Discussion Papers 9877, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    5. Ingolf Dittmann & Ko-Chia Yu & Dan Zhang, 2017. "How Important Are Risk-Taking Incentives in Executive Compensation?," Review of Finance, European Finance Association, vol. 21(5), pages 1805-1846.
    6. Josef Schroth, 2015. "Managerial Compensation Duration and Stock Price Manipulation," Staff Working Papers 15-25, Bank of Canada.

  8. Matthieu Bouvard & Pierre Chaigneau & Adolfo de Motta, 2012. "Transparency in the Financial System: Rollover Risk and Crises," Cahiers de recherche 1206, CIRPEE.

    Cited by:

    1. Natalya Zelenyuk & Robert Faff & Shams Pathan, 2021. "The impact of voluntary capital adequacy disclosure on bank lending and liquidity creation," Accounting and Finance, Accounting and Finance Association of Australia and New Zealand, vol. 61(3), pages 3915-3935, September.
    2. Fan, Yaoyao & Huang, Yichu & Jiang, Yuxiang & Liu, Frank Hong, 2020. "Watch out for bailout: TARP and bank earnings management," Journal of Financial Stability, Elsevier, vol. 51(C).
    3. Kathleen Weiss Hanley & Gerard Hoberg, 2019. "Dynamic Interpretation of Emerging Risks in the Financial Sector," Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 32(12), pages 4543-4603.
    4. Karlo Kauko, 2021. "The Vanishing Interest Income of Chinese Banks," Asian Economic Papers, MIT Press, vol. 20(3), pages 94-113, Fall.
    5. Faria-e-Castro, Miguel & Martinez, Joseba & Philippon, Thomas, 2015. "Runs versus Lemons: Information Disclosure and Fiscal Capacity," CEPR Discussion Papers 10614, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    6. Mark D. Flood & Dror Y. Kenett & Robin L. Lumsdaine & Jonathan K. Simon, 2017. "The Complexity of Bank Holding Companies: A Topological Approach," NBER Working Papers 23755, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    7. Céline Gauthier & Alfred Lehar & Héctor Pérez Saiz & Moez Souissi, 2015. "Emergency Liquidity Facilities, Signalling and Funding Costs," Staff Working Papers 15-44, Bank of Canada.
    8. Bo, Wang & Suli, Zheng, 2020. "Heterogeneous fragility, systematic panic and optimal transparency," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 191(C).
    9. Joel Shapiro & David Skeie, 2015. "Information Management in Banking Crises," Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 28(8), pages 2322-2363.
    10. Itay Goldstein & Alexandr Kopytov & Lin Shen & Haotian Xiang, 2020. "Bank Heterogeneity and Financial Stability," NBER Working Papers 27376, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    11. Gadi Barlevy & Fernando Alvarez, 2014. "Mandatory Disclosure and Financial Contagion," 2014 Meeting Papers 115, Society for Economic Dynamics.
    12. Ahnert, Toni & Martinez-Miera, David, 2021. "Bank Runs, Bank Competition and Opacity," CEPR Discussion Papers 16207, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    13. Jungherr, Joachim, 2018. "Bank opacity and financial crises," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 97(C), pages 157-176.
    14. Ryuichiro Izumi, 2021. "Opacity: Insurance and Fragility," Review of Economic Dynamics, Elsevier for the Society for Economic Dynamics, vol. 40, pages 146-169, April.
    15. Itay Goldstein & Chong Huang, 2020. "Credit Rating Inflation and Firms' Investments," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 75(6), pages 2929-2972, December.
    16. Kim, Jinyong & Kim, Mingook & Lee, Jeong Hwan, 2019. "The effect of TARP on loan loss provisions and bank transparency," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 102(C), pages 79-99.
    17. Bischof, Jannis & Laux, Christian & Leuz, Christian, 2020. "Accounting for financial stability: Lessons from the financial crisis and future challenges," SAFE Working Paper Series 283, Leibniz Institute for Financial Research SAFE.
    18. König-Kersting, Christian & Trautmann, Stefan T. & Vlahu, Razvan, 2022. "Bank instability: Interbank linkages and the role of disclosure," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 134(C).
    19. Moreno, Diego & Takalo, Tuomas, 2021. "Precision of Public Information Disclosures, Banks’ Stability and Welfare," Research Discussion Papers 3/2021, Bank of Finland.
    20. Yaron Leitner & Basil Williams, 2018. "Model Secrecy and Stress Tests," 2018 Meeting Papers 566, Society for Economic Dynamics.
    21. Azarmsa, Ehsan & Cong, Lin William, 2020. "Persuasion in relationship finance," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 138(3), pages 818-837.
