IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/pal/jbkreg/v23y2022i3d10.1057_s41261-021-00159-z.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Central bank screening, moral hazard, and the lender of last resort policy

Author

Listed:
  • Mei Li

    (University of Guelph)

  • Frank Milne

    (Queen’s University)

  • Junfeng Qiu

    (Central University of Finance and Economics)

Abstract

This paper constructs a theoretical model to examine the LOLR policy when a central bank can imperfectly screen insolvent from solvent banks. We find that: (1) Central bank screening produces a “positive” stigma associated with central bank borrowing by punishing insolvent banks. (2) With central bank screening, the LOLR policy in fact reduces moral hazard rather than inducing it. (3) If the central bank can better identify solvent and insolvent banks when they apply for central bank loans, it will improve social welfare first by forcing the insolvent banks to efficiently liquidate their assets and second by deterring banks from choosing the risky assets to start with.

Suggested Citation

  • Mei Li & Frank Milne & Junfeng Qiu, 2022. "Central bank screening, moral hazard, and the lender of last resort policy," Journal of Banking Regulation, Palgrave Macmillan, vol. 23(3), pages 244-264, September.
  • Handle: RePEc:pal:jbkreg:v:23:y:2022:i:3:d:10.1057_s41261-021-00159-z
    DOI: 10.1057/s41261-021-00159-z
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://link.springer.com/10.1057/s41261-021-00159-z
    File Function: Abstract
    Download Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.

    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1057/s41261-021-00159-z?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version below or search for a different version of it.

    Other versions of this item:

