Wages and Sanctions against Hierarchical Corruption
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References listed on IDEAS
- Mookherjee, Dilip & Png, I P L, 1995. "Corruptible Law Enforcers: How Should They Be Compensated?," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 105(428), pages 145-159, January.
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- Basu, Kaushik & Bhattacharya, Sudipto & Mishra, Ajit, 1992. "Notes on bribery and the control of corruption," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 48(3), pages 349-359, August.
- Gary S. Becker & George J. Stigler, 1974. "Law Enforcement, Malfeasance, and Compensation of Enforcers," The Journal of Legal Studies, University of Chicago Press, vol. 3(1), pages 1-18, January.
- Nadeem Ul Haque & Ratna Sahay, 1996. "Do Government Wage Cuts Close Budget Deficits? Costs of Corruption," IMF Staff Papers, Palgrave Macmillan, vol. 43(4), pages 754-778, December.
- Rose-Ackerman, Susan, 1975. "The economics of corruption," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 4(2), pages 187-203, February.
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More about this item
KeywordsGovernmental corruption; tax evasion; coalition; game theory; behavioral of economic agents; wages and penalties in public sector;
- C02 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - General - - - Mathematical Economics
- C61 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Mathematical Methods; Programming Models; Mathematical and Simulation Modeling - - - Optimization Techniques; Programming Models; Dynamic Analysis
- C7 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory
- D73 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Bureaucracy; Administrative Processes in Public Organizations; Corruption
- H1 - Public Economics - - Structure and Scope of Government
- H26 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Tax Evasion and Avoidance
- H3 - Public Economics - - Fiscal Policies and Behavior of Economic Agents
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