    22. Shapiro, Joel & Zeng, Jing, 2019. "Stress Testing and Bank Lending," CEPR Discussion Papers 13907, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    23. Ana Babus & Maryam farboodi, 2019. "The Hidden Costs of Strategic Opacity," 2019 Meeting Papers 1508, Society for Economic Dynamics.
    24. Carlos Corona & Lin Nan & Gaoqing Zhang, 2019. "The Coordination Role of Stress Tests in Bank Risk‐Taking," Journal of Accounting Research, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 57(5), pages 1161-1200, December.
    25. Gaoqing Zhang, 2021. "Competition and Opacity in the Financial System," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 67(3), pages 1895-1913, March.
    26. Chakravarty, Surajeet & Choo, Lawrence & Fonseca, Miguel A. & Kaplan, Todd R., 2020. "Should regulators always be transparent? A bank run experiment," MPRA Paper 99948, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    27. Tirupam Goel & Isha Agarwal, 2021. "Limits of stress-test based bank regulation," BIS Working Papers 953, Bank for International Settlements.
    28. Danielsson, Jon & Macrae, Robert & Uthemann, Andreas, 2021. "Artificial intelligence and systemic risk," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 111601, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
    29. Toni Ahnert & Benjamin Nelson, 2016. "Opaque Assets and Rollover Risk," Staff Working Papers 16-17, Bank of Canada.
    30. Walther, Ansgar & White, Lucy, 2019. "Rules versus Discretion in Bank Resolution," CEPR Discussion Papers 14048, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    31. Natalya Zelenyuk & Robert Faff & Shams Pathan, 2020. "Size‐conditioned mandatory capital adequacy disclosure and bank intermediation," Accounting and Finance, Accounting and Finance Association of Australia and New Zealand, vol. 60(4), pages 4387-4417, December.
    32. Goldstein, Itay & Leitner, Yaron, 2018. "Stress tests and information disclosure," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 177(C), pages 34-69.
    33. Xuewen Liu, 2018. "Diversification and Systemic Bank Runs," 2018 Meeting Papers 739, Society for Economic Dynamics.
    34. Gao, Pingyang & Jiang, Xu, 2018. "Reporting choices in the shadow of bank runs," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 65(1), pages 85-108.
    35. Ding, Haina & Guembel, Alexander, 2020. "Market Information in Banking Supervision: The Role of Stress Test Design," TSE Working Papers 20-1144, Toulouse School of Economics (TSE).
    36. Jungherr, Joachim, 2016. "Bank opacity and financial crises," Economics Working Papers ADE2016/02, European University Institute.
    37. Bermpei, Theodora & Kalyvas, Antonios & Nguyen, Thanh Cong, 2018. "Does institutional quality condition the effect of bank regulations and supervision on bank stability? Evidence from emerging and developing economies," International Review of Financial Analysis, Elsevier, vol. 59(C), pages 255-275.
    38. König, Philipp Johann & Laux, Christian & Pothier, David, 2021. "The leverage effect of bank disclosures," Discussion Papers 31/2021, Deutsche Bundesbank.
    39. Gary Gorton & Guillermo Ordoñez, 2020. "Fighting Crises with Secrecy," American Economic Journal: Macroeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 12(4), pages 218-245, October.
    40. Pereira, Ana Elisa, 2021. "Rollover risk and stress test credibility," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 129(C), pages 370-399.
    41. Yaron Leitner, 2014. "Should regulators reveal information about banks?," Business Review, Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia, issue Q3, pages 1-8.
    42. Bischof, Jannis & Laux, Christian & Leuz, Christian, 2021. "Accounting for financial stability: Bank disclosure and loss recognition in the financial crisis," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 141(3), pages 1188-1217.
    43. Michal Kowalik, 2016. "Opacity and Disclosure in Short-Term Wholesale Funding Markets," Supervisory Research and Analysis Working Papers RPA 16-2, Federal Reserve Bank of Boston.
    44. Gallagher, Emily & Schmidt, Lawrence & Timmermann, Allan G & Wermers, Russ, 2017. "Transparency, Investor Information Acquisition, and Money Market Fund Risk Rebalancing during the 2011-12 Eurozone Crisis," CEPR Discussion Papers 11895, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.

