Choosing Agents and Monitoring Consumption: A Note on Wealth as a Corruption-Controlling Device
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- RafaelDi Tella & Federico Weinschelbaum, 2008. "Choosing agents and monitoring consumption: a note on wealth as a corruption-controlling device," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 118(532), pages 1552-1571, October.
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CitationsCitations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
- Abhijit Banerjee & Rema Hanna, 2012.
Introductory Chapters,in: Sendhil Mullainathan & Robert Gibbons & John Roberts (ed.), The Handbook of Organizational Economics
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- repec:hrv:faseco:33077931 is not listed on IDEAS
- Simeon Djankov & Rafael La Porta & Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes & Andrei Shleifer, 2010.
"Disclosure by Politicians,"
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- Simona Fabrizi & Steffen Lippert, 2012. "Corruption and the Public Display of Wealth," Working Papers 1202, University of Otago, Department of Economics, revised Jun 2012.
More about this item
- D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
- K42 - Law and Economics - - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior - - - Illegal Behavior and the Enforcement of Law
NEP fieldsThis paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2007-06-18 (All new papers)
- NEP-LAW-2007-06-18 (Law & Economics)
- NEP-REG-2007-06-18 (Regulation)
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