How post-crisis regulation has affected bank CEO compensation
This paper assesses whether compensation practices for bank Chief Executive Officers(CEOs) changed after the Financial Stability Board (FSB) issued post-crisis guidelines on sound compensation. Banks in jurisdictions which implemented the FSBâ€™s Principles and Standards of Sound Compensation in national legislation changed their compensation policies more than other banks. Compensation in those jurisdictions is less linked to short-term profits and more linked to risks, with CEOs at riskier banks receiving less, by way of variable compensation, than those at less-risky peers. This was particularly true of investment banks and of banks which previously had weaker risk management, for example those that previously lacked a Chief Risk Officer.
|Date of creation:||28 Apr 2017|
|Date of revision:||28 Apr 2017|
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