  9. Pierre Chaigneau, 2011. "Explaining the Structure of CEO Incentive Pay with Decreasing Relative Risk Aversion," FMG Discussion Papers dp693, Financial Markets Group.

    Cited by:

    1. Pierre Chaigneau, 2012. "The effect of risk preferences on the valuation and incentives of compensation contracts," FMG Discussion Papers dp697, Financial Markets Group.
    2. Pierre Chaigneau, 2012. "The Effect of Risk Preferences on the Valuation and Incentives of Compensation Contracts," Cahiers de recherche 1209, CIRPEE.
    3. Ingolf Dittmann & Ko-Chia Yu & Dan Zhang, 2017. "How Important Are Risk-Taking Incentives in Executive Compensation?," Review of Finance, European Finance Association, vol. 21(5), pages 1805-1846.

Articles

  1. Pierre Chaigneau & Louis Eeckhoudt, 2020. "Downside risk-neutral probabilities," Economic Theory Bulletin, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 8(1), pages 65-77, April.
    See citations under working paper version above.
  2. Chaigneau, Pierre & Sahuguet, Nicolas, 2018. "The Effect of Monitoring on CEO Compensation in a Matching Equilibrium," Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, Cambridge University Press, vol. 53(3), pages 1297-1339, June.

    Cited by:

    1. Lucas W. Davis and Catherine Hausman, 2020. "Are Energy Executives Rewarded for Luck?," The Energy Journal, International Association for Energy Economics, vol. 0(Number 6), pages 157-180.
    2. Clement Olalekan Olaniyi & Olaolu Richard Olayeni, 2020. "A new perspective into the relationship between CEO pay and firm performance: evidence from Nigeria’s listed firms," Journal of Social and Economic Development, Springer;Institute for Social and Economic Change, vol. 22(2), pages 250-277, December.
    3. Chemmanur, Thomas J. & Hu, Gang & Li, Yingzhen & Xie, Jing, 2021. "Institutional trading, information production, and forced CEO turnovers," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 67(C).

  3. Chaigneau, Pierre & Edmans, Alex & Gottlieb, Daniel, 2018. "Does improved information improve incentives?," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 130(2), pages 291-307.
    See citations under working paper version above.
  4. Chaigneau, Pierre, 2018. "The optimal timing of CEO compensation," Finance Research Letters, Elsevier, vol. 24(C), pages 90-94.
    See citations under working paper version above.
  5. Pierre Chaigneau, 2015. "Risk aversion, prudence, and compensation," The European Journal of Finance, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 21(15), pages 1357-1373, December.

    Cited by:

    1. Ines Macho-Stadler & David Pérez-Castrillo, 2016. "Moral Hazard: Base Models and Two Extensions," CESifo Working Paper Series 5851, CESifo.
    2. François Desmoulins-Lebeault & Luc Meunier, 2018. "Moment Risks: Investment for Self and for a Firm," Decision Analysis, INFORMS, vol. 15(4), pages 242-266, December.
    3. Bernard Sinclair-Desgagné & Sandrine Spaeter, 2018. "Incentive Contracts and Downside Risk Sharing," Post-Print halshs-02292797, HAL.

  6. Matthieu Bouvard & Pierre Chaigneau & Adolfo De Motta, 2015. "Transparency in the Financial System: Rollover Risk and Crises," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 70(4), pages 1805-1837, August.
    See citations under working paper version above.
  7. Chaigneau, Pierre, 2013. "Explaining the structure of CEO incentive pay with decreasing relative risk aversion," Journal of Economics and Business, Elsevier, vol. 67(C), pages 4-23. See citations under working paper version above.
  8. Chaigneau, Pierre, 2013. "Risk-shifting and the regulation of bank CEOs’ compensation," Journal of Financial Stability, Elsevier, vol. 9(4), pages 778-789.