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. In-Koo Cho & David M. Kreps, 1987. "Signaling Games and Stable Equilibria," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 102(2), pages 179-221.
    2. William Haraf, 1988. "Restructuring Banking & Financial Services in America," Books, American Enterprise Institute, number 917739, September.
    3. Mei Li & Frank Milne & Junfeng Qiu, 2020. "The LOLR Policy and its Signaling Effect in a Time of Crisis," Journal of Financial Services Research, Springer;Western Finance Association, vol. 57(3), pages 231-252, June.
    4. Goodhart, Charles A E, 1999. "Myths about the Lender of Last Resort," International Finance, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 2(3), pages 339-360, November.
    5. Cordella, Tito & Yeyati, Eduardo Levy, 2003. "Bank bailouts: moral hazard vs. value effect," Journal of Financial Intermediation, Elsevier, vol. 12(4), pages 300-330, October.
    6. Matthieu Bouvard & Pierre Chaigneau & Adolfo De Motta, 2015. "Transparency in the Financial System: Rollover Risk and Crises," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 70(4), pages 1805-1837, August.
    7. Jean-Charles Rochet & Xavier Vives, 2004. "Coordination Failures and the Lender of Last Resort: Was Bagehot Right After All?," Journal of the European Economic Association, MIT Press, vol. 2(6), pages 1116-1147, December.
    8. C.A.E. Goodhart, 1999. "Myths about the Lender of Last Resort," International Finance, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 2(3), pages 339-360, November.
    9. Miguel Faria-e-Castro & Joseba Martinez & Thomas Philippon, 2017. "Runs versus Lemons: Information Disclosure and Fiscal Capacity," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 84(4), pages 1683-1707.
    10. Pritsker, Matthew, 2013. "Knightian uncertainty and interbank lending," Journal of Financial Intermediation, Elsevier, vol. 22(1), pages 85-105.
    11. Allen, Franklin & Carletti, Elena & Goldstein, Itay & Leonello, Agnese, 2018. "Government guarantees and financial stability," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 177(C), pages 518-557.
    12. Dell’Ariccia, Giovanni & Ratnovski, Lev, 2019. "Bailouts and systemic insurance," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 105(C), pages 166-177.
    13. Charles A. E. Goodhart & Haizhou Huang, 1999. "A model of the lender of last resort," Proceedings, Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco.
    14. Mei Li & Frank Milne & Junfeng Qiu, 2016. "Uncertainty in an Interconnected Financial System, Contagion, and Market Freezes," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 48(6), pages 1135-1168, September.
    15. Mei Li & Frank Milne & Junfeng Qiu, 2013. "Uncertainty in an Interconnected Financial System, Contagion," Working Papers 1304, University of Guelph, Department of Economics and Finance.
    16. Moritz Schularick & Alan M. Taylor, 2012. "Credit Booms Gone Bust: Monetary Policy, Leverage Cycles, and Financial Crises, 1870-2008," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 102(2), pages 1029-1061, April.
    17. Marvin Goodfriend & Robert G. King, 1988. "Financial deregulation, monetary policy, and central banking," Economic Review, Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond, vol. 74(May), pages 3-22.
    18. Bengt Holmstrom & Jean Tirole, 1997. "Financial Intermediation, Loanable Funds, and The Real Sector," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 112(3), pages 663-691.
    19. Diego Moreno & Tuomas Takalo, 2016. "Optimal Bank Transparency," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 48(1), pages 203-231, February.
    20. Xavier Freixas & Jean-Charles Rochet, 2008. "Microeconomics of Banking, 2nd Edition," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 2, volume 1, number 0262062704, December.
    21. Mr. Haizhou Huang & Mr. C. A. E. Goodhart, 1999. "A Model of the Lender of Last Resort," IMF Working Papers 1999/039, International Monetary Fund.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Mei Li & Frank Milne & Junfeng Qiu, 2016. "The Signaling Effect And Optimal Lolr Policy," Working Paper 1353, Economics Department, Queen's University.
    2. Rafael Repullo, 2005. "Liquidity, Risk Taking, and the Lender of Last Resort," International Journal of Central Banking, International Journal of Central Banking, vol. 1(2), September.
    3. Jean-Charles Rochet & Xavier Vives, 2004. "Coordination Failures and the Lender of Last Resort: Was Bagehot Right After All?," Journal of the European Economic Association, MIT Press, vol. 2(6), pages 1116-1147, December.
    4. Mei Li & Frank Milne & Junfeng Qiu, 2020. "The LOLR Policy and its Signaling Effect in a Time of Crisis," Journal of Financial Services Research, Springer;Western Finance Association, vol. 57(3), pages 231-252, June.
    5. Makoto (M.) Watanabe & Tarishi Matsuoka, 2019. "Banking Panics and the Lender of Last Resort in a Monetary Economy," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 19-002/V, Tinbergen Institute.
    6. Mark A. Carlson & Burcu Duygan-Bump & William R. Nelson, 2015. "Why Do We Need Both Liquidity Regulations and a Lender of Last Resort? A Perspective from Federal Reserve Lending during the 2007-09 U.S. Financial Crisis," Finance and Economics Discussion Series 2015-11, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.).
    7. White, Lucy & Walther, Ansgar, 2019. "Rules versus Discretion in Bank Resolution," CEPR Discussion Papers 14048, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    8. Toporowski, Jan, 2006. "Open market operations: beyond the new consensus," Bank of Finland Research Discussion Papers 14/2006, Bank of Finland.
    9. Mark A. Carlson & David C. Wheelock, 2012. "The lender of last resort: lessons from the Fed’s first 100 years," Working Papers 2012-056, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis.
    10. Pereira, Ana Elisa, 2021. "Rollover risk and stress test credibility," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 129(C), pages 370-399.
    11. Nikolaou, Kleopatra, 2009. "Liquidity (risk) concepts: definitions and interactions," Working Paper Series 1008, European Central Bank.
    12. Eijffinger, Sylvester & Nijskens, Rob, 2011. "Complementing Bagehot: Illiquidity and insolvency resolution," CEPR Discussion Papers 8603, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    13. Xavier Freixas & Bruno Maria Parigi, 2008. "Lender of Last Resort and Bank Closure Policy," CESifo Working Paper Series 2286, CESifo.
    14. repec:zbw:bofrdp:2006_014 is not listed on IDEAS
    15. Toporowski, Jan, 2006. "Open market operations : beyond the new consensus," Research Discussion Papers 14/2006, Bank of Finland.
    16. Fabio Castiglionesi & Wolf Wagner, 2012. "Turning Bagehot on His Head: Lending at Penalty Rates When Banks Can Become Insolvent," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 44(1), pages 201-219, February.
    17. Ahnert, Toni & Martinez-Miera, David, 2021. "Bank Runs, Bank Competition and Opacity," VfS Annual Conference 2021 (Virtual Conference): Climate Economics 242348, Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association.
    18. Cecile Bastidon & Philippe Gilles & Nicolas Huchet, 2008. "A Selective Bail-Out International Lending of Last Resort Model," Annals of Economics and Finance, Society for AEF, vol. 9(1), pages 103-114, May.
    19. Bastidon, Cécile & Gilles, Philippe & Huchet, Nicolas, 2008. "The international lender of last resort and selective bail-out," Emerging Markets Review, Elsevier, vol. 9(2), pages 144-152, June.
    20. Rob Nijskens & Sylvester Eijffinger, 2011. "The Lender of Last Resort: Liquidity Provision versus the Possibility of Bailout," Chapters, in: Sylvester Eijffinger & Donato Masciandaro (ed.), Handbook of Central Banking, Financial Regulation and Supervision, chapter 4, Edward Elgar Publishing.
    21. Tarishi Matsuoka & Makoto Watanabe, 2023. "A Monetary Equilibrium with the Lender of Last Resort," CESifo Working Paper Series 10439, CESifo.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Central bank screening; Moral hazard; Lender of last resort;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • E58 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Central Banks and Their Policies
    • G20 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - General

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:pal:jbkreg:v:23:y:2022:i:3:d:10.1057_s41261-021-00159-z. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Sonal Shukla or Springer Nature Abstracting and Indexing (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www.palgrave-journals.com/ .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.