    Cited by:

    1. Neus, Werner, 2014. "Eigenkapitalnormen, Boni und Risikoanreize in Banken," Die Unternehmung - Swiss Journal of Business Research and Practice, Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft mbH & Co. KG, vol. 68(2), pages 92-107.
    2. Cerasi, Vittoria & Deininger, Sebastian M. & Gambacorta, Leonardo & Oliviero, Tommaso, 2020. "How post-crisis regulation has affected bank CEO compensation," Journal of International Money and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 104(C).
    3. Carlos A. Arango & Oscar M. Valencia, 2015. "Macro-Prudential Policy under Moral Hazard and Financial Fragility," BORRADORES DE ECONOMIA 012695, BANCO DE LA REPÚBLICA.
    4. Feess, Eberhard & Wohlschlegel, Ansgar, 2014. "Bank Capital Requirements and Mandatory Deferral of Compensation," MPRA Paper 59456, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    5. Chaiporn Vithessonthi, 2016. "Consequences of Bank Loan Growth: Evidence from Asia," PIER Discussion Papers 19, Puey Ungphakorn Institute for Economic Research.
    6. Albuquerque, Rui & Cabral, Luis & Guedes, Jose, 2016. "Relative Performance, Banker Compensation, and Systemic Risk," CEPR Discussion Papers 11693, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    7. Gietl, Daniel, 2018. "Overconfidence and Bailouts," Rationality and Competition Discussion Paper Series 132, CRC TRR 190 Rationality and Competition.
    8. Zhiwei Su & Xingchun Wang, 2019. "Pricing executive stock options with averaging features under the Heston–Nandi GARCH model," Journal of Futures Markets, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 39(9), pages 1056-1084, September.
    9. Dong, Yizhe & Girardone, Claudia & Kuo, Jing-Ming, 2017. "Governance, efficiency and risk taking in Chinese banking," The British Accounting Review, Elsevier, vol. 49(2), pages 211-229.
    10. Carlos Arango & Oscar Valencia, 2015. "Macro-prudential Policies, Moral Hazard and Financial Fragility," IHEID Working Papers 06-2015, Economics Section, The Graduate Institute of International Studies.
    11. Ingolf Dittmann & Ko-Chia Yu & Dan Zhang, 2017. "How Important Are Risk-Taking Incentives in Executive Compensation?," Review of Finance, European Finance Association, vol. 21(5), pages 1805-1846.
    12. Iyad Isbaita, 2020. "Corporate governance in banking institutions," Manager Journal, Faculty of Business and Administration, University of Bucharest, vol. 31(1), pages 75-85, December.
    13. Gietl, Daniel & Kassner, Bernhard, 2020. "Managerial Overconfidence and Bank Bailouts," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 179(C), pages 202-222.
    14. Douglas da Rosa München & Herbert Kimura, 2020. "Regulatory Banking Leverage: what do you know?," Working Papers Series 540, Central Bank of Brazil, Research Department.

More information

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Statistics

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Co-authorship network on CollEc

NEP Fields

NEP is an announcement service for new working papers, with a weekly report in each of many fields. This author has had 14 papers announced in NEP. These are the fields, ordered by number of announcements, along with their dates. If the author is listed in the directory of specialists for this field, a link is also provided.
  1. NEP-CTA: Contract Theory & Applications (8) 2012-04-10 2012-04-10 2012-06-05 2014-02-08 2014-12-03 2014-12-19 2014-12-29 2014-12-29. Author is listed
  2. NEP-HRM: Human Capital & Human Resource Management (8) 2012-04-10 2012-06-05 2014-02-08 2014-12-19 2014-12-29 2014-12-29 2020-04-13 2021-05-10. Author is listed
  3. NEP-MIC: Microeconomics (8) 2014-12-03 2014-12-19 2014-12-24 2014-12-29 2014-12-29 2014-12-29 2020-04-13 2021-05-10. Author is listed
  4. NEP-BEC: Business Economics (4) 2012-04-10 2012-06-05 2014-02-08 2021-05-17
  5. NEP-UPT: Utility Models & Prospect Theory (3) 2012-04-10 2014-12-24 2014-12-29
  6. NEP-RMG: Risk Management (2) 2015-11-21 2020-04-13
  7. NEP-BAN: Banking (1) 2012-04-10
  8. NEP-CBA: Central Banking (1) 2012-04-10
  9. NEP-CFN: Corporate Finance (1) 2021-05-17
  10. NEP-ORE: Operations Research (1) 2020-04-